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The identification of demographic factors of vulnerability and resilience in communities facing belligerent conflicts is increasingly relevant today. This representative study aims to examine the effect of protracted violence on the level of fear of the overall Israeli-Jewish population, and the role of the conflict on the connection between socio-economic factors and fears. Sixty-six representative samples were identified and surveyed from 2001 to 2019 (n = 37,190) that occurred during (n = 14,362) and between (n = 22,828) seven conflicts and non-conflict periods. Results show that during military conflicts, civilians declared less fears of physical injury comparing routine time; a slow trend of decline in the level of fears over time was observed; during routine periods, fear was associated with female-gender and with the lowest income level group. Ultra-orthodox and Religious respondents had significantly less fear than the secular and traditional respondents. During military conflicts, the results changed significantly, mainly for the lowest income group, women and ultra-orthodox.

dimensions of most conflicts involving man since time immemorial. Of all resources, however, land has remained an overwhelming source of conflicts among various user groups as well as individuals at varying thresholds. In particular, conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in the use of agricultural land are becoming fiercer and increasingly widespread in Nigeria, largely due to ‘intensification and extensification’ of production activities that are necessitated by increasing human population (Gefu and Kolawole 2005; Fasona and Omojola 2005 cited in Adisa and Adekunle, 2010). The vital role of agriculture in the development of conflicts between pastoralists and farmers have been noted as an example of Low Intensity Conflict emanating from environmental degradation, resource scarcity, demographic and climate change (Shettima and Tar, 2008).

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to propose that a more optimal regulatory focus in conflict reflects a mix of promotion and prevention considerations because conflict often elicits needs for promoting well-being as well as needs for preventing threats to security and interests. Two studies using distinct methodologies tested the hypothesis that social conflict is associated with better outcomes when the parties construe the conflict with a regulatory focus that reflects a combination of both promotion and prevention orientations. Design/methodology/approachStudy 1 was an experiment that framed the same low-intensity conflict scenario as either prevention- or promotion-focused, or as both. In Study 2, we mouse-coded stream-of-thought accounts of participants’ actual ongoing high-intensity conflicts for time spent in both promotion and prevention focus. FindingsIn Study 1, the combined framing resulted in greater satisfaction with expected conflict outcomes and goal attainment than did either prevention or promotion framing alone. However, a promotion frame alone was associated with greater process and relationship satisfaction. These results were replicated in Study 2. Originality/valuePrior research on regulatory focus has emphasized the benefits of a promotion focus over prevention when managing conflict. The present research offers new insight into how these seemingly opposing motives can operate in tandem to increase conflict satisfaction. Thus, this research illustrates the value of moving beyond dichotomized motivational distinctions in conflict research, to understand the dynamic interplay of how these distinctions may be navigated in concert for more effective conflict engagement. It also illustrates the value of mouse-coding methods for capturing the dynamic interplay of motives as they rise and fall in salience over time.

