Search

Many morally significant outcomes can be brought about only if several individuals contribute to them. However, individual contributions to collective outcomes often fail to have morally significant effects on their own. Some have concluded from this that it is permissible to do nothing. What I call ‘the problem of insignificant hands’ is the challenge of determining whether and when people are obligated to contribute. For this to be the case, I argue, the prospect of helping to bring about the outcome has to be good enough. Furthermore, the individual must be in a position to increase the probability of its being brought about to an appropriate extent. Finally, I argue that when too few are willing to contribute, people may have a duty to increase their number. Thus, someone can be obligated to contribute or to get others to contribute. This prospect account is consistent with Kantianism, contractualism and rule consequentialism but inconsistent with act consequentialism.

The article analyzes the aesthetic views of Friedrich Hölderlin, and, first, his understanding of the categories of the Beautiful and Sublime. Particular attention is paid to the comparison of Hölderlin's views with the aesthetic teachings of Plato and Immanuel Kant, who had a great influence on the German poet. The author of the article concludes that Hölderlin sought to unite the Platonian and Kantian understanding of beauty, seeing the similarity between the concepts of Plato and Kant in the question of the source of the beautiful. The central for aesthetics of Hölderlin was the problem of combining the spheres of aesthetic and ethical, to solve which he relied on the idea of Kant about beautiful as a symbol of the moral good and the Teaching of Plato on the climbing of the soul to the Good. Hölderlin pays less attention to the theoretical development of the category of the Sublime than to the comprehension of the category of the Beautiful, however, in his writings, the Sublime is present implicitly, and Hölderlin's understanding of this category is close, on the one hand, to Platonian, bringing together the Beautiful and the Sublime, and, on the other, to Kantian understanding, which brings the Sublime together with the idea of infinity, God and the sphere of morality. The conclusions to which Hölderlin comes, are far from Platonism, and from Kantianism. The poet concludes about the central and leading role of poetry and poetic gift in the knowledge of the world, which should be aesthetic. This indicates a romantic way to interpret Hölderlin's aesthetic concepts of Plato and Kant.

With respect to the views of dead thinkers, answers to many particular questions are often interpretive in Ronald Dworkin's sense. Such answers must attempt (1) to fit the materials to be interpreted and (2) to justify them, that is, to put them in the best constructive light. What looks like (1), or what purports to be (1), is often (2). That is, when a follower of Kant urges that ‘Kant would say x’, or that ‘Kantianism entails y’, the goal is to make the best constructive sense of Kant and Kantianism, not merely to adhere to something that Kant actually said. An approach to behavioral economics cannot claim to be Hayekian if it is rooted in enthusiasm for the abilities of planners to set prices and quantities, or if it sees the price system as a jumble of mistakes and errors. But within a not-so-narrow range, a variety of freedom-preserving approaches, alert to the epistemic limits of planners, can fairly claim to be Hayekian. Hayekian behavioral economics, I suggest, is an approach that (1) recognizes the importance and pervasiveness of individual errors, (2) emphasizes the epistemic limits of planners, (3) builds on individual choices rather than planner preferences, and (4) gives authority to choices made under epistemically favorable conditions, in which informational deficits and behavioral biases are least likely to be at work. The key step, of course, is (4). If it is properly elaborated, the resulting approach deserves respect. It is worthy of serious consideration, even if some of us, including the present author, would not entirely embrace it. In defending that proposition, the present essay responds to some critical remarks on behaviorally informed policy, including the resort to ‘explainawaytions’ (Matthew Rabin's term) for behavioral findings.

Many people believe that animals possess moral status, but human beings possess higher moral status than animals. To try to identify a theoretical basis for this view, Robert Nozick proposed Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People. The present manuscript evaluates Nozick’s proposal by identifying the tradeoffs in welfare that it permits in medical research with animals and assessing whether those tradeoffs are indeed permissible. This analysis suggests that at least some deontological side constraints apply to the treatment of sentient animals, hence, Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People is mistaken. Because Nozick’s proposal represents a prominent attempt to provide a theoretical basis for the common belief that human beings possess higher moral status than animals, this conclusion is noteworthy in its own right. Moreover, by granting equal moral weight to the interests of animals, but reserving deontological side constraints for human beings, Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People offers one of the more plausible bases for the claim that there are degrees of moral status among those who matter morally. The manuscript thus ends by considering the implications of the present analysis for the possibility that moral status comes in degrees.

This study aims to adapt the light triad scale of participants to Turkish. The research carried out for this purpose includes the validity and reliability process in the scale adaptation stage. In this context, an application was made to 139 participants who received postgraduate education in different branches in the field of physical education and sports sciences. The scale developed by Kaufman, Yaden, Hyde, and Tsukayama (2019) consists of 12 items. It consists of three sub-factors: belief in humanity, humanism, and Kantianism. The data collected with the language validity scale were processed into the SPSS-25 package program. Item-total correlation analysis was performed to test the internal validity of the items on the scale. In order to test the confirmation of the previously defined structure of the scale, confirmatory factor analysis was performed using the AMOS-25 package program. Cronbach Alpha and Gutmann coefficients were calculated in testing the reliability analysis of the scale. In the study, it was concluded that previously defined structure was confirmed and the items were distinctive, and their internal validity was ensured within the Turkish adaptation of the three-factor, 12-item light triad scale. It was determined that the reliability coefficients of the sub-factors and general of the scale are at an acceptable level. İt was concluded that the 3-factor, 12-item structure of the light triad scale, which was adapted into Turkish, was valid and reliable. The structure of the scale adapted within the scope of the research can be retested in larger samples and in each branch., Bu araştırmada katılımcıların aydınlık üçlü ölçeğinin Türkçe’ye uyarlamasını yapmak amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaç bağlamında yapılan araştırma ölçek uyarlama aşamasında geçerlik ve güvenirlik sürecini içermektedir. Bu bağlamda beden eğitimi ve spor bilimleri alanında farklı branşlarda lisansüstü eğitim gören 139 katılımcıya uygulama yapılmıştır. Kaufman, Yaden, Hyde ve Tsukayama (2019) tarafından geliştirilen ölçek toplam 12 maddeden oluşmaktadır. İnsanlığa inanç, insancılık ve kantçılık olmak üzere üç alt faktörden oluşmaktadır. Dil geçerliği sağlanan ölçek ile toplanan veriler SPSS-25 paket programına işlenmiştir. Ölçekteki maddelerin iç geçerliğinin test edilmesinde madde toplam korelasyon analizi yapılmıştır. Ölçeğin daha önceden tanımlanan yapısının doğrulanma durumunun test edilmesi için AMOS-25 paket programı kullanılarak doğrulayıcı faktör analizi yapılmıştır. Ölçeğe ait iç tutarlığa dayalı güvenirlik analizlerinin test edilmesinde Cronbach Alpha ve Gutmann katsayıları hesaplanmıştır. Yapılan araştırmada üç faktörlü 12 maddelik aydınlık üçlü ölçeğinin Türkçe uyarlamasında daha önceden tanımlanan yapının doğrulandığı maddelerin ayrıt edici ve iç geçerliklerinin sağlandığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Ölçeğe ait alt faktörlerin ve genelinin güvenirlik katsayılarının kabul edilebilir düzeyde olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Sonuç olarak Türkçe uyarlaması yapılan aydınlık üçlü ölçeğinin 3 faktörlü 12 maddelik yapısının geçerli ve güvenilir bir şekilde çalıştığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Araştırma kapsamında uyarlaması yapılan ölçeğin çok daha büyük örneklemlerde ve her bir branş bazında yapısının doğrulanma durumu bir daha test edilebilir.

