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A proxy war, between a coalition of countries, BLUE and a country, RED, is considered. RED wants to increase the size of the RED territory. BLUE wants to involve more regions in trade and other types of cooperation. GREEN is a small and independent nation that wants to become a member of BLUE. RED attacks GREEN and tries to invade. BLUE decides to give optimal arms support to GREEN. This support can help GREEN in the war against RED and simultaneously reduce the military power of RED, which is valuable to BLUE, also outside this proxy war, since RED may confront BLUE also in other regions. The optimal control problem of dynamic arms support, from the BLUE perspective, is defined in general form. The objective function is a weighted sum of the present value of the free GREEN territory and the present value to BLUE of the net loss of military resources in the RED army. The net loss of RED at a particular point in time is a function of the location of the front line and the size of the mobile GREEN forces behind the RED line. First, it is assumed that the expected net loss is proportional to the force ratio behind the red front line. It is proved that the net loss function is a strictly concave quadratic function of x, the location of the front line. It is also proved that the unique maximum of the net loss function occurs at the same front location, also if the net loss function is proportional to the strength ratio behind the RED lines, raised to any strictly positive exponent. From the BLUE perspective, there is an optimal position of the front. This position is a function of the weights in the objective function and all other parameters. Optimal control theory is used to determine the optimal dynamic BLUE strategy, conditional on a RED strategy, which is observed by BLUE military intelligence. The optimal arms support strategy for BLUE is to initially send a large volume of arms support to GREEN, to rapidly move the front to the optimal position. Then, the support should be almost constant during most of the war, keeping the war front location stationary. In the final part of the conflict, when RED will have almost no military resources left and tries to retire from the GREEN territory, BLUE should strongly increase the arms support and make sure that GREEN rapidly can regain the complete territory and end the war

Resumen. Este artículo analiza las operaciones de las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia en el conflicto fronterizo colombo-peruano entre los años 1932 y 1933, así como el desarrollo de las negociaciones previas y posteriores a la ratificación del Tratado Salomón-Lozano de 1922 entre ambos países. Se hace una revisión documental de noticias de prensa de la época, al tiempo que otras fuentes históricas, para comprobar en qué medida este conflicto determinó las relaciones bilaterales entre los dos países. Los resultados muestran que la estrategia diplomática y militar utilizada por Colombia en el manejo de la resolución del conflicto potenció el desarrollo de las Fuerzas Armadas colombianas y posicionó al país ante la comunidad internacional y la región como una nación fuerte y con buenas relaciones diplomáticas. Abstract. This article analyzes the Colombian Armed Forces’ operations in the 1932-1933 Colombian-Peruvian border conflict and the negotiations before and after the ratification of the Salomón-Lozano Treaty of 1922 between the two countries. To this end, a documentary review of press reports at the time and other historical sources is carried out to verify to what extent this conflict determined the bilateral relations between the two countries. The results show that Colombia’s diplomatic and military strategy in handling the resolution of the conflict enhanced the development of the Colombian Armed Forces, positioning the country before the international community and the region as a strong nation with good diplomatic relations.

In the last thirty years the appreciation of the First World War as ‘the war of coalitions’ has gained widespread recognition, and firmly established itself as one of the most prominent approaches to the evaluation of the military strategy of the First World War. However, due to inaccessibility of the archives and complexity of the language, Russian Empire’s contribution to the Entente strategy has often been overlooked. This thesis attempts to remedy that and evaluates the role that the Russian high command played in developing the coalition strategy of the Entente from August 1914 until February 1917. It argues that after September 1915 Russia became one of the greatest advocates of a unified coalition strategy and was instrumental in the Entente’s agreeing on a plan for a coordinated Allied offensive in 1915 and 1916. The driver for this development was the weakening of Russia’s military power and the political crisis at home brought on by the Great Retreat in summer 1915. The new high command led by General Alekseev was anxious to achieve victory for Russia before it could be engulfed in political unrest. Alekseev also had his own original vision of strategy that involved using the Salonika and Ottoman fronts as launching grounds for a large-scale offensive designed to break the geographical unity of the Central Powers and deprive Germany of material resources of its allies. Although Alekseev’s plans were never fulfilled, their existence proves that the Entente strategists often had a better understanding of coalition warfare and were more flexible in their planning than previously thought. By bringing Russia into the coalition narrative, this thesis questions existing preconceptions about the Entente developed as a result of research focused predominantly on Anglo-French relations and opens a path to a more balanced view of the 1914-1918 conflict.

