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An intuition of ambivalence in cognition is particularly strong for complex decisions, for which the merits and demerits of different options are poorly matched. Yet ambivalence has been relatively underexplored both empirically and theoretically. We examined an experimental paradigm which tasked participants with an ambivalent question, while monitoring attentional dynamics concerning the information relevant to each option in different Areas of Interest (AOIs). We developed two dynamical models for describing eye tracking curves, for each response separately. The models incorporated a drift mechanism towards the various options, as in standard drift diffusion theory. In addition, they included a mechanism for intrinsic oscillation, which competed with the drift process and undermined eventual stabilization of the dynamics. The two models varied in the range of drift processes postulated. Higher support was observed for the simpler model, which only included drifts from an uncertainty state to either of two certainty states. In addition, model parameters could be weakly related to the eventual decision, complementing our knowledge of the way eye tracking structure relates to decision (notably the gaze cascade effect).

This project tests whether participants who exhibit a propensity for a series of cognitive heuristics and biases demonstrated discernible patterns in their willingness to trust healthcare systems

A novel decision bias, called the evaluation bias (EB), was reported by White et al. (2014). In a sequence of two stimuli of opposite affective valence, evaluating the first stimulus leads to a more contrasting evaluation for the second one, compared to when the first stimulus is just observed. The EB is consistent with a long tradition of constructive influences or decision biases in questionnaire judgments. The prediction of the EB was based on the application of a quantum probability model, taking advantage of the unique role of evaluations in quantum probability. In the present work, we develop the quantum model so as to examine whether similar predictions are possible in the context of real questionnaires, where precise control over the relative valence of stimulus pairs is impossible. It is shown that an EB prediction can be extracted and we test this prediction in an organizational opinion survey, administered to a range of organizations across four experiments (total N = 868 and 84 organizations) and with two different languages. In all experiments, there was clear evidence for an EB. We examine the result with the quantum model and Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) belief-adjustment model. Both models can broadly capture the empirical findings and so offer promise for providing a formal understanding of constructive influences.

Binocular rivalry refers to a phenomenon in which the perceived image changes spontaneously over time when the two eyes are presented with different images. The purpose of this study is to test whether the violation of temporal Bell inequality can be experimentally observed in binocular rivalry. If the temporal Bell inequality is violated (under no-signaling in time: NSIT), it implies that the perception of the rival stimuli cannot be assumed to be definite at each point in time (i.e., “realism” in the corresponding mental representations is violated), which is a key indication of non-classical behavior (as in, for example, quantum-like systems). Here, to test the violation of the inequality, we used binocular rivalry and measured both subjective reports and electroencephalogram (EEG). With EEG, we used frequency-tagging technique to track the cortical signal driven by each eye’s stimulus, known as the steady-state visual evoked potential (SSVEP). We present the conceptual and methodological approaches to test the temporal Bell inequality., Quantum Innovation 2021

Introduction The purpose of the present study is to investigate quantum-like properties of mental states in bistable perception. In order to do this, we tested whether the temporal Bell inequality applied to bistable perception experiments[1] can be violated. In the present study, we used visual stimuli [2], where we can continuously and systematically manipulate two types of ambiguities in the perceived rotation of dots. When the rotation angle is large, the stimuli induce bistable percept. When the angle is small, the direction of rotation of the stimuli becomes difficult to judge. We use the stimuli to test if the temporal Bell inequality can be violated, and if so, under what parameter regime, it can be violated. Method Two patterns were presented alternately: a visual stimulus consisting of four disks, and one in which the disks were rotated by a specific angle (5-45 degrees) in each trial [FIG. 1(A)]. When the angle of rotation was close to 45 degrees, stimuli were perceived to rotate in one of the two directions for a while with occasional reversals at random times (i.e., bistable perception). When the angle of rotation was close to 5 degrees, no rotation was perceived beyond the angle of rotation of the stimulus, and left and right rotations were perceived alternately, but the angle of rotation was so small that it was difficult to determine the direction of rotation [FIG. 1(B)]. At two time points after the beep, the participants responded by pressing a button in the direction of rotation that they saw at that time [FIG. 1(C)]. Reference 1H. Atmanspacher, and T. Filk, J. Math. Psychol. 54, 314-321 (2010). 2S. Takei and S. Nishida, J. Vision. 10, 23 (2010). 3M. M. Wilde and A. Mizel, Found. Phys. 42, 256 (2012). Acknowledgement This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI JP20H05711 and MEXT Q-LEAP Grant Number JPMXS0120330644., The 4th international forum on quantum metrology and sensing / Quantum innovation 2021

The complexity picture for dynamical inference and supplementary details for quantum theory.

The impact of sampling on the complexity comparisons.

An argument for how simplified representation spaces can lead to overconfidence.