Drawing on the results of contemporary Russian Buddhist studies, the authors problematize such well-established ideas as the status of “I”, understanding of nirvana, the denial of the absolute, etc. It is shown that these concepts are not so unambiguous, they need to be clarified and deepened; they can have a contradictory dialectical character, this is especially true of such Mahayana schools as the Tathagatagarbha and the Vajrayana. The analysis of these problematic concepts and their clarification are necessary for an adequate understanding of both Buddhism in its historical development and the history of philosophy as a whole. The authors reveal the unanimity of views of contemporary Russian Buddhologists on the need to distinguish between the empirical and the possible absolute “Self” in Buddhism, as well as to outline the difference in their ontological statuses. The article also provides a comparison with the concepts of “Self” in Western philosophical schools of thought, especially in the criticism of Immanuel Kant. The researchers note both the commonality of transcendental beliefs in Buddhism and Kantianism, and the difference in attitude to metaphysics, understanding of the spiritual and ethical. They consider apophatism in definition of nirvana and the transcendent and immanent nature of Buddhism in comparison with other teachings, primarily Christianity. The revealed problematicity of determining the fundamental principles and concepts of Mahayana requires further in-depth study of the history of the development of the philosophy of Buddhism.

The article presents a critical analysis of the influence of I. Kant's ideas on the work of analytical philosophers. It is substantiated the thesis on the independence of Kantian ontology from transcendental epistemology. The article investigated possible areas of integration for various aspects of Kantian ontology and epistemology in the theories of a number of analytical philosophers (P. F. Strawson, W. V. O. Quine), who were directly influenced by I. Kant's ideas. A semantic analysis of the concepts they use does not confirm the hypothesis about the evolutionary influence of Kantian transcendental epistemology on the ontological aspects of the works of analytical philosophers (ontology of language, logical-semantic concepts, notions of proposition and modality, categories of particulars and universals)

It is widely affirmed that human beings have irreplaceable valuable, and that we owe it to them to treat them accordingly. Many theorists have been drawn to Kantianism because they think that it alone can capture this intuition. One aim of this paper is to show that this is a mistake, and that Kantianism cannot provide an independent rational vindication, nor even a fully illuminating articulation, of irreplaceability. A further aim is to outline a broadly Aristotelian view that provides a more fitting theoretical framework for this appealing conception of human value. This critique of Kantianism extends to contemporary theorists with a broadly Kantian orientation, including Christine Korsgaard, Stephen Darwall and John Rawls. The problem with these views, at heart, is that they attempt to ground morality in respect alone. Yet it is love, not respect, that brings irreplaceability into view. The paper closes with a sketch of a virtue-theoretic theory that follows Aquinas in taking love to be a master virtue that refines the other virtues so as to ensure a continuous and practically efficacious sensitivity to the irreplaceable value of fellow human beings.

The article considers the first experience of interpretation and criticism of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge on the part of neo-scholastic thinkers in 1st half of the 19th century. It is shown that the transition from confessional polemics, which hadn’t philosophical in­terpretation, to the presentation and analysis of Kantian epistemology in Cesare Baldinotti’s treatise “Tentaminum metaphysicorum” (1817), when scholar takes an under­standing of Kantianism as radical skepticism. At the same time, he left unanswered ques­tions about what type of traditional concepts Kantianism refers, and how it can be de­scribed in the language of scholasticism. The first problem was solved by the Italian thinker Gaetano Sanseverino, who tried to correlate Kantianism with models traditionally opposed to scholasticism (like averroism). The second problem was solved by Jaime Balmes and Joseph Kleutgen, who outlined the boundaries of the compromise between scholasticism and Kantianism, trying to describe Criticism in terms of Thomism and show possible intersection points between these doctrines. As a result of these efforts, it becomes clear that the mechanical transfer of solutions developed in medieval scholas­ticism to the problems of modern European philosophy is not a successful polemic strat­egy. It was necessary to update the scholastic philosophy in a modern European context, which was subsequently carried out by Matteo Liberatore and the Neo-Thomists who fol­lowed him.

