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Autori u radu polaze od razumijevanja ljudskog dostojanstva kako ga predstavlja Drugi vatikanski koncil u dvama dokumentima: Pastoralnoj konstituciji Gaudium et spes o Crkvi u suvremenom svijetu i Deklaraciji Dignitatis humanae o slobodi vjerovanja. Suvremeno doba pokazuje duboku krizu razumijevanja ljudske osobe, iz koje se javljaju i brojne povrede ljudskog dostojanstva. Izazovi i poteškoće uzrokovani antropocentrizmom suvremene kulture izgubili su dimenziju transcendentnosti ljudske osobe. Koncilski nauk o ljudskom dostojanstvu pokazuje da je nužno i potrebno čovjeka-osobu razumijevati u odnosu na Boga na čiju je sliku stvoren i na sliku Isusa Krista – savršenog čovjeka koji je utjelovljenjem čovjeka uzdignuo na veoma visoko dostojanstvo, čime je ljudsko dostojanstvo ozdravljeno od zatvorenosti i grijeha. Suvremena kriza ljudskog dostojanstva u svjetlu kulturalnih dinamika pokazuje radikalnu dramu odbacivanja Boga, s jedne strane, i gaženja ljudskog dostojanstva, s druge strane. Bog kao izvor i počelo svega života apsolutni je izvor i jamac ljudskog dostojanstva. U svjetlu teološkog i antropološkog razumijevanja ljudskog dostojanstva potrebno je poći od cjelovitog razumijevanja ljudske osobe upravo onako kako nam pokazuje koncilski nauk o čovjeku. Čovjek je središte i vrhunac Božjeg djela stvaranja i kao takav nositelj oznake slike Božje (usp. Post 1, 26-27), te je pozvan na istinski život koji mu dolazi iz vrela kršćanske Objave., The authors of this paper depart from the conciliatory understanding of human dignity as presented by the Second Vatican Council in two documents, in the pastoral constitution of the Gaudium et Spes on the Church in the contemporary world and the Dignitatis Humanae Declaration on freedom of belief. Today’s contemporary crisis shows a deep crisis of understanding of human person from whom the violation of human dignity results. Challenges and difficulties caused by the anthropocentrism of modern culture have lost the dimension of human transcendence. The Council’s science of human dignity shows that it is necessary and necessary to understand a person in relation to God whose image created man and to the image of Jesus Christ – a perfect man who, by incarnation of man, elevated himself to a very high dignity, thereby healing human dignity from sin. The contemporary crisis of human dignity in the light of cultural dynamics shows the radical drama of rejecting God on the one hand and trampling human dignity on the other. As a source and the beginning of all life, God is an absolute source and guarantor of human dignity. In the light of theological and anthropological understanding of human dignity, it is necessary to start from the complete understanding of human person just as the Council’s science about man shows us. Man is the centre and peak of God’s work of creation and as such bears the mark of the image of God (cf. Post 1, 26-27), and is called to a true life that comes to him from the hot Christian revelation.

During the Hellenistic period the value of philosophical systems was to be judged by a meta-philosophical criterion, i.e., by their ability to lead practitioners towards the pursuit of good or happiness, albeit treating pain and sorrow, since all human beings are supposed to be able to reach the state of happiness via their own efforts. By emphasizing the role of thoughts or judgments, Stoics placed cognition in the intermediate phase between an event and the reaction that somebody has due to the event, rendering it both the cause and the cure of emotional disorders. This viewpoint is also fundamental in modern cognitive psychotherapy, although the parallelism goes beyond theory to the practical character in both approaches. Rational and non-rational aspects of human psychology cannot be isolated from each other, allowing thus adults to actively engage in their moral development by altering their beliefs. In this frame, cognitive distancing, the practice of awareness, attention to the present moment, and the Socratic dialogue become valuable tools in structuring emotional self-regulation.

L’opération qui définit une puissance est, pour Platon comme pour Aristote, son acte ou sa fin. Platon soutient qu’une puissance ne possède qu’une seule opération propre (conception monovalente de la puissance). Si Aristote souscrit à cette thèse, en y ajoutant quelques précisions destinées à permettre de bien définir les puissances, il semble compliquer la question en introduisant la notion de puissance des contraires qu’il élabore au chapitre 2 du livre Θ de la Métaphysique. Cependant la puissance des contraires ne doit être définie elle-même qu’en fonction de ce qui est son objet en soi, et non par accident ; en outre, on se demandera s’il est certain que la notion de puissance « accompagnée de raison », qui est au fondement de la puissance des contraires, permette vraiment à Aristote de dépasser la conception monovalente de la puissance : le logos montre-t-il bien à lui seul sa privation ? According to Plato and Aristotle, what defines a capacity (dynamis) is its goal or its activity. But Plato argues that a capacity, even if one can use it for another purpose, has only one characteristic operation (« one capacity-one function » thesis). To a certain extent, Aristotle agrees with him ; in the Topics or in the De Cælo, he just makes some elements more precise in order to help to formulate correct definitions of the capacities. Obviously, the notion of « capacity of contraries » (Metaphysics Θ, 2), which is proper to Aristotle, makes the point much more intricate. Notwithstanding, even this capacity must be defined by reference to its proper goal, and not according to the privation, which is only its object by accident. But one must ask if the notion of capacity « with reason » (meta logou), which is what makes possible the capacity of contraries, really allows Aristotle to go beyond the « one capacity-one function » thesis. Can the logos really « show » by itself its own privation, as Aristotle in Θ, 2 maintains it does ? If it is not the logos that shows it, but the rational soul by its reasoning, the contrary does not belong to the capacity itself, as it is also the case in Plato.

U onim granama filozofije koje se uobičava nazvati teorijskima – poput ontologije, logike i filozofije uma – postoji zagonetna navika da se njihovi opći pojmovi ne smatraju bitno aficirani društvenim zbivanjima. Za pojmove poput bitka, mudrosti, razuma i uma često se smatra da imaju svoju tvrdu jezgru koju ne mogu promijeniti efemernosti historije. S jedne strane, ovaj rad nudi prikaz povijesno-filozofijskog razvoja pojma uma u njegovom odnosu prema pojmu razuma, te spram fluktuirajuće društvene i povijesne dinamike društva, s druge strane. Na primjeru djela Theodora Adorna, Maxa Horkheimera, Herberta Marcusea i Györgya Lukácsa rad pokazuje kako um ima bitno socijalnu funkciju čija je zanemarenost u jednoj od najvažnijih epoha europske povijesti – prosvjetiteljstvu – odlučujuće utjecala na prelazak emancipatornog ideala umske spoznaje u apsolutizaciju formalističkog i instrumentalnog mišljenja. Konačno, rad u svom posljednjem dijelu nudi ogled o pojmovima društvenosti i revolucije te odnosu koji um ima spram njih. In those areas of philosophy which are often called theoretical – such as ontology, logic and the philosphy of mind – there exists a puzzling habit of viewing their general concepts as essentially divorced from social events. Concepts such as being, wisdom, reason and mind are thought to have a hard inner core which is unable to be altered by the ephemeral goings-on of history. This paper aims to showcase the historico-philosophical development of the concept of “mind“ in its relation to reason on the one hand and the fluctuating social and historical dynamics on the other. Using the works of Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and György Lukács as its primary references the paper attempts to illustrate the substantially social function of the mind whose neglect in one of the most crucial epochs of European history – that of the Enlightenment – resulted in the transformation of an emancipatory ideal into the absolutization of formal and instrumental thinking. Lastly, in its final part the paper aims to discuss the relationship of the mind to revolution and human socialit

Objektivnost je ena od temeljnih načel vsakega pravnega sistema in to še toliko bolj pride do izraza v vsakem konkretnem primeru pred sodiščem. V svojem magistrskem delu pa se osredotočim na nasprotje te zahteve in se sprašujem, ali so čustva v sodni dvorani popolnoma prepovedana in ali vedno vodijo v pristransko sprejeto sodnikovo odločitev. S pomočjo teoretične podlage ugotavljam, da čustva niso vedno nekaj slabega. Biti sodnik namreč pomeni biti čustven, zato se v nalogi sprašujem, koliko se tega sodniki zavedajo in kako to vpliva na sprejemanje odločitev. Osvetlim vprašanje, ali je vpliv čustev nujno škodljiv in ko ugotovim, da odgovor ni pritrdilen, obravnavam merila in pogoje tistih čustev, ki so med sojenjem zaželena. To storim v želji prikazati razmejitev med primeri škodljive in neškodljive čustvenosti. Izvor take razmejitve najdem v vrednotah, s katerimi je prav tako potrebno biti previden, saj so razumljene relativno in jih je mogoče različno interpretirati. Gre namreč za kolizijo vrednot, ki podpirajo sodnikovo posamično odločitev in vrednot, na katerih bazira pravni sistem. Objectivity is one of the basic principles of any legal system, and this is all the more apparent when it comes to each specific case before the court. However, my master’s thesis considers the opposing view, and explores whether emotions should be completely forbidden in the courtroom, and whether they always lead to biased decisions by the judge. Using a theoretical basis, I have found that emotions are not always a bad thing. Being a judge means being emotional, so in my thesis I ask to what extent judges are aware of this and how it affects their decision-making. After examining the question of whether the influence of emotions is necessarily harmful, my answer is not always affirmative, and therefore I address the criteria and conditions of those emotions that are desirable during a trial. I do this in an attempt to show the demarcation between cases of harmful and harmless emotionality. The origin of such a demarcation can be located in values, which also need to be treated with caution, since they are understood in relative terms and are open to interpretation. This is a case of a conflict between the values that support the judge's individual decision, and the values on which the legal system is based.

