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Abstract. The Rorschach offers a unique and interesting paradigm from the perspective of the (Bayesian) brain. This contribution to the cross-disciplinary special issue considers the Rorschach from the perspective of perceptual inference in the brain and how it might inform subject-specific differences in perceptual synthesis. Before doing so, we provide a broad overview of active inference in its various manifestations. In brief, active inference supposes that our perceptions are the best hypothesis to explain sensory impressions. On a Bayesian account, the requisite belief updating rests sensitively upon the precision or confidence ascribed to sensory input, relative to prior beliefs about the causes of sensations. This focus – on the balance between sensory and prior precision – has been a useful construct in both cognitive science (e.g., as a formal explanation for attention) and neuropsychology (e.g., as a formal explanation for aberrant or false inference in hallucinations). In this setting, false inference is generally understood as abnormally high precision afforded to high-level hypotheses or explanations for visual input, which may compensate for a failure to attenuate sensory precision. On this view, the Rorschach offers an interesting paradigm because the amount of precise information about the causes of visual input is deliberately minimized – and rendered ambiguous – thereby placing greater emphasis on prior beliefs entertained by the respondent. We close by exploring this issue and several other areas of intersection between Rorschach responding and active inference.

The aim of this paper is to introduce a field of study that has emerged over the last decade called Bayesian mechanics. Bayesian mechanics is a probabilistic mechanics, comprising tools that enable us to model systems endowed with a particular partition (i.e., into particles), where the internal states (or the trajectories of internal states) of a particular system encode the parameters of beliefs about external states (or their trajectories). These tools allow us to write down mechanical theories for systems that look as if they are estimating posterior probability distributions over the causes of their sensory states. This provides a formal language for modelling the constraints, forces, potentials, and other quantities determining the dynamics of such systems, especially as they entail dynamics on a space of beliefs (i.e., on a statistical manifold). Here, we will review the state of the art in the literature on the free energy principle, distinguishing between three ways in which Bayesian mechanics has been applied to particular systems (i.e., path-tracking, mode-tracking, and mode-matching). We go on to examine a duality between the free energy principle and the constrained maximum entropy principle, both of which lie at the heart of Bayesian mechanics, and discuss its implications., Comment: 50+7 pages, six figures. Invited contribution to "Making and Breaking Symmetries in Mind and Life," a special issue of the journal Royal Society Interface. First two authors have contributed equally

Accumulating evidence suggests that the brain is highly dynamic; thus, investigation of brain dynamics especially in brain connectivity would provide crucial information that stationary functional connectivity could miss. This study investigated temporal expressions of spatial modes within the default mode network (DMN), salience network (SN) and cognitive control network (CCN) using a reliable data-driven co-activation pattern (CAP) analysis in two independent data sets. We found enhanced CAP-to-CAP transitions of the SN in patients with MDD. Results suggested enhanced flexibility of this network in the patients. By contrast, we also found reduced spatial consistency and persistence of the DMN in the patients, indicating reduced variability and stability in individuals with MDD. In addition, the patients were characterized by prominent activation of mPFC. Moreover, further correlation analysis revealed that persistence and transitions of RCCN were associated with the severity of depression. Our findings suggest that functional connectivity in the patients may not be simply attenuated or potentiated, but just alternating faster or slower among more complex patterns. The aberrant temporal-spatial complexity of intrinsic fluctuations reflects functional diaschisis of resting-state networks as characteristic of patients with MDD.

BACKGROUND: Diminished synaptic gain-the sensitivity of postsynaptic responses to neural inputs-may be a fundamental synaptic pathology in schizophrenia. Evidence for this is indirect, however. Furthermore, it is unclear whether pyramidal cells or interneurons (or both) are affected, or how these deficits relate to symptoms. \ud \ud METHODS: People with schizophrenia diagnoses (PScz) (n = 108), their relatives (n = 57), and control subjects (n = 107) underwent 3 electroencephalography (EEG) paradigms-resting, mismatch negativity, and 40-Hz auditory steady-state response-and resting functional magnetic resonance imaging. Dynamic causal modeling was used to quantify synaptic connectivity in cortical microcircuits. \ud \ud RESULTS: Classic group differences in EEG features between PScz and control subjects were replicated, including increased theta and other spectral changes (resting EEG), reduced mismatch negativity, and reduced 40-Hz power. Across all 4 paradigms, characteristic PScz data features were all best explained by models with greater self-inhibition (decreased synaptic gain) in pyramidal cells. Furthermore, disinhibition in auditory areas predicted abnormal auditory perception (and positive symptoms) in PScz in 3 paradigms. \ud \ud CONCLUSIONS: First, characteristic EEG changes in PScz in 3 classic paradigms are all attributable to the same underlying parameter change: greater self-inhibition in pyramidal cells. Second, psychotic symptoms in PScz relate to disinhibition in neural circuits. These findings are more commensurate with the hypothesis that in PScz, a primary loss of synaptic gain on pyramidal cells is then compensated by interneuron downregulation (rather than the converse). They further suggest that psychotic symptoms relate to this secondary downregulation.

