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Predictions of the distribution of groundfish species are needed to support ongoing marine spatial planning initiatives in Canadian Pacific waters. Data to inform species distribution models are available from several fishery-independent surveys. However, no single survey covers the entire region and different gear types are required to survey the range of relevant habitat. Here, we demonstrated a method for integrating presence–absence data across surveys and gear types that allows us to predict the coastwide distributions of 65 groundfish species in British Columbia. Our model leverages data from multiple surveys to estimate how species respond to environmental gradients while accounting for differences in survey catchability. We find that this method has two main benefits: (1) it increases the accuracy of predictions in data-limited surveys and regions while having negligible impacts on accuracy when data are already sufficient, and (2) it reduces uncertainty, resulting in tighter confidence intervals on predicted occurrences. These benefits are particularly relevant in areas of our coast where our understanding of habitat suitability is limited due to a lack of spatially comprehensive long-term groundfish surveys.

This chapter studies the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). After almost a decade since the end of World War II, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand once again enjoyed a formal strategic alliance in the Asia-Pacific. The eventual creation of the SEATO in early 1955 complemented the short-term ambitions of all four Western powers in the region. Nevertheless, diplomatic bargaining preceding signature and ratification led to compromises that diluted the usefulness of the security alliance. The United States continued to limit commitments to joint planning after the implementation of the treaty. SEATO was therefore smaller, weaker, and less integrated than originally envisaged. The organization also lacked the necessary military and economic infrastructure to be effective, which helped encourage Australia and New Zealand to focus on regional rather than British Commonwealth interests, shifting focus away from the Middle East and Mediterranean and toward the “near north.”

This introductory chapter provides an overview of post-World War II relations among the four Western powers: the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. In contrast to the broad strategic cooperation that emerged in Europe after World War II, no formal alliances between Western powers existed throughout the Asia-Pacific until the 1950s. Even when established, these security agreements remained limited in terms of military planning and scope of membership, despite the rising threat posed by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. To be sure, the Western powers that exerted most influence on security pacts in the region continued to enjoy close relations in many quarters and each held serious concerns about the Communist threat. All four states shared the ties of ancestry, language, and democratic institutions and maintained close economic and security relationships around the world. Yet, however close these four powers might have been to one another, they remained separate, sovereign states with their own interests. Although the pressures created by the Cold War could unite Western powers on an ad hoc basis, long-term strategic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific remained curiously limited. Thus, the purpose of this book is to examine why strategic cooperation among these four powers was so challenging in the Asia-Pacific during the early Cold War.

By directly challenging existing accounts of post-World War II relations among the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, this book is a significant contribution to transnational and diplomatic history. At its heart, the book examines why strategic cooperation among these closely allied Western powers in the Asia-Pacific region was limited during the early Cold War. The book probes the difficulties of security cooperation as the leadership of these four states balanced intramural competition with the need to develop a common strategy against the Soviet Union and the new communist power, the People's Republic of China. It exposes contention and disorganization among non-communist allies in the early phase of containment strategy in Asia-Pacific. In particular, it notes the significance of economic, racial, and cultural elements to planning for regional security and highlights how these domestic matters resulted in international disorganization. The book shows that, amidst these contentious relations, the antipodean powers Australia and New Zealand occupied an important role in the region and successfully utilized quadrilateral diplomacy to advance their own national interests, such as the crafting of the 1951 ANZUS collective security treaty. As fractious as were allied relations in the early days of NATO, the book demonstrates that the post-World War II Asia-Pacific was as contentious, and that Britain and the commonwealth nations were necessary partners in the development of early global Cold War strategy.

This chapter details how, following the arrival of a new U.S. administration in 1953, the British government resumed its efforts to improve its position in the Asia-Pacific. The United Kingdom again sought membership in the ANZUS Treaty but also offered an alternative in the form of a Pacific security pact. This larger alliance would provide a more comprehensive global defense umbrella that would allow the British government to continue to prioritize the defense of its preferred regions. The United States rejected such proposals, fearing that any Pacific security pact would inevitably involve greater contributions to the region and risked drawing it into the defense of other territories. United States policymakers and diplomats again used the concept of race to defend British exclusion, however, rather than stressing strategic or economic concerns. In contrast to the events of the preceding year, the United States reacted more forcefully against British efforts and adopted rougher diplomacy with Australia and New Zealand. Formal cooperation between all four powers in the Asia-Pacific looked unlikely by the close of 1953.