The Russia-Ukraine war, which began February 24, 2022, is ongoing, with a cost of many thousands of lives, catastrophic property destruction, and displacement of millions. As the international community grapples with nuclear threats and a humanitarian disaster resulting from the war, many small states in the region are struggling to maintain economic stability and military security. Perhaps no small state is more immediately affected than geographically unique Mongolia, situated between world powers Russia and China. This thesis examines how Russia’s war in Ukraine is impacting Mongolia in the economic and military domains. The thesis finds that because Mongolia’s 2011 foreign policy concept and 2015 military strategy remain in place, there is little chance of any change in current military strategy. The economic effects, however, have been pronounced: fuel prices have risen by 68 percent and consumer goods by 15.7 percent. The thesis concludes that Mongolia’s overreliance on Russia leaves it vulnerable to severe economic impacts over which it has little control. The thesis recommends that Mongolia pursue economic self-sufficiency in critical areas such as electrical power and that it assess ways to stabilize its economy in times of regional or international conflict. The thesis also recommends that Mongolia’s military innovate in response to the war and continue to develop its strength. Major, Mongolian Armed Forces Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

O artigo trata das estratégias utilizadas pelos Estados Unidos com o fim de manter e expandir sua hegemonia conquistada no pós-guerra fria. Aborda a ideia de guerra híbrida e discorre acerca do lawfare ou guerra jurídica, práticas estas que imprimem novas feições aos conflitos geopolíticos globais, consistentes em estratégias de intervenção nos Estados soberanos, distintas das utilizadas nos embates bélicos convencionais. A partir desses conceitos, analisa o emprego de tais práticas de guerra no cenário contemporâneo. Destaca-se a América Latina, em países cujas políticas de Estado não se alinhavam aos interesses dos externos. Notadamente o Brasil atuou com protagonismo dos militares, mas também do sistema judiciário, além do alinhamento com políticas neoliberais e subserviente aos Estados Unidos, a militarização da política, movimento essencialmente oposto ao fortalecimento do Estado democrático de direito. O ponto em comum observado no âmbito dessa estratégia de guerra - que se presta a definir o espectro ideológico dos governantes que assumirão o comando de cada Estado alvo, suas estratégias também se orientam para as disputas eleitorais – é o combate à corrupção. Sob tal fundamento, e contando com o aparato do sistema de justiça local, tornam-se inelegíveis lideranças políticas, vilipendiam-se reputações e corrompem-se democracias não consolidadas.

North Nias’ traditional house is the only oval-shaped traditional house in the whole world. The oval floor plan that is not commonly found in other traditional buildings is analyzed based on anthropological (non-physical) and functional (physical) backgrounds of North Nias and other community groups in various regions whose traditional house forms resemble, which aims to compare and find similarities between them. The method used in this research is comparative, which is a type of descriptive research that aims to find a fundamental answer about cause and effect by analyzing the factors that cause a particular phenomenon. It was found that the process of forming an oval floor plan in a traditional house in North Nias was caused by several factors, including the functional aspect of North Nias community requiring a large oval-shaped space to gather among villagers, and also as a war strategy wherein an oval room, it is easier to observe around the building. From the anthropological aspect, the use of oval shape is related to the belief of the North Nias community. The benefit of this research is to add insight and public references about the use of architectural forms that are not commonly applied.

The development of irregular warfare and various phenomena of post-modern warfare increasingly make war strategies develop dynamically and adaptively. Strategy is no longer used as a tool to win wars like in the traditional era but is more directed towards how to maintain space security or security. In addition, threats are also growing rapidly and extraordinary in line with the rapid development of science and technology so that the study of strategy itself must also be adaptive and dynamic. This study uses a qualitative approach by using a literature study. The results of the study prove that to deal with this, the government needs to integrate between actors competing in irregular wars to support national security. The government must also take firm and bold steps to make 'peace' with non-state actors.

Los peruanos celebran el año 1821 por la proclamación de la independencia del Perú, pero no recuerdan que este evento fue consecuencia de un sitio militar de diez meses, impuesto por el Ejército Libertador dirigido por el general José de San Martín. El presente artículo describe ese acontecimiento a través del análisis de cartas, memorias, impresos y actas del cabildo, mostrando el uso del hambre como estrategia militar, así como la experiencia sensorial y emocional que sufrió la población sitiada. Se concluye que Lima experimentó una transición traumática del virreinato a la república sin haberse producido batallas sangrientas entre los ejércitos realista y patriota.

Formal models of war termination have been developed along two major approaches: in one, war is interpreted as a series of battles, where nations exchange denials that aim to destroy enemy forces; in the other, war is illustrated as a process of bargaining with mutual punishments that inflict costs on opponents. By integrating these two approaches, I build a dynamic model of war, where two nations choose between military force and civilian value as the targets of their attacks in every battle. The war proceeds along one of the following three paths in equilibrium. First, either nation immediately gives in to the other’s threat of punishment such as nuclear strikes. Second, both the nations continue to conduct counterforce denial campaigns to weaken each other until either side is fully disarmed (i.e. all-out war). Third, after significant military imbalance is generated by the exchange of denials in an early battle, the winner of the battle switches to a countervalue punishment campaign, to which the loser responds by capitulation (i.e. limited war). My equilibrium analyses suggest that while denials largely determine a war’s outcome, punishments can influence its duration. Unlike existing models, mine illuminates the two-way causal relationship, where past battle outcomes can influence the choice of military strategy, whereas military strategies also shape how the war will further evolve.