The article was submitted on 19.11.2019. Since the early 1980s, American scholarly and analytical literature has discussed the effectiveness of Soviet, and subsequently Russian, management of low-intensity conflicts. Though both the Soviet and Russian experience has been examined from many perspectives, including the military, economic, social and political, the American academic community does not tend to deem such an approach relevant and useful in terms of understanding US foreign policy. This disjoint is even harder to understand given the fact that the American military faced the same problems in Afghanistan and Iraq as the Soviet army experienced in Afghanistan (1979–1989), and Russian forces experienced during the First Chechen War (1994–1996). The greatest perplexity for American authors was the ability of Soviet and Russian leaders to recreate a power hierarchy on the ground while relying on their former adversaries – the Afghan Mujahideen and Chechen separatists. According to American intellectual discourse, reliance on a former enemy cannot be considered, by definition, during post-conflict state-building. Since the condition of the Russian conflict settlement model was pragmatism that is opposite to normative approach of the American policies in conflicts, this experience was not in demand in American foreign policy practice. The number of works by American scholars that include the comparison between the Soviet/Russian and the US campaigns is significantly smaller than the number of papers focusing on Soviet and Russian conduct, let alone their experience of nation-building. The aim of this study is to analyse American academic discourse about the Soviet/Russian experience of conducting low intensity conflicts. In the first part, the authors analyse the key mistakes of the Russian leadership during the campaigns, according to the estimates given by American researchers; the second part examines Russian strategy and its conflict settlement drawing comparison with the American experience. The authors conclude that US adaptation on the basis of Russian experiences in Afghanistan and Chechnya has proved impossible due to normative imperatives dominating American academic papers and policies. These imperatives bind the conflict resolution with the level of sophistication of a given country’s institutions. Perhaps, the vice versa claim could have grounds, yet it exceeds the limits of this study. Предметом исследования является анализ американской академической мысли об опыте СССР и России в конфликтах низкой интенсивности, который изучается в американской научной и аналитической литературе с начала 1980-х гг. Хотя опыт рассмотрен с множества исследовательских ракурсов – военного, экономического, социального и политического – он получил в американском научно-исследовательском сообществе оценку как нерелевантный и оказался невостребованным во внешнеполитиче- ской практике США. Это усугубляется тем, что американские вооруженные силы столкнулись с теми же проблемами в Афганистане и Ираке, что Советский Союз в Афганистане (1979–1989) и Россия в Чечне (1994–1996). Наибольшее недоумение американских авторов вызывала способность советских и российских руководителей воссоздавать властную иерархию на месте при опоре на своих бывших оппонентов – афганских моджахедов и чеченских сепаратистов. С точки зрения американского интеллектуального дискурса, российский подход по вовлечению в сотрудничество бывшего врага, основанный на комбинации силового давления и системы компромиссов, не является постконфликтным урегулированием. Вследствие того, что условием российской модели урегулирования был прагматизм, отрицающий классический для американской политики нормативноценностный подход, этот опыт оказался не востребован в американской внешнеполитической практике. Количество работ американских ученых, проводящих параллели между кампаниями СССР/России и США, существенно меньше количества их работ, изучающих сугубо советскую/российскую модели ведения войн и постконфликтного урегулирования. В первой части статьи исследуются американские представления о ключевых ошибках советского/российского руководства в военных кампаниях, во второй сравниваются российская стратегия и методы урегулирования конфликтов с американским опытом. Авторы приходят к выводу, что адаптация Соединенными Штатами российского опыта постконфликтного урегулирования в Афганистане и Чечне оказалась невозможна из-за доминирования в академических исследованиях и политической практике нормативных установок, увязывающих урегулирование конфликта с уровнем развития политических институтов. This research is funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation (grant agreement 14.641.31.0002).

The growing number of low-intensity conflicts around the world calls for greater attention by military and political strategists to identify and target pre-crisis intervention points for Phase zero operations. The pre-conflict environment of Phase zero is more complex than ever and requires a multivariate analysis. This article uses a method of quantitative analysis to illuminate the various facets of the Venezuelan crisis to provide decision-makers with the necessary information to make better-informed decisions for Phase zero operations. This may include who the influencers are and how they can be leveraged, what the indicators of conflict are, when there are opportunities to act, and where there are key locations of political competition. By using exploratory methods in the fields of social network analysis, social movement theory, and statistical analysis, this article develops an alternative quantitative model of analysis to answer the questions of who, what, where, when, and how for Phase zero opera...

Judging by recent media reporting and pronouncements by senior US military and security officials, the use of drones by militant groups is both reshaping conflict between armed non-state actors and...

As part of the collective work “Inconvenient Realities: Parastates, between Statehood and Frozen Conflict,” this article discusses today’s status of Azawad, a relatively remote parastate occupying the territories of northern Mali, currently entrapped in a low intensity conflict involving non-state actors, local security forces, and external interveners. By retracing the history and the development of Azawad, the article identifies the different and partly contrasting socio-economic and ethnic elements at the basis of Azawadian parastatehood, and it charts the dialectical process of co-construction, which have shaped and inextricably linked together the Azawad and the Malian state. Moreover, it underlines the complex and evolving relations existing between “nationalist” Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups, with the aim to problematize the classical distinction between secessionist and terrorist parastates. By showing the connections between parastatehood, hybrid governance, patronage politics, and statelessness characterizing the situation in the Azawad, the article claims that the current condition of stalled conflict represents a temporary and unstable arrangement, which is paving the way for further parastatehood projects to arise.

