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In July 2021, we conducted environmental sampling at the residence of a person in Dallas, Texas, USA, who had travel-associated human West African monkeypox virus (MPXV-WA). Targeted environmental swab sampling was conducted 15 days after the person who had monkeypox left the household. Results indicate extensive MPXV-WA DNA contamination, and viable virus from 7 samples was successfully isolated in cell culture. There was no statistical difference (p = 0.94) between MPXV-WA PCR positivity of porous (9/10, 90%) vs. nonporous (19/21, 90.5%) surfaces, but there was a significant difference (p0.01) between viable virus detected in cultures of porous (6/10, 60%) vs. nonporous (1/21, 5%) surfaces. These findings indicate that porous surfaces (e.g., bedding, clothing) may pose more of a MPXV exposure risk than nonporous surfaces (e.g., metal, plastic). Viable MPXV was detected on household surfaces after at least 15 days. However, low titers (10

NEHA strives to provide up-to-date and relevant information on environmental health and to build partnerships in the profession. In pursuit of these goals, we feature this column on environmental health services from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in every issue of the Journal. In these columns, authors from CDC’s Water, Food, and Environmental Health Services Branch, as well as guest authors, will share insights and information about environmental health programs, trends, issues, and resources. The conclusions in these columns are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of CDC. Kerton Victory is an environmental health specialist and emergency coordinator with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health’s (NIOSH) Emergency Preparedness and Response Office (EPRO). Jill Shugart is a senior environmental health specialist and the Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance coordinator with NIOSH EPRO. Sherry Burrer is a senior epidemiologist and emergency coordinator with NIOSH EPRO. Chad Dowell is the NIOSH deputy associate director for emergency preparedness and response. Lisa Delaney is the NIOSH associate director for emergency preparedness and response.

N95 respirators are personal protective equipment most often used to control exposures to infections transmitted via the airborne route. Supplies of N95 respirators can become depleted during pandemics or when otherwise in high demand. In this paper, we offer strategies for optimizing supplies of N95 respirators in health care settings while maximizing the level of protection offered to health care personnel when there is limited supply in the United States during the 2019 coronavirus disease pandemic. The strategies are intended for use by professionals who manage respiratory protection programs, occupational health services, and infection prevention programs in health care facilities to protect health care personnel from job-related risks of exposure to infectious respiratory illnesses. Consultation with federal, state, and local public health officials is also important. We use the framework of surge capacity and the occupational health and safety hierarchy of controls approach to discuss specific engineering control, administrative control, and personal protective equipment measures that may help in optimizing N95 respirator supplies.

CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), state and local health departments, and public health and clinical stakeholders are investigating a nationwide outbreak of e-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI) (1). As of November 13, 2019, 49 states, the District of Columbia, and two U.S. territories (Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands) have reported 2,172 EVALI cases to CDC, including 42 (1.9%) EVALI-associated deaths. To inform EVALI surveillance, including during the 2019-20 influenza season, case report information supplied by states for hospitalized and nonhospitalized patients with EVALI were analyzed using data collected as of November 5, 2019. Among 2,016 EVALI patients with available data on hospitalization status, 1,906 (95%) were hospitalized, and 110 (5%) were not hospitalized. Demographic characteristics of hospitalized and nonhospitalized patients were similar; most were male (68% of hospitalized versus 65% of nonhospitalized patients), and most were aged

Introduction Complementary and alternative therapies (CATs) are widely used by cancer patients but are infrequently disclosed and documented. This study aimed to improve radiation therapy staff knowledge, confidence, views and documentation of radiation oncology patients' use of CATs. Method Participants completed a baseline questionnaire regarding their knowledge, confidence, views and documentation relating to patients' CAT use. An intervention was undertaken whereby participants attended an educational session and a CAT screening tool was implemented simultaneously. Participants immediately completed a post‐intervention questionnaire and later a 6‐month follow‐up questionnaire. A patient record audit was conducted to measure the documentation of CAT use pre‐ and post‐intervention. Results From baseline to post‐intervention, there was a statistically significant shift in staff knowledge and confidence (P = 0.001–0.01). The observed shift was sustained over a 6‐month period, (P = 0.453–1.00). Participants' perceived views of CATs did not change as a result of the intervention (P = 0.261–1.000). The post‐intervention audit compared to the baseline audit yielded a statistically significant increase in documentation. There was an increase in CAT use mentioned in patient records from 14% (15/108) to 40% (35/88) (P

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4).