Objective: The light triad personality results from a positive attitude towards others, which is contrasted with the dark triad personality. This study aimed to analyze the managers' Kantianism, humanity and faith in humanity in the government structures of the country to develop managers who have a human not a tool attitude towards subordinates.Methods: This study is an applied one in terms of purpose and it is a descriptive survey study in terms of data gathering. The population of this study was the staff of one of the governmental agencies of the Ministry of Energy. According to Krejcie Morgan table, the sample size was 256 persons and a random sampling method was used. The data analysis method was structural equations modeling with the least-squares approach using Smart PLS2.6 software.Results: Results of the research hypotheses showed that dimensions of Kantianism and humanity had significant effects on perceived organizational support, but the hypothesis suggesting the significant effect of faith in humanity on perceived organizational support was rejected. The moderating role of leader-member exchange in the relationship between Kantianism and humanity on perceived organizational support was confirmed, but this variable was not a significant moderator in the relationship between faith in humanity and perceived organizational support of employees.Conclusion: The Kantianism personality of the leader and his humanity, considering the quality of the relationship with his followers, causes appreciation and valuable behaviors, including perceived organizational support by followers. But since in the dimension of faith in humanity, the goal and audience are all human beings and not just followers of the leader, the hypothesis relating this variable to perceived organizational support was rejected

Purpose.The purpose of the study is to show the connection of romanticism with the anthropological doctrine that goes back to Hegelianism and Kantianism, and at the same time – with the concepts of the future, structuralism and postmodernism.Theoretical basis.The man is a central figure of the Romantic literary, therefore it makes sense to single out romantic human anthropological doctrine and the image of man associated with a specific historical and cultural era called the "epoch of romanticism"; to show that many romantic philosophical positions remained relevant to the basic foundations of contemporary anthropological research and coincide with it in analytical and critical thinking about a man, a person, his historical and evolutionary fate.Originality.The romantic worldview determined the specifics of anthropological discourse, both logical and illogical, remaining symbols and attaching, as for example, a real historical anecdote, a popular history, a philosophical thought, a myth, a famous literary episode and the arts multiplied by creative inspiration and imagination. This tendency determined the fragmentation of thinking and the scientific image of man as a dual being, nevertheless, presented and described in all the variety of relations with the world and with himself, that allows us to call this area of thought "the romantic human science".Conclusions.Structural analysis of numerous romantic texts allows us to draw the following conclusion: with mythopoetic imagery and anthropological thought about a man, romantic writers introduced the reader to any wisdom, to philosophical understanding of their human essence, to past and modern teachings, in a way processed antique, medieval and enlightening views, in which an important place was given to reflections on the place of man in nature, society, and history. Correlating the well-known statements about a person as a descendant of the "old Adam", "person", "personality", "soul", with the modern idea of historical and social development, about the evolution of the consciousness of a person who revealed himself as an individual in modern times, with scientific and aesthetic views, the writers of the first half of the XIX century gave romantic thought anthropological meaning and, in fact, laid the foundations of historical, social, psychological, cultural and psychoanalytic anthropology.

The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism” and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to introduce this term in the classification of philosophy of the XX century with the appropriateness of building the model of “Kantianism - Neo-Kantianism - Neo-Neo-Kantianism - Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's “Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the semantically correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kantianism, the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early (classical) and late (“correct”). Neo-Kantianism shows the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or Hans-Michael Baumgartner.

The article deals with the interpretation of Kant’s theory of knowledge by Matteo Liberatore, a major representative of Neo-Scholastics in the middle of the 19th century, in his treatise Della conoscenza intellettuale (1858). It is shown that his study of to Kant was conditioned by a number of tasks that were solved by Neo-Scholastics, i. e. (1) apologetic: overcoming Kant’s criticism of theological argumentation; (2) critical: refuting the concurrent doctrines like Ontologism, Hermesianism, etc.; (3) conceptual: actualising scholastic philosophy in the context of the issues of Modern Time. A range of responses given by Liberatore’s predecessors (G. Sanseverino, J. Balmes, J. Kleutgen) could not adequately present and eff ectively substantiate the Thomist theory of knowledge. Liberatore solved that problem on the basis of a consistent reconstruction of Aquinas’ epistemology as part of the questions posed by the theories of knowledge in Modern Time. Taking into account the break in continuity between scholasticism and Modern European philosophy (for which Descartes is responsible), Liberatore notes that the subject content of both types of concepts is the same, although the method of determining the sources of knowledge diff ers. In particular, Liberatore denies the need to assume the original givenness of a certain content (innate ideas) or forms of constituting objects (a priori forms) that mediate the relationship of subject and the objective world. On the contrary, Liberatore assumes only the actual capacity of knowledge as a substantial quality of the rational soul, but it is devoid of content independent of the known reality (tabula rasa); it is formed due to a cognitive mechanism of abstractions and mediations (which Liberatore, like Aquinas and other scholastics, describes as intellectus agens et patiens), driven by aff ections on the part of objects. According to Liberatore, it is a mistake to give this mechanism its own place and a special non-objective content that becomes the focus of knowledge and obscures reality. However, this criticism of Kantianism did not mean that certain aspects of this theory could not be integrated as counter-arguments into Neo-Scholastic epistemology. Liberatore laid the ground for further research and interpretation of Kant’s philosophy by Catholic intellectuals.

This paper offers a reading of Sharon Sliwinski’s Mandela’s Dark Years: A Political Theory of Dreaming. Sliwinski reflects on Nelson Mandela’s dream-life while he was incarcerated on Robben Island, and the ways in which his dreams, which staged for him the affect of racial oppression, may have contributed to his judgment of apartheid and his concept of freedom. While acknowledging the productivity of this framing of Mandela’s dream-life—it should interest anyone concerned with political subjectivity, sovereignty, and modes of resistance—the paper develops two lines of critique. The first underlines the political implications of two Kantian concepts Sliwinski utilises to characterise Mandela’s intellectual contribution to the world: the sublime and enlarged thought, both of which are part of a discourse on disinterested reflection and aesthetic judgment. The second offers a psychoanalytic formulation of Mandela’s dreams different to the one Sliwinski proposes, placing childhood wishes, the death drive, and the postal system more centrally than they are in Mandela’s Dark Years. Linking these two lines, the objectives here are: to reconsider a certain Kantianism within psychoanalysis, and to abide by what in Mandela’s thought might trouble disinterested reflection and implicate it, as well as any psychoanalytic approach to dreams of freedom, in the very violence against which Mandela fought. Ultimately, it is an argument for a postcolonial psychoanalysis that might learn from Mandela’s example.