Russia has historically succeeded in using various hostile measures to sow disorder, weaken democratic institutions, and undermine Western alliances. However, it also has a long track record of strategic shortfalls and even ineptitude. Exploring opportunities to deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile behavior will benefit NATO and other Western powers in the so-called gray zone short of war, as well as in a conventional warfare scenario.

This brief summarizes a series of reports about the geopolitical, economic, environmental, legal, informational, and military trends that are likely shape the contours of conflict through 2030.

This series of reports examines the key geopolitical, economic, environmental, geographic, legal, informational, and military trends that will shape the contours of conflict between now and 2030.

This Perspective examines the interests that inspire Russia's use of subversion, the means involved, and recent events that illustrate Russia's attempts at subversion. The authors propose ensuring that any responses to such actions are closely and clearly linked with particular acts of subversion, conducting additional research on what makes some Russian subversion effective, and improving rapid attribution of subversion.

This article aims to rekindle the debate on the politics of aid in the increasingly common – yet still under-studied – authoritarian and low-intensity conflict settings, detailing the case of Ethiopia in 2016, when a 50-year drought coincided with a wave of protests and a state of emergency. During four months of qualitative fieldwork in 2017, state, civil society, Ethiopian and international actors were approached – from humanitarian headquarters to communities in the Amhara, Oromiya and Somali regions. Research participants relayed stark discrepancies between the humanitarian theatre's ‘frontstage’, where disaster responders showcase an exemplary response, and its ‘backstage’, where they remove their frontstage masks and reflect on the information, the decision-making monopoly of the state and the intrusion of conflict dynamics into the humanitarian response. In humanitarian research and in policy, a collective conversation is necessary on where to draw the line between respect for governments’ sovereignty and the intrusion of humanitarian principles.

The 2014 Russian - Ukrainian crisis and Russian military activities in the crisis, that changed the security paradigm in Europe, reopened the debate on the characteristics of post Cold War conflicts, which have been associated mainly with terrorism and civil war. The post-Cold War conflicts produced new warfare theories, including “low intensity warfare”, “fourth generation warfare” or “compound warfare”, followed by “hybrid warfare,” the term used by the West for Russian military activities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This paper first outlines the basis of warfare principles and characteristics described in official military doctrines, and describes post Cold War warfare theories focused mainly on the evolution of hybrid warfare theory. It basically examines Russian military activities within the framework of warfare doctrines in official military documents. It will be argued that hybrid warfare, like the other theories that describe post Cold War conflicts, does not constitute a new form of warfare.

Conflicts and their management in Central Asia have never been prioritised by the osce although five states of the region are among its participating states. This has been due to that unlike in some other parts of the post-Soviet space most of the conflicts did not threaten with military escalation, and the intensity of strategic rivalry is less noticeable in this distant part of the osce area than closer to the heart of Europe. The fact Russia is not a direct party to the conflicts in Central Asia also reduces the interests of many participating states. There was one high intensity conflict in the region, the Tajik civil war that came too early for the osce. Lower intensity conflicts, ranging from border skirmishes, disputes about access to water, violation of rights of national minority groups, rigged elections are monitored and their resolutions are facilitated by the organisation. Some of them, like the 2010 Kyrgyz-Uzbek conflict had such short shelf-life internationally that no consensus-based inter-governmental organisation could have effectively intervened into it. The osce has been successful in conflict management when the party or parties also wanted to break the stale-mate that the Organization could facilitate. Domestic change in some Central Asian states is essential for advancing the osces cooperative security approach.