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Norway’s main impetus for developing national military satellite-based capability was the 1977 introduction of the EEZ, through which Norway became responsible for vast maritime areas in the High North. These capabilities also underpinned Norway’s intelligence mission that entailed monitoring Russian military activity, especially the Kola Bay-based Russian strategic forces in the vicinity of Norway. Norway developed niche technologies for military use predominantly based on civilian satellites, and ESA became an essential instrument as it enabled Norway to develop indigenous satellite-based services for the Norwegian Armed Forces. Norway in turn used this capability to reinforce its military relations with the United States and key allies within the NATO framework. Following the pivotal military space strategic review in 2014/2015, the Norwegian Armed Forces developed a function-oriented management structure and incorporated space as a new military domain. National security implications of space were finally incorporated into Norwegian space policy, and Norway has since developed a wide range of national space capabilities, all of which support the nation’s defence and security objectives. This thesis examines how Norwegian military space activity fits into the nation’s overall defence and security policy and argues this activity and the associated national capability development has emerged as a strategic asset in Norwegian alliance policy. This activity reflects upon relations between national policymakers and practitioners, and has contributed to obscure the notion of civil-military separation in Norway. The activity also demonstrates the existence of two unofficial space doctrines in Norway. One focuses on intelligence and the other on force enhancement. The 2020 appointment of the Norwegian Intelligence Service as Norway’s military space authority demonstrates the value of space for intelligence activities supersedes other uses of the domain. Lastly, the study has identified a notable discrepancy between Norwegian military space activity and how space is addressed in national military doctrine.

The US military has developed a persistent ‘German problem' due to the outsize influence of legendary strategist John Boyd. In a cautionary tale of how poor military history can lead to real-world ...

Following the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea, Western assessments of Russia’s military capabilities rapidly changed from ‘basket case’ to ‘menace’. In this pendulum swing, some estimat...

The Korean War (1950–1953) was one of the most calamitous and brutal wars in modern history. It was fought by the post-colonial people of the peninsula, and it culminated in the creation of two ideologically opposed states, but the three years’ military clash in East Asia (or the Far East) is often labelled simply as a “Forgotten War” in the West including North America. The ensuing ethnic division has been interpreted through the various geopolitical lenses of military strategy, politics, international relations, and power games. What about the situation of casualties? Which particular nations in the United Nations (UN) dispatched medical aid for the treatment of war victims? How did the Scandinavian allies participate the non-European war? What were their unique characteristics among non-military supporting nations? What legacy they left for the post-war Koreans? This paper explores the military-historical backgrounds by which each of the following Northern European nation, namely, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, decided to send unarmed skilled personnel to aid South Korea. The paper argues the social voluntarism of the neutral group in the critical insight that the field activities of Swedish Seojeon Byungwon, Danish Jutlandia, and Norwegian NORMASH individually promoted the Red Cross spirit of advanced humanitarianism on the top of mandatory duty, in giving special attention on children (orphans), women, civilians, POWs, and medical education, as well as the post-war collaboration for the initial Korean public health system in the 1960s.

The Afghan conflict, which has lasted for more than three decades, at the turn of 2011-2012 went through a new cycle of its evolution. In June 2011, it was announced that the withdrawal from countries of American troops and at the same time - about the start of direct US talks with the Taliban. Observers agreed that the complete conclusion US troops in 2014 will not end conflict, but can contribute to its new round. Few assumed that in the mid-1970s began one of the longest-running and most internationalized modern regional conflicts. By its complexity it is comparable to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East conflict. It is noteworthy that none of external participants in the Afghan situation could not completely turn off, even with the withdrawal of troops, Afghanistan gave rise to and showed the limits for many international endeavors.

Environmental destruction has long been used as a military strategy in times of conflict. A long-term example of environmental destruction in a conflict zone can be found in Dersim/Tunceli province, located in Eastern Turkey. In the last century, at least two military operations negatively impacted Dersim’s population and environment: 1937–38 and 1993–94. Both conflict and environmental destruction in the region continued after the 1990s. Particularly after July 2015, when the brief peace process that began in 2013 ended, conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) resumed and questions arose about the cause of forest fires in Dersim. In this research we investigate whether there is a relationship between conflict and forest fires in Dersim. This is denied by the Turkish state but asserted by many Dersim residents, civil society groups, and political parties. We use a multi-disciplinary approach, combining methods of qualitative analysis of print media (newspapers), social media (Twitter), and local accounts, together with quantitative methods: remote sensing and spatial analysis. Interdisciplinary analysis combining quantitative datasets with in-depth, qualitative data allows a better understanding of the role of conflict in potentially exacerbating the frequency and severity of forest fires. Although we cannot determine the cause of the fires, the results of our statistical analysis suggest a significant relationship between fires and conflict in Dersim, indicating that the incidence of conflicts is generally correlated with the number of fires.

