The performance of state of the art worldwide telecommunication networks strongly depends on the efficiency of the applied routing mechanism. Game theoretical approaches to this problem offer new solutions. In this paper a new continuous network routing model is defined to describe data transfer in fixed telecommunication networks of multiple hosts. The nodes of the network correspond to routers whose latency is assumed to be traffic dependent. We propose that the whole traffic of the network can be decomposed to a finite number of tasks, which belong to various hosts. To describe the different latency-sensitivity, utility functions are defined for each task. The model is used to compare router and host intelligent types of routing methods, corresponding to various data transfer protocols. We analyze host intelligent routing as a transferable utility cooperative game with externalities. 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