Search

The NIF Shot Data Systems (SDS) team developed the Target Request Tool (TRT) Web application for facilitating the management of target requests from creation to approval. TRT provides a simple-to-use and user-friendly interface that allows the user to create, edit, submit and withdraw requests. The underlying design uses the latest Web technologies such as Node.js, Express, jQuery and Java-Script. The overall software architecture and functionality will be presented in this paper., Proceedings of the 16th Int. Conf. on Accelerator and Large Experimental Control Systems, ICALEPCS2017, Barcelona, Spain

We show that the static duopoly model in which firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment is often a prisoners’ dilemma game in which a switch from exporting to foreign direct investment reduces profits. By contrast, we show that when the game is repeated there is a range of parameters for which the firms can partially collude by choosing to export rather than invest. In this range, a reduction in export costs may undermine the partial collusion, causing a switch from export to investment.

We show that the static duopoly model in which firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment is often a prisoners' dilemma game in which a switch from exporting to foreign direct investment reduces profits. By contrast, we show that when the game is repeated there is a range of parameters for which the firms can partially collude by choosing to export rather than invest. In this range, a reduction in export costs may undermine the partial collusion, causing a switch from export to investment.

We show that the static duopoly model in which firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment is often a prisoners' dilemma game in which a switch from exporting to foreign direct investment reduces profits. By contrast, we show that when the game is repeated there is a range of parameters for which the firms can partially collude by choosing to export rather than invest. In this range, a reduction in export costs may undermine the partial collusion, causing a switch from export to investment.

We re-examine the economic justification for the regulation of firms' spatial price policies. Existing analysis, by treating market structure as exogenous, loses an important trade-off. Discriminatory pricing is more competitive between incumbents but acts as a strong deterrent against entry. Product variety is determined by the degree of spatial contestability of the market (the ability of entrants to make binding location commitments) and by whether firms can price discriminate. The entry deterring effect of discriminatory pricing is dominant whatever the degree of spatial contestability or the nature of demand but welfare effects depend upon the degree of spatial contestability. The lower the degree of spatial contestability, the more effective is discriminatory pricing at limiting entry and the more likely is it that mill pricing is socially desirable.

The thesis examines three Departments of the British Home Civil Service from 1919 to 1946: the Home Office, the Ministry of Labour and the Treasury Establishment Division. The study investigates the contrasting needs, in establishment terms, of an old "Secretary of State" department the Home Office, performing a largely regulatory role, with a new department the Ministry of Labour performing an administrative role, and the relationship of both over establishment matters with the Treasury. The study assesses the roles of individual Administrative Class civil servants in the three departments from the rank of Principal to Permanent Secretary: with particular reference to the relationships existing between the Permanent Secretaries of the two departments and the Permanent Secretaries of the Treasury and their Controllers of Establishments. This is followed by an assessment of the work of the Treasury Establishment Division during the first 14 years of its existence from 1919 to 1933, comparing the work of the Standing Committee of Establishment Officers with the Home Office and Ministry of Labour reorganisation of their administrative staff during the same period. This is followed by an assessment made from examining the years of growth in the two Departments from 1933 to 1939 and the relationship of the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour with a reorganised Treasury Establishment Division. The study finishes with the examination of the changing needs of the two Departments during the war years from 1939 to 1945: with their extended roles when the Home Office took on administrative as well as regulatory roles in contrast to the Ministry of Labour (and National Service after September 1939) taking on regulatory as well as administrative roles. The role of the Treasury Establishment Division after the retirement of Warren Fisher in 1939 is measured against the impact that wartime staffing needs brought to the Division. The thesis concludes, first, that the restraints of the Treasury Establishment Division on establishment matters did not differ greatly over the claims made by the two Departments, despite their different historical backgrounds in the Home Civil Service, and their contrasting roles. Second, the effect of these restraints would have had a greater, and possibly harmful, impact in 1939 had the Home Office not quickly changed its incestuous establishment policy and adopted the Fisher concept (originally formulated in 1919) for the interchange of Administrative Class civil servants between departments; whilst, in contrast, the Ministry of Labour was able to adapt its pre-war administrative role to meet the requirements of its extended wartime role. Third, that the personality, style and political attitudes of the individual Permanent Secretaries had small effect on the success (or otherwise) of their dealing with the Treasury Establishment Division. This final conclusion is drawn from the effects of Ministerial intervention on establishment matters concerning individual Administrative Class civil servants.