The 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa underscores the need for health care infection prevention and control (IPC) practices to be implemented properly and consistently to interrupt transmission of pathogens in health care settings to patients and health care workers. Training and assessing IPC practices in general health care facilities not designated as Ebola treatment units or centers became a priority for CDC as the number of Ebola virus transmissions among health care workers in West Africa began to affect the West African health care system and increasingly more persons became infected. CDC and partners developed policies, procedures, and training materials tailored to the affected countries. Safety training courses were also provided to U.S. health care workers intending to work with Ebola patients in West Africa. As the Ebola epidemic continued in West Africa, the possibility that patients with Ebola could be identified and treated in the United States became more realistic. In response, CDC, other federal components (e.g., Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response) and public health partners focused on health care worker training and preparedness for U.S. health care facilities. CDC used the input from these partners to develop guidelines on IPC for hospitalized patients with known or suspected Ebola, which was updated based on feedback from partners who provided care for Ebola patients in the United States. Strengthening and sustaining IPC helps health care systems be better prepared to prevent and respond to current and future infectious disease threats.The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).

Inhalation anthrax occurred in a man who vacationed in 4 US states where anthrax is enzootic. Despite an extensive multi-agency investigation, the specific source was not detected, and no additional related human or animal cases were found. Although rare, inhalation anthrax can occur naturally in the United States.

On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) semisubmersible Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit, located 45 miles southeast off the Louisiana coast, suffered a massive explosion and subsequent fire that ultimately led to the sinking of the Unit. Eleven workers lost their lives as a result of the explosion and fire, and seventeen other workers were injured. Oil from a subsea blowout began flowing into the Gulf of Mexico soon after the explosion, and continued to flow until the well was finally capped on July 15, 2010.

Emerging zoonotic diseases are of increasing regional and global importance. Preventing occupational exposure to zoonotic diseases protects workers as well as their families, communities, and the public health. Workers can be protected from zoonotic diseases most effectively by preventing and controlling diseases in animals, reducing workplace exposures, and educating workers. Certain avian influenza viruses are potential zoonotic disease agents that may be transmitted from infected birds to humans. Poultry workers are at risk of becoming infected with these viruses if they are exposed to infected birds or virus-contaminated materials or environments. Critical components of worker protection include educating employers and training poultry workers about occupational exposure to avian influenza viruses. Other recommendations for protecting poultry workers include the use of good hygiene and work practices, personal protective clothing and equipment, vaccination for seasonal influenza viruses, antiviral medication, and medical surveillance. Current recommendations for protecting poultry workers from exposure to avian influenza viruses are summarized in this article.

A negative pressure user seal check (NPUSC) method was evaluated for its ability to adequately detect known exhalation valve leakage into a respirator. Three valves with different types of damage were included. Twenty-six test subjects, wearing full facepiece respirators, were asked to perform a NPUSC. Their responses as to whether they passed or failed the user seal check were compared to fit testing results from two quantitative fit test methods: ambient aerosol and controlled negative pressure. In addition, equipment developed at the University of Cincinnati was used to measure in-mask pressures that are generated during the performance of NPUSCs. This technique was employed to assess the ability of respirator wearers to properly conduct user seal checks. The data were analyzed to determine if the user seal check procedure is an effective method for detecting known exhalation valve damage. All test subjects reported passing the user seal check with the undamaged valve. With the warped valve installed, 95 percent of test subjects reported passing the user seal check. With the slit valve installed, 73 percent of test subjects reported passing. With the dirty valve installed, 65 percent reported passing. All fit factors, measured with the damaged valves, were below the Occupational Safety and Health Administration-recognized pass/fail criteria except one fit test with the respirator equipped with the slit valve. Results from the in-mask pressure measurements confirmed whether or not the subject properly conducted a user seal check, but did not detect respirator leakage. In conclusion, the performance of a NPUSC rarely helped to identify damaged exhalation valves. These results support the need for respirator inspection prior to donning with periodic fit testing and the performance of user seal checks as necessary components of an adequate respiratory protection program.

(2002). Occupational Exposures in Seismic Retrofitting Operations. Applied Occupational and Environmental Hygiene: Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 75-81.

Objective: To evaluate both the cholinesterase monitoring program and newer field methods of determining coumaphos exposure among tick eradication workers. Methods: Measured blood cholinesterase by the Ellman and field testing methods and tested urine for chlorferon pre- and postshift; conducted personal air sampling, patch sampling of clothing, and wipe sampling of hands for coumaphos. Results: Fifteen workers had normal plasma cholinesterase and acetylcholinesterase levels. No significant changes occurred pre- to postshift. High correlation was found between plasma cholinesterase and acetylcholinesterase levels by field testing and Ellman methods (r = 0.91, P < 0.01 and r = 0.63, P < 0.01, respectively). Chlorferon levels rose 4 to 6 hours after use (P < 0.01). Airborne coumaphos was detected in only one sample, in a trace amount. The majority of patch and hand wipe samples detected coumaphos. Conclusions: Dermal exposure to coumaphos resulted in significant increases in urinary metabolites of coumaphos.