The article examines the ways of creating and developing the technology of cryptographic information protection in the USSR on the eve and during the Second World War and their impact on the command and control system of Workers and Peasants Red Army and Navy. The theory of “deep operation”, in fact — the military strategy of the USSR at that time, was a result of the technical progress of the means of armed struggle, in particular the means of communication. Changes in views on the organization of troops, their operational structure, the spatial and temporal characteristics of operations required fundamental changes in troop command and control and organization interaction of joint groupings. One of the ways to achieve this goal was the automation of information encryption processes. Undoubtedly, the scientific and technological progress affects the forms and methods of warfare. The development of weapons and military equipment, forms and methods of their use requires implementation of the communication and informatization systems, technical intelligence, cryptanalysis. The requirements are examined to be considered for increasing the secrecy and efficiency of command and control of troops within the preparation and during the conduct of operations, including Joint Forces Operations, based on the experience gained by the USSR. Key words: confidentiality, cryptographic protection of information, efficiency, covert command and control of troops, secrecy, encryption machine, encryption authority, encryption equipment.

This article not only describes the culture of intelligence as the way to provide adequate information for decision-making in a State but also analyzes how it should be considered in the processes to generate actions to improve security conditions. In order to operationalize these concepts, the descriptive method was used, to reflect on the importance of intelligence for political leadership and for the formulation of strategies that propitiate an adequate level of security. Within this vision, it is intended to reflect on the need for a global security scope, but without neglecting the intelligence associated with State interest. As an example of the aforementioned, the problem of drug trafficking in two countries of the Andean region, Colombia and Peru, is considered. The importance of an intelligence culture that conceptually considers political orientation but fundamentally guides its actions to support strategies that generate an adequate security scenario at the state and global level is highlighted. En el presente artículo no solo se describe la cultura de inteligencia como la forma de proporcionar información adecuada para la toma de decisiones de un Estado, sino que se expone cómo debe ser considerada en los procesos para generar acciones que permitan mejorar las condiciones de seguridad. Con la finalidad de operacionalizar estos conceptos, se emplea el método descriptivo para evidenciar la importancia de la inteligencia en la conducción política y la formulación de estrategias que permitan disponer de un adecuado nivel de seguridad. Con esta visión, se pretende reflexionar sobre la necesidad de un alcance de seguridad global, pero sin dejar de lado la inteligencia vinculada al interés estatal. Como ejemplo, se considera el problema del narcotráfico en dos países de la región andina: Colombia y Perú. Se destaca la importancia de una cultura de inteligencia que considere conceptualmente la orientación política, pero que oriente su accionar a apoyar estrategias que generen un adecuado escenario de seguridad a escala estatal y global. Abstract This article not only describes the culture of intelligence as the way to provide adequate information for decision-making in a State but also analyzes how it should be considered in the processes to generate actions to improve security conditions. In order to operationalize these concepts, the descriptive method was used, to reflect on the importance of intelligence for political leadership and for the formulation of strategies that propitiate an adequate level of security. Within this vision, it is intended to reflect on the need for a global security scope, but without neglecting the intelligence associated with State interest. As an example of the aforementioned, the problem of drug trafficking in two countries of the Andean region, Colombia and Peru, is considered. The importance of an intelligence culture that conceptually considers political orientation but fundamentally guides its actions to support strategies that generate an adequate security scenario at the state and global level is highlighted.

The project analyses the French defeat in Indochina to illustrate aspects of situational metacogniton, phronesis and strategic foresight. The French Indochina War (1946-1954) provides an exotic milieu to systematically explore strategic failure that resonates today. The study reviews the Indochina War literature across five themes, looking for military insights as metaphors for strategic ecological transformation. It explores the evolution of casualties and limits of conflict modelling. The Indochina War was an unnecessary and catastrophic one for France, Vietnam and, subsequently, the Untied States. Notwithstanding some heroic military actions, the dissonance between the dirty reality of ‘la sale guerre’ and the antiquated ideals for which it was ostensibly pursued, undermined the French position. In short the war merely delayed and bloodied an inevitable post-colonial regime shift. Systemic dysfunction and leadership failure has parallels for ecological transformation. Today, diminished situational cognition, ignorance or limited foresight inevitably entails widespread and unnecessary suffering.

The COVID 19 crises illustrates systemic economic fragility and the need for strategic reflection on resilience. The French Indochina War (1946-1954) provides a useful milieu to systematically explore lessons in strategic failure that resonate today to redress fiscal imbalance and accelerate ecological transformation towards more sustainable economic system. The study reviews the Indochina War literature across five themes, looking for military insights as metaphors for strategic ecological transformation.