Therapeutic affective touch has been recognized as essential for survival, nurturing supportive interpersonal interactions, accelerating recovery—including reducing hospitalisations, and promoting overall health and building robust therapeutic alliances. Through the lens of active inference, we present an integrative model, combining therapeutic touch and communication, to achieve biobehavioural synchrony. This model speaks to how the brain develops a generative model required for recovery, developing successful therapeutic alliances, and regulating allostasis within paediatric manual therapy. We apply active inference to explain the neurophysiological and behavioural mechanisms that underwrite the development and maintenance of synchronous relationships through touch. This paper foregrounds the crucial role of therapeutic touch in developing a solid therapeutic alliance, the clinical effectiveness of paediatric care, and triadic synchrony between health care practitioner, caregiver, and infant in a variety of clinical situations. We start by providing a brief overview of the significance and clinical role of touch in the development of social interactions in infants; facilitating a positive therapeutic alliance and restoring homeostasis through touch to allow a more efficient process of allostatic regulation. Moreover, we explain the role of CT tactile afferents in achieving positive clinical outcomes and updating prior beliefs. We then discuss how touch is implemented in treatment sessions to promote cooperative interactions in the clinic and facilitate theory of mind. This underwrites biobehavioural synchrony, epistemic trust, empathy, and the resolution of uncertainty. The ensuing framework is underpinned by a critical application of the active inference framework to the fields of pediatrics and neonatology.

Ever since the first discovery of human brain waves in 1929, brain rhythm has been attracting interest in the field of neuroscience. The integration of distributed brain functions similar to small-scale circuits for the same task in a larger scale network which oscillations facilitate offers a means to study the brain at work. Importantly, changes in synchronized brain oscillations may reveal important aspects of pathophysiology. For example, excess beta rhythms are characteristic of Parkinson's brain. However, various spatial distributions and frequencies of neuronal oscillations and nonlinear and complicated neuronal processes make it difficult to understand neuronal messages, and it is needed to find an appropriate model. Thus, we present a brief review of techniques used in characterizing frequency-related local fluctuations and interactions between neuronal assemblies by measuring electroencephalography (EEG) or MEG. Specifically, we focus on the objectives of these methods, including: (1) inferential versus non-inferential, (2) linear versus nonlinear, (3) uni-versus multi-variate, and (4) power modulation versus phase-synchrony. Three practical issues – that are typically confronted when applying these methods – are also discussed. This article aims to provide readers who are not familiar with current methods an accessible overview – that may help the neuroscientists to interpret the similar findings of this study.

Understanding information processing in the brain-and creating general-purpose artificial intelligence-are long-standing aspirations of scientists and engineers worldwide. The distinctive features of human intelligence are high-level cognition and control in various interactions with the world including the self, which are not defined in advance and are vary over time. The challenge of building human-like intelligent machines, as well as progress in brain science and behavioural analyses, robotics, and their associated theoretical formalisations, speaks to the importance of the world-model learning and inference. In this article, after briefly surveying the history and challenges of internal model learning and probabilistic learning, we introduce the free energy principle, which provides a useful framework within which to consider neuronal computation and probabilistic world models. Next, we showcase examples of human behaviour and cognition explained under that principle. We then describe symbol emergence in the context of probabilistic modelling, as a topic at the frontiers of cognitive robotics. Lastly, we review recent progress in creating human-like intelligence by using novel probabilistic programming languages. The striking consensus that emerges from these studies is that probabilistic descriptions of learning and inference are powerful and effective ways to create human-like artificial intelligent machines and to understand intelligence in the context of how humans interact with their world.

Synaptic loss occurs early in many neurodegenerative diseases and contributes to cognitive impairment even in the absence of gross atrophy. Currently, for human disease there are few formal models to explain how cortical networks underlying cognition are affected by synaptic loss. We advocate that biophysical models of neurophysiology offer both a bridge from clinical to preclinical models of pathology, and quantitative assays for experimental medicine. Such biophysical models can also disclose hidden neuronal dynamics generating neurophysiological observations like electro- and magneto-encephalography (MEG). Here, we augment a biophysically informed mesoscale model of human cortical function by inclusion of synaptic density estimates as captured by [11C]UCB-J positron emission tomography, and provide insights into how regional synapse loss affects neurophysiology. We use the primary tauopathy of progressive supranuclear palsy (Richardson’s syndrome) as an exemplar condition, with high clinicopathological correlations. Progressive supranuclear palsy causes a marked change in cortical neurophysiology in the presence of mild atrophy and is associated with a decline in cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobe. Using (parametric empirical) Bayesian inversion of a conductance-based canonical microcircuit model of MEG data, we show that the inclusion of regional synaptic density—as a subject-specific prior on laminar specific neuronal populations—markedly increases model evidence. Specifically, model comparison suggests that a reduction in synaptic density in inferior frontal cortex affects superficial and granular layer glutamatergic excitation. This predicted individual differences in behaviour, demonstrating the link between synaptic loss, neurophysiology, and cognitive deficits. The method we demonstrate is not restricted to progressive supranuclear palsy or the effects of synaptic loss: such pathology-enriched dynamic causal models can be used to assess the mechanisms of other neurological disorders, with diverse non-invasive measures of pathology, and is suitable to test the effects of experimental pharmacology.

Newly emerging infectious diseases, such as the coronavirus (COVID-19), create new challenges for public healthcare systems. Before effective treatments, countering the spread of these infections depends on mitigating, protective behaviours such as social distancing, respecting lockdown, wearing masks, frequent handwashing, travel restrictions, and vaccine acceptance. Previous work has shown that the enacting protective behaviours depends on beliefs about individual vulnerability, threat severity, and one's ability to engage in such protective actions. However, little is known about the genesis of these beliefs in response to an infectious disease epidemic, and the cognitive mechanisms that may link these beliefs to decision making. Active inference (AI) is a recent approach to behavioural modelling that integrates embodied perception, action, belief updating, and decision making. This approach provides a framework to understand the behaviour of agents in situations that require planning under uncertainty. It assumes that the brain infers the hidden states that cause sensations, predicts the perceptual feedback produced by adaptive actions, and chooses actions that minimize expected surprise in the future. In this paper, we present a computational account describing how individuals update their beliefs about the risks and thereby commit to protective behaviours. We show how perceived risks, beliefs about future states, sensory uncertainty, and outcomes under each policy can determine individual protective behaviours. We suggest that these mechanisms are crucial to assess how individuals cope with uncertainty during a pandemic, and we show the interest of these new perspectives for public health policies.