This article proposes a new way of approaching the roots of secularism and its outcome that is secularization. The fact that this phenomenon arises precisely in a Christian world, which ultimately leads to a complete emancipation of that what is worldly toward religion, profanum toward sacrum, is astonishing. The process of European secularism has its beginning in the 11th century, when the so-called dispute about reason was initiated resulting, in the next epochs of human history, in an intensifying departure from transcendence in favour of a secular interpretation of reality. What ensued is a fading away of the classical understanding of truth as a “compatibility of entities with intellect” (adaequatio rei et intellectus), that is compatibility of understanding and reality, replacing understanding with one’s own crafting of reality, making of a new society. An examination of the history of the European secularization can contribute to a rise of a new humanism, which rests upon reasonableness that originates at the deepest basis of the Logos.

Class participation is an important aspect of student learning. Classroom time is a golden opportunity for students to speak up and learn to express their ideas however, the vast majority of students struggle and are reluctant to participate which is linked to a variety of factors. This study was conducted among college students, to identify the effects of students’ self-related and external factors on their participation, whether there is a difference between the level of participation and the factors impacting it, among students of different universities. Our study demonstrated that, among all students, 66% are participating. The level of preparation is positively correlated with the frequency of participation as 87.5% of students who are fully prepared before class session participate, while only 54% of those who are not prepared are participating. Students whom their colleges evaluate them based on their class participation are more likely to participate than those students whom their colleges don’t (92% vs. 60.7%). The most common factor affecting student class participation is level of preparation before lectures followed by approach of college for their evaluation. The highest level of participation is among students of HMU followed by students of Tishk International University, and the lowest level of involvement is at Salahadin University.

Tanabe Hajime développa sa philosophie dans la perspective d’une « ontologie sociale » à travers la « logique de l’espèce » et la « logique de l’Amour ». La première, développée de 1934 à 1941, vise la rationalisation de la société japonaise en temps de guerre, la seconde le salut de la société japonaise après la Seconde Guerre mondiale dans le cadre d’une philosophie de la religion. Le but de cet article est de mettre au jour le développement de la logique de l’espèce vers la logique de l’Amour et de présenter l’histoire de l’ontologie sociale tanabéenne dans le cadre de la « métanoétique ». Tanabe Hajime’s Social Ontology: From the “Logic of Species” to the “Logic of Love” Tanabe Hajime developed his philosophy with a view to building a “social ontology” through his “Logic of Species” and his “Logic of Love.” The former, developed from 1934 to 1941, seeks the rationalization of the Japanese society in war times, while the latter seeks the salvation of the Japanese society after World War II in the framework of a philosophy of religion. This article aims to shed light on how the Logic of Species developed into a Logic of Love and, in so doing, to present the history of Tanabe’s social ontology in the framework of his “metanoetics.”

Purpose: This study explores the experiences of Indonesian students studying while working at Taiwanese public universities. Design/methodology/approach: Through a phenomenological research approach that utilizes face-to-face interview techniques, the personal experiences of 15 Indonesian students were recorded. As a student who conducts lecture activities while working, apart from having assignments from the place of study, students also have to face problems at work. Findings: The findings from this study indicate that the main reasons from within and from outside students in carrying out learning and work activities are financial problems. Furthermore, when students devote less time to work, this causes students to divert their attention a little from the main task of learning. Research, Practical & Social implications: From these study and work activities, students get a positive impact in the form of experience and a negative impact in the form of fatigue and problems with their time.

This reporthighlights the essential link between obsessive-compulsive symptoms (OCS) and brain damage due to the accumulation of non-transferrin bound iron (NTBI), the pathomechanism of H63D syndrome type-1 in the substantia nigra and basal ganglia.The role of NTBI in neurodegenerative diseases cannot be underestimated and holds the potential for entirely new therapeutics, particularly drugs that protect the brain from NTBI and the oxidative microinflammations responsible for it.

This essay aims to reflect some points considered relevant to the understanding of human “rationality”. Technologies of modernity were produced from rationality, which infiltrated the social core as something that, until then, signaled “progress”. But, the technological conquests in the accelerated march to the progress of science also produced serious consequences that turned against the man himself, since he starts to be subjugated, controlled and dominated by his own creations. The text brings as a study a type of contemporary domination over man: deadly production about the strategy applied in health policy during the pandemic phase of Covid-19, of deciding the life and death of some. The conclusion reached is that the population is dominated by technological sophistication, and when it came to managing rational measures against Covid-19, they were adopted unevenly, disfavoring socioeconomically vulnerable groups, without taking into account the specific needs of this population. There was a lack of assistance to this most vulnerable population with basic services, as well as the lack of production and dissemination of data regarding this neglect, which only contributed even more to accentuate racial inequalities in the country, it is certainly the strategy to be fulfilled the application of death to these bodies. The essay was developed with a view supported by theories of philosophy and social sciences to try to understand and reflect on the project of human rationality, as well as using the survey of texts published in scientific journals and news, predominantly of a qualitative nature, to based on the Covid-19 pandemic scenario.

While perhaps the most recognizable hallmark of David Hume's moral philosophy is his commitment to an anti-rationalist theory of ethics, I argue that Hume came to reject this position found the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) in his later Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). In the Treatise, Hume endorses the view that reason is wholly inactive and cannot be the source of our sense of morals. According to the Treatise, our human reasoning does not give rise to the feelings of pleasure that we associate with an action being right. Instead, the determination we make that an action is right arises from feelings of approval that are rooted solely in natural sympathy and fellow-feeling, and these feelings never arise from reason. Yet, I argue that in the Second Enquiry, Hume abandons these anti-rationalist commitments and allows rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that ultimately approve our actions. In this paper, I argue for two claims about the role of reason in Hume's moral philosophy. First, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume is committed to a strong form of anti-rationalism where reason has no role in the process in which we approve/disapprove actions that are right or wrong. Second, I argue Hume moves away from these strong anti-rationalist commitments in the Treatise to a version of his moral theory where reason plays a role in making determinations of morality by allowing rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that approve actions. Finally, I argue that Hume makes these changes in the Second Enquiry to rule out an egoistic interpretation of his theory, and by accepting a rationalistic sentimentalism, Hume can defend his moral theory from an egoistic interpretation and prevent his system from collapsing into egoism. Master of Arts In the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), the Scottish philosopher David Hume argued for a moral theory where the rightness or wrongness of any action could be determined by our feelings of pleasure or pain that we feel when we have an idea of that action. While contemporary historians of philosophy agree that in the earlier Treatise version of his theory Hume did not allow these feelings associated with moral rightness to arise from reason, I argue that Hume fundamentally changed his theory in the later Second Enquiry to do just that. In particular, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume did not believe that our feelings about rightness or wrongness could arise from rational judgments. Nevertheless, in the Second Enquiry, Hume changed is theory to allow rational judgments about what is useful to give rise to those moral feelings. I then conclude that Hume made these changes to his theory to prevent his moral philosophy from reducing to a theory where only those actions that are in my self-interest could be considered morally right.

Resumen En este artículo se sostiene la siguiente hipótesis: si una hipótesis tiene valor epistémico para Hume, este valor tiene que provenir de la intuición. Para ello se consideran las tres posibles fuentes de conocimiento en su pensamiento: la demos tración, la experiencia y la intuición. Considerando que Hume presenta su doctrina de la creencia como una hipótesis, se argumenta que el valor epistémico de las hipótesis no puede provenir de la demostración ni de la experiencia y, por tanto, o las hipótesis carecen de valor epistémico o su valor epistémico proviene de la intuición. Para sostener la hipótesis propuesta se ofrece un análisis de la evidencia textual sobre la hipótesis y la intuición a la luz de la literatura disponible sobre el tema. Abstract This paper supports the following hypothesis: if a hypothesis has epistemic value for Hume, this value has to derive from intuition. I consider the three possible sources of knowledge in Hume’s thinking: de- monstration, experience and intuition. Then, considering that Hume presents his doctrine of belief as a hypothesis, I argue that the epistemic value of hypotheses cannot derive from demonstration nor experience, therefore, either the hypotheses lack epistemic value or their epistemic value derives from intuition. To support the proposed hypothesis I offer an analysis of textual evidence related to hypothesis and intuition in the light of the available literature on the subject.