The recent international politics remains very unstable and after switching again world order structure and percussion occurred in stability of the ongoing international security system. As it is perceived main missions of the international security as structural element of the global politics remain in avoiding wars and military conflicts and perceives of examining power capability. The definition “International Security” is being affiliated with the UN Charter[1]. It means that the great powers are at time being determined the transitional international order relicts are tailored with namely power theory articulation, including the Russian Federation that is considering as one of the global power in the order formulation[2]. Hence, the article focuses on “Russia’s new power” capability reflection at a time when it was still conventional to speak of a more general “transition to democracy”. This focuses of this new and very different course is the “Putinist” system that came into existence in the early years of the new century, amid a widespread acceptance that early and more optimistic forecasts of Russia’s political direction had been mistaken or at least premature. Therefore the Kremlin is seeking to promote its national interests and foreign policy goals exercises for itself new type of power capability – “smart power”.

Purpose: Exploration of military towns as one of the components of military strategy of the cities of Omsk and Novo-Nikolaevsk in the 19–20th centuries.Design/methodology/approach: Archival and literary sources, buildings of the military department, quite autonomous in Siberian cities corresponding to all functional purposes.Research findings: The influence of the militarystrategic plans of the Russian Empire on the spatial development of military-strategic aspect of construction of barrack complexes in urban development.Practical implications: The research results can be applied in further study of military towns in Omsk and Novo-Nikolayevsk Originality/ value: Research results show the history of construction and architecture of military buildings of the 41st, 43rd, 44th Siberian Rifle Regiments, which were part of the Omsk Military District (Siberian Military District from 1899 to 1906) and stationed in Omsk and Novo-Nikolaevsk.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century there is a widespread belief in the unique character of this moment of history, but military forces still remain a fundamental tool at the disposal of the authorities of the state which wants to play a significant role. Primary role of the armed forces of a sovereign state is still to provide military security of the state and its defence. The capacity of taking action, the nature and structure of the armed forces determines the credibility and effectiveness of national defence, the position and contribution of the state in the creation of its own and collective safety. Ensuring effective implementation of the objectives of the security policy is the subject of a military strategy. This role of strategy has been perceived by philosophers and representatives of other sciences since ancient times. Linking strategy with the policy was stressed and well-characterized by General Andre Beaufre, Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. It is a fascinating subject of studies how military leaders and decision makers from antiquity, through Middle Ages, Renaissance, to the present days implemented Sun Tzu’s lessons even without any knowledge about The Art of War’s existence, and how the ancient Chinese conclusions are similar to the those of the European prophet of strategy – Carl von Clausewitz.

Povzetek: V članku je predstavljen proces oblikovanja predloga Vojaške strategije Republike Slovenije znotraj Slovenske vojske z namenom oblikovanja zgodovinskega spomina in krepiti prepričanja, da sta obramba in varnost stalen proces, ki ne more biti podvržen vsakodnevnemu političnemu razpoloženju ampak mora biti dobro načrtovan, nivojsko in resorno usklajen proces, ki je na koncu zapisan v strategijah. Nato in EU intenzivno sprejemata nove strategije na obrambnem in vojaškem področju. Sledi jima tudi Republika Slovenija z oblikovanjem prvega predloga Vojaške strategije Republike Slovenije. Ključno vlogo pri oblikovanju predloga strategije do sedaj je imel proces, ki je zagotovil krepitev in sistematizacijo vojaške misli, poenotenje razumevanj znotraj Slovenske vojske in usklajenost z obrambno-vojaškimi dokumenti. Ključne besede: vojaška strategija, proces izdelave vojaške strategije, Vojaška strategija Republike Slovenije Abstract The article presents the process of developing the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia within the Slovenian Armed Forces, with the aim of building historical memory, and in strengthening belief that defence and security are a continual process that cannot be subjected to everyday political mood, but must be a well-planned process, departmentally coordinated at all levels, which is finally written into a strategy. NATO and the EU are intensively adopting new defence and military strategies, followed by the Republic of Slovenia with its first proposal of a Military Strategy. A key role in writing the proposed strategy was played by the process within the Slovenian Armed Forces, which ensured the strengthening and systematization of military thought, the synchronization of its understanding, and harmonization with defence-military documents. Key words: military strategy, process of drafting military strategy, Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia

It cannot be a strategy without technical determinations. Technique is the most dynamic element of the action. In general, the technical component answers a sharp question: with what? The ancient warrior used the spear, the bow and arrow, the sword and the shield. These means allowed nothing but close combat and, eventually, hitting the enemy from a distance with an arrow or a spear. The historical evolution of peoples was obviously based on the art of political-military leadership. In the distant past, there was no theoretical system of general notions, principles and laws of this art, although, intuitively, great army commanders, some of them true geniuses of war politics, masterfully applied it.