Traditionally, short-term memory (STM) has been assessed by asking participants to remember words, visual objects, or numbers for a short amount of time before their recall or recognition of those items is tested. However, this focus on memory for past sensory input might have obscured potential theoretical insights into the function of this cognitive faculty. Here, we suggest that STM may have an important role in predicting future sensory input. This reconceptualization of STM may provide a functional explanation for its capacity limitation.

Natural language syntax yields an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions. We claim that these are used in the service of active inference in accord with the free-energy principle (FEP). While conceptual advances alongside modelling and simulation work have attempted to connect speech segmentation and linguistic communication with the FEP, we extend this program to the underlying computations responsible for generating syntactic objects. We argue that recently proposed principles of economy in language design - such as "minimal search" criteria from theoretical syntax - adhere to the FEP. This affords a greater degree of explanatory power to the FEP - with respect to higher language functions - and offers linguistics a grounding in first principles with respect to computability. We show how both tree-geometric depth and a Kolmogorov complexity estimate (recruiting a Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm) can be used to accurately predict legal operations on syntactic workspaces, directly in line with formulations of variational free energy minimization. This is used to motivate a general principle of language design that we term Turing-Chomsky Compression (TCC). We use TCC to align concerns of linguists with the normative account of self-organization furnished by the FEP, by marshalling evidence from theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics to ground core principles of efficient syntactic computation within active inference.

Empirical applications of the free-energy principle are not straightforward because they entail a commitment to a particular process theory, especially at the cellular and synaptic levels. Using a recently established reverse engineering technique, we confirm the quantitative predictions of the free-energy principle using in vitro networks of rat cortical neurons that perform causal inference. Upon receiving electrical stimuli—generated by mixing two hidden sources—neurons self-organised to selectively encode the two sources. Pharmacological up- and downregulation of network excitability disrupted the ensuing inference, consistent with changes in prior beliefs about hidden sources. As predicted, changes in effective synaptic connectivity reduced variational free energy, where the connection strengths encoded parameters of the generative model. In short, we show that variational free energy minimisation can quantitatively predict the self-organisation of neuronal networks, in terms of their responses and plasticity. These results demonstrate the applicability of the free-energy principle to in vitro neural networks and establish its predictive validity in this setting.

We present a hierarchical empirical Bayesian framework for testing hypotheses about neurotransmitters' concertation as empirical prior for synaptic physiology using ultra-high field magnetic resonance spectroscopy (7T-MRS) and magnetoencephalography data (MEG). A first level dynamic causal modelling of cortical microcircuits is used to infer the connectivity parameters of a generative model of individuals' neurophysiological observations. At the second level, individuals' 7T-MRS estimates of regional neurotransmitter concentration supply empirical priors on synaptic connectivity. We compare the group-wise evidence for alternative empirical priors, defined by monotonic functions of spectroscopic estimates, on subsets of synaptic connections. For efficiency and reproducibility, we used Bayesian model reduction (BMR), parametric empirical Bayes and variational Bayesian inversion. In particular, we used Bayesian model reduction to compare alternative model evidence of how spectroscopic neurotransmitter measures inform estimates of synaptic connectivity. This identifies the subset of synaptic connections that are influenced by individual differences in neurotransmitter levels, as measured by 7T-MRS. We demonstrate the method using resting-state MEG (i.e., task-free recording) and 7T-MRS data from healthy adults. Our results confirm the hypotheses that GABA concentration influences local recurrent inhibitory intrinsic connectivity in deep and superficial cortical layers, while glutamate influences the excitatory connections between superficial and deep layers and connections from superficial to inhibitory interneurons. Using within-subject split-sampling of the MEG dataset (i.e., validation by means of a held-out dataset), we show that model comparison for hypothesis testing can be highly reliable. The method is suitable for applications with magnetoencephalography or electroencephalography, and is well-suited to reveal the mechanisms of neurological and psychiatric disorders, including responses to psychopharmacological interventions.

The mainstream science of consciousness offers a few predominate views of how the brain gives rise to awareness. Chief among these are the Higher-Order Thought Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and hybrids thereof. In parallel, rapid development in predictive processing approaches have begun to outline concrete mechanisms by which interoceptive inference shapes selfhood, affect, and exteroceptive perception. Here, we consider these new approaches in terms of what they might offer our empirical, phenomenological, and philosophical understanding of consciousness and its neurobiological roots.

Highlights • We leverage the idea of ‘Markov blanket’ as a statistical boundary to provide an analysis of partitions in neuronal systems. • We show this partition is applicable to multiple scales, from single neurons, brain regions, and brain-wide networks. • Based on the canonical micro-circuitry, our treatment has practical applications for effective connectivity. • Our proposed partition highlights the limitations of ‘modular’ proposals considering a single level of description., Recent characterisations of self-organising systems depend upon the presence of a ‘Markov blanket’: a statistical boundary that mediates the interactions between the inside and outside of a system. We leverage this idea to provide an analysis of partitions in neuronal systems. This is applicable to brain architectures at multiple scales, enabling partitions into single neurons, brain regions, and brain-wide networks. This treatment is based upon the canonical micro-circuitry used in empirical studies of effective connectivity, so as to speak directly to practical applications. The notion of effective connectivity depends upon the dynamic coupling between functional units, whose form recapitulates that of a Markov blanket at each level of analysis. The nuance afforded by partitioning neural systems in this way highlights certain limitations of ‘modular’ perspectives of brain function that only consider a single level of description.