PurposeThe main goal of this paper is to provide us with a more systematic framework for examining the moral background of markets.Design/methodology/approachThe paper makes an attempt to put forward a way of market evaluation relying upon the three major moral theories of utilitarianism, deontology (Kantianism) and virtue ethics. Specifically, by using these three basic pillars, an “evaluation triangle” is constructed in order to examine various crucial moral aspects of markets' functioning.FindingsThe paper examines some significant distortions with respect to the three above-mentioned triangle's sides, using also examples from the real world. The paper also discusses the main findings from the previous analysis, stressing also emphasis on some crucial factors with respect to the triangle's functioning, such as the role of culture and time.Originality/valueMainstream economic theory, with a very few exceptions, does not acknowledge the interwovenness of economic behavior and morality, adopting the fact/value dichotomy underlying modern science. Accordingly, most economists usually avoid answering questions concerning ethical topics. The market system, however, has a direct effect on our everyday lives, so it is crucial that a systematic method of moral assessment can be proposed. Thus, this paper seeks to promote the dialogue with respect to the interconnection between economic and moral issues.

Russian philosophy underwent many phases: Westernism, Slavophilism, nihilism, pre-revolutionary religious philosophy, and dialectical materialism or Soviet philosophy. At first sight, each one of these phases seems antithetical to the preceding one. Yet, they all appear to have in common a certain negative attitude towards the subjectivism of Kantianism and German Idealism. In contrast to the latter, Russian philosophy typically displays a tendency towards ontologism, which is generally defined as the view that there is such a thing as being in itself, i.e., being independent of cognition, and that this being is to some extent knowable. We discern, in these otherwise diametrically opposed movements, an underlying ontologism that constitutes a common thread running in a straight line through the history of Russian philosophy. In this article, I provide an overview of Russian ontologism.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often associated with a certain political mode of relating to another, where a person (“a Citizen”) is a locus of enforceable demands. I claim that Rousseau also articulated an affective mode of relating to another, where a person is seen as the locus of a kind of value (expressive of their being an independent point of view) that cannot be demanded. These are not isolated sides of a distinction, for the political mode constitutes a solution to certain problems that the affective mode encounters in common social circumstances, allowing us to see how these modes might be distinct while the political nevertheless shapes the affective. I contrast this approach with that of some contemporary Kantian writers on affective phenomena (Sarah Buss on shame, and J. David Velleman on love) who, for reasons rooted in Kant’s moral philosophy, have modeled affective ways of relating to others on duty. I claim that Rousseau’s writing provides us with a way of capturing the correct insight of these accounts—that some of our emotional responses to others are ways of appreciating their personhood—while avoiding the characteristic implausibilities of their close association between the affective and the political.

In the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories – Kantianism, Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism – are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled in what he calls ‘Triple Theory’. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on correspondence with Parfit to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider Parfit's efforts, in the third volume of On What Matters, to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the triple theory, in part by treating impartial rationality as an external rival to morality, in much the same way that egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that Parfit's attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success.

Le moi valéryen est une simple condition de connaissance qui sert à assurer l’unité de la conscience. Vide et inconnaissable, il est presque identique au sujet transcendantal de Kant. Sous l’impulsion de son penchant nihiliste, Valéry renie cette influence et finit par détruire l’unité de son moi en effectuant de multiples divisions., The Valeryan Self is a simple condition of knowledge which serves to ensure the unity of consciousness. Empty and unknowable, it is almost identical to Kant’s transcendental subject. Under the impulse of his nihilistic inclination, Valery denies this influence and ends up destroying the unity of his ego by carrying out multiple divisions.

This bachelor’s thesis aims to give a brief overview of the aesthetic theories of Immanuel Kant and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Kant’s main goal with his Critique of Judgment was to complete his system of critical philosophy by finding a link between nature and morality in the faculty of reflective judgment. Kant’s descendants in the spirit of his critical philosophy disregarded everything which did not satisfy the criteria of natural sciences as subjective. Therefore, Gadamer blames Kant for the advent of what he calls “aesthetic consciousness”, a view which separates a work of art from its deeper meaning and place in history, only emphasizing its immediate, empirically perceived aesthetic qualities. Thus Gadamer claims that because of this, it is now significantly more difficult for people to experience the type of truth that is inherent in art, which leads people towards self-understanding. Kristin Gjesdal however claims that Gadamer has misconstrued Kant’s views. Her main criticism towards Gadamer is that he has not properly understood Kant’s views on the experience of natural beauty, which Kant views as intrinsically meaningful. Gadamer on the other hand finds nature to be hermeneutically empty, because one is able to assign any kind of meaning to nature according to their subjective mood., Gadameri filosoofia peamiseks taotluseks on näidata, et kunstis leidub teatud sorti tõde, mis võimaldab avardada meie maailma- ja enesemõistmist ning suudab inimest muuta. Moodsa loodusteaduse arenedes ja Kanti filosoofia vaimus said aga hoopis loodusteadused tõe etaloniks. Kunsti hakati selle taustal vaatlema kui pelgalt esteetilist nähtust, mis pakub inimestele vaid esteetilisi elamusi. Taolist kunstikogemust nimetab Gadamer esteetiliseks teadvuseks. Esteetilise teadvuse juures taandatakse teose tähendus vaid selle esteetilistele omadustele, mis on lahutatud teose ajaloolisest kontekstist. Gadamer vastandub sellisele kunstikäsitlusele, sest Gadameri järgi on kunst ajalooliselt kujunenud mõistuse ja vaimu tulemus., https://www.ester.ee/record=b5507164