The issue of studying the physiognomy of military actions in the light of the influence of the main military strategy schools is integrated into the field of military art as an objective necessity of a relevant analysis of risks and threats that may affect military force and, consequently, to identify effective means and methods of response against them. The conclusion that emerges from the study is that military action will remain the beneficiary of forward-looking thinking and initiative, in which past moments are primarily considered as a source of lessons learned to increase the effectiveness of the actions to come.

The understanding of uniting the nation's cultural diversity requires a strategy in handling it so that it does not become a breaker of Indonesian unity, in the political integration of diversity in party groups and their partisanship with government power, it becomes less and less pro to certain communities in society that are represented in dealing with various problems. Cultural diversity that characterizes the Indonesian nation is a nation's wealth or asset that must be preserved and it is hoped that it will lead to potential excellence in the world. Conflicts that are oriented towards division, disintegration of the nation, and want to liberate from the unitary republic of Indonesia require concrete efforts to be overcome for the sake of realizing national unity in the Universal War Strategy. Therefore, the researcher wants to examine how the implementation of a sense of unity and political integration as an element that plays a very important role in the universal war strategy, because the understanding of universal war in the face of non-military threats is needed from government agencies outside of defense, especially in the political dimension, so civic, universality and populist is a feature of the settlement with a universal war strategy.

The study draws attention to the fact that innovation is a strategic tool. An important component of defense innovation is to align the latest advances in the technological revolution with the objectives of force deve­lopment. Therefore, this study analyses the relationship between modern military strategy and innovation by examining the effects of the latest, digitized method of military technology research and development through a case study. The effect of the new development methodology is that the military technology research and development project cycle significantly accelerates, which not only allows us to seize the technological advantage in the near future, but also to create strategic surprises and a lasting strategic competitive advantage by creating completely new weapon systems and thereby maintaining a lasting strategic competitive advantage. In this way, a new type of military technology research and development process built on a significant IT base will become a key element of the military strategy of the future.

The study draws attention to the fact that innovation is a strategic tool. An important component of defense innovation is to align the latest advances in the technological revolution with the objectives of force development. Therefore, this study analyses the relationship between modern military strategy and innovation by examining the effects of the latest, digitized method of military technology research and development through a case study. The effect of the new development methodology is that the military technology research and development project cycle significantly accelerates, which not only allows us seize the technological advantage in the near future, but also to create strategic surprises and a lasting strategic competitive advantage by creating completely new weapon systems and thereby maintaining a lasting strategic competitive advantage. In this way, a new type of military technology research and development process built on a significant IT base will become a key element of the military strategy of the future.

This article traces the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) different perceptions of military education from the 1940s to the 2000s and discusses their place in the Israeli military strategy. It first comp...

Predicting or deducing war outcomes is the basis of military strategy formulation. Considering the high information uncertainty and complex influencing factors of modern wars, we applied a fuzzy influence diagram (FID) to realize the macroscopic prediction of war outcomes. In particular, we identified multidimensional factors that influence war outcomes in a relatively comprehensive and practical manner, thereby obtaining a relatively complete FID containing 24 nodes, with the value node “combat outcome” as the core. Subsequently, we performed a simulation analysis for a hypothetical war scenario to demonstrate the specific application and applicability of the proposed FID model. This study expands the prediction methods of war outcomes, and demonstrates that an FID can be feasibly applied in an uncertain battlefield environment to realize the prediction and risk assessment of war outcomes. Moreover, this approach can be used to analyze prewar decision making. The findings highlight that combat participants should attempt to further improve their military technology and combat effectiveness to gain combat advantage.

This collection of essays is the most useful available book about the analytical approach that is called net assessment as it was practiced by Andrew W. Marshall while he was director of the Office...

This article studies the rational side of symbolic victories. It opens with the broad question, why are some battles more significant than others? Extending the literature on bargaining and war, it argues that a belligerent can deliberately increase strategic risk in order to communicate its strength. By increasing the information a battle conveys, the belligerent artificially creates the conditions for a symbolic victory. In short, strategic risk becomes a useful, costly signal. This claim is developed in a formal model in which players choose between more and less dangerous military options. Under most conditions, a symbolic equilibrium exists in which both strong- and weak-type players are able to signal their types after only one round. This equilibrium’s rapid information flow is unusual in the rationalist literature: typically, strong types must wait to signal effectively. The article goes on to establish that, when the prior probability a player is strong is sufficiently small, this symbolic equilibrium uniquely satisfies the intuitive criterion. It then applies the model to two famous episodes from military history, the Doolittle Raid of WWII and the battles of Cannae and Capua of the Second Punic War. For both, it highlights how actors deliberately manipulate strategic risk to communicate with adversaries, allies, and their own publics.