Published: 25 July 2022 Functional neuroimaging research on anxiety has traditionally focused on brain networks associated with the psychological aspects of anxiety. Here, instead, we target the somatic aspects of anxiety. Motivated by the growing appreciation that top-down cortical processing plays a crucial role in perception and action, we used resting-state functional MRI data from the Human Connectome Project and Dynamic Causal Modeling (DCM) to characterize effective connectivity among hierarchically organized regions in the exteroceptive, interoceptive, and motor cortices. In people with high (fear-related) somatic arousal, top-down effective connectivity was enhanced in all three networks: an observation that corroborates well with the phenomenology of anxiety. The anxiety-associated changes in connectivity were sufficiently reliable to predict whether a new participant has mild or severe somatic anxiety. Interestingly, the increase in top-down connections to sensorimotor cortex were not associated with fear affect scores, thus establishing the (relative) dissociation between somatic and cognitive dimensions of anxiety. Overall, enhanced top-down effective connectivity in sensorimotor cortices emerges as a promising and quantifiable candidate marker of trait somatic anxiety. This research was supported by the Basque Government through the BERC 2018–2021 program, by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities (BCBL Severo Ochoa excellence accreditation SEV- 2015–0490 and BCAM Severo Ochoa accreditation SEV-2017–0718), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Ramon y Cajal Fellowship, RYC-2017–21845) and the project MTM2017–82379- R(AEI/FEDER,UE) (principal investigator: Dr. Maria Xose Rodriguez, BCAM). KJF was supported by funding for the Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (Ref: 205103/Z/16/Z), a Canada-UK Artificial Intelligence Initiative (Ref: ES/T01279X/1) and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation under the Specific Grant Agreement No. 945539 (Human Brain Project SGA3).

Touch is recognised as crucial for survival, fostering cooperative communication, accelerating recovery, reducing hospital stays, and promoting overall wellness and the therapeutic alliance. In this hypothesis and theory paper, we present an entwined model that combines touch for alignment and active inference to explain how the brain develops “priors” necessary for the health care provider to engage with the patient effectively. We appeal to active inference to explain the empirically integrative neurophysiological and behavioural mechanisms that underwrite synchronous relationships through touch. Specifically, we offer a formal framework for understanding – and explaining – the role of therapeutic touch and hands-on care in developing a therapeutic alliance and synchrony between health care providers and their patients in musculoskeletal care. We first review the crucial importance of therapeutic touch and its clinical role in facilitating the formation of a solid therapeutic alliance and in regulating allostasis. We then consider how touch is used clinically – to promote cooperative communication, demonstrate empathy, overcome uncertainty, and infer the mental states of others – through the lens of active inference. We conclude that touch plays a crucial role in achieving successful clinical outcomes and adapting previous priors to create intertwined beliefs. The ensuing framework may help healthcare providers in the field of musculoskeletal care to use hands-on care to strengthen the therapeutic alliance, minimise prediction errors (a.k.a., free energy), and thereby promote recovery from physical and psychological impairments.

Time series of brain activity recorded from different anatomical regions and in different behavioural states and pathologies can be summarised by the power spectrum. Recently, attention has shifted to characterising the properties of changing temporal dynamics in rhythmic neural activity. Here, we present evidence from electrocorticography recordings made from the motor cortex to show that, dependent on the specific motor context, the statistics of temporal transients in beta frequency (14-30 Hz) rhythms (i.e., bursts) can significantly add to the description of states such rest, movement preparation, movement execution, and movement imagery. We show that the statistics of burst duration and amplitude can significantly improve the classification of motor states and that burst features reflect nonlinearities not detectable in the power spectrum, with states increasing in order of nonlinearity from movement execution to movement preparation to rest. Further, we provide mechanistic explanations for these features by fitting models of the motor cortical microcircuit to the empirical data and investigate how dynamical instabilities interact with noise to generate burst dynamics. Finally, we examine how beta bursting in motor cortex may influence the integration of exogenous inputs to the cortex and suggest that properties of spontaneous activity cannot be reliably used to infer the response of the cortex to external inputs. These findings have significance for the classification of motor states, for instance in novel brain-computer interfaces. Critically, we increase the understanding of how transient brain rhythms may contribute to cortical processing, which in turn, may inform novel approaches for its modulation with brain stimulation.

Objective This article offers a philosophical thesis for psychiatric disorders that rests upon some simple truths about the mind and brain. Specifically, it asks whether the dual aspect monism—that emerges from sleep research and theoretical neurobiology—can be applied to pathophysiology and psychopathology in psychiatry. Methods Our starting point is that the mind and brain are emergent aspects of the same (neuronal) dynamics; namely, the brain–mind. Our endpoint is that synaptic dysconnection syndromes inherit the same dual aspect; namely, aberrant inference or belief updating on the one hand, and a failure of neuromodulatory synaptic gain control on the other. We start with some basic considerations from sleep research that integrate the phenomenology of dreaming with the neurophysiology of sleep. Results We then leverage this treatment by treating the brain as an organ of inference. Our particular focus is on the role of precision (i.e., the representation of uncertainty) in belief updating and the accompanying synaptic mechanisms. Conclusions Finally, we suggest a dual aspect approach—based upon belief updating (i.e., mind processes) and its neurophysiological implementation (i.e., brain processes)—has a wide explanatory compass for psychiatry and various movement disorders. This approach identifies the kind of pathophysiology that underwrites psychopathology—and points to certain psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacological targets, which may stand in mechanistic relation to each other.