Selenite and selenate at submicrogram levels were added to suspensions of two lake sediments (Buffalo Pound and Katepwa Lakes) from southeastern Saskatchewan, Canada. The sediment from Buffalo Pound Lake rapidly oxidized selenite in an Arrhenius type reaction and followed first order kinetics. The sediment from Katepwa Lake oxidized selenite, but at a much slower rate. The oxidation of selenite is an abiotic process. The sediment from Katepwa Lake also reduced selenate, while Buffalo Pound Lake sediment did not. The reduction of selenate is likely mediated by biotic activity, associated biochemical processes, and/or organic matter.

The relationships that emerge from leadership research should be regarded as diagnostic tools, not precise guidelines. The authors' six propositions are intended to be used as such tools. The propositions are as follows: leadership flexibility is desirable and feasible; the prime variables are job function, organization levels, and operating system characteristics; differences in style derive from cultural factors; differences in modes exist among line-and-staff managers; external forces can modify modes; and institutional effects are not the most important determinants of patterns. The authors do not suggest that these tools will provide precise answers. But the analysis can help managers to define the elements of the problem.

n/a

Customary international law is an enigma. It is produced by the decentralized actions of states, and it generally lacks centralized enforcement mechanisms. Political science realists and some rationalist legal scholars argue that customary international law cannot affect state behavior: that it is “epiphenomenal.” This article develops a model of an n-player prisoner’s dilemma in the customary international law context that shows that it is plausible that states would comply with customary international law under certain circumstances. These circumstances relate to: (i) the relative value of cooperation versus defection, (ii) the number of states effectively involved, (iii) the extent to which increasing the number of states involved increases the value of cooperation or the detriments of defection, including whether the particular issue has characteristics of a commons problem, a public good, or a network, (iv) the information available to the states involved regarding compliance and defection, (v) the relative patience of states in valuing the benefits of long-term cooperation compared to short-term defection, (vi) the expected duration of interaction, (vii) the frequency of interaction, and (viii) whether there are also bilateral relationships or other multilateral relationships between the involved states. One implication of this model is to lend credence to customary international law. From a research standpoint, this model identifies a number of parameters for which data may be developed in order to test the model. From a policy standpoint, this model shows what types of contexts, including malleable institutional features, may affect the ability of states to reach stable and efficient equilibria in their customary international law relations.

Market Structure and Competition Policy applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organisation, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers. --Introduction --George Norman and Jacques-Francois Thisse 1 --1 Competition policy and game-theory: reflections based on the cement industry case Claude d'Aspremont, David Encaoua and Jean-Pierre Ponssard 9 --2 Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in EC competition policy Damien J. Neven 31 --3 A guided tour of the Folk Theorem James W. Friedman 51 --4 Predatory pricing and anti-dumping P.K. Mathew Tharakan 70 --5 Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude? George Norman and Jacques-Franois Thisse 96 --6 Tougher price competition or lower concentration: a trade-off for anti-trust authorities? Claude d'Aspremont and Massimo Motta 125 --7 The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game Jonathan H. Hamilton 143 --8 Product market competition policy and technological performance Stephen Martin 161 --9 On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets Gianni De Fraja 191 --10 Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition: an introduction to repeated-commitment models Jean-Pierre Ponssard 215 --11 Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition Andre de Palma and Robert J. Gary-Bobo 232 --12 How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labour and product markets Xavier Wauthy and Yves Zenou 271 --Index 287