This study aims: 1) to know the background of Toyotomi Hideyoshi to unite Japan, 2) to know Toyotomi Hideyoshi's war strategy to unite Japan 3) to know the political policies initiated by Toyotomi Hideyoshi The method used is the literature method. Collecting data by collecting sources in books, journals, theses and the internet. The steps in the research are as follows, heuristics, source criticism and interpretation and historiography. The research results describe that 1) Toyotomi dedicates himself to Oda Nobunaga who has a vision, and is innovative in various fields, making Toyotomi Hideyoshi a factor in becoming a leader who later replaced Oda Nobunaga as the unifier of Japan. 2) Toyotomi strategy, namely the strategy of balancing, control and command, intelligence and maturity to reap. 3) Political policies initiated by Toyotomi Hideyoshi: Forming a board of 5 administrators, 1588 enforcing a policy of confiscating weapons, holding a national census and cleaning up Rounin, measuring land ownership, improving infrastructure, reforming currencies and prohibiting slave trade.

Globalization of markets, intense competition, the need for rapid innovation require managers to make quick and correct strategic decisions. The traditional process of strategic business planning is outdated and inefficient. The Art of War provides guidance on making correct and quick strategic decisions for managers. The Art of War by Sun T´zu is the oldest surviving work on military strategy. The benefit of the work lies in a clear and comprehensive method combining political and economic strategy, rules of team building and business competition. Effective methodology for making strategic decisions will be created as a combination of the following: focus of strategic decisions on solving problems, ideas of the Art of War and selected methods of decision making. Strategic and tactical excellence is essential for success of a company. Every company must have a quality strategy and effective principles for its implementation. Such principles are provided to managers by the Art of War. The article deals with possibilities of implementing the ideas of the Art of War into strategic decision-making in companies. By implementing them correctly, managers will ensure prosperity both of their companies and employees.

What explains the Russian Federation's Arctic military buildup? Scholarly assessments have pondered this question many times, providing descriptive analyses of its buildup or finding Russia's motivation in high-level policy. This article complements that work by examining Russian military theory in the context of the Arctic, revealing the relationship between geo-economics and military strategy in the region. It shows that Russian writers view Arctic military investments as defensive in nature, designed to protect critical economic and security infrastructure from attack by the United States, an adversary that, in their view, seeks to destroy such critical infrastructure as part of a war-winning strategy. Rather than responding to military deployments in an inconsistent tit-for-tat that contributes to a security dilemma, the United States should develop firm, but more predictable, military responses that may help slow the Arctic escalation spiral.

The question of when the government of the Republic of China abandoned “Retaking the Mainland” has not been clearly answered in previous studies. In this article, I attempt to address this by reexamining the transformation of Taiwan’s military strategy. I focus on the preparations for the “Retaking the Mainland” operation, which have been studied extensively, and the efforts to increase defensive capabilities as part of the “Taiwan Defense” operation, which has lesser scholarship. With respect to this period of transformation of Taiwan’s military strategy, a now broadly accepted interpretation was laid out in the 2006 National Defense Report. However, a different perspective was outlined in a 2013 book jointly compiled by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and Academia Historia. The result is that, with respect to the historical shift in military strategy, the official view of the Ministry of National Defense has become somewhat ambiguous. In this article, I advance an alternative view on this period by highlighting two points at which new policies were adopted. There was a move from a strategy of “Offensive Posture” that had been in place since 1949 to a strategy of “Unity of the Offensive and Defensive,” in the Spring of 1969. Subsequently, after the establishment of the “Guidelines for National Unification” in 1991, there was another shift, to a strategy of “Defensive Posture.” As I suggest, the ROC government abandoned the concept of using military force to “Retake the Mainland” in 1991, when it moved to a strategy of “Defensive Posture.”

What good is military strategy? According to the scholarship on military effectiveness, the answer is “not much”—strategy does not significantly affect the performance of armies in combat. Strategic theory scholarship disagrees and describes four specific mechanisms linking strategy to military effectiveness: Exploiting weaknesses in the adversary’s strategy; causing psychological dislocation in the enemy commanders; creating a favorable center of gravity and pattern of war; and focusing resources and controlling violence in service of political goals. This essay uses a case study from the southern front of the First Arab-Israeli War to explore how strategy affects military performance. We find that Israeli General Yigal Allon’s military strategy significantly increased the combat efficiency and battlefield performance of the Israeli Defense Force, consistent with the mechanisms suggested by strategic theory. These findings suggest that military strategy is indeed an important determinant of military effectiveness.