This chapter looks at how, throughout 1954, the United States began to consider seriously the creation of a wider strategic alliance in the Asia-Pacific that would include the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Such a policy reversal reflected growing concerns about Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. The United States consequently looked abroad for support for collective action. Only a small number of states, however, could provide substantial military resources. Washington focused its attention on London, Canberra, and Wellington. Fundamental disagreements among all four states concerning Cold War strategy persisted throughout negotiations. Although welcoming the opportunity for closer cooperation in the realm of security planning, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand all resisted U.S. ideas about immediate and major military commitments in the region. Even the existence of the ANZUS Treaty proved insufficient motivation for Canberra and Wellington to agree to support Washington's request for military support. The treaty instead appeared to have the opposite effect as antipodean officials feared the dilution or dissolution of existing trilateral strategic arrangements in favor of a wider alliance. All three British Commonwealth powers instead drove debate away from immediate military action toward longer-term alliance building.

This concluding chapter addresses how the interest of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in securing the Asia-Pacific grew steadily in response to the evolving Communist threat in the region. Formalized cooperation could have allowed policymakers in each country to prepare for these threats more effectively, helping them to share the burdens of containment in the region as well. Progress toward mutual security planning was nevertheless slow and difficult. Ultimately, however, complications befell the security agreements that emerged in the Asia-Pacific in the 1950s. The ANZUS Treaty continued to function as a limited security alliance but failed to survive in its tripartite form following New Zealand's suspended membership in 1985. SEATO would face ongoing military and economic challenges and, following Communist success in Indochina, eventually dissolved in 1977. An analysis of ANZUS and SEATO highlights the complexity and difficulty of international cooperation.

This chapter discusses events in Malaya and Korea, which, when viewed together, help explain progress toward closer cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific. The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand slowly developed elements of strategic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region following crises in Malaya and Korea between 1948 and 1951. The extent of cooperation varied between states and rarely reflected purely strategic concerns. Whereas New Zealand supported the United Kingdom in the Malayan Emergency, the United States and Australia were initially far more cautious in offering assistance. Although the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand did support the United States in the Korean War, their efforts also reflected attempts to build closer strategic relations, generate diplomatic capital, and restrain their superpower ally from escalating the conflict. In both instances, all four states held different assumptions about the causes and management of conflict. Divergent national interests therefore weakened a coherent and united response to the Communist challenge from the Western powers.

This chapter presents a broad survey of events from the end of World War II through to the early years of the Cold War. During the course of World War II, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand established unprecedented levels of strategic cooperation. Such cooperation, however, should not obscure the existence of significant and persistent differences during and after the conflict. All four states held different views about the future of security and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. The chapter then contrasts U.S., British, Australian, and New Zealand national interests as well as regional objectives in the Asia-Pacific to show that postwar relations between all four states were not always conducive to future cooperation. Indeed, differences in national interests, military capabilities, economic preferences, domestic-political contexts, and security concerns repeatedly undermined cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. These competing national interests would come to weaken and confuse their response to the rising Communist challenge in the Asia-Pacific.

This chapter examines the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). United States policymakers increasingly recognized the importance of Japan in the Cold War. Indeed, the Truman administration concluded that the recovery of Japan was strategically and economically essential for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Imperative to achieving such ambitions was ending formal occupation by Allied forces and providing a Japanese peace treaty that would allow for its full economic and industrial recovery. However, U.S. plans encountered considerable opposition. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand resented a new commercial challenger in the region and feared a Japanese military revival. As all were signatories to the Japanese instruments of surrender, their support was essential to secure the two-thirds majority required to end formal occupation. The United States' desire for a Japanese peace treaty provided Australia and New Zealand with the opportunity to push for their longtime goal of a security treaty with the United States. Following negotiations, the ANZUS Treaty emerged in February of 1951. The United States, however, excluded the United Kingdom from this newly formed security pact. Washington also brushed aside London's efforts at drafting its own Japanese peace treaty, instead pushing forward a more lenient agreement that largely reflected U.S. wishes.

This chapter assesses in detail the exclusion of Britain from the ANZUS Treaty, which embarrassed British policymakers and undermined many of the United Kingdom's interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Clement Attlee had initially accepted exclusion, but Winston Churchill's election to office in October of 1951 resulted in a concerted effort to gain membership. Although Australia and New Zealand remained sympathetic to an expanded treaty, both feared that pushing British membership too forcefully risked the United States dissolving the ANZUS Treaty. Despite enjoying a degree of recovery, economic limitations and ongoing commitments to Europe and the Middle East meant that the United Kingdom was unable to offer the antipodean states a credible alternative to existing arrangements. Australia and New Zealand consequently attempted to secure membership for Britain but prioritized ongoing cooperation with the United States. The major obstacle to British membership in ANZUS remained the United States. As far as U.S. policymakers interpreted matters, British inclusion provided few benefits and considerable economic and strategic drawbacks. Yet, U.S. officials preferred to use arguments about race and imperialism to justify British omission from the treaty. Ultimately, the United States remained committed to maintaining ANZUS in its existing form and rebuffed efforts by the antipodean powers to secure British inclusion.