Uppsatsens syfte är att utreda hur den kantianska rätten till liv förhåller sig till Europakonventionens. Frågorna som använts för att uppnå syftet är hur både kantianismen och Europakonventionen förhåller sig till abort, dödsstraff, eutanasi och suicid. Metoden som har använts för att jämför kantianismen med Europakonventionen är en komparativ metod och för att tolka Kants texter används hermeneutik. Hur förhåller sig kantianismen till Europakonventionen gällande rätten till liv, utifrån abort, dödsstraff, eutanasi och suicid? Kantianismen har en långt mycket striktare syn på vad som är rätt och vad som är fel. Och de mänskliga rättigheterna härleds inte från en politisk konsensus. Det går att räkna ut vad som är en rättighet och vad som inte är det. Vad som är en plikt och vad som inte är det. Vilket självfallet skiljer sig från Europakonventionen som är ett så kallat levande instrument. Den är föränderlig och kantianismen är rigorös. Frågan om legaliteten bakom eutanasi tillhör konventionsstaterna. Likaså frågan om selektiv abort och när ett foster anses börja livet. Konventionen tillåter självmord och terapeutiska aborter och förbjuder dödsstraff kategoriskt. I jämförelse tillåter kantianismen dödsstraff för att straffa mördare och den tillåter även att göra en terapeutisk abort. Kantianismen förbjuder däremot självmord och eutanasi. Selektiv abort kan vara tillåtet beroende på hur samhället och omgivningen behandlar en havande eller någon med barn. Dock är ett foster likväl en människa och förtjänar en rätt till att leva. The purpose of the thesis is to investigate how the Kantian right to life relates to the European Convention on Human Rights. The questions used to achieve the purpose are how both Kantianism and the European Convention relate to abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, and suicide. The method that has been used to compare Kantianism with the European Convention is a comparative method and hermeneutics is used to interpret Kant's texts. How does Kantianism relate to the European Convention on the Right to Life, based on abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia and suicide? Kantianism has a much stricter view of what is right and what is wrong. And human rights are not derived from a political consensus. It is possible to calculate what is a human right and what is not. What is a duty and what is not. Which of course differs from the European Convention, which is a so-called living instrument. It is changeable and Kantianism is rigorous. The question of the legality of euthanasia belongs to the States Parties. Likewise, the question of selective abortion and when a fetus is considered to begin life. The convention allows suicide and therapeutic abortions and categorically prohibits the death penalty. In comparison, Kantianism allows the death penalty to punish murderers and it also allows for a therapeutic abortion. Kantianism, on the other hand, forbids suicide and euthanasia. Selective abortion may be allowed depending on how society and the environment treats a pregnant woman or someone with children. However, a fetus is nevertheless a human being and deserves a right to live.

In this paper, I argue that within Kantianism, widespread indifference of the global rich to the suffering of the global poor should be understood as resulting at least partly from vice. Kant had much more to say about vice than is often recognized, and it forms a crucial part of his moral anthropology. Kantians should thus attend to the ways in which vice functions as a practical obstacle to fulfilling duties of beneficence. In vice-fueled indifference, inclinations associated with self-love and self-conceit work their way into our wills, interfering with our moral commitments by impeding our ability to recognize moral requirements and our motivation to act on them. Vice distorts our reasoning in ways that promote self-deception and rationalization about the extent to which we are fulfilling moral demands. Kantian vice also has social dimensions. I argue that widespread indifference exacerbates our individual vices through social norms and practices that legitimize ignoring the needs of others. I conclude by offering some potential remedies to indifference within the Kantian framework.

The purpose of this paper is to question the legitimacy of the intervention that determines Kant's philosophy over Maine's philosophy of Biran. We will maintain, in this research, that Biranism is not a kind of Kantism and that the French philosopher's oppositions to the German philosopher are more striking than the apparent compatibility between them. To prove this proposition, we will demonstrate that the Biranian theses are essentially Biranian, contesting the words of our Lachelier that “Maine de Biran is Kant”, and also that Maine de Biran was never a Kantian in strict sense, following a path opposite to that of the German philosopher, distancing himself from his philosophy and from any determinant influence of Kant. O objetivo deste artigo é questionar a legitimidade da intervenção determinante da filosofia de Kant sobre a filosofia de Maine de Biran. Sustentaremos, nesta pesquisa, que o biranismo não é uma espécie de kantismo e que as oposições do filósofo francês ao filósofo alemão são mais contundentes do que as aparentes compatibilidades entre elas. Para comprovar essa proposição, demonstraremos que as teses biranianas são essencialmente biranianas, contestando as palavras de Lachelier de que “Maine de Biran é o nosso Kant”, e, também, que Maine de Biran nunca foi um kantiano em stricto sensu, seguindo uma via oposta à do filósofo alemão, distanciando-se de sua filosofia e de qualquer influência determinante de Kant.

Este artículo busca proporcionar una descripción completa y fundamental de por qué los epítetos raciales y slurs similares son inmora-les, allá donde lo sean. Considera tres teorías prin-cipales, según las cuales, a grandes rasgos, son inmorales porque son dañinos (bienestarismo), porque socavan la autonomía (kantianismo) o porque son hostiles (un enfoque relacional poco discutido informado por ideas del Sur Glo-bal). Este artículo presenta nuevas objeciones a las dos primeras teorías y concluye a favor de la última justificación. Se muestra que considerar que los slurs son inmorales en la medida en que son hostiles captura las ventajas de las otras teo-rías evitando sus desventajas. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes in favour of the latter rationale. Deeming slurs to be wrong insofar as they are unfriendly is shown to capture the advantages of the other theories, while avoiding their disadvantages.

This article situates Roger Scruton in the tradition of Christian Platonism. It begins by revisiting Scruton’s reluctance to pursue theological speculation as it has been traditionally practised in...

BackgroundThe aim of the study was to examine the development and structural validation of the Polish version of the Light Triad Scale, which measures three factors: Faith in Humanity, Humanism, and Kantianism. This tool reflects caring and beneficent orienta-tion toward other people, which is demonstrated in everyday behaviour.Participants and procedureThe participants included 400 people aged between 18 and 80 (M = 29.17, SD = 10.60). To measure psychometric properties and for validation of the scale, we used the Polish Dirty Dozen scale and International Personality Item Pool-Big Five Aspect Scales.ResultsConfirmatory factor analysis, reliability analysis using α and ω coefficients, and two measures of validity (content and criterion validity) were applied. The statistical analyses confirmed an acceptable fit of the three-factor model. The α and ω reliability coef-ficients were satisfactory, with the highest value for Faith in Humanity, and the lowest one for Kantianism. The validity indices of CVR and CVI indicated that the Polish scale items fit well into the concept of the Light Triad.ConclusionsOverall, the Polish version of the Light Triad Scale proved to be a valuable and reliable tool which presents an innovative ap-proach to measuring positive features of personality and behaviour. Our results demonstrated that the scale as a whole has good psychometric properties that allow its use in further research.