At the inception of human brain mapping, two principles of functional anatomy underwrote most conceptions—and analyses—of distributed brain responses: namely, functional segregation and integration. There are currently two main approaches to characterizing functional integration. The first is a mechanistic modeling of connectomics in terms of directed effective connectivity that mediates neuronal message passing and dynamics on neuronal circuits. The second phenomenological approach usually characterizes undirected functional connectivity (i.e., measurable correlations), in terms of intrinsic brain networks, self-organized criticality, dynamical instability, and so on. This paper describes a treatment of effective connectivity that speaks to the emergence of intrinsic brain networks and critical dynamics. It is predicated on the notion of Markov blankets that play a fundamental role in the self-organization of far from equilibrium systems. Using the apparatus of the renormalization group, we show that much of the phenomenology found in network neuroscience is an emergent property of a particular partition of neuronal states, over progressively coarser scales. As such, it offers a way of linking dynamics on directed graphs to the phenomenology of intrinsic brain networks., Author Summary This paper describes a treatment of effective connectivity that speaks to the emergence of intrinsic brain networks and critical dynamics. It is predicated on the notion of Markov blankets that play a fundamental role in the self-organization of far from equilibrium systems. Using the apparatus of the renormalization group, we show that much of the phenomenology found in network neuroscience is an emergent property of a particular partition of neuronal states, over progressively coarser scales. As such, it offers a way of linking dynamics on directed graphs to the phenomenology of intrinsic brain networks.

We propose a computational neurology of movement based on the convergence of theoretical neurobiology and clinical neurology. A significant development in the former is the idea that we can frame brain function as a process of (active) inference, in which the nervous system makes predictions about its sensory data. These predictions depend upon an implicit predictive (generative) model used by the brain. This means neural dynamics can be framed as generating actions to ensure sensations are consistent with these predictions—and adjusting predictions when they are not. We illustrate the significance of this formulation for clinical neurology by simulating a clinical examination of the motor system using an upper limb coordination task. Specifically, we show how tendon reflexes emerge naturally under the right kind of generative model. Through simulated perturbations, pertaining to prior probabilities of this model’s variables, we illustrate the emergence of hyperreflexia and pendular reflexes, reminiscent of neurological lesions in the corticospinal tract and cerebellum. We then turn to the computational lesions causing hypokinesia and deficits of coordination. This in silico lesion-deficit analysis provides an opportunity to revisit classic neurological dichotomies (e.g. pyramidal versus extrapyramidal systems) from the perspective of modern approaches to theoretical neurobiology—and our understanding of the neurocomputational architecture of movement control based on first principles., Parr et al. report a series of numerical simulations—based on Bayesian message passing—of healthy and pathological motor control. They perform an in silico lesion-deficit analysis and demonstrate how the sorts of syndromes observed during a clinical neurological examination emerge from pathological computation.

The positive-negative axis of emotional valence has long been recognized as fundamental to adaptive behavior, but its origin and underlying function have largely eluded formal theorizing and computational modeling. Using deep active inference, a hierarchical inference scheme that rests on inverting a model of how sensory data are generated, we develop a principled Bayesian model of emotional valence. This formulation asserts that agents infer their valence state based on the expected precision of their action model—an internal estimate of overall model fitness (“subjective fitness”). This index of subjective fitness can be estimated within any environment and exploits the domain generality of second-order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). We show how maintaining internal valence representations allows the ensuing affective agent to optimize confidence in action selection preemptively. Valence representations can in turn be optimized by leveraging the (Bayes-optimal) updating term for subjective fitness, which we label affective charge (AC). AC tracks changes in fitness estimates and lends a sign to otherwise unsigned divergences between predictions and outcomes. We simulate the resulting affective inference by subjecting an in silico affective agent to a T-maze paradigm requiring context learning, followed by context reversal. This formulation of affective inference offers a principled account of the link between affect, (mental) action, and implicit metacognition. It characterizes how a deep biological system can infer its affective state and reduce uncertainty about such inferences through internal action (i.e., top-down modulation of priors that underwrite confidence). Thus, we demonstrate the potential of active inference to provide a formal and computationally tractable account of affect. Our demonstration of the face validity and potential utility of this formulation represents the first step within a larger research program. Next, this model can be leveraged to test the hypothesized role of valence by fitting the model to behavioral and neuronal responses.

We provide a proof of principle for an evolutionary systems theory (EST) of depression. This theory suggests that normative depressive symptoms counter socioenvironmental volatility by increasing interpersonal support via social signalling and that this response depends upon the encoding of uncertainty about social contingencies, which can be targeted by neuromodulatory antidepressants. We simulated agents that committed to a series of decisions in a social two-arm bandit task before and after social adversity, which precipitated depressive symptoms. Responses to social adversity were modelled under various combinations of social support and pharmacotherapy. The normative depressive phenotype responded positively to social support and simulated treatments with antidepressants. Attracting social support and administering antidepressants also alleviated anhedonia and social withdrawal, speaking to improvements in interpersonal relationships. These results support the EST of depression by demonstrating that following adversity, normative depressed mood preserved social inclusion with appropriate interpersonal support or pharmacotherapy.

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of ‘predicting precision’ and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that “I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception”. We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the ‘other agent’ is ‘me’ (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.