Many of today’s problems revolve around distance and proximity. Progres­ sives argue that a universalist, inclusive ethics requires us to bridge distan­ ces in identity, space, and time. Conservatives object that such bridging is psychologically unrealistic: people of flesh and blood can only care about whom/what is close­by. Evolutionary and psychological research seems to corroborate this sobering view. Many researchers confirm that our intuitions (‘System 1’) are groupish and short­sighted, and largely deaf to the appeal of rational universalism (‘System 2’).But not all agree. We distinguish four ‘evo­progressive’ attempts to reconcile evolution and psychology with a universalist, inclusive ethics. Singer and Pinker (1), Buchanan and Powell (2), and Sunstein (3) contend that a reason­ based, inclusive ethics is psychologically feasible, but that such an ethics has to be thin, solely focusing on rights and no­harm. By contrast, Haidt (4) argues that an inclusive ethics should be ‘broad’, also encompassing moral domains like sacrality, loyalty and authority. This implies for him that it cannot be reason­based.We argue that a broad form of inclusive ethics can and should be reason­ based, but that this requires a rethinking of ‘reason’. We show that the evo­progressives’ conviction that a rational ethics is by definition thin, results from their theoreticistic conception of reason. But reason can also have more mimetic­embodied or mythical­narrative forms. These do allow or a broad, rational, inclusive ethics that can motivate real people to include stakeholders that are distant in identity, place, and time.

In the last decades, there has been a far-reaching debate about whether reason is a natural power of the human animal or a socio-historical achievement. This paper brings out and criticizes two paradigmatic views of reason entangled in that dilemma: the substantive view which construes reason as a primitive power possessing the basic forms of intelligibility; and the derivative view which traces back reason to non-rational, natural-historic processes. I approach the issue by discussing how Aristotle addresses the underlying predicament in Metaphysics Theta. The predicament persuades us to overdetermine or underdetermine our natural potentiality for reason because it ignores what I call Aristotle's main insight: the understanding from which rational capacities are exercised is acquired by undertaking appropriate activities. The measure of rational capacities is neither merely naturally determined nor merely socio-historically inherited but relies on the engagement with the things falling under the purview of the pertaining activities. We must recover this Aristotelian insight, I argue, to avoid succumbing to either the substantive or the derivative view of reason.

Scholars have widely discussed the paradigm of integration of Islam and science. Still, a model of integration of Islam and science that uses the reasoning of Martabat Tujuh [seven grades] has not been found. Therefore, this study sought to investigate the manuscripts of Shaykh Abdussamad al-Palimbani’s Martabat Tujuh in the integration of Islam and science. This study used a descriptive qualitative approach, and data collection techniques were documentation and interviews. This study found two spiritual reasons in the manuscript of Shaykh Abdussamad al-Palimbani’s Martabat Tujuh: tanazzul [move down] deductive reasoning and taraqqi [move up] inductive reasoning.Contribution: The article contributed to developing the integration of Islam and science in Indonesia. The manuscripts of Martabat Tujuh [seven grades] by Shaykh Abdussamad al-Palimbani offer the circular motion of Martabat Tujuh as a model for integrating knowledge. The circular motion model of Martabat Tujuh is expected to be used as a theoretical basis for applying knowledge integration at various Islamic universities in Indonesia.

A partir das obras “Fenomenologia da percepção e o “O olho e o espírito” de Merleau - Ponty, vamos tentar, num exercício de abstração teórica, mostrar que o “Ser” o “Mundo” e o “Ser-no-Mundo” da(pela)Criança, mais do que um olhar pelo “olho da racionalidade técnica e científica”, deve, num primeiro momento, ser olhado pela sensibilidade, pela percepção, pela intencionalidade fenomenológica. Esse olhar tem no corpo os eu campo de ação e interpretação. Neste sentido, a intenção deste artigo é propor uma reflexão teórica sobre as dimensões que envolvem o “ver fenomenológico/pré-reflexivo”, que é anterior ao “ver racional/reflexivo”, e as possíveis consequências no ato pedagógico e didático no campo da Educação Física nas primeiras idades. A metodologia utilizada recorreu na análise de referências teóricas de um autor em particular (Merleau-Ponty) e a partir daí se propõe fazer um (outro) exercício teórico, reflexivo e especulativo no campo da Educação Infantil, em particular no que toca ao corpo e ao movimento humano. Consideramos: 1. Quanto mais rico for o estímulo fenomenológico assente na sensibilidade, percepção, intuição, imaginação, subjetividade; quanto mais rico for o estímulo pré-reflexivo (este cimento), mais rico será depois o estímulo racional de que tanto a modernidade e a pós-modernidade “gosta”. Há linguagens que vêm antes da linguagem racional; 2. A educação nas primeiras idades deverá ser uma educação para ensinar a viver com curiosidade, com alegria, com sentimento e não para adorar, produzir, cumprir…um currículo demasiado racional e ideológico; 3. A investigação/ciência nas primeiras idades não deve ficar apenas ancorada na ciência exata. As primeiras idades precisam das ciências humanas – mais ampla e mais precisa no dizer do homem. Razão, ordem, objetividade, mas também emoção, afeto, sensibilidade, subjetividade, intersubjetividade. Os professores são/deverão ser especialistas em humanidades., From the works “Phenomenology of perception and “The eye and the spirit” by Merleau - Ponty, wewill try, in an exercise of theoretical abstraction, to show that the “Being” the “World” and the “Being-in-the-World” of (by) the Child, more than a look through the “eye of technical and scientific rationality”, it must, inafirst moment, be looked at by sensitivity, by perception, by phenomenological intentionality. This lookhasitsfield of action and interpretation in the body. In this sense, the intention of this article is to propose a theoretical reflection on the dimensions that involve the “phenomenological/pre-reflective view”, which is prior tothe“rational/reflective view”, and the possible consequences in the pedagogical and didactic act in the fieldofPhysical Education in early ages. The methodology used resorted to the analysis of theoretical references ofaparticular author (Merleau-Ponty) and from there it is proposed to carry out (another) theoretical, reflectiveandspeculative exercise in the field of Early Childhood Education, in particular with regard to the bodyandtohuman movement. We consider: 1. The richer the phenomenological stimulus based on sensitivity, perception, intuition, imagination, subjectivity; the richer the pre-reflective stimulus (this cement), the richer thelaterrational stimulus that both modernity and postmodernity “like”. There are languages that come beforerational language; 2. Education in the early ages should be an education to teach how to live with curiosity, withjoy, with feeling and not to adore, produce, fulfill…an overly rational and ideological curriculum; 3. Research/science in the early ages should not be based solely on exact science. The first ages need the humansciences – broader and more precise in the words of man. Reason, order, objectivity, but also emotion, affection, sensitivity, subjectivity, intersubjectivity. Teachers are/should be specialists in the humanities.

This paper aims to propose an analysis of fifteen pieces created by the Argentine writer Adolfo Bioy Casares (1914-1999) based on a postulate pronounced in 1976 by the Mexican critic Bernardo Ruiz. This exercise of reflection allows us to confront the narrated self of La invención de Morel (1940) and Historias fantásticas (1972) in a centrifugal and centripetal movement that questions both the forces of reason and the demands of destiny. As main conclusions, we can highlight that, although the subject of the narrative is capable of confronting and questioning the meanings proposed by these two instances —reason and destiny—, a perpetual restructuring of that environment is constantly required to redefine, again and again, certain parameters of fantastic literature. Este trabajo se propone analizar un corpus de quince piezas del escritor argentino Adolfo Bioy Casares (1914-1999) a partir de un postulado pronunciado en 1976 por el crítico mexicano Bernardo Ruiz. Este ejercicio de reflexión nos permite confrontar al yo narrado de La invención de Morel (1940) y de las Historias fantásticas (1972) en un movimiento centrífugo y centrípeto que cuestiona a la vez las fuerzas de la razón y las interrogantes del destino. Como conclusiones principales podemos destacar que, si bien el sujeto de la narración es capaz de enfrentarse y de cuestionar las significaciones propuestas por estas dos instancias —razón y destino—, una reestructuración perpetua de ese entorno se requiere constantemente para redefinir una y otra vez algunos parámetros de la literatura fantástica.

The spiritual harmony of the medieval East and West, as a special necessity, created such personalities who were able to unite several continents at once. For example, the great Arab-Spanish philosopher Ibn Rushd is not only a great philosopher but also a bridge connecting Africa and Asia, Asia and Europe, and Christianity and Islam. Moreover, Europe rediscovered itself thanks to Ibn Rushd. Having translated the works of the great Greek philosophers from Arabic into Spanish, he introduced the European peoples to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the founders of Greek culture. And in Averroism, for the first time, embers of knowledge and reason were revealed. This scientific thinking led to the emergence of such great intellectuals as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Ibn Rushd is the last major representative of the Eastern school of peripateticism associated with the term “philosophy” in the medieval Muslim world. This article highlights the different attitudes of later philosophers to Ibn Rushd's views that religion and philosophy are parallel to each other and that they are the result of the same phenomena with logical views that do not contradict each other. The theoretical and ideological successors of Ibn Rushd's concept of “Two Truths” are presented on the basis of these conclusions. Also, after Ibn Rushd, issues of concern to both philosophers and theologians, who expressed different opinions about the harmony of religion and philosophy, were presented and compared. Even if the ideas of the philosophers of the Middle Ages and the modern period do not correspond exactly with the views of Ibn Rushd, they have a special place in the history of philosophy in relation to faith and reason, and can serve to define the position of people in this regard.