This article explains the origins of the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Treaty by highlighting U.S. ambitions in the Pacific region after World War II. Three clarifications to the historiography merit attention. First, an alliance with Australia and New Zealand reflected the pursuit of U.S. interests rather than the skill of antipodean diplomacy. Despite initial reservations in Washington, geostrategic anxiety and economic ambition ultimately spurred cooperation. The U.S. government's eventual recourse to coercive diplomacy against the other ANZUS members, and the exclusion of Britain from the alliance, substantiate claims of self-interest. Second, the historiography neglects the economic rationale underlying the U.S. commitment to Pacific security. Regional cooperation ensured the revival of Japan, the avoidance of discriminatory trade policies, and the stability of the Bretton Woods monetary system. Third, scholars have unduly played down and misunderstood the concept of race. U.S. foreign policy elites invoked ideas about a “White Man's Club” in Asia to obscure the pursuit of U.S. interests in the region and to ensure British exclusion from the treaty.

As a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Canada has committed to establishing a network of marine protected areas (MPAs) that effectively conserves at least 10% of coastal and marine areas by 2020. Research shows that the most effective MPAs are large, well enforced, no-take, and designed as part of a network. Canada's Pacific MPAs, designated site-by-site, cover approximately 3% of Canadian Pacific waters. We investigated how these MPAs could effectively contribute to Canada's national network by analyzing the implementation of management intent through the application of fisheries closures and conducting a preliminary assessment of their size and spacing relative to scientific guidelines. Fisheries closures outside of MPAs were similarly assessed. Results showed that 90% of existing MPAs were intended to exclude commercial fishing, yet only 2.5% fully or partially met this goal, therefore management intent was not achieved. Further, existing MPAs were small, 75% less than 10 km2 in size...

With the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, superpower détente broke down. With it came a hardening of U.S. foreign policy towards Moscow. Efforts to implement a series of sanctions against Moscow are explored within this chapter and highlights how London decided to protect its narrow commercial interests against the wishes of Washington. This chapter also surveys Anglo-American cooperation and competition as it pertained to the boycott of the 1980 summer Olympic games, the Iranian hostage situation and the Trident nuclear weapons agreement between London and Washington.

This books draws on a wealth of recently declassified documents to reveal that relations between Britain and the United States were riven by far more antagonism than is generally believed. Jimmy Carter the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ reveals that even the special intelligence and nuclear relationships shared between London and Washington were not immune from the high level tension. Thomas Robb explores the competitive nature of the relationship during Carter’s presidency and provides an original interpretation to how both countries dealt with the breakdown of superpower détente; the subject of international human rights promotions and the Anglo-American nuclear and intelligence relationship.

This chapter contextualizes Jimmy Carter’s promotion of a human rights agenda coupled to efforts to maintain superpower détente. By doing so, this chapter highlights how London often fought to restrain the president’s promotion of human rights for a mixture of reasons predicated upon geopolitical assumptions and the need to maintain British commercial interests. All told, the advent of the Carter administration created considerable unease in British policy making circles.

In Britain we know how much we owe to America. We understand how close our countries are. America’s cause is, and always will be, our cause.1 We share a lot in common. Although our cars, or our automobiles, may drive on opposite sides of the highway, our people generally move in the same direction. And we share, or at least attempt to share, a common language. Sometimes we don’t succeed. But in the most important things, we do see issues and ideas, challenges, hopes, and expectations in the same way....

By 1978, Carter’s foreign policy was in a state of flux. Unsure of how to promote arms limitations agreements with the Soviet Union, balance the energy and economics difficulties that the United States, as well as tackle his increasingly difficult NATO allies, the president looked towards London and the government of James Callaghan for assistance. Carter found a willing partner in Callaghan but as this chapter demonstrates, there were considerable limits to just how useful London could prove in a time of economic malaise and decreased international power.

When analysing the Anglo-American relationship during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, it is evident that disagreement between the two countries on a number of international topics of mutual interest was a prominent aspect of the relationship. Many of these differences can be explained by virtue of the fact that the United States was a global power and the United Kingdom was simply not. As one author has suggested, ‘Small powers have a whole set of different priorities in their foreign policies than great powers.’...