Integrating neurons into digital systems may enable performance infeasible with silicon alone. Here, we develop DishBrain, a system that harnesses the inherent adaptive computation of neurons in a structured environment. In vitro neural networks from human or rodent origins are integrated with in silico computing via a high-density multielectrode array. Through electrophysiological stimulation and recording, cultures are embedded in a simulated game-world, mimicking the arcade game "Pong." Applying implications from the theory of active inference via the free energy principle, we find apparent learning within five minutes of real-time gameplay not observed in control conditions. Further experiments demonstrate the importance of closed-loop structured feedback in eliciting learning over time. Cultures display the ability to self-organize activity in a goal-directed manner in response to sparse sensory information about the consequences of their actions, which we term synthetic biological intelligence. Future applications may provide further insights into the cellular correlates of intelligence.

In our everyday lives, we are often required to follow a conversation when background noise is present (“speech-in-noise” perception). Speech-in-noise perception varies widely—and people who are worse at speech-in-noise perception are also worse at fundamental auditory grouping, as assessed by figure-ground tasks. Here, we examined the cortical processes that link difficulties with speech-in-noise perception to difficulties with figure-ground perception using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We found strong evidence that the earliest stages of the auditory cortical hierarchy (left core and belt areas) are similarly disinhibited when speech-in-noise and figure-ground tasks are more difficult (i.e., at target-to-masker ratios corresponding to 60% than 90% thresholds)—consistent with increased cortical gain at lower levels of the auditory hierarchy. Overall, our results reveal a common neural substrate for these basic (figure-ground) and naturally relevant (speech-in-noise) tasks—which provides a common computational basis for the link between speech-in-noise perception and fundamental auditory grouping.

The selective destruction of large-scale brain networks by pathogenic protein spread is a ubiquitous theme in neurodegenerative disease. Characterising the circuit architecture of these diseases could illuminate both their pathophysiology and the computational architecture of the cognitive processes they target. However, this is challenging using standard neuroimaging techniques. Here we addressed this issue using a novel technique—spectral dynamic causal modelling—that estimates the effective connectivity between brain regions from resting-state fMRI data. We studied patients with semantic dementia—the paradigmatic disorder of the brain system mediating world knowledge—relative to healthy older individuals. We assessed how the effective connectivity of the semantic appraisal network targeted by this disease was modulated by pathogenic protein deposition and by two key phenotypic factors, semantic impairment and behavioural disinhibition. The presence of pathogenic protein in SD weakened the normal inhibitory self-coupling of network hubs in both antero-mesial temporal lobes, with development of an abnormal excitatory fronto-temporal projection in the left cerebral hemisphere. Semantic impairment and social disinhibition were linked to a similar but more extensive profile of abnormally attenuated inhibitory self-coupling within temporal lobe regions and excitatory projections between temporal and inferior frontal regions. Our findings demonstrate that population-level dynamic causal modelling can disclose a core pathophysiological feature of proteinopathic network architecture—attenuation of inhibitory connectivity—and the key elements of distributed neuronal processing that underwrite semantic memory.

Research in clinical neuroscience is founded on the idea that a better understanding of brain (dys)function will improve our ability to diagnose and treat neurological and psychiatric disorders. In recent years, neuroscience has converged on the notion that the brain is a 'prediction machine,' in that it actively predicts the sensory input that it will receive if one or another course of action is chosen. These predictions are used to select actions that will (most often, and in the long run) maintain the body within the narrow range of physiological states consistent with survival. This insight has given rise to an area of clinical computational neuroscience research that focuses on characterizing neural circuit architectures that can accomplish these predictive functions, and on how the associated processes may break down or become aberrant within clinical conditions. Here, we provide a brief review of examples of recent work on the application of predictive processing models of brain function to study clinical (psychiatric) disorders, with the aim of highlighting current directions and their potential clinical utility. We offer examples of recent conceptual models, formal mathematical models, and applications of such models in empirical research in clinical populations, with a focus on making this material accessible to clinicians without expertise in computational neuroscience. In doing so, we aim to highlight the potential insights and opportunities that understanding the brain as a prediction machine may offer to clinical research and practice.

Adaptive social behavior and mental well-being depend on not only recognizing emotional expressions but also, inferring the absence of emotion. While the neurobiology underwriting the perception of emotions is well studied, the mechanisms for detecting a lack of emotional content in social signals remain largely unknown. Here, using cutting-edge analyses of effective brain connectivity, we uncover the brain networks differentiating neutral and emotional body language. The data indicate greater activation of the right amygdala and midline cerebellar vermis to nonemotional as opposed to emotional body language. Most important, the effective connectivity between the amygdala and insula predicts people's ability to recognize the absence of emotion. These conclusions extend substantially current concepts of emotion perception by suggesting engagement of limbic effective connectivity in recognizing the lack of emotion in body language reading. Furthermore, the outcome may advance the understanding of overly emotional interpretation of social signals in depression or schizophrenia by providing the missing link between body language reading and limbic pathways. The study thus opens an avenue for multidisciplinary research on social cognition and the underlying cerebrocerebellar networks, ranging from animal models to patients with neuropsychiatric conditions.

It is a great pleasure to comment on Solms’ Rosetta Stone. This commentary focuses on the New Project as a natural science. As such, the New Project has to conform to natural laws. In the physical ...