Рассмотрены вопросы по психолого-педагогическим мотивам настроений современных подростков и профилактическим действиям, направленным на безопасное обучение в образовательных учреждениях и предупреждению «скулшутинга» среди лиц, не достигших совершеннолетия., The issues of psychological and pedagogical motives of the moods of modern adolescents and preventive actions aimed at safe education in educational institutions and the prevention of «schoolshooting» among persons under the age of majority are considered.

YÖK TEZ NO: 10355312 Posthumanism is a theory that has been put forward as a reaction to the failing aspects of humanism. It is basically a response to the alleged shortcomings of the humanist thought. Critical posthumanism focuses on the critical discourses rather than technological aspects of posthumanism. The theory is anti-anthropocentric, and is against speciesism. It criticizes the humanist ideology by rejecting the notion of the human as the focal point in Western thought and practices. It rejects the humanist idea that language and reason are human-specific characteristics, and it asserts that these two characteristics are utilized in order for the human to dominate the nonhuman. In this context, this thesis analyzes Gulliver’s Travels from the perspective of the posthumanist theory, and aims to exhibit how the work presages posthumanism as early as in the eighteenth-century by deconstructing and defamilarizing human bodies and reason.

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İbnü’l-Hümam’a Göre Hüsün-Kubuh Meselesi adlı çalışmamızda İslâm düşünce tarihinde farklı disiplinler tarafından ele alınan ve ahlâkî yargıları ifade eden “hüsün-kubuh” kavramları noktasında, 9. Hicrî asırda yaşamış, kelam, fıkıh, hadis ve diğer ilimlerde değerli eserlerin sahibi olan, geliştirmiş olduğu kelâmî yöntemler ile gerek yaşadığı devir ve gerekse sonraki dönemlerin Müslüman düşüncesi üzerinde etkili olan İbnü’l-Hümam’ın düşüncelerini, klasik kelâm düşüncesindeki görüşlerle arasındaki farklılık ve benzerlikleri tespit etmeye çalıştık. Tezimiz giriş ve iki ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde, hüsn ve kubh kavramlarından yola çıkarak meselenin genel bir tasvirini çizmeye, hüsün-kubuh meselesinin tarihçesini ele alarak meselenin kökenini anlamaya ve kelamda hangi noktalarda tartışma konusu olduğunu ele almaya çalıştık. Mu‘tezile, Eş‘arî ve Mâtürîdî kelâm ekollerinin meseleye dair yaklaşımları, ayrışma noktaları ve kendi yorumlarını desteklemek için sunmuş oldukları argümanların incelemesini yaptık. İkinci bölümde ise, hüsün ve kubuhun kaynağı, hüsün-kubuh ile ilgili olabileceğini düşündüğümüz ta’dil-tecvir, hidâyet-dalâlet konuları ve İbnü’l-Hümam’ın mesele hakkındaki görüşlerini etkileyen faktörlerden akıl-nakil, irade-fiil, salah-aslah, ecel ve teklif anlayışı üzerinde durarak müellifimizin görüşlerini ortaya koyduk. Tezimizi sonuç kısmında İbnü’l-Hümam’ın Mu’tezilî ve Eş’arî bilginlerin aksine aklı ve nakli buluşturan mutedil bir yol izlediği şeklinde bir değerlendirme yaparak sonlandırdık., In our study titled " The Problem of Husn-Qubh According to İbn al-Hümam", the concepts of "husn-qubh", which are discussed by different disciplines in the history of Islamic thought and express moral judgments, we tried to determine the thoughts, differences and similarities between Ibn al-Humam's views in classical kalam thought who lived in the 9th Hijri century, owner of valuable works in kalam, fiqh, hadith and other sciences, with the theological methods he developed, who were influential on the Muslim thought of both the period he lived and the following periods. Our thesis consists of an introduction and two main chapters. In the first chapter, we tried to draw a general description of the issue based on the concepts of husn and qubh, to understand the origin of the issue by considering the history of the issue of husn-kubuh, and to discuss at what points it is a matter of discussion in kalam. We examined the approaches of Mu'tazila, Ash'ari and Maturidi theological schools on the issue, their divergence points and the arguments they presented to support their own interpretations. In the second chapter, the source of husn and qubh, the subjects of ta'dil-tacwir, guidance distraction, which we think may be related to husn-qubh, we presented the author's views by emphasizing the understanding of reason-transmission, will-action, righteousness-aslah, death and proposal, which are among the factors affecting Ibn al-Humam's views on the issue. In the conclusion of our thesis, we concluded by making an assessment that Ibn al-Humam, unlike Mu'tazilite and Ash'ari scholars, followed a moderate path that brought together reason and transmission.

The following reflection focuses on the reading and interpretation of the moral booklet entitled Regra da Vida Virtuosa, by São Martinho de Dume. In this sense, we present the four cardinal virtues as a moral reflection, since it is about giving advice that aims at a concern about practical action, we point out, even though São Martinho, in the 6th century, marked the beginning of Portuguese culture.

Рассмотрены основные угрозы современному пониманию гуманизма и разумности, формирующиеся при переходе из информационного общества в общество социальных платформ. Показана объективная технологическая обусловленность перерождения капитализма в новую форму социализма. Обоснована ключевая роль российского общества при осуществлении этого перехода., The main threats to the modern understanding of humanism and reasonableness, formed during the transition from information society to society of social platforms, are considered. The objective technological conditioning of the rebirth of capitalism into a new form of socialism is shown. The key role of Russian society in the implementation of this transition is justified.

Bihbehânî döneminde akıl delili hakkında yapılan değerlendirmeleri konu edindiğimiz bu çalışmada söz konusu dönemde akıl delilinin temellendirilmesi, mahiyeti ve muhtevasındaki dönüşümler, bu delilebağlı olarak kullanılan aklî ilkelerin tahlil edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Sağlıklı bir değerlendirme yapılabilmesi amacıyla öncelikle Bihbehânî’nin (v. 1205/1791) hayatı ve ilmî şahsiyetinin yanı sıra bu dönem öncesinde Ca‘feriyye mezhebinde akıl delili etrafında yapılan değerlendirmelere yer verilmiştir.Bu kapsamda akıl delilinden dördüncü delil olarak bahseden ilk fakihin İbn İdrîs (v. 598/1202) olduğu; eserinde bu delile sıkça atıfta bulunduğu; daha sonraki süreçte Muhakkık el-Hillî (v. 676/1277) ve Şehîd-i Evvel’in (v. 786/1384) akıl delilinin kısımlarına değindikleri ve hüküm istinbatında kullanılanbazı ilke ve yöntemleri bu delilin altında mütalaa ettikleri; Fâzıl et-Tûnî’nin (v. 1071/1660) de geniş bir şekilde aklî delilleri usul eserinde ele alan ilk usulcü olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Çalışmamızın ana konusu olarak belirlediğimiz Bihbehânî döneminde akıl delili konusunda ulaştığımız sonuçlar kısaca şöyledir: Akıl delili Ca‘ferî usulünde ilk defa bu dönemin usulcülerinden Mirzâ el-Kummî (v. 1231/1815) tarafından tarif edilmiştir. Bu dönemin hemen bütün usulcüleri akıl delilini, hüsün ve kubhun aklîliği temelinde ele almışlar ve aklın hüsün ve kubuh önermeleri vasıtasıyla şer‘î hükme ulaşabileceğini teorik zeminde savunmuşlardır. Bu tezlerini, mülâzemet adını verdikleri ve aklın ulaştığı hükmün aynı zamanda Şâri‘in de hükmü olduğu teziyle desteklemeye çalışmışlardır. İncelediğimiz dönemde kesin hükme ulaşılamadığında uygulanması gereken birtakım ilkeler de akıl delili kapsamında ele alınmıştır. İstishâb, berâet-i asliyye ve ibâha-i asliyye bu dönemdeki usulcülerin en fazla üzerinde durduğu ilkelerdir. Daha sonra bu ilkeler “usûl-i ameliyye” adıyla terimleşecektir. In this study, in which I have subjected evaluations on the role of reason in the Ja’fari methodology of the Behbāhānī period, I aimed to identify the evidence of reason, its nature and the transformations in its content, and to evaluate the rational principles used in this evidence in the period. In order to be able to right evaluation, primarily together with the life of Behbāhānī (d. 1205/1791) and his scholarly character, prior to this period, evaluations through proof of reason in the Ja’fari sect have been put forward. In this context it is ascertained that Ibn Idrīs (d. 598/1202) was the first jurist who talked about reason as the fourth evidence; in the following period Muhaqqiq al-Hillī (d. 676/1277) and Shahīd alAwwal (d. 786/1384) dealt with the parts of rational evidence and under this evidence, they considered some principles and methods which used in the determination of judgment; Fāzel at-Tūnî (d. 1071/1660) was the first methodologist who widely considered evidences of reason in his methodology book. As the main subject of our work about the evidence of reason in Behbāhānī’s period the conclusions we reached briefly such as: The evidence of reason was defined for the first time in the Ja'farī methodology by Mirzā al-Qummī (d. 1231/1815), one of the methodologists of this period. Almost all the jurists of this period dealt with the evidence of reason on the basis of the rationality of good and evil (husn and qubh) and argued on the theoretical grounds that the intellect can reach a sharī'ah ruling through the propositions of good and evil. They tried to support this thesis with the thesis so-called “requirement/mulazamāt” and the judgment reached by the intellect is also the judgment of the shāri'ah. In the period we have analyzed if it cannot be reached absolute judgment some principles which need to be applied were also dealt with within the scope of the evidence of reason. In this period what methodologists mostly emphasized the principles were istishāb, berāat al-asliyya and ibāha al-asliyya. After that those principles would be gained terminological meaning under name “al-usul al amaliyya.