Most studies of the gendered impact of conflict focus on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) atrocities committed in high-intensity conflict environments. In contrast, this article focuses on the patterns of SGBV in Mindanao, Philippines – an environment of protracted low-intensity conflict within a fragile state. We examine the current Mindanao peace process to highlight the disempowerment of survivors of SGBV, due in large part to the reporting constraints that affect those most likely to be targeted for sexual violence by rival groups, some of whom are closely associated with the peace process. By making visible the significant social, political-economic, and institutional barriers affecting the recognition and reporting of SGBV, we discuss how and why conflict-related SGBV continues in fragile and low-intensity conflict environments.

The armed forces are usually conversant with the rules on the use of force against the enemy in the traditional battle space. However, military forces are usually ill-equipped for this when the opponent is not a regular combatant but an un-uniformed person – a militant or even a criminal – operating in seemingly benign environs. This constitutes a serious legal void, particularly given the emerging environment wherein navies would be increasingly tasked to perform non-traditional constabulary functions. The trend is best exemplified by the case of the Indian Navy that was entrusted with the responsibility for the nation's overall maritime security, including coastal and offshore security. This paper examines the concept and the salient issues relating to rules of engagement (RoE) for maritime forces operating in the low-intensity conflict environment.

The most potent symbol of conflict and violence in the closing years of the 20th century is the AK-47 assault rifle, and the increasingly widespread incidence of low intensity conflict is rapidly becoming the major security threat of this era. A critical aspect of the trend toward political and military violence is the growing availability of light weapons and small arms which were originally produced and procured for use primarily by armed forces. The main source of concern regarding the present and future supply of light weapons is the former Eastern bloc and former republics of the Soviet Union (FSU). Weapons are flowing out of and around this region in considerable quantities, to several destinations—in Europe, Central Asia and beyond—via numerous networks. There are two basic sources of demand for light weapons-including small arms-in South Africa, the first political and the second criminal. Of the 18,312 murders in 1994, 5,872 were committed with small arms and light weapons.

This report examines current Russian hostile measures in Europe and forecasts how Russia might threaten Europe using these measures over the next few years. This report observes that Russia has the most strategic interest in influencing western Europe, but it has the most leverage over countries of eastern Europe, and offers a range of recommendations for the U.S. government and for the U.S. Army on countering hostile measures.

RAND researchers analyzed how political warfare is practiced today and identified ways that the U.S. government, its allies, and its partners can respond to or engage in this type of conflict to achieve U.S. ends and protect U.S. interests.

Esta investigación pretende dilucidar de qué forma Estados Unidos de América desde su origen como nación ha usado los pilares ideológicos de su política exterior- Destino Manifiesto y Doctrina Monroe- para imponer y dominar a los países de América Latina a través de dispositivos de control que han evolucionado de acuerdo a su proceso de consolidación hegemónica en materia de seguridad en el continente. Buscando patrones sistemáticos en las intervenciones más relevantes a nivel militar en el continente. He usado el método comparado para hacer un análisis especifico de los casos de El Salvador y Colombia durante contextos internacionales diferentes en los que se desarrollaron los procesos de guerra revolucionaria adelantada por las guerrillas del FMLN y FARC-EP. El análisis de factores históricos como causas y efectos de la guerra sobre la población civil, la guerra llevada a cabo por las insurgencias, el proceso de intervención y el camino a la solución negociada, permite evidenciar el hilo conductor de la intervención que condujo a los insurgentes a dar paso a la salida negociada al conflicto. Los casos seleccionados para el análisis comparado por su similitud me permiten demostrar la sistematicidad de los patrones de violencia que emplea Estados Unidos a través de una proyección geopolítica usando la guerra como instrumento principal para conservar su control hegemónico en la región. (texto tomado de la fuente) This research paper aims to elucidate in what way the United States of America, since its origin as a nation, has used the ideological pillars of its foreign policy -Manifest Destiny and Monroe Doctrine- to impose upon and dominate the countries of Latin America. This is accomplished via various control mechanisms which have evolved alongside the process of gaining hegemony in the area of security in the region. Therefore, the idea is to identify systematic patterns in the most relevant military interventions in the continent. In order to do so I decided to use a comparative method to analyze two cases that take place in different international contexts; one from El Salvador and one from Colombia, where both scenarios provide examples of processes of revolutionary wars fostered by the guerrillas FMLN and FARC-EP. The analysis of historical factors like the causes and effects of the war on the civil population, the war led by these insurgent groups, the process of intervention and the road to a negotiated solution to these conflicts, all allow us to observe a common thread in the interventions that led these insurgent groups to take steps towards a negotiated solution. The two cases chosen for this comparative analysis based on their similarities allow me to prove the systematicity of the patterns of violence used by the United States through a geopolitical projection using wars as a principal instrument for maintaining hegemonic control over the region. Magíster en Estudios Políticos Latinoamericanos. Línea de Investigación: Relaciones Internacionales y Globales. Maestría Relaciones Internacionales y Globales