Recent advances in molecular biology such as gene editing [1], bioelectric recording and manipulation [2] and live cell microscopy using fluorescent reporters [3], [4] - especially with the advent of light-controlled protein activation through optogenetics [5] - have provided the tools to measure and manipulate molecular signaling pathways with unprecedented spatiotemporal precision. This has produced ever increasing detail about the molecular mechanisms underlying development and regeneration in biological organisms. However, an overarching concept - that can predict the emergence of form and the robust maintenance of complex anatomy - is largely missing in the field. Classic (i.e., dynamic systems and analytical mechanics) approaches such as least action principles are difficult to use when characterizing open, far-from equilibrium systems that predominate in Biology. Similar issues arise in neuroscience when trying to understand neuronal dynamics from first principles. In this (neurobiology) setting, a variational free energy principle has emerged based upon a formulation of self-organization in terms of (active) Bayesian inference. The free energy principle has recently been applied to biological self-organization beyond the neurosciences [6], [7]. For biological processes that underwrite development or regeneration, the Bayesian inference framework treats cells as information processing agents, where the driving force behind morphogenesis is the maximization of a cell's model evidence. This is realized by the appropriate expression of receptors and other signals that correspond to the cell's internal (i.e., generative) model of what type of receptors and other signals it should express. The emerging field of the free energy principle in pattern formation provides an essential quantitative formalism for understanding cellular decision-making in the context of embryogenesis, regeneration, and cancer suppression. In this paper, we derive the mathematics behind Bayesian inference - as understood in this framework - and use simulations to show that the formalism can reproduce experimental, top-down manipulations of complex morphogenesis. First, we illustrate this 'first principle' approach to morphogenesis through simulated alterations of anterior-posterior axial polarity (i.e., the induction of two heads or two tails) as in planarian regeneration. Then, we consider aberrant signaling and functional behavior of a single cell within a cellular ensemble - as a first step in carcinogenesis as false 'beliefs' about what a cell should 'sense' and 'do'. We further show that simple modifications of the inference process can cause - and rescue - mis-patterning of developmental and regenerative events without changing the implicit generative model of a cell as specified, for example, by its DNA. This formalism offers a new road map for understanding developmental change in evolution and for designing new interventions in regenerative medicine settings.

The notions of degeneracy and redundancy are important constructs in many areas, ranging from genomics through to network science. Degeneracy finds a powerful role in neuroscience, explaining key aspects of distributed processing and structure–function relationships in the brain. For example, degeneracy accounts for the superadditive effect of lesions on functional deficits in terms of a “many-to-one” structure–function mapping. In this paper, we offer a principled account of degeneracy and redundancy, when function is operationalized in terms of active inference, namely, a formulation of perception and action as belief updating under generative models of the world. In brief, “degeneracy” is quantified by the “entropy” of posterior beliefs about the causes of sensations, while “redundancy” is the “complexity” cost incurred by forming those beliefs. From this perspective, degeneracy and redundancy are complementary: Active inference tries to minimize redundancy while maintaining degeneracy. This formulation is substantiated using statistical and mathematical notions of degenerate mappings and statistical efficiency. We then illustrate changes in degeneracy and redundancy during the learning of a word repetition task. Finally, we characterize the effects of lesions—to intrinsic and extrinsic connections—using in silico disconnections. These numerical analyses highlight the fundamental difference between degeneracy and redundancy—and how they score distinct imperatives for perceptual inference and structure learning that are relevant to synthetic and biological intelligence.

Changes in neurovascular coupling are associated with both Alzheimer's disease and vascular dementia in later life, but this may be confounded by cerebrovascular risk. We hypothesized that hemodynamic latency would be associated with reduced cognitive functioning across the lifespan, holding constant demographic and cerebrovascular risk. In 387 adults aged 18-85 (mean = 48.82), dynamic causal modeling was used to estimate the hemodynamic response function in the left and right V1 and V3-ventral regions of the visual cortex in response to a simple checkerboard block design stimulus with minimal cognitive demands. The hemodynamic latency (transit time) in the visual cortex was used to predict general cognitive ability (Full-Scale IQ), controlling for demographic variables (age, race, education, socioeconomic status) and cerebrovascular risk factors (hypertension, alcohol use, smoking, high cholesterol, BMI, type 2 diabetes, cardiac disorders). Increased hemodynamic latency in the visual cortex predicted reduced cognitive function (p

In this paper, we address reports of “selfless” experiences from the perspective of active inference and predictive processing. Our argument builds upon grounding self-modelling in active inference as action planning and precision control within deep generative models – thus establishing a link between computational mechanisms and phenomenal selfhood. We propose that “selfless” experiences can be interpreted as (rare) cases in which normally congruent processes of computational and phenomenal self-modelling diverge in an otherwise conscious system. We discuss two potential mechanisms – within the Bayesian mechanics of active inference – that could lead to such a divergence by attenuating the experience of selfhood: “self-flattening” via reduction in the depth of active inference and “self-attenuation” via reduction of the expected precision of self-evidence.

Highlights • New (hierarchical) generative model for linguistic interactions. • Builds on active inference formulations of dyadic interactions. • We simulate agents that ask and answer questions together. • Theta-gamma coupling emerges from belief updating under this framework., This paper presents a biologically plausible generative model and inference scheme that is capable of simulating communication between synthetic subjects who talk to each other. Building on active inference formulations of dyadic interactions, we simulate linguistic exchange to explore generative models that support dialogues. These models employ high-order interactions among abstract (discrete) states in deep (hierarchical) models. The sequential nature of language processing mandates generative models with a particular factorial structure—necessary to accommodate the rich combinatorics of language. We illustrate linguistic communication by simulating a synthetic subject who can play the ‘Twenty Questions’ game. In this game, synthetic subjects take the role of the questioner or answerer, using the same generative model. This simulation setup is used to illustrate some key architectural points and demonstrate that many behavioural and neurophysiological correlates of linguistic communication emerge under variational (marginal) message passing, given the right kind of generative model. For example, we show that theta-gamma coupling is an emergent property of belief updating, when listening to another.