This paper is devoted to the study of main ideas of philosophy of religion of W. M. L. de Wette (1780–1849), the German and Swiss Protestant theologian and biblical scholar. Two elements of de Wette’s work had a prolonged infl uence on the development of theology and religious studies, i.e. the original and fairly elaborate doctrine of the religious feeling and drafts of topics and methods of the planned scientifi c study of religion in the framework of theological knowledge. The article shows which place de Wette’s constructions occupy in the development of the German-language philosophy of religion of the 19th century. They are close to Fries’s ideas, though they do not go back to them in terms of their origin. De Wette states that the essence and source of religion are the unconveyable, the initially non-conscious feeling that emerges separately in each individual and has its foundation in the perception of the unity and the need for separate objects and phenomena. The natural and at the same time supernatural ability to feel the divine is also termed by de Wette the inner revelation. This complex feeling is comprised by several elements, i.e. the anticipation of the presence and activity in the fi nite world of the eternal, non-conditional, omnipotent Will; the anticipation of God’s kingdom on earth; full trust and self-off ering to God; awe in front of the beautiful and elevated in nature and culture. The feeling is initially image-related, then it is conceptualised by the power of reason on the collective level of community; its symbolisation generates religious institutions. De Wette’s contribution to the development of knowledge of religion is made up of his focus on making clear what religion is, his desire to reconstruct the initially non-conscious religious feeling by means of extremely strict introspection and refl ection; the claim that in order to study religion, one should master the language of its texts; the claim that it is necessary to study history of religion. The article shows that in its conception and methodology, de Wette’s doctrine foreshadows both the later-to-come liberal theology and the early projects in religious studies.

In this article we critically evaluate an argument against state-sanctioned euthanasia made by David Velleman in his 1992 paper 'Against the right to die'. In that article, Velleman argues that legalizing euthanasia is morally problematic as it will deprive eligible patients of the opportunity of staying 'alive by default'. That is to say, those patients who are rendered eligible for euthanasia as a result of legislative reform will face the burden of having to justify their continued existence to their epistemic peers if they are to be perceived as 'reasonable'. We discuss potential criticisms that could be made of the argument, and consider how a defender of the view might respond. Velleman's argument is particularly interesting as it is a consequentialist argument against state-sanctioned euthanasia, challenging the many consequentialist arguments that have been made in favour of legalizing the procedure. We conclude by suggesting that further research on the question of unfair burdens is important to adequately evaluating the potential harms of legalizing euthanasia for patients at the end of life.

Artykuł analizuje program filozoficzny Feliksa Jarońskiego, profesora Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, sformułowany w dwu pierwszych dziesięcioleciach wieku XIX. Ukazuje go na tle przemian w kulturze filozoficznej przełomu wieku XVIII i XIX, przede wszystkim w aspekcie oddziaływania szkockiej filozofii zdrowego rozsądku, kantyzmu i tradycjonalizmu, przełamującego minimalistyczne i sekularystyczne tendencje oświecenia. Ustosunkowuje się do dotychczasowych interpretacji i formułuje własną, łącząc dokonanie Jarońskiego z długim ciągiem philosophia recentiorum, zapoczątkowanej w połowie XVIII w., ale będącej standardem akademickim i na początku wieku XIX, choć stale modyfikowanej o asymilację zmieniających się autorytetów filozoficznych. Mimo jej eklektyzmu zachowała ona aspiracje maksymalistyczne (zachowując metafizykę) oraz otwarcie na religię, a nawet na chrystianizm. W końcu sygnalizująco zestawiono to dokonanie ze standardami kultury filozoficznej i naukowej początków wieku XXI, kwestionującej standardowy charakter naturalizmu ugruntowanego na ideale wąsko pojętej filozofii naukowej.

Suppose that a young athlete has just become quadriplegic. He expects to live several more decades, but out of self-interest he autonomously chooses to engage in physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). Some of us are unsure whether he or his physician would be acting rightly in ending his life. One basis for such doubt is the notion that persons have dignity in a Kantian sense. This paper probes responses that David Velleman and Frances Kamm have suggested to the question of whether participating in PAS or VAE to benefit oneself, as the young man might, respects the dignity of persons, specified in an orthodox Kantian way. Velleman claims that it does not, while Kamm insists that, in certain circumstances, it does. I argue against Kamm's position. I go on to contend that while orthodox Kantianism might provide a basis for moral concern regarding the case of the young quadriplegic, it suffers from two serious shortcomings. First, it implies that terminally ill patients are wrong to request VAE or engage in PAS to avoid intense suffering, at least when this suffering has not yet overwhelmed their reason. Second, orthodox Kantianism implies that it is wrong for physicians to withdraw such patients from life-sustaining treatments, even if they request it. To remedy these shortcomings, I sketch an unorthodox Kantian account of respect for the dignity of persons. This account promises to capture the idea that it would be morally problematic for doctors to help the young quadriplegic to die, but to avoid the shortcomings of an orthodox Kantian account.

Two books inaugurated the revival of Kantianism in German universities in the second half of the nineteenth century. Both works were exercises in the history of philosophy. And both took to the his...

We thus propose to criticize the subjective-anthropological conception of beauty and to define the meaning of an ontological conception of the beautiful while at the same time inquiring into an aesthetic conception of ontology from the standpoint of speculative realism. We discuss first the general character of Kantian aesthetics, considered as the founding moment of modern aesthetic subjectivism. The first section reviews Gadamer’s criticisms of Kantianism before exposing, in the second section, the reinterpretation made by some neorealist thinkers (Shaviro, Harman) of the Kantian conception of art and beauty and, more generally, of the meaning of aesthetics at large. Through this line of inquiry the third section exposes an aesthetic interpretation of the ‘principle of unreason’ introduced by Quentin Meillassoux. By way of conclusion, the fourth section examines the philosophical meaning of art and the general aims of an ontological aesthetic.

This chapter interrogates how Kantianism and utilitarianism propose to deal with the challenge supererogation presents. In order to facilitate this examination, Heyd’s description of this challenge as the twofold problem of supererogation—the meta-ethical and normative problems—is turned to. The meta-ethical problem arises because non-deontological moral theories such as utilitarianism are not based on duty, and so speaking of acts beyond duty becomes meaningless; while in deontological theories such as Kantianism, there is no space for supererogatory acts because they are not obligatory. The normative problem concerns the scope and limits of duty. Kantianism and utilitarianism attempt to assimilate supererogation by a two-fold strategy that broadly maps onto the meta-ethical and normative problems—a reduction of the supererogatory to the obligatory, and an extension of the limits of duty. I approach the former by examining Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. I argue that this distinction fails to reduce the supererogatory to the obligatory. I approach strategies to extend the scope of duty through a critical analysis of the life-saving analogy (LSA) Peter Singer presents in his 1972 essay ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’. I argue that this strategy fails because the principle underpinning the analogy—what I call the ‘sacrifice principle’—is not an a-theoretical principle as Singer claims, but a utilitarian principle. This is problematic because the findings from the previous chapter show that utilitarianism is an impartial moral theory, and impartialism is too morally-demanding on the agent. I conclude that neither Kantianism, nor utilitarianism, can satisfactorily assimilate supererogation, because both are impartial moral theories. The challenges that supererogation presents to moral theory in general, and to moral autonomy in particular remain as a result of this finding.