This chapter surveys the first year of Carter’s handling of the Anglo-American relationship. The new president brought a bold agenda to both foreign relations and to the Anglo-American relationship as he sought to bring about a majority rule settlement in Rhodesia as well as solve the “Troubles” inside Northern Ireland. Such efforts created difficulties with London, not least as both sides had competing ideas as to how best to balance concerns with morality and pragmatism in settling this questions. This chapter also demonstrates how the institutional aspects of the special relationship, those concerned with nuclear and intelligence cooperation continued to be maintained.

Margaret Thatcher’s coming to power threatened to bring with a radically different British foreign policy. In her public speeches prior to assuming office she had spoken about how superpower détente was akin to a policy of appeasement and should be abandoned. Her Conservative Party manifesto of 1979 hinted that the Anglo-American agreement on Rhodesia should be dropped and the Salisbury Accords accepted as a basis of a political solution in Rhodesia. Washington was troubled by Thatcher’s likely foreign policy trajectory. This chapter explores this first crucial year of Thatcher’s premiership and her handling of the Anglo-American relationship.

The Cold War has often been depicted as a period of relative decline for the United Kingdom. Yet the author clearly suggests that the United Kingdom was far from a marginal power in the internation...

This journal is usually recognised as the best International History journal in the world. The article itself is over 22,000 words long.

Canada's Pacific coast is one region where there is a renewed commitment to pursue marine spatial planning (MSP). The British Columbia Marine Conservation Analysis (BCMCA) project aimed to set the stage for MSP, and was designed to provide resource managers, scientists, decision-makers, and stakeholders with a new set of resources to inform coast-wide integrated marine planning and management initiatives. Geographic Information Systems and the decision support tool Marxan were used to develop two main products: (1) an atlas of known marine ecological values and human uses; and (2) analyses of areas of conservation value and human use value. 110 biophysical datasets and 78 human use datasets were collated and refined where applicable, as identified through five ecological expert workshops, one expert review of physical marine classification and representation, and guidance from the human use data working group. Ecological data richness maps and Marxan results show the importance of nearshore and continental shelf regions. Data richness maps for the six categories of human uses show that all, except shipping and transport, are also closely linked to the shoreline and continental shelf. An example ecological Marxan solution identifying areas of conservation value overlapped human use sector footprints by percentages ranging from 92% (i.e., 92% of planning units selected by Marxan also contain commercial fisheries) to 3%. The experience of the BCMCA project has the potential to provide valuable guidance to regions seeking to jump-start planning processes by collating spatial information and carrying out exploratory analyses.

Pre-licensure baccalaureate nursing programs are facing the demand to retain and graduate students with the skills needed for the complex health care environment. Nursing faculty are challenged to identify the best pedagogical methods for educating the current generation of students. The influence of student-centered approaches is documented in the literature. However, the effective use of these methods requires a collaborative partnership. The cognitive, self-regulated approaches used by millennial nursing students is not well understood. This article describes the findings of a study that examined the relationship between self-regulated approaches to learning, self-efficacy, independent study behaviors, and grade point average.

A variety of techniques can be implemented for facial reconstruction. Each defect is unique and a unique solution is often necessary. The reconstructive ladder may serve as a guide for repair, but often the ideal method is site specific. Adjacent tissue transfer with local flaps may provide skin that more closely matches the surrounding skin color, texture, and thickness; however, more complex defects will often require regional or free flap reconstruction. The skin is not the only concern, as the three-dimensional structure of the face, ears, and nose also requires attention in order to restore premorbid appearance and function. This chapter outlines the various common techniques utilized in facial reconstruction and provides site-specific guidelines for repair.

This article focuses on Anglo-American relations during, what US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger termed, the ‘Year of Europe’. In particular, Anglo-American interaction leading up to, and during, the Washington Energy Conference (11–13 February 1974) is examined. By doing this, subtle nuances in the foreign policy of Edward Heath, British Prime Minister, 1970–1974, can be better appreciated. Traditionally viewed by commentators as varying between lukewarm and antagonistic towards the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, this article highlights that Heath was more than capable with working closely with Washington when he believed British interests were best promoted by doing so. Heath showed throughout the Arab oil embargo of 1973–1974 an ability to work in close cooperation with Washington. Indeed, Heath demonstrated that he was prepared to sacrifice his wider European ambitions in order to secure this. This was largely driven by Heath's overriding concern that US support was imperative to prevent th...