Music is ubiquitous across human cultures - as a source of affective and pleasurable experience, moving us both physically and emotionally - and learning to play music shapes both brain structure and brain function. Music processing in the brain - namely, the perception of melody, harmony and rhythm - has traditionally been studied as an auditory phenomenon using passive listening paradigms. However, when listening to music, we actively generate predictions about what is likely to happen next. This enactive aspect has led to a more comprehensive understanding of music processing involving brain structures implicated in action, emotion and learning. Here we review the cognitive neuroscience literature of music perception. We show that music perception, action, emotion and learning all rest on the human brain's fundamental capacity for prediction - as formulated by the predictive coding of music model. This Review elucidates how this formulation of music perception and expertise in individuals can be extended to account for the dynamics and underlying brain mechanisms of collective music making. This in turn has important implications for human creativity as evinced by music improvisation. These recent advances shed new light on what makes music meaningful from a neuroscientific perspective.

Humans are highly proficient in learning about the environments in which they operate. They form flexible spatial representations of their surroundings that can be leveraged with ease during spatial foraging and navigation. To capture these abilities, we present a deep Active Inference model of goal-directed behavior, and the accompanying belief updating. Active Inference rests upon optimizing Bayesian beliefs to maximize model evidence or marginal likelihood. Bayesian beliefs are probability distributions over the causes of observable outcomes. These causes include an agent’s actions, which enables one to treat planning as inference. We use simulations of a geocaching task to elucidate the belief updating—that underwrites spatial foraging—and the associated behavioral and neurophysiological responses. In a geocaching task, the aim is to find hidden objects in the environment using spatial coordinates. Here, synthetic agents learn about the environment via inference and learning (e.g., learning about the likelihoods of outcomes given latent states) to reach a target location, and then forage locally to discover the hidden object that offers clues for the next location.

The first comprehensive treatment of active inference, an integrative perspective on brain, cognition, and behavior used across multiple disciplines. Active inference is a way of understanding sentient behavior—a theory that characterizes perception, planning, and action in terms of probabilistic inference. Developed by theoretical neuroscientist Karl Friston over years of groundbreaking research, active inference provides an integrated perspective on brain, cognition, and behavior that is increasingly used across multiple disciplines including neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. Active inference puts the action into perception. This book offers the first comprehensive treatment of active inference, covering theory, applications, and cognitive domains. Active inference is a “first principles” approach to understanding behavior and the brain, framed in terms of a single imperative to minimize free energy. The book emphasizes the implications of the free energy principle for understanding how the brain works. It first introduces active inference both conceptually and formally, contextualizing it within current theories of cognition. It then provides specific examples of computational models that use active inference to explain such cognitive phenomena as perception, attention, memory, and planning.

Although the increase in the use of dynamical modeling in the literature on cultural evolution makes current models more mathematically sophisticated, these models have yet to be tested or validated. This paper provides a testable deep active inference formulation of social behavior and accompanying simulations of cumulative culture in two steps: First, we cast cultural transmission as a bi-directional process of communication that induces a generalized synchrony (operationalized as a particular convergence) between the belief states of interlocutors. Second, we cast social or cultural exchange as a process of active inference by equipping agents with the choice of who to engage in communication with. This induces trade-offs between confirmation of current beliefs and exploration of the social environment. We find that cumulative culture emerges from belief updating (i.e., active inference and learning) in the form of a joint minimization of uncertainty. The emergent cultural equilibria are characterized by a segregation into groups, whose belief systems are actively sustained by selective, uncertainty minimizing, dyadic exchanges. The nature of these equilibria depends sensitively on the precision afforded by various probabilistic mappings in each individual's generative model of their encultured niche.

Objective. In the theoretical framework of predictive coding and active inference, the brain can be viewed as instantiating a rich generative model of the world that predicts incoming sensory data while continuously updating its parameters via minimization of prediction errors. While this theory has been successfully applied to cognitive processes—by modelling the activity of functional neural networks at a mesoscopic scale—the validity of the approach when modelling neurons as an ensemble of inferring agents, in a biologically plausible architecture, remained to be explored. Approach. We modelled a simplified cerebellar circuit with individual neurons acting as Bayesian agents to simulate the classical delayed eyeblink conditioning protocol. Neurons and synapses adjusted their activity to minimize their prediction error, which was used as the network cost function. This cerebellar network was then implemented in hardware by replicating digital neuronal elements via a low-power microcontroller. Main results. Persistent changes of synaptic strength—that mirrored neurophysiological observations—emerged via local (neurocentric) prediction error minimization, leading to the expression of associative learning. The same paradigm was effectively emulated in low-power hardware showing remarkably efficient performance compared to conventional neuromorphic architectures. Significance. These findings show that: (a) an ensemble of free energy minimizing neurons—organized in a biological plausible architecture—can recapitulate functional self-organization observed in nature, such as associative plasticity, and (b) a neuromorphic network of inference units can learn unsupervised tasks without embedding predefined learning rules in the circuit, thus providing a potential avenue to a novel form of brain-inspired artificial intelligence.

We apply Dynamic Causal Models to electrocorticogram recordings from two macaque monkeys performing a problem-solving task that engages working memory, and induces time-on-task effects. We thus provide a computational account of changes in effective connectivity within two regions of the fronto-parietal network, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the pre-supplementary motor area. We find that forward connections between the two regions increased in strength when task demands increased, and as the experimental session progressed. Similarities in the effects of task demands and time on task allow us to interpret changes in frontal connectivity in terms of increased attentional effort allocation that compensates cognitive fatigue.