This chapter provides a brief history of Kantianism in Russia since the late eighteenth century and identifies the main themes of Kantianism in Russia. It considers the reasons for the uneven and intermittent spread of Kantianism, the main motives behind the fierce resistance to Kantianism within the framework of certain trends of Orthodox thought, and the ways in which this philosophical polemic was reflected in the Russian literature. The achievements of Russian Kantianism are analyzed with attention to both its undeniable merits and its weaknesses and inconsistencies. In addition, the scope and scale of Russian Kantianism will be compared with Schellingism and Hegelianism in Russia. On the basis of this comparison, I will argue against the stereotype that Russian philosophy is resistant to Kant.

I have argued that the failure of Kantianism and utilitarianism to solve the problems of supererogation in particular and moral-demandingness in general, arise on account of their impartialism. I now claim that moral enquiry within the analytic tradition proceeds chiefly along impartialist lines. This chapter argues that because continental philosophy does not rely on impartialism to support its claims about morality, and is more sensitive to situational, contextual and relational contingencies which allow the personal to play a more prominent and determinative role, it is better positioned to address the problem of moral-demandingness and offer a reconceptualisation of supererogation. This chapter is a segue between the argument presented in part one of this study—broadly representative of the analytic tradition—to the argument presented in Part II—broadly representative of the continental tradition. I explore some of the salient differences between the two traditions and then trace one paradigm of a methodology operative in continental philosophy—‘the possibility of impossibility’. This Derridean-inspired paradigm purports to demonstrate the paradoxes and limits of establishing the conditions for the meaning and application of certain philosophical concepts and language. Derrida’s idea of the undecidable decision is introduced as a way to elaborate on these (im)possible concepts. I then make the case that Emmanuel Levinas is the most well-suited continental philosopher to approach supererogation and moral-demandingness because his notion of infinite responsibility is a radical reinscription of moral-demandingness which attempts to dissolve all ethical boundaries, including the purportedly boundary between obligatory and supererogatory actions. I conclude by offering a short preview of my methodology in part two of the study: a Levinasian reinscription of certain concepts that featured in the first half of the study’s attempts to conceptualise supererogation—these being proximity, asymmetry and autonomy.

As opposed to Kantianism, phenomenology is neither premised on what sets humans apart from the other animals (rational cognition) nor on the fact of an initial difference that opens up a yawning gap between us and them. On the contrary, phenomenology takes what originally binds us all together as a starting point. It is not a question of whether species may initially be different from one another while unified by common goals which “diminish” or “partially fade” such differences, but rather that what constitutes the depth of our being (thus, our ontology) is shared by all of us animals, expressed, of course, according to the abilities of each species. Essentiality, both of humans and the rest of animals, goes back to corporeality and herein lies their ability to be “transcendental subject” which is something entirely biological and with no bearing on rational thinking.

В трагедии Пушкина «Моцарт и Сальери» одним из ключевых моментов является концепция художника и художественного творчества. В пушкинском тексте мы постоянно встречаем понятия, имеющие прямое отношение к этой теме: жречество, бессмертный гений, ремесло, божественность, служитель искусства, сын гармонии и другие. О природе творчества в пьесе высказывается в основном Сальери. Его концепция гениальности восходит к авторитетным источникам античности и раннего Нового времени. Один из наиболее важных источников — Иммануил Кант. Суждения Сальери и совпадают, и драматически не совпадают с кантовскими определениями гения. В лице Моцарта Сальери покушается на бессознательное природы, что влечёт за собой целый ряд парадоксов в позиции антагониста., In Pushkin's tragedy Mozart and Salieri, one of the key points is the concept of the artist and artistic creativity. In Pushkin's text, we constantly encounter concepts that are directly related to this topic: priesthood, immortal genius, craft, divinity, servant of art, son of harmony, and others. The nature of creativity in the play is mainly expressed by Salieri. His concept of genius goes back to the authoritative sources of antiquity and early Modern times. One of the most important sources is Immanuel Kant. Salieri's judgments both coincide and dramatically differ from Kant's definitions of genius. In the person of Mozart, Salieri attacks the unconscious of nature, which entails a number of paradoxes in the position of the antagonist.

portuguesO objetivo deste artigo e questionar a legitimidade da intervencao determinante da filosofia de Kant sobre a filosofia de Maine de Biran. Sustentaremos, nesta pesquisa, que o biranismo nao e uma especie de kantismo e que as oposicoes do filosofo frances ao filosofo alemao sao mais contundentes do que as aparentes compatibilidades entre elas. Para comprovar essa proposicao, demonstraremos que as teses biranianas sao essencialmente biranianas, contestando as palavras de Lachelier de que “Maine de Biran e o nosso Kant”, e, tambem, que Maine de Biran nunca foi um kantiano em stricto sensu, seguindo uma via oposta a do filosofo alemao, distanciando-se de sua filosofia e de qualquer influencia determinante de Kant. EnglishThe purpose of this paper is to question the legitimacy of the intervention that determines Kant's philosophy over Maine's philosophy of Biran. We will maintain, in this research, that Biranism is not a kind of Kantism and that the French philosopher's oppositions to the German philosopher are more striking than the apparent compatibility between them. To prove this proposition, we will demonstrate that the Biranian theses are essentially Biranian, contesting the words of our Lachelier that “Maine de Biran is Kant”, and also that Maine de Biran was never a Kantian in strict sense, following a path opposite to that of the German philosopher, distancing himself from his philosophy and from any determinant influence of Kant.

