Search

Watershed eco-compensation is a policy tool to realize watershed environment improvement and regional economic development. It is important to eliminate the influence of economic differences between upstreamdownstream regions and realize the fairness of regional social development based on Natural based Solutions (NbS). At present, lack of clarity in coupling and coordination analysis of ecosystem servicessocioeconomic based on NbS could hamper watershed eco-compensation standards "popularization" and reduce the ability to successfully ecological governance. To meet the needs of economic development and ecological service value realization, dynamic equilibrium game research based on multidimensional relationship coordination and a multi-objective optimization solution of economic benefit distribution was carried out. To achieve the bargaining Bayesian/Nash equilibrium of the watershed eco-compensation standard in the game, the existence conditions of the equilibrium solution of the eco-compensation standard based on the mixed equilibrium game implementation process were studied. To carry out the complete information dynamic game, the equilibrium solution of the watershed eco-compensation standard based on the dynamic transfer payment was solved, and the rational analysis of the dynamic Bayesian equilibrium game of bargaining based on the incentive compatibility mechanism was also discussed. Water quantity and quality eco-compensation can ensure balanced development between ecological protection and the social economy in the Mihe River Basin. Combined with the variation law of socioeconomic water intake-utilization standards and the water use value, the city of Shouguang CityQingzhou City should pay Linqu County 4.78 million US$ and 1.29 million US$ as watershed eco-compensation standards per year based on NbS, respectively. To verify the rationality of the results derived from the economically optimal model, two modes of "bargaining""perfect competition", were used to study the characteristics of the protocols generated by the equilibrium game, and the applicable conditions of the nonzero-sum game solution upstream and downstream of the watershed were also explored. Based on the nonzero-sum processing of the survey results, the current relationship between the input value of eco-compensation and the willingness to pay satisfies

The chemical looping hydrogen (CLH) production was conducted in a fluidized bed reactor with the modified iron ore oxygen carriers (OCs) using simulated biomass pyrolysis gas (BPG) as fuel. Both carbon capture efficiency and hydrogen yield increased with the elevated reaction temperature in the fuel reactor (FR). As the reduction time in the FR increased, the carbon capture efficiency decreased but the hydrogen yield increased. An FR temperature of 900 °C and reduction time of 40 min in the FR were optimal conditions for CLH production. At this condition, the carbon capture efficiency for the NiO–iron ore, CuO–iron ore CeO–iron ore and iron ore were 83.29%, 82.75%, 70.05% and 40.46%, respectively. The corresponding hydrogen yield and hydrogen purity were 8.89 mmol g−1 and 99.02%, 7.78 mmol g−1 and 99.68%, 6.25 mmol g−1 and 99.52%, and 2.45 mmol g−1 and 97.46%, respectively. The presence of NiFe2O4, CuFe2O4 and CeFeO3 in the modified iron ore samples enhanced the reactivity of the iron ore and promoted its reduction. Both NiO–iron ore and CeO2–iron ore exhibited good cycle performance, while the sintering of the CuO–iron ore resulted in a decrease in the reactivity. Compared with the CuO–iron ore and CeO–iron ore, the NiO–iron ore was more appropriate for hydrogen production due to its high hydrogen yield and good cycle performance.