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Immanuel Kant argues that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good. This paper argues that this claim is valuable as a conceptual connection between aesthetics and morality due to its ability to account for our intuitions while also not falling into the various conceptual issues into which other ways of connecting the two subjects fall. In the first chapter, the paper argues that four central characteristics of beauty which Kant argues for can be grounded with minimal relation to Kant's overall system. In the second chapter, the paper expands upon the sparse discussion Kant gives of symbolism, for the neglected purpose of having a clearer sense of the original claim Kant makes. In the course of this chapter, the largely undetermined Kantian category of 'ideas of reason' is retooled with respect to the possibility of having notions that require a sense of agency in others and an aside on aesthetic ideas and their connection to art and symbolism is considered. In the third chapter, the paper gives a brief exploration of certain core characteristics of morality before arguing first that the beautiful is a symbol of the morally good and second that the beautiful is (in a strong sense) the primary symbol of the morally good. In the course of this argument, the paper considers the possibility of the sublime (as posited by Paul Guyer) and aesthetic ideas being alternative symbols of the morally good, but finds that each has a different relationship to the morally good. The third chapter ends with some thoughts about the implications of the beautiful being the symbol of the morally good for moral education, and these considerations carry over into the conclusion. The paper concludes with some comparisons between the proposed symbolic relationship between beauty and morality and other possible ways of connecting the two, as well as a final discussion about the value of a sense of the beautiful for our moral lives.Also included are two appendices. The first discusses beauty with an eye towards Kant's systematic philosophy, while the second considers a possible radical implication of the paper's newly refined notion of ideas of reason and a certain quality of beauty --- subjective universality --- for the foundations of Kant's moral theory.

El ser humano siempre busca explicarse lo que existe y acontece a su alrededor e, igualmente, siempre aspira a determinar lo que es moralmente bueno. Ello genera en él la necesidad de encontrar certeza en el conocimiento que adquiere en esa búsqueda y objetividad en esa determinación práctico-moral. Una vez que lo sobrenatural o divino le resultan fundamento insatisfactorio, solo le queda apelar a su razón como último recurso, pero ¿qué hace que la razón se constituya en ese fundamento último?, ¿hasta dónde efectivamente la razón es capaz de satisfacer esa búsqueda de objetividad o certeza?, ¿a qué responde la distinción entre razón teórica y razón práctica?, ¿cuándo y por qué se dice que algo es racional o razonable?, ¿qué asemeja, diferencia y determina los alcances y límites de la racionalidad y la razonabilidad? Son interrogantes que se busca responder en este trabajo siguiendo una metodología que pretende guiar de manera intuitiva el propio razonamiento del lector. The human being always seeks to explain what exists and happens around him, likewise, he always aspires to determine the morally good. This generates in him the need to find certainty in the knowledge that acquire in that search and objectivity in that practical-moral determination. Once the supernatural and the divine results unsatisfactory foundations for him, he can only appeal to his reason as the last resource, but what make the reason be constituted in that ultimate foundation? To what extend can effectively the reason satisfy that search of objectivity or certainty? What does the distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason answer to? When and why is something said to be rational or reasonable? What resembles, differentiates and determines the scope and limits of rationality and reasonableness? These are questions that are sought to be answered in this work following a methodology that aims to intuitively guide the reader’s own reasoning.

Scholars have widely discussed the paradigm of integration of Islam and science. Still, a model of integration of Islam and science that uses the reasoning of Martabat Tujuh [seven grades] has not been found. Therefore, this study sought to investigate the manuscripts of Shaykh Abdussamad al-Palimbani's Martabat Tujuh in the integration of Islam and science. This study used a descriptive qualitative approach, and data collection techniques were documentation and interviews. This study found two spiritual reasons in the manuscript of Shaykh Abdussamad al-Palimbani's Martabat Tujuh: tanazzul [move down] deductive reasoning and taraqqi [move up] inductive reasoning. CONTRIBUTION: The article contributed to developing the integration of Islam and science in Indonesia. The manuscripts of Martabat Tujuh [seven grades] by Shaykh Abdussamad al-Palimbani offer the circular motion of Martabat Tujuh as a model for integrating knowledge. The circular motion model of Martabat Tujuh is expected to be used as a theoretical basis for applying knowledge integration at various Islamic universities in Indonesia.

Lugavî kullanımda bir şeye benzeme çabası ve sürecini ifade eden teşebbüh, insanın bireysel ve toplumsal düzeyde eğilim gösterdiği bir varlığa; felsefî literatürde ise Tanrıya benzeme arzusunu belirtir. İslam felsefesinde, felsefenin geleneksel tanımlarından birinde geçen ve insanın gücü oranında Tanrı'nın fiillerine benzeme çabası'nı yansıtan önemli bir kavram olarak ortaya çıkar. İbn Sînâ'da Teşebbüh Kavramı adlı bu çalışma, teşebbüh'ü arka planı, kavramsal çerçevesi ve içeriğiyle ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Arka planda kavramın etimolojik yapısı, mahiyeti, temel ilkeler ile ontolojik ve kozmolojik bağlam ele alınmaktadır. Kavramsal çerçevede ğanî, melîk, cûd, fakr, istikmâl, nefs, akıl, şevk, aşk, hareket, muharrik, gaye, mebde ve meâd kavramları, teşebbüh'ü anlamada sağladıkları çeşitli açılarla işlenmektedir. İbn Sînâ düşüncesindeki muhtevası itibariyle ise kavram üç farklı boyutta ortaya konmaya çalışılmaktadır. İlki cismani (biyo-fizyolojik) boyutta besin ve beslenme düzeyinde gerçekleşen teşebbüh'ü ifade eder. Bu boyut, bitki ve hayvanda (hars ve nesl) yetkinlik ve istikrarı sağlamak amacıyla besinin, beslediği cismin doğasına benzetilip dönüştürülmesiyle çözülüp gidenin yerine yenisini ikame etme olgusuna dayanır. İkincisi; insanın nâtık nefsinin aklileşme süreciyle ilgili olan aklî teşebbüh'tür. Bu aşama, kavramın esas çerçevesi olup felsefenin geleneksel tanımlarından birinin ifade ettiği insanın tanrıya benzeme sürecini belirtir. Felsefeyi uzak gayesi yönünden tarif eden bu tanımdaki teşebbüh, Platon'dan felsefî düşüncenin İslam dünyasına intikaline kadar geçen uzun dönemde insanın entelektüel-etik gelişimini ifade edegelmiştir. Üçüncüsü de semavî cisimlerin sürekli dairevî hareketini sağlayan bir faktör olarak semavî nefslerin ayrık akıllara benzeme eylemidir. Bu üç boyutun ortak gayesi, her boyuttaki ilgili varlığın selâmet ve bekâsıdır. Son olarak tezi tamamlayıcı ve oluşan istifhamları yanıtlayıcı bir nitelikte olmak üzere teşebbüh-lezzet ve teşebbüh-mahiyet ilişkisine yer verilmiştir. While tashabbuh, which expresses the process of resembling something in the lexicon, reflects the desire to resemble an entity to which a person tends at the individual and social level; In philosophical literature, it refers to the effort to resemble God. It emerges as an important concept in Islamic Philosophy, which is included in one of the traditional definitions of philosophy and reflects the effort to resemble God's actions in proportion to man's power. This study, titled The Concept of Tashabbuh in Avicenna, tries to reveal the background, conceptual framework and content of tashabbuh in Avicenna's thought. In the background, the etymological structure, nature, basic principles and ontological and cosmological context of the concept are discussed. In the conceptual framework, concepts such as soul, mind, love, action and purpose are handled from various angles that they provide in understanding tashabbuh. In terms of its content in Avicenna's thought, the concept is tried to be put forward in three different dimensions. The first one expresses the attempt that takes place at the level of food and nutrition in the bodily (bio-physiological) dimension. This dimension is based on the fact of replacing the dissolved one by transforming the food into the nature of the body it feeds, in order to ensure competence and stability in plants and animals. Latter; It is rational tashabbuh, which is related to the rationalization process of the human soul. This stage is the main framework of the concept and indicates the process of human being like a god, which is expressed by one of the traditional definitions of philosophy. In this definition, which describes philosophy in terms of its distant purpose, tashabbuh has expressed the intellectual-ethical development of man in the long period from Plato to the transfer of philosophical thought to the Islamic world. The third one is the act of resembling the celestial souls to discrete minds as a factor that ensures the continuous circular motion of the celestial bodies. The common goal of tashabbuh, which takes place in these three different dimensions, is the peace and survivability of the related being in every dimension. Finally, to complement the thesis, the relationship of tashabbuh-taste and tashabbuh-nature is given.