With respect to the views of dead thinkers, answers to many particular questions are often interpretive in Ronald Dworkin’s sense: such answers must attempt (1) to fit the materials to be interpreted and (2) to justify them, that is, to put them in the best constructive light. What looks like (1), or what purports to be (1), is often (2). That is, when a follower of Kant urges that “Kant would say x,” or that “Kantianism entails y,” the goal is to make the best constructive sense of Kant and Kantianism, not merely to follow something that Kant actually said. An approach to behavioral economics cannot claim to be Hayekian if it is rooted in enthusiasm for the abilities of planners to set prices and quantities, or if it sees the price system as a jumble of mistakes and errors. But within a not-so-narrow range, a variety of freedom-preserving approaches, alert to the epistemic limits of planners, can fairly claim to be Hayekian. Hayekian behavioral economics, I suggest, is an approach that (1) recognizes the importance and pervasiveness of individual errors, (2) emphasizes the epistemic limits of planners, (3) builds on individual choices rather than planner preferences, and (4) gives authority to choices made under epistemically favorable conditions, in which informational deficits and behavioral biases are least likely to be at work. The key step, of course, is (4). If it is properly elaborated, the resulting approach deserves respect, even if some of us, including the present author, would not entirely embrace it. In defending that proposition, the present essay responds to some critical remarks by Robert Sugden, including his resort to “explainawaytions” (Matthew Rabin’s term) for behavioral findings.

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason plays an important role for Stein’s understanding of phenomenology. It exemplifies for her an idealist position espoused by the later Husserl but denounced by Stein as a metaphysical conviction. Nevertheless, in her discussions of the philosophy of the natural sciences she returns many times to Kant to address the nature and experience of causality, and the status of the categories and space. She follows Reinach’s criticism of Kant for subjectivizing the a priori and argues that phenomenology is the way to liberate Kantianism from its uncritical elements. This chapter argues that her engagement with Kant occasions a clarification of her own metaphysical position as closer to that of Plato than that of Aristotle.

In this thesis I explore a novel context sensitive conceptualisation of civic duty according to which the conduct (or misconduct) of elected officials affects whether eligible voters feel either a duty to vote (DTV) or a duty to abstain (DTA). Specifically, I argue that under conditions of corruption the norm of electoral accountability may override peoples’ sense of DTV in which case they instead feel a DTA. This context sensitive account is contrasted with a Kantian account of civic duty according to which eligible voters feel a duty to always vote, regardless of contextual factors. The empirical results provides tentative support for the claim that corruption not only decreases eligible voters’ sense of DTV but also increases their sense of DTA. This thesis thus contributes not only to the advancement of the conceptualisation of civic duty in relation to voter turnout, but its results also has important implications for how the rational choice perspective approaches the cost/benefit analysis commonly associated with the voting decision. In the latter case these results indicate that abstainers too may act out of duty and can therefore be assumed to gain positive utility from their abstention. However, the possibility that abstention (just as voting) yields unique costs and benefits has to my knowledge never been acknowledged in the rational choice literature on voter turnout. I therefore conclude by presenting a novel suggestion of how the potential costs and benefits of abstention can be incorporated into the calculus of voting.

Obra ressenyada: Luciano ROCHA SANTANA, La teoría de los derechos animales de Tom Regan: Ampliando las fronteras de la comunidad moral y de los derechos más allá de lo humano. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc, 2018. El estudio de Luciano Rocha Santana ofrece un análisis detallado de la teoría de los derechos de los animales de Tom Regan. El libro sigue básicamente la estructura de la obra principal de Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, y analiza tanto los puntos de fuerza como las deficiencias de su teoría, examinando una gran cantidad de literatura y de posiciones filosóficas. La conclusión es que la teoría de Regan, pese a su inestimable contribución a la causa de la defensa de lo animales, es todavía insuficiente en relación a sus grandes ambiciones, pero también que, a pesar de esto, su enfoque en el derecho es el único que podría llevarnos a un cambio verdadero. This study by Luciano Rocha Santana proposes a detailed analysis of Tom Regan's theory of animal rights. The book basically follows the structure of Regan's main work, The Case for Animal Studies, and analyses both strengths and flaws of his theory, examining a great amount of literature and philosophical positions. The conclusion is that Regan's theory, despite his invaluable contribution to the cause of animal advocacy, is still insufficient in respect to its high ambitions, but also that, this notwithstanding, his focus on rights is the only one which could possibly lead to a real change.

It is common knowledge that the major representative of contemporary New Confucianism Mou Zongsan borrowed the concepts and framework of Kantian philosophy to reconstruct Confucianism on the one hand, and critiqued Kantian philosophy based on Confucian thought on the other hand. This displays a complicated relationship between Confucianism and Kantianism. This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first, I describe Mou’s life, educational background, and intellectual development. In the second, I sketch out how Mou borrowed the concepts and framework of Kantian philosophy to reconstruct Confucianism. Mou used Kant’s philosophical framework of “appearance and thing-in-itself” to reconstruct Confucian “moral metaphysics” (different from Kant’s “metaphysics of morals”), while also using Kant’s concept of autonomy to interpret Mengzi’s ethics as well as to distinguish lines of Song-Ming Confucianism. Kant proposed a theory of “the highest good” to justify the harmony between virtue and happiness. But Mou was dissatisfied with Kant’s thesis. In the third, I articulate Mou’s solution of this problem in terms of the “perfect teaching” in Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. The fourth section discusses how Mou interpreted the relationship between Confucian tradition and Chinese modernization, in particular the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. Finally I discuss Mou’s influences and criticisms directed against him.

The Catholic Church, from its earliest times, attempted to synthesize religious faith and human reason by appropriating the insights of Greek philosophy. Thereby, it hoped to root its teachings in the objective order of the universe. However, modern philosophy called into question the degree to which there is an objective, knowable order. In the face of this challenge, William James argued that one should focus directly on religious experience itself, rather than on doctrine, which, he believed, one could not rationally argue in a compelling way. In contrast, the leadership of the Catholic Church responded to the challenge by reasserting the classic synthesis of faith and reason, especially as found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. However, innovative Catholic thinkers, like Karl Rahner, tried to engage creatively the challenge of modern philosophy by giving more room, in their philosophy and theology, to religious experience. The efforts of theologians like Rahner have somewhat influenced the formal teachings of the Catholic Church. This, in turn, has positive ramifications for issues such as interreligious dialogue.