The history of Israel is framed by wars. However, the nature of Israel’s wars has changed over time, from mainly infantry-based warfare to modern armor warfare, and from conventional warfare to regular armies clashing with nonstate combatants, known in the professional literature as low intensity conflict (LIC). Conventional warfare took place within a clear and well-defined territory, with relative separation between civilians and soldiers. Low intensity conflict has blurred the battlefield boundaries, and armed operations take place in civilian areas. With these changes, the meaning of victory has changed as well. The decisive military victory that marked the military campaigns of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 is no longer relevant in the LIC battlefield. Conquest of territory and destruction of the enemy’s military forces, the hallmark of victory during the days of the conventional wars, are much less important in a mode of fighting in which the image of being able to continue to inflict damage is much more important.

States (principals) frequently employ pro-government militias (agents) in low intensity conflicts with mixed results. In some cases, principal and agent interests diverge or the principal loses control over its agent, which devolves into an autonomous terrorist, warlord, or criminal organization. Looking at historical cases of Latin American pro-government militias from Colombia (Self-Defense groups, Convivirs, and Hometown Soldiers) and Peru (Rondas Campesinas), I examined the principal-agent problem in the context of state-sponsored, pro-government militias and answered the following question: How do sponsor states succeed or fail in maintaining positive control and influence over pro-government militias? States fail when they grant too much autonomy and firepower to militias and succeed when they limit militias’ autonomy by subjecting them to a tailored combination of control mechanisms: monitoring, screening, sanctions, and rewards. Cases from Colombia and Peru demonstrate that the best way to control militias and employ them in counterinsurgency is by incorporating them as legitimate auxiliaries of the armed forces. Incorporation of a militia into the armed forces greatly reduces the principal-agent problem, the associated risk of diverging interests and objectives, and the future pain of demobilization. Arming militias with restricted use weapons, outsourcing their financing to private benefactors, and granting them too much autonomy is a recipe for disaster. http://archive.org/details/theprincipalagen1094559551 Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are an increasingly popular tool for reducing poverty in conflict-affected areas. Despite their growing popularity, there is limited evidence on how CCT programs affect conflict and theoretical predictions are ambiguous. We estimate the effect of conditional cash transfers on civil conflict in the Philippines by exploiting an experiment that randomly assigned eligibility for a CCT program at the village level. We find that cash transfers caused a substantial decrease in conflict-related incidents in treatment villages relative to control villages in the first 9 months of the program. Using unique data on local insurgent influence, we also find that the program reduced insurgent influence in treated villages. An analysis of possible spillovers yields inconclusive results. While we find no statistical evidence of spillovers, we also cannot rule out that the village-level effect was due to displacement of insurgent activity from treatment to control villages.