The current health status of the general public can substantially benefit from a healthy diet. Using a personalized approach to initiate healthy dietary behavior seems to be a promising strategy, as individuals differ in terms of health status, subsequent dietary needs, and their desired behavior change support. However, providing personalized advice to a wide audience over a long period is very labor-intensive. This bottleneck can possibly be overcome by digitalizing the process of creating and providing personalized advice. An increasing number of personalized advice systems for different purposes is becoming available in the market, ranging from systems providing advice about just a single parameter to very complex systems that include many variables characterizing each individual situation. Scientific background is often lacking in these systems. In designing a personalized nutrition advice system, many design questions need to be answered, ranging from the required input parameters and accurate measurement methods (sense), type of modeling techniques to be used (reason), and modality in which the personalized advice is provided (act). We have addressed these topics in this viewpoint paper, and we have demonstrated the feasibility of setting up an infrastructure for providing personalized dietary advice based on the experience of 2 practical applications in a real-life setting.

This article argues that Kaminski’s concept of philosophy meets the requirements for being a Christian philosophy as articulated by John Paul II. In the encyclical letter Fides et Ratio, John Paul II affirmed the possibility, existence, meaning, and need for a Christian philosophy. He distinguished three stances of philosophy concerning the Christian faith. First, philosophy should be completely independent of the Biblical Revelation but implicitly open to the supernatural. A second stance adopted by philosophy is often designated as Christian philosophy. Third, philosophy presents another stance that is closely related to theology. Kamiński constructed an understanding of philosophy that is original, universal, and autonomous. Such a notion of philosophy (and its methodology) was based on the classical theory of being, which fulfils the demand for the autonomy of philosophy through its relationship with faith. Kamiński’s doctrinal standpoints in philosophy are rational, objective, and universal. According to him, philosophy is also compatible with the Christian faith. In this sense, one can speak of his philosophy as a Christian philosophy. --------------- Received: 22/04/2021. Reviewed: 06/09/2021. Accepted: 23/10/2021.

Âşık Paşa, Garib-nâme‘de şehir gibi olan insan vücudunun yöneticisinin akıl olduğunu belirtmektedir. Ona göre, bu şehirde sekiz kapı bulunmakta ve o, bu kapıların akıl sayesinde ideal işlevlerini yerine getirebileceklerini ifade etmektedir. Akıl, her kapının ideal işlevini yerine getirmesini sağlayan ve insandaki düzeni tesis edebilen yetidir. Bu çalışma ise Garib-nâme’de insan vücudunun bir şehire benzetildiği ve bu şehirin yöneticisinin akıl olduğuna ilişkin kısmın felsefi açıdan değerlendirilmesini ve bu düşünceye kaynaklık eden düşünceleri ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bunu yaparken de gerek evrensel felsefedeki gerekse Türk felsefesindeki konuyla ilgili benzeşen düşüncelerden yararlanılacaktır. Böylece insanın vücut şehrinde yer alan kapıların varlık, bilgi ve değerler açısından ne anlam ifade ettiği ve aklın bu konudaki işlevi gün yüzüne çıkarılacaktır., Âşık Pasha states in the Garib-nâme that human body viewed as a city (the city of body) has Reason as its ruler. For him, there are eight doors in this city and he says that these doors can serve their ideal functions by means of reason. Reason is the faculty that enables any door to serve its ideal function, a faculty that can establish the required order in a human being. This study aims to give a philosophical evaluation of the relevant part of Garib-nâme where the human body is likened to a city with reason as its ruler, and to unveil the provenances of this thought. This will be done with the aid of some analogous thoughts on the same subject from both universal and Turkish philosophical literature. It will thus be brought to light what these doors in the human’s “city of body” are to mean from the perspective of being, knowledge and values, and what function is to be served by reason in this setting.

This essay brings postal history and postcolonial theory into an encounter, considering the history of the Post Office in South Africa, stretching from its emergence under Dutch rule at the Cape. Turning to postal history reread under the sway of postcolonial theory may enable a rethinking of apartheid, what apartheid carried from the systems of government and administration that preceded it, and though this remains at the edge of the essay, largely undeveloped but certainly there what, in turn, of apartheid has been carried into post-apartheid South Africa. The essay forms part of an ongoing project that considers the relation between social institutions and subjectivity.

Muhammad Abed Al-Jabri (1935-2010) is one of the significant philosophical and scientific figures who left their strong and broad imprint in various fields of contemporary Arab culture. Al-Jabri created his philosophy towards various aspects of Arab history. This included philosophy, theology, politics, ethics, and other aspects. His philosophical works culminated in his famous book on "The Arab Mind," in which he dealt with "The Structure of the Arab Mind" and supplemented it with his famous book - "Critique of the Arab Mind." The article's primary task is limited to addressing the intellectual path of Al-Jabri by tracing what he wrote and the content of these works. Besides, in this article, what Al-Jabri wrote is arranged in chronological order in order to clarify the features of the general and particular course of his philosophical creativity. It is a necessary task for scientific research in his philosophy. It provides the reader and researcher with the complete basic set of his books.

Among the most peculiar traits of Kant’s critical philosophy is the contention that, while we can know our moral maxims and can thus reflect on our actions from a moral point of view, we cannot really know whether in a given situation our actions are actually motivated by those maxims. This means that, although we have a firm sense of our moral duties, we can never be certain whether some particular action of ours is done from duty or simply in accordance with it. This view is voiced in several of Kant’s writings. Most prominent is its appearance in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, but we also find it in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and in The Metaphysics of Morals, and it is even present in smaller writings such as “On a Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy” or “On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but is of no use in practice”. It is against this background that I revisit Kant’s remarks on the lack of self-knowledge regarding the motives of our proper actions. I suggest a reading of Kant’s views on this issue in the light of a tradition reaching back to Plato, in which man’s (moral) self-relation is shaped in an irreducible way by both self-consciousness and self-ignorance.

In the second half of the eleventh century, monastic culture found the theoretical support for the project of ecclesiastical reform in which it participates in the ratio fidei, in the enhancement of the sciences and in the refinement of argumentative techniques, with which to adapt the behaviour of Christians to the Truth of the Mysteries and to the reality of the sacraments. The reform project that supports the need of the institutional Church to restore the powers and moral credit lost in the last two centuries conflicts in several places with a more radical and universalistic conception of the Church as the people of God. And the stakes of this conflict must be sought not in a theoretical aspect but in the defence or downsizing of the Church’s magisterial function. In this context, Pier Damiani’s participation in the debate on Judaism manifests at least three general aspects, in addition to a constructive attitude on the relationship with cultural otherness. In the first place he confirms the attitude of monastic culture to the theological use of the arts; secondly, he explicitly identifies an ancillary role for reason with respect to faith; finally, he implicitly clarifies the ideological nature of the internal oppositions of the reformer movement.

“Philosophical, Theological and Affective Reasons for Vocation”: The article deals with the problem of justifying a vocation. The arguments used to justify the existence of God were used for this. It has been shown that for the existence of a vocation one can present natural (philosophical), supernatural (theological) and affective (experimental) reasons. The supernatural reasons are necessary and sufficient for understanding the vocation; natural and affective reasons are helpful, but they do not ultimately determine the existence of a vocation.

Like philosophy of natural sciences, philosophy of social sciences begins with questioning of the meaning of science and the criterion of scientific explanation. Although in the former, just similar to the latter, the epistemological abstractive discussions are divergent, the practice of science is not. But in the sphere of social sciences the practice also lakes convergence and the community of scientists does not share the same scientific criteria of scientificity. The problematic of this article is that, in the realm of social sciences, what exactly scientists are pursuing and searching for when they are producing science. Usually, there are, at least, three responses to that question: cause, reason, and meaning. Describing, analyzing, and criticizing those epistemological positions, each of which is a well-known school in philosophy of social sciences, I will try to demonstrate that none of these criteria is able to pretend an absolute dominance in scientific explanation. However, this does not mean that they have all the same value and weight. The hypothesis is that, in theoretical analysis as well as in scientific practice, causal explanation, investigation of reason, and inquiry concerning meaning, are respectively more important and functional in scientific explanation in the area of social sciences. In many works of the most prominent social scientists, we can find some sort of combination of these different points of view that reflect this hierarchy of criteria.