Contamination of groundwater with chlorinated ethenes is common and represents a threat to drinking water sources. Standard anaerobic bioremediation methods for the highly chlorinated ethenes PCE and TCE are not always effective in promoting complete degradation. In these cases, the target contaminants are degraded to the daughter products DCE and/or vinyl chloride. This creates an additional health risk, as vinyl chloride is even more toxic and carcinogenic than its precursors. New treatment modalities are needed to deal with this widespread environmental problem. We describe successful bioremediation of a large, migrating, dilute vinyl chloride plume in Massachusetts with an aerobic biostimulation treatment approach utilizing both oxygen and ethene. Initial microcosm studies showed that adding ethene under aerobic conditions stimulated the rapid degradation of VC in site groundwater. Deployment of a full-scale treatment system resulted in plume migration cutoff and nearly complete elimination of above-standard VC concentrations.

This article focuses upon the British defence cuts undertaken during the final governments of Harold Wilson, 1974–1976, within the broader context of the Anglo–American “special relationship.” Utilising previously classified material, it shows how the United States attempted to negate the severity of Britain's defence cuts. Such efforts were largely futile in preventing such reductions. Moreover, Anglo–American co-operation in a number of highly sensitive areas remained largely unaffected. Rather, the consequence for Anglo–American relations was for Britain to lose political standing in the opinion of the Nixon-Ford administrations. In the short term, this process was to have little discernable impact. Rather the repercussions of this became clear once Wilson had left office, most notably during the International Monetary Fund Crisis of 1976.

No-take marine protected areas (MPAs), where all fishing is prohibited, have been shown to provide benefits that include greater productivity of fish stocks due to increased densities, average sizes, and reproductive output. A critical component of this success is the effective management of MPAs to ensure that only those activities deemed permissible, are allowed to occur. As of 2008, 161 MPAs had been designated on the Pacific coast of Canada by federal, provincial or municipal authorities. The objective of this study was to discover how many of these MPAs are intended to provide full protection to habitats and species from commercial fishing and whether management measures were put in place to actualize this conservation intent. The comprehensive spatial dataset was built illustrating commercial fisheries closures and this was overlaid with MPA locations in a GIS. The majority of MPAs were designated as IUCN Strict Nature Reserve (Type Ia), Wilderness Area (Type Ib), and National Park (Type II) marine reserves, which are intended to be free from exploitation. It was found that 160 of the 161 MPAs are open to some commercial harvesting within their bounds. One small municipal MPA and portions of three other MPAs are not open to commercial harvesting. The incongruence between management intent and fisheries permitted suggests a management failure between designation of MPAs and implementation of fisheries management regulations. Recommendations include better coordination between the management of fisheries and the management of protected areas in Canada's Pacific Waters. This analysis and these recommendations are timely as Canada has made an international commitment as a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity to build a network of MPAs by 2012, in which at least 10% of each ecological region will be effectively conserved.

Henry Kissinger's ‘Year of Europe’ was supposed to produce a renewed ‘Atlantic Charter’. Anglo-American differences over the creation of this led to severe discord between the two countries. The severity of this disagreement has not been noted by the existing historiography. These political antagonisms resulted in the cancellation of both intelligence and nuclear cooperation between the United States and Britain. This was done at the behest of Kissinger in an attempt to make British policy-makers more forthcoming towards the ‘Year of Europe’ concept.

Health Canada and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States have recently issued warnings pertaining to the use of gadolinium-based magnetic resonance contrast agents in patients with renal insufficiency. A strong temporal relationship between the administration of gadolinium agents and the development of nephrogenic fibrosing dermopathy/nephrogenic systemic fibrosis in this patient cohort has been established. This study presents a review of the literature, description of the disease, and discussion of possible contributing co-factors to its development. Best practice recommendations are provided for medical radiation technologists for management of patients with renal insufficiencies that may need to undergo magnetic resonance imaging with a gadolinium-based magnetic resonance contrast agent.

Three-dimensional (3-D) detectors have many potential advantages over standard planar devices and for a range of applications, e.g., high energy physics, synchrotron radiation detection and medical imaging. One such area is minimizing the effects due to charge sharing between adjacent pixels. Simulations of pixel detector compatible with the Medipix2 chip show that 3-D detectors have significant advantages in this area. In addition, a 64/spl times/64 pixel 3-D detector designed for read-out by the Medipix1 chip has been fabricated. The sensors have been characterized using current-voltage and capacitance measurements. They are currently being bump-bonded to the Medipix1 chip at the University of Freiburg in order for the complete system to be evaluated using a X-ray source.