Today, globalization is a civilizational process of forming a new world order that is carried out through institutional forms on aglobal scale such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO), the NorthAtlantic Alliance (NATO). Ukraine-NATO relations include political, military, law enforcement and economic components. Theinevitable aspect of the evolution of these relations is the transformation of the international security system, the analysis of which is aguarantee of effective cooperation and counteraction to external aggression.The purpose of the article is to analyze the current approach to the military conflict and to consider the conceptual security frameworkfor the formation of Ukraine’s development strategy for reliable protection and successful military development of our state.The history of military associations dives deep into time. The tradition of just war has changed over time, and there has been adesire to impose practical restrictions on war. First of all, strategic leaders, who define large-scale military policy, must control the trainingand preparation of operational plans for national armed forces, deeply rooted in the principles of just war. The worldview of thestrategist is as follows:1. Determination of the stimulus;2. Formulation of interests;3. Evaluation of information;4. Identification of strategic factors;5. Selection of key factors;6. Formulation of strategy.The strategy requires a dynamic approach and the use of the following tools:– change of methods and / or means;– compress the goal;– adjust the strategy;– supplement resources;– reduce the goal and increase funds to achieve it; – misinformation, bluff;– modification of the purpose.NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010 “Active Participation, Modern Defense” presents NATO’s three most important tasks – collectivedefense, crisis management and security through cooperation.NATO pays special attention to assistance:– in carrying out democratic reforms;– modernizing defense institutions to make them transparent and accountable;– developing the capacity of Partner countries’ armed forces to work with NATO forces;– cope with natural disasters;– in the development of scientific and technical cooperation.Modern means of implementing strategic approaches and the strategic concept of the NATO bloc, as well as the benefits of joi -ning NATO for Ukraine, emphasize the need for a transition to cosmopolitan thinking and legal application in the context of modernpolitical and economical changes and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The development and full functioning of the security and defence sector of Ukraine, to meet the conditions of contemporary military conflicts, are hardly possible without scientific analysis of all methods, forms and ways of «hybrid» war that were fully applied by the Russian Federation as an aggressor country. And it is not excluded that they will be disseminated and improved in the future.In fact, Ukraine has become a testing field for various forms and methods of such war, including the use of private military companies, which has made it possible to conduct various operations in circumvention of international conventions and ceasefire agreements.Given that there is a strong link between the leadership of individual states and the owners of private military companies, we can see a trend that has reached such proportions that it is time to think what conventional forces should do, what actions are needed in response, what can be done with regard to preparation of the state in general to repel armed aggression, which can be carried out in completely unexpected forms and conducted in unconventional ways.The purpose of the article is to analyse Ukraine’s experience in counteracting Russian aggression as well as the specifics of combating private military companies, to outline some views on the tasks of national military strategy and the aspects of the state’s preparation for defence, to make scientifically sound recommendations to senior political leadership concerning preparation of the state for repelling armed aggression with wide application of private military companies.

Russia is pursuing select 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies in a drive to rapidly close the capability gaps with rivals. The transformation of warfare these technologies portend could al...

The article examines the actions of the US diplomacy aimed at strengthening the US military and political presence in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean in the first half of the 1950s. The United States began creating mechanisms for mobilizing its allies to contain possible Soviet aggression in the event of a new local conflict on the Balkan Peninsula. This policy led to the need to develop plans for internationalization of alleged conflict. The author uses materials from the US National Archives, the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the electronic archives of the Central Intelligence Agency, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the US National Security Council, as well as published sources. Special attention is paid to the position of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on military strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. The outbreak of the Korean War became an important milestone in American politics not only for the Far East, but also for other regions of the world. In the Balkans, the Americans were mostly afraid of the aggression of Soviet “satellites” against Greece and Yugoslavia. In response, in the early 1950s the United States formed a new security model in the Balkans, which based on a differentiated approach: Greece became a member of NATO, while Yugoslavia entered the anti-Soviet Balkan Pact affiliated with NATO. Yugoslavia became a bridge between the NATO countries – Italy and Greece. Documents held in the US National Archives show that American military leaders spoke out in favor of Yugoslavia’s membership in NATO and insisted on coordinating the military plans of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. The author concludes that the rapprochement of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey was situational. The improvement of the situation in the Balkans after the death of Joseph Stalin led to the collapse of the Balkan Pact. The analysis of American policy in the Balkans made it possible to contribute to the study of the means and methods used by the United States to internationalize military conflicts in various regions of the world in the mid-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

The anticipation of security threats is one of the key elements in the determination of objectives and the main direction for the functioning of states or organizations. It constitutes a fundamental basis for building capacity, aimed at counteracting the identified threats or limiting the emergence of new ones. This is also applicable to the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which in their security documents identify threats that may have an impact on their existence and future development. The purpose of this article is to identify common threats to EU and NATO security, as well as to demonstrate their impact on the security of the countries of the Eastern flank. The analyses, comparisons and generalizations are based on strategic documents concerning the sphere of EU and NATO security (the EU security strategies and the NATO strategic concepts). The analyzed timeline covered the period from the end of the Cold War until the publication of the strategic documents in question. The perception of threats to the external security of the EU and NATO was contrasted with the results of public opinion polls from the member states of both organizations. The general result leads to the conclusion that the perception of security threats, contained in the strategic documents of the above-mentioned entities, is essentially identical; however, the priorities in the scope of reducing the risks associated with the occurrence of specific threats are perceived differently, including the Eastern flank countries.