Hannah Arendt’s claim that thinking is the last defense against the moral outrages of criminal political regimes sets the problematic of good and evil in relief. Human freedom, Paul Ricœur reminds us, is responsible for evil. The avowal of the evil of violence is thus the condition of our consciousness of the freedom to act anew.Aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics highlights our capacity to respond to exigencies in apposite ways. Exemplary representations of the good, the right, and the justexpress a desire for being. Eros is accordingly the law of every work, word, deed, or act that answers to a difficulty, challenge, or crisis. Bound to living experiences, thought attains its true height through interrogating, demystifying, and vacating frozen norms, standards, and mores. Judgment actualizes thought’s liberating effects in answer to the demands of the situations in which we find ourselves.

In literature Peter Damian has been often presented as an anti-dialectic thinker. Over time this statement has been subjected to careful historiographical revision. Today it is commonly accepted that the distinction between dialectic and anti-dialectic thinkers only partially describes the state of philosophy in the eleventh century. In fact, the relation between faith and reason is complex in Damian. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider this relation in the light of the significance Damian attributes to the notion of contradiction. Reason must respect the principle of non-contradiction not only when it describes the natural world, but also when it explores the dimension of the mysteries of faith.

Introduction: formation of legal norms and their transformation, creation of the legal system, specialization and sectoral differentiation of legal norms indicate constant qualitative, intellectually grounded development of law. In the article the author analyzes basic concepts of understanding law (natural, historical, psychological, normative, Marxist, of anthropological approach) in order to determine the essence (nature) of law. The study of essential foundations of law is a fundamental task not only for the theory of law and state, but also for other sciences (philosophy of law, sociology of law, history of legal doctrines). The purpose of the work is to study an intellectual nature of law on the basis of analysis of various concepts of understanding law. Methods: the author’s key conclusions and findings are based on the use of materialistic dialectics in comparative legal, sociological and historical methods. Discussions: it is noteworthy that in each concept of understanding law, intelligence (mind, reason, common sense) is considered by scientists as an integral element of the process of legal education. Conclusions: taking into account the stated above, the author proposes to consider law within the framework of an anthropological approach as a result of human intellectual activity not only by its origin, but also by its essential basis, its nature. The author puts forward the thesis that law is the result of intelligence-based thinking activity of a person and suggests the author’s definition of law.

Diện tích rừng trồng các loài Keo ở Việt Nam chiếm tỷ trọng rất lớn với khoảng hơn 02 triệu ha. Những năm gần đây rừng trồng Keo lai đã bị những thiệt hại rất lớn do bệnh chết héo gây ra. Với tỷ lệ và mức độ bị bệnh trên rừng trồng ngày càng nghiêm trọng, nên rất cần xác định mức độ gây hại và nguyên nhân gây bệnh để có các giải pháp quản lý hiệu quả và kịp thời. Kết quả điều tra cho thấy Keo lai bị bệnh chết héo có tỷ lệ trung bình dao động 10,8% - 21,9 % , chỉ số bệnh hại trung bình dao động từ 6,4 – 13,1% và chỉ số tổn thất cho thấy mức độ hại của bệnh ở mức hại nhẹ. Từ đặc điểm về triệu chứng, hình thái của nấm được quan sát cho thấy nấm gây bệnh chết héo cây Keo lai xác định là Ceratocystis sp. Loài nấm này gây hại rừng trồng Keo lai với triệu chứng điển hình là trên vỏ của thân hoặc cành cây bị bệnh có những vết loét, gỗ bị thâm đen hoặc xanh đen, có chảy nhựa hoặc sùi bọt vào mùa mưa. Khi cây bị bệnh, tán lá bị héo dần và treo trên cây, sau một thời gian bị chết lá rụng hoàn toàn. Cấu trúc quả thể chứa túi bào tử và bào tử túi có dạng hình cầu hoặc gần cầu, có màu nâu đen đến đen, đường kính phần rộng nhất 145- 280 µm. Cổ nấm màu nâu đen, có chiều dài 250 - 660 µm., {"references":["Anh Tuấn (2022). Giá gỗ keo nguyên liệu ở Đắk Lắk tăng cao. Trang thông tin kinh tế của TTXVN. Truy cập vào ngày 11/10/2022, từ https://bnews.vn/gia-go-keo-nguyen-lieu-o-dak-lak-tang-cao/ 261583.html","Nguyễn Minh Chí và Phạm Quang Thu (2016). \"Bệnh chết héo bạch đàn tại Việt Nam\", Tạp chí Nông nghiệp và Phát triển nông thôn, (6), tr. 119-123.","Nguyễn Minh Chí, Phạm Quang Thu, Phạm Đức Huy & Nguyễn Tuấn Anh (2020). Hiện trạng bệnh chết héo rừng trồng Keo tại Tổng công ty giấy Việt Nam. Tạp chí Khoa học Lâm nghiệp, 2, 91-100.","Cục Bảo vệ Thực vật (2015). Công văn số 2400/BVTV-QLSVGHR ngày 01/12/2015 của về việc báo cáo tình hình một số dịch hại mới nổi và kết quả phòng chống.","Phạm Quang Thu (2016). Kết quả nghiên cứu thành phần sâu, bệnh hại một số loài cây trồng rừng chính tại Việt Nam. Tạp chí Khoa học Lâm nghiệp, 1/2016:4257-4264.","Phạm Quang Thu, Nguyễn Minh Chí và Trần Thị Thanh Tâm (2016). Bệnh chết héo keo lá tràm, keo lai, keo tai tượng tại Việt Nam. Nông nghiệp và phát triển nông thôn, 2:134-140","Phạm Quang Thu, Đặng Nhu Quỳnh và Bernard Dell (2012). Nấm Ceratocystis sp. gây bệnh chết héo các loài Keo (Acacia spp.) cây trồng ở nhiều vùng sinh thái trong cả nước. Tạp chí Bảo vệ thực vật, (5): 24-29.","Bộ Khoa học và Công nghệ (2013). Tiêu chuẩn Quốc gia TCVN 8928:2013, Phòng trừ bệnh hại cây rừng.","Ake, S., Darbon, H., Grillet, L. and Lambert, C. (1992). \"Fimbriatan, a protein from Ceratocystis fimbriata\", Phytochemistry, 31(4), pp. 1199-1202.","Brawner, J., Japarudin, Y., Lapammu, M., Rauf, R., Boden, D., Wingfield, M.J. (2015). \"Evaluating the inheritance of Ceratocystis acaciivora symptom expression in a diverse Acacia mangium breeding population\". Southern Forest, 77(1), pp. 83-90.","Harwood, C.E and Nambiar, E.K.S., (2014). Productivity of acacia and eucalypt plantations in South East Asia. 2. trends and variations, International Forestry Review, Vol.16(2), pp. 249-260.","Harrington, T.C. (2009). \"The genus Ceratocystis. Where does the oak wilt fungus fit?\" In: Billings, R.F. and Appel, D.N. (eds) National Oak Wilt Symposium, The Proceedings of the Second National Oak Wilt Symposium, Texas Forest Service Publication 166, College Station, Texas, pp. 21-35.","Heath, R.N., Meke, G. and Mbaga, A. (2009). Ceratocystis species on Acacia mearnsii and Eucalyptus spp. in eastern and southern Africa including six new species. Fungal Divers 34:41–67","Kile, G.A., (1993). \"Plant diseases caused by species of Ceratocystis sensu stricto and Chalara\", In: Wingfield, M.J., Seifert, K.A., Webber, J.F. (Eds.), Ceratocystis and Ophiostoma: Taxonomy, Ecology and Pathogenicity. The American Phytopathology Society, St. Paul, Minnesota, pp. 173-183.","MARD (2019). Wood processing industry, wood and forest product export in 2018-Successes. Lessons learned. Breakthrough solutions in 2019; Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development: Hanoi, Vietnam, p.10","Tarigan, M., Van Wyk, M., Roux, J., Tjahjono, B. and Wingfield, M.J. (2010). \"Three new Ceratocystis spp. in the Ceratocystis moniliformis complex from wounds on Acacia mangium and A. crassicarpa\", Mycoscience, (51), pp. 53-67.","Tarigan, M., Roux, J., Van Wyk, M., Tjahjono, B. and Wingfield, M.J. (2011a). \"A new wilt and die-back disease of Acacia mangium associated with Ceratocystis manginecans and C. acaciivora sp. nov. in Indonesia\", South African Journal of Botany, 77(2), pp. 292-304.","Tarigan, M., Yuliarto, M., Gafur, A., Wong, C.Y. and Sharma, M. (2016). \"Other Acacia species as a source of resistance to Ceratocystis\", Workshop Ceratocystis in tropical hardwood plantations, February 15-18, 2016, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, pp. 31-32.","Wingfield, M.J., Carolien, D.B., Christa, V. and Brenda, D.W. (1996). \"A New Ceratocystis species defined using morphological and ribosomal DNA sequence comparisons\", Systematic and Applied Microbiology, 19(2), pp. 191202."]}