Two themes have puzzled the research on developmental and learning disorders for decades. First, some of the risk and protective factors behind developmental challenges are suggested to be shared and some to be specific for a given condition. Second, language-based learning difficulties like dyslexia are suggested to result from or correlate with also nonlinguistic aspects of information processing. In the current study, we investigated how adults with developmental dyslexia and ADHD as well as healthy controls cluster across various dimensions designed to tap the prominent nonlinguistic theories of dyslexia. Participants were 18–55-year-old adults with dyslexia (n = 36), ADHD (n = 22), and controls (n = 35). Nonlinguistic theories investigated with experimental designs included temporal processing impairment, abnormal cerebellar functioning, procedural learning difficulties as well as visual processing and attention deficits. Latent profile analysis (LPA) was used to investigate the emerging groups and patterns of results across these experimental designs. LPA suggested three groups: 1) a large group with average performance in the experimental designs, 2) participants predominantly from the clinical groups but with enhanced conditioning learning, and 3) participants predominantly from the dyslexia group with temporal processing as well as visual processing and attention deficits. Despite the presence of these distinct patterns, participants did not cluster very well based on their original status, nor did the LPA groups differ in their dyslexia or ADHD-related neuropsychological profiles. Remarkably, the LPA groups did differ in their intelligence. These results highlight the continuous and overlapping nature of the observed difficulties and support the multiple deficit model of developmental disorders, which suggests shared risk factors for developmental challenges. It also appears that some of the risk factors suggested by the prominent nonlinguistic theories of dyslexia relate to the general level of functioning in tests of intelligence. peerReviewed

Measurement of cognitive bias typically relies on laboratory-based tasks. In order for cognitive bias measures to be useful outside of laboratory settings, a simple measure is required which does not rely on precise measurement tools, for example, precise reaction time measurement (which can be done only with specialized software typically running through either dedicated hardware or specifically configured computers). The Rough Estimation Task is a simple reading task which has been previously shown to be an effective measure of alcohol-related cognitive bias. We conducted an online version of the Rough Estimation Task, so that we could measure cognitive bias away from a laboratory environment. We also measured whether baseline Rough Estimation Task scores could predict future drinking and Rough Estimation Task scores. A sample of undergraduate participants completed the study online. We found that the online Rough Estimation Task was associated with both current and future drinking, as measured in a follow-up online task. The results imply that the online Rough Estimation Task could be used as a simple online measure of cognitive bias for both concurrent and future drinking behavior, and so raises hope for employing this measure outside of laboratory settings and possibly even in clinical applications.

Appendix 1 Neuropsychological assessment battery. List of neuropsychological assessments used in the study. (DOCX 81 kb)

Appendix 2 SLT assessment battery. List of speech and language assessments used in the study. (DOCX 25 kb)

Cromwell's rule (also known as the zero priors paradox) refers to the constraint of classical probability theory that if one assigns a prior probability of 0 or 1 to a hypothesis, then the posterior has to be 0 or 1 as well (this is a straightforward implication of how Bayes's rule works). Relatedly, hypotheses with a very low prior cannot be updated to have a very high posterior without a tremendous amount of new evidence to support them (or to make other possibilities highly improbable). Cromwell's rule appears at odds with our intuition of how humans update probabilities. In this work, we report two simple decision making experiments, which seem to be inconsistent with Cromwell's rule. Quantum probability theory, the rules for how to assign probabilities from the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, provides an alternative framework for probabilistic inference. An advantage of quantum probability theory is that it is not subject to Cromwell's rule and it can accommodate changes from zero or very small priors to significant posteriors. We outline a model of decision making, based on quantum theory, which can accommodate the changes from priors to posteriors, observed in our experiments.

A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction, disjunction, inverse, and conditional fallacies, as well as unpacking effects and partitioning effects. Quantum probability theory is a general and coherent theory based on a set of (von Neumann) axioms which relax some of the constraints underlying classic (Kolmogorov) probability theory. The quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these judgment errors including the representativeness heuristic, the averaging model, and a memory retrieval model for probability judgments. The quantum model also provides ways to extend Bayesian, fuzzy set, and fuzzy trace theories. We conclude that quantum information processing principles provide a viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning., Comment: 49 pages

This paper contributes to quantum-like modeling of decision making (DM) under uncertainty through application of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (in the form of the Robertson inequality). In this paper we apply this instrument to quantify uncertainty in DM performed by quantum-like agents. As an example, we apply the Heisenberg uncertainty principle to the determination of mutual interrelation of uncertainties for “incompatible questions” used to be asked in political opinion pools. We also consider the problem of representation of decision problems, e.g., in the form of questions, by Hermitian operators, commuting and noncommuting, corresponding to compatible and incompatible questions respectively. Our construction unifies the two different situations (compatible versus incompatible mental observables), by means of a single Hilbert space and of a deformation parameter which can be tuned to describe these opposite cases. One of the main foundational consequences of this paper for cognitive psychology is formalization of the mutual uncertainty about incompatible questions with the aid of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle implying the mental state dependence of (in)compatibility of questions.