In 2015, the U.S. officially concluded combat operations in the Philippines ending the 14-year mission. The general view among experts is that Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) achieved its underlying objectives and the U.S. government concluded combat operations determining OEF-P met U.S. strategic goals. This research highlights the phases leading to the conclusion of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines and the sustainability of the Philippine government to continue operations to counter violent extremist activity. Has the impact of persistent engagement (operations) and building partner capacity (relationships) set the conditions for a peaceful future of the southern islands in the Philippines? Although the official determination of success has led to the completion of OEF-P, this thesis shows it is possible that operations did not remove the root causes of threats from violent extremist organizations. http://archive.org/details/conditionsformis1094555651 Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

a b s t r a c t This study investigated the psychological asymmetry of majority and minority intergroup attitudes at different conflict stages: high versus low intensity conflict. Cross-sectional surveys using the same outcome measures were conducted at two time points with rep- resentative Kurdish and Turkish community samples in selected neighborhoods in the city of Izmir in Turkey. The first survey was conducted during a period of low intensity con- flict (LIC), whereas the second survey was conducted 6 months later during a period of high intensity conflict (HIC). The results revealed seemingly paradoxical outcomes among minority Kurds, such that during HIC they exhibited higher social distance and less support for (Turkish) nationalistic leaders, but also higher endorsement of assimilative national- ism, less out-group negativity, and lower support for minority Kurdish rights. By contrast, Turks exhibited lower social tolerance, more support for nationalistic leaders, higher out- group negativity, lower support for minority rights, and higher endorsement of assimilative nationalism during HIC than LIC. Turks' and Kurds' images of each other were also assessed, revealing patterns consistent with image theory predictions: Turks viewed Kurds as rogue, whereas Kurds viewed Turks as barbarian. While Turks' out-group images did not change over time, Kurds' images of Turks were slightly more variable at HIC than LIC. The findings are interpreted in light of distinct challenges that conflict and violence at the national level poses to ethnic minorities and majorities. The results highlight the importance of consid- ering the role of dynamic inter-group contexts on understanding micro-level intergroup outcomes.

Incidents are the key data for several of the statistical reports and analyses created within the military intelligence community. This paper discusses factors that affect the utility of quantitative methods in military intelligence analysis when used in a low intensity conflict. The first half of the paper presents the general critique of the use of quantitative methods. The second half applies this critique to the case of incident reporting in Afghanistan.

The impact of armed conflict on gender differentials in schooling appears to be highly context-specific, as the review of the literature and the findings from the three studies in this symposium reveal. In some settings boys' schooling is more negatively affected than that of girls. In others, the reverse is the case. Effects are largely shaped by events surrounding a conflict, pre-war gender differences in educational attainments, and education and labor market opportunities in the absence of war. Rigorous evaluations of post-conflict policies and aid projects can provide useful information to address educational needs and gender differentials in these environments.

Civil conflicts constitute one of the most significant threats to human security. Understanding when belligerents are willing to undertake conflict management efforts is an important first step in better understanding how civil conflicts can be dealt with by the international community. In this article, I examine the occurrence of mediation in low-intensity conflicts. Drawing on insights from the war termination literature, I develop a theoretical argument that links mediation in low-intensity conflicts to the evolution of fighting. I argue that, while the characteristics of a conflict and its belligerents influence when mediation happens, how events unfold on the battlefield also influences the occurrence of mediation. I test this argument by looking at low-intensity conflicts in Africa from 1997 to 2004 using data on mediation in low-intensity conflicts and battle-level civil conflict events. The analysis highlights the important effect of battlefield outcomes and locations upon the occurrence of mediation in low-intensity conflicts.

This article discusses the development of a low-intensity conflict in Sudan's eastern region between 1994 and 2006. Drawing on data collected in the region in 2009, recruitment processes within three different insurgent groups are analysed and compared, paying attention to the impact of these processes on insurgents' organisational development and military capacity. The peace process in Eastern Sudan is further discussed, focusing specifically on the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes for former insurgents. The article finally discusses current developments and draws conclusions regarding the risk of renewed rebellion in Eastern Sudan.

This report uses an original data set of U.S. ground interventions to identify factors that determine where and when the United States is most likely to intervene militarily. The report focuses on interventions into armed conflicts, stability operations, and deterrence missions. It identifies signposts of future interventions that can be used by Army planners and also explores intervention lead time, duration, and resource constraints.