The paper investigates the training future foreign language teachers as innovative upbringing work managers based on the competence approach, index of satisfaction and professiogram in the context of Ukrainian higher education reforming. The research questions whether future foreign language teachers are satisfied with the upbringing work at pedagogical universities and pragmatically competent in it, and what the reasons of their dissatisfaction are. The authors developed the blocks of indicators that characterize the level of the future teachers training for innovative upbringing activity, including a questionnaire related to determining the level of their satisfaction with the upbringing work. The self-esteem of 148 students (2-3 study years) of the Faculty of Ukrainian and Foreign Philology of Hryhorii Skovoroda University in Pereiaslav showed that the majority of respondents (85%) expressed satisfaction with the upbringing work at the faculty and University; 15% of respondents expressed their indifference and dissatisfaction, giving the thought about the reasons of that, which could be their incompetency in it and not involving in the upbringing activity, the absence of interest and motivation for it (because of old upbringing methods, forms and approaches etc.). On the ground of the results of the research, the authors defined the professiogram of a modern foreign language teacher as a manager of innovative upbringing work, grounding on the key competences required of a European teacher. Moreover 5 main reasons for designing the program of the future foreign language teachers training to innovative upbringing work (based on a competence approach, index of satisfaction and professiogram) were identified as: the necessity of the education quality improving by the way of reforming it;the need of raising the level of students’ satisfaction with educational and upbringing process, and with a future profession in general; the new European demand for teachers in their key competences; the changing role of a teacher into a manager of curricular and extracurricular process at school, according to a new professiogram of a modern foreign language teacher as a manager of innovative upbringing work;the need to transform the upbringing process into the innovative one, according to the modern time period. The research results of this pre experimental stage will allow forming the future teachers’ readiness for an innovative upbringing work., У статті досліджено підготовку майбутніх учителів іноземних мов як керівників інноваційної виховної роботи на основі компетентнісного підходу, індексу задоволеності та професіограми в контексті реформування вищої освіти України. У дослідженні ставиться питання про задоволеність майбутніх учителів іноземної мови виховною роботою в педагогічному закладі вищої освіти та причини їхнього незадоволення. Авторами розроблено блоки показників, що характеризують рівень підготовки майбутніх учителів іноземної мови до інноваційної виховної діяльності, також використано анкету для учасників експерименту щодо визначення рівня їх задоволеності виховною роботою. З огляду на те, що за самооцінкою 148 студентів (2-3 роки навчання) факультету української та іноземної філології Університету Григорія Сковороди в Переяславі, більшість респондентів (85%) висловили задоволення виховною роботою на факультеті та в університеті, лише 15% респондентів висловили свою байдужість і невдоволення, то автори розмірковують про можливі причини, серед негативних може бути їх некомпетентність у цьому та незалучення до виховної діяльності, відсутність інтересу та мотивації до неї (через старі методи, форми виховання і підходи тощо). За результатами дослідження автори визначили професіограму сучасного вчителя іноземної мови як керівника інноваційної виховної роботи, що базується на ключових компетенціях, необхідних європейському вчителю. Крім цього визначено 5 основних причин для розробки програми підготовки майбутнього вчителя іноземної мови до інноваційної виховної роботи (на базі компетентнісного підходу, індексу задоволеності та професіограми), а саме: необхідність підвищення якості освіти шляхом її реформування; необхідність підвищення рівня задоволеності студентів навчальним і виховним процесом, майбутньою професією в цілому; нова європейська вимога щодо ключових компетентностей учителів; зміна ролі вчителя на менеджера навчального та позакласного процесу в школі, відповідно до нової професіограми сучасного вчителя іноземної мови як менеджера інноваційно-виховної роботи; необхідність трансформації виховного процесу в інноваційний, відповідно до сучасного періоду часу. Результати дослідження цього доекспериментального етапу дозволять сформувати готовність майбутніх учителів до інноваційної виховної роботи.

Članek obravnava vprašanje racionalnosti moderne politike. Avtor oponira predstavi o politiki, ki jo bolj kot razum determinirajo strasti. Glavni namen je prikazati razumsko razsežnost političnega, s katero je na pot pospremljena moderna politična znanost. Ker političnost predpostavlja oblastne odnose med vladajočimi in vladanimi, je potrebno razumsko plat politike prikazati z obeh zornih kotov. Medtem ko je Machiavelli v 16. stoletju razumsko plat politike skušal prikazati knezu, se je Hobbes v 17. stoletju v iskanju zrna razuma obrnil k sleherniku. Oba pionirja moderne politične znanosti potrdita, da se v jedru političnosti nahaja razum, ki mora za namene političnega delovanja obvladati strasti. The article considers the question of rationality of modern politics, where the author opposes the image of politics in which the determining factor in politics is passions, not rationality. The main purpose is to show the rational dimension of the political that distinguishes modern political science. Since the political presupposes power relations between governors and the governed, the rational dimension of politics must be shown from both viewpoints. Whereas in the 16th century Machiavelli tried to introduce the rational dimension of politics to the prince, in the 17th century Hobbes attempted to find a grain of rationality in everyman. Both pioneers of modern political science confirm that what lies at the core of the political is rationality, which has to control passions in the sphere of political action.

Purpose. The authors aim to reveal the peculiarity of comprehension of the human phenomenon in the process of referring to the text of "Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime" by the early Immanuel Kant, which is based on the critical rethinking of the Enlightenment position. A prerequisite for its substantial solution is addressing the problem of the place of the "Observations" in the evolution of Kant’s anthropological views. Theoretical basis. Our view of Kant’s legacy is based upon the conceptual positions of phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics. Originality. We have proved that the anthropological interest was inherent in Kant already in the pre-critical stage of his work, as shown by the still underestimated treatise "Observation". The paper give arguments that this text highlights the main topics that will later be the subject of a detailed study of both Kant himself and philosophical anthropology of the 20th century. It is revealed that Kant overcomes the Enlightenment temptation to absolutize the power of human reason and emphasizes its limitations. The specified step is a necessary condition for him to comprehend the important role of the sensual-passionate component of human nature and to recognize the importance of the metaphysical nature of man. Conclusions. For us today, the pre-critical Kant appears as the developer of anthropological teaching, first presented in the treatise "Observations". Already at this stage, Kant demonstrates a holistic vision of human nature. In the process of creative evolution of the thinker, this treatise should be qualified as a kind of sketch of the future concentrated development of human nature, elaborated in the pages of "Anthropology" in 1798. The author gives a key place to the metaphysics of human nature, a vivid illustration of which is, in particular, the last paragraph of "Observations" dedicated to freedom. The conducted analysis provides sufficient grounds for qualifying this text as an outline of the anthropological basis of his doctrine of pure reason, the doctrine of metaphysics as the metaphysics of man, which, in turn, gives us the key to understanding "Anthropology" as his final text., Мета. Автори ставлять за мету виявити своєрідність осмислення феномену людини в процесі звертання до тексту "Спостережень за почуттям прекрасного та піднесеного" раннього Іммануїла Канта, в основі якого лежить критичне переосмисленням позиції просвітників. Умовою її змістовного розв’язання є звернення до проблеми місця "Спостережень" в еволюції антропологічних поглядів Канта. Теоретичний базис. Наш погляд на спадщину Канта базується на концептуальних положеннях феноменології, екзистенціалізму та герменевтики. Наукова новизна. Обґрунтовано, що антропологічний інтерес був притаманний Канту вже на докритичному етапі його творчості, проявом чого є досі недооцінений трактат "Спостереження". Аргументовано, що в цьому тексті виокремлені ті основні теми, які пізніше будуть предметом детального вивчення як самого Канта, так і філософської антропології ХХ ст. Виявлено, що Кант долає спокусу епохи Просвітництва щодо абсолютизації сили людського розуму та наголошує на його обмеженості. Означений крок є для нього необхідною передумовою осмислення важливої ролі чуттєво-пристрасної складової природи людини та визнання важливості метафізичності природи людини. Висновки. Для нас сьогодні докритичний Кант постає як розробник антропологічного вчення, яке вперше репрезентоване в трактаті "Спостереження". Уже на цьому етапі Кант демонструє цілісне бачення природи людини. У процесі творчої еволюції мислителя цей трактат слушно кваліфікувати як свого роду ескіз майбутньої концентрованої розробки природи людини, викладеної на сторінках "Антропології" 1798 року. Ключове місце автор відводить метафізичності природи людини, яскравою ілюстрацією чого є, зокрема, останній параграф "Спостережень", присвячений свободі. Проведений аналіз дає достатні підстави для кваліфікації цього тексту як окреслення антропологічного підґрунтя його вчення про чистий розум, вчення про метафізику як метафізичність людини, що, своєю чергою, дає нам ключ до розуміння "Антропології" як його підсумкового тексту.