A Joint Force Commander (JFC) leading military joint operations faces several complex challenges. The purpose of this article is to investigate some of the challenges a Joint Force Commander may face when a conflict changes character from being a high-intensity conflict to becoming a low-intensity conflict. Sources of evidence: In connection with command and control, especially issues concerning different cultures and the understanding of this can be the biggest challenge for a Joint Force Commander during the transition to a low intensity conflict as a peace support operation setting. Main argument: Being able to anticipate some of these problems will be essential to a Joint Force Commander's ability to exercise leadership and command and control. Conclusions: Furthermore, target selection and information operations have proven to be two factors that will have a greater importance in the planning and conduct of operations during a transition from a high-intensity conflict to a low-intensity conflict.

This report assesses trends in armed conflict and their implications for defense planning. The incidence of such conflict has declined in recent decades and only sharply different alternative future scenarios are likely to change such trends. Several key political, economic, and strategic factors, including the deterrent effect of the U.S. military, appear to have contributed to this decline and are likely to continue to do so in the future.

This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February–March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February–late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances — political, historical, geographical, and military — that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented — and perhaps ill-conceived — effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia's armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere.

This report describes how the Israel Defense Force evolved to meet an adaptive and determined hybrid adversary during its wars in Gaza. It then draws a series of lessons from the Israeli experience for the U.S. Army and the joint force: from the importance of armored vehicles and active protection systems to the limitations of airpower in urban terrain and of conventional militaries to deter nonstate actors.

Purpose This paper aims to identify antecedents for, and consequences of, low-intensity inter-unit conflict in multinational corporations (MNCs). Inter-unit conflict in MNCs is an important and well-researched theme. However, while most studies have focused on open conflict acknowledged by both parties, much less research has dealt with low-intensity conflicts. Still, low-intensity conflicts can be highly damaging – not least because they are rarely resolved. Design/methodology/approach The authors used a qualitative approach to understanding low-intensity conflict relying on 170 interviews in four Danish MNCs. Findings They describe consequences of low-intensity conflict and identify three types of actions by headquarters’ representatives that could lead to the development of low-intensity conflicts, namely, ignoring, bypassing and educating. Originality/value Very few studies have dealt with low-intensity conflict – not least in international business research. The authors argue that the study of low-intensity conflict in MNCs can provide relevant, novel knowledge of MNC functioning.

This brief summarizes a RAND report that explores lessons that the U.S. Army and the Joint force can draw from Israel's military operations in Gaza from 2009 to 2014 and how Israel adapted to hybrid adversaries in complex urban terrain.

As the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) prepares for future conflicts, some have questioned its ability to conduct Special Warfare and Surgical Strike in all domains of warfare, to include the cyber domain. This thesis examines the applicability of cyber operations to U.S. special operations and whether the cyber support provided by the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is sufficient to meet USSOCOM's potential cyber requirements. It explores USSOCOM's congressionally mandated core activities and how cyber operations could promote such activities. Finally, the thesis provides a decision theory and operational design analysis of how USSOCOM could build its own internal cyber capability - if USSOCOM determines USCYBERCOM cannot meet the cyber requirements of the special operations community. The researcher was unable to conclude as to whether USCYBERCOM's cyber support to USSOCOM was sufficient. USCYBERCOM's cyber support structure is still too immature for analysis and therefore necessitates future research by USSOCOM. The thesis does conclude USSOCOM can improve their special operation's efficacy by incorporating the cyber domain. Finally, the research concludes, if USSOCOM were to build a cyber capacity, the reflagging of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade would be the best course of action. http://archive.org/details/specialoperation1094551622 Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This paper focuses on the impact of maritime piracy on international trade. Piracy increases the cost of international maritime transport through an increase in insecurity regarding goods deliveries. Bilateral trade flows between the main European and Asian countries over the 1999 to 2008 period are used to estimate an augmented gravity model that includes various measures of piracy acts. We found robust evidence indicating that maritime piracy reduces the volume of trade; the effect of ten additional vessels hijacked being associated to an 11% decrease in exports. Using these results, the international cost of piracy in terms of trade destruction is estimated to be 28 billion dollars. Finally, we compare the cost of low intensity conflict like Somalia, to the cost of a full scale conflict (Afghanistan) and to the cost of an autarkic state (North Korea) for the international community in the year 2008.The results indicate that the cost of war more than doubles the cost of low intensity conflict.

This paper will illustrate the utilization of systemic family therapy services inside a hospital in a war-affected region of the Central African Republic. Through an international non-governmental organization (NGO), the author, a family therapist, provided counselling supervision and services to hospital staff and patients in an area of open conflict in the northern region of the country. In circumstances of chronic insecurity fuelled by both government and rebel forces, families displaced in this region are vulnerable to numerous health conditions and social problems. Family therapy techniques and ideas were used to work with individuals, couples and families presenting with health and social problems resulting from HIV-TB, infections, chronic malnutrition, acute poisoning and beliefs about sorcery. Case examples illustrate the systems consultation model used with the mental health team in order to expand and promote the sustainability of patient mental healthcare in this underserved region.

A decade after the Kargil conflict and over seven years after the major Indian military mobilization along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, both countries were yet again on the verge of a m...

This study explores the meaning of “dirty war;” a term that has been in increasing usage in popular and academic discussion. It endeavors to detach the phrase from its normative connotations, and using a strategic methodology along with supporting case studies, seeks to arrive at a theoretical exposition of the dirty war concept. The investigation attempts to provide a working definition that helps make sense of the term, and develops some notions of what dirty war might constitute in contradistinction to its antonym, clean war. It is argued that dirty war represents a form of strategic practice occurring in the gray area between the criminal justice and war models of counterinsurgency, and possesses its own distinctive escalatory path. Finally, the analysis returns to the ethical and normative features implicit in the term, pointing to the outstanding dilemmas that continue to permeate the study of war.

Cyber attacks represent a new set of tools in international relations and conflict. Employment of cyber attacks is attractive because the means necessary for subverting or compromising networked information systems are low and can yield significant impact, often with a reasonably low degree of confidence for attribution. We are likely witnessing a blending of cyber tactics into low-intensity and economic forms of conflict. The capacity to launch cyber attacks is increasingly desired by non-state actors and participants in terror or insurgent campaigns. At the same time, cyber combatants have come to be viewed as legitimate targets for kinetic military action. An important complicating factor of incorporating cyber tools into international conflict is how the opportunities presented by vulnerabilities throughout the cyber ecosystem at the tactical level fit into strategic decision-making by the United States and other states as well as non-state actors. Bridging this gap is an important and necessary step for both achieving the aspirational goals for cyber espionage and covert action, while at the same time deepening understanding of ancillary effects and externalities. Provided here is a narrative of the development of cyber conflict as well as several guideposts for assessing the utility of cyber attack as policy. Among the topics covered are: Internet-based intelligence activities; the role of encryption in the privacy-security debate; cyber economic warfare; the connection between cyber and kinetic action; and lastly the role of information and strategic influence in cyber conflict.

The changes in the nature of warfare and its transformation toward Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) intrastate conflict have challenged the patterns of interaction between the political and the military echelons in Israel. It seems that the political echelon's superiority is maintained at the institutional and formal levels, but on the substantive level, which demands relying on knowledge and systematic staff work, the political echelon's position is weakened and loses its validity. Introducing the military echelon in Israel as an epistemic authority regarding the violent confrontation and the main outlines of the military knowledge development process might clarify why the absence of the required dialogue between the echelons and the weakness of the intellectual effort increased the military's influence over the shaping of Israeli conflict-management strategy. The argument's validity and its explanatory power can be found relevant for other countries whose militaries are deeply involved in the manag...

(2007). The British Experience of Low-Intensity Conflict in Sierra Leone. Defense & Security Analysis: Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 185-200.