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Recent scholarship has narrated the financialization of development, which Gabor (2021) refers to as the Wall Street Consensus (WSC), whose purpose is to facilitate the investment of global capital in Southern infrastructure by institutionalising the distribution of risk, reward and responsibility between investors and states. Gabor’s conceptualization of the ‘de-risking state’ subordinated to global finance capital stands in stark contrast with scholarship on state capitalism, which charts the unprecedented entrepreneurial role played by states as investors and market participants. Our objective in this article is to reconcile the apparent paradox presented by the simultaneous emergence of the WSC and evolution of state capitalism. We argue that the WSC affords de-risking states scope to pursue autonomous strategic visions, and many have responded by embracing infrastructure-led development designed to integrate places within global value chains in ways that foster economic diversification, industrial upgrading and balanced regional growth. We present three examples in which de-risking states have implemented spatialised industrial strategies – Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Kenya’s Vision 2030 and Thailand 4.0. In each of these cases spatialised industrial strategies undertaken by de-risking states have fuelled the proliferation of large-scale infrastructure projects and served to justify political centralization.

The characteristic of a supervolatile “disaster economy” is given, in which the number of shocks caused by natural and man-made disasters is growing. The factors of creating such an economy at the global level are disclosed. The review of discussions about the future of the world (economy, finance) after the pandemic - 2020 is made. New longterm trends emerging in such an economy and the deep changes associated with them in the economic and financial structures of the world and the West are forecasted. These trends include: the collective desire for greater autonomy of households and, accordingly, changes in their demand (growth of stocks, reserves, decrease in demand for rental assets, more desire for personal property, for the acquisition of equipment and technologies that provide autonomy, development of offices at home and the transition to a different life model (to be the most at home – the least in the office and in the public space); the digitalization of households; the increasing individualization of demand for products and services; deagglomeration (living in suburbs or satellite cities); increased mobility; in creased demand for goods and services related to the protection of life and health. The global trends in the economic / financial behavior of countries are disclosed in detail: protectionism; government policy to keep “the economy on a respirator”; changes in economic ideology, in its “mainstream”; the inevitable emergence of the concept of “economic sacrifice”; growing volatility of the global economy and global finance. In particular, ahead: the development of the ideology of the “economy of fear”; demonstration of a new balance between collectivism and individualism; revaluation of the models of capitalism existing in different countries; ideological revolution in global finance. The possibilities of an unfavorable scenario in the global economy and a strong challenge that still need to be answered are shown - is development or destruction ahead?

An increasingly lamented consequence of re-regulatory efforts following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis has been ‘de-risking’—the growing disengagement by banks and other financial institutions with markets perceived as posing greater risks than justified by potential profits. As banks based in the Global North have moved to withdraw financial services from many emerging economies, de-risking has attracted attention for undermining financial inclusion and developmental efforts. Novel technologies are being harnessed to address this problem, including applications of blockchain, the digital ledgers of transactions originally underpinning cryptocurrencies. Contributing to IR theorising of legitimacy and re-risking, this article illustrates how technology-based de-risking efforts that seek to attend to the perceptions of foreign financiers can undermine the legitimacy of financial inclusion projects. Contrasting unfolding blockchain-based financial inclusion initiatives in two regions of small states in the Eastern Caribbean and Eastern Europe, our analysis stresses the need for greater local participation and clearer distribution of benefits from finance and technology (fintech) centred forms of digital development.

In recent years, the topic of green finance has received great attention in the world. It is also gaining popularity in Russia, both in scientific discourse and in practical work. The global investment and financial system is also deeply involved in this process. ESG (environmental, social and governance) factors, which take into account the three pillars of sustainable development (environmental, social and corporate governance responsibility), formed the basis of the concept of “responsible/green investment.” Many financial markets around the world now have a strong interest in sustainable development. With good government support, securities markets can play a huge role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals related to green investment. In 2016–2017, 132 countries, which account for 82% of all harmful emissions, at the state level adopted a number of national initiatives in the field of green financing development. In the implementation of environmental, climatic and socially significant projects, independent specialized experts assess their compliance with green finance principles and standards. In addition, they are subject to special requirements for disclosure and isolation of cash flows. Countries that do not participate in the formulation of rules and standards in this not yet regulated market will eventually be forced to accept the conditions of play formed without their participation. The work emphasizes that green finance is an important factor for sustainable development. The subject of the study is green investment as one of the key elements characterizing the balanced socio-ecological-economic development of the country. The objective of the study is responsible/green financing of the national economy, viewed in the context that balanced sustainable development is the fundamental objective of macroeconomic policies of the State. The methodological basis of the study was the general scientific methods and techniques. The empirical basis of the study was statistics on the green investment market. The formation of a green investment market is an important factor contributing to the balanced development of the country as part of the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

The major challenges facing the 21st century world demands disruptive technology based solutions. One of the most promising exponential technology set to address world challenges is the Internet of Things (IoT) based Trillion Sensor System (TSS). The IoT supports many revolutionary commercial and societal solutions including wearable or unobtrusive medical sensors, Industry 4.0, power and water grids, smart cities, food production, education, transportation and roadway infrastructure needs. However, to support these solutions the current IoT infrastructure needs improved spectrum and the use of between one to ten Trillion Sensors (TS). The development of a robust IoT based TSS infrastructure would create an addition to world GDP equal to that of the U.S. GDP to double the worlds GDP. This new IoT based TSS would create a high paying job base that will form a new vibrant world middle class and an abundant economy. Yet while much is written about the ability of the IoT to transform society little effort is focused on its infrastructure. If this is true there is cause for concern. We add to the literature by developing a precursor road mapping construct which focuses on the service sector and supports 3rd generation road mapping techniques. We utilize the emerging IoT TSS technology base as our case study. We utilize the best thoughts of hundreds of experts from three organizations focused on accelerating IoT TSS road mapping efforts.

The article establishes stable codependencies between international financial markets and their underlying cause and effect mechanisms, as an object of a global transformation. We demonstrate an intense co-integration between the financial markets of Russia, Brazil and the other emerging markets of Latin America (through the lens of stock markets and national currencies). The cause and effect mechanisms of this dependency are examined. We characterize the countries as analogous substitutes for investors (abundant similarities include: models of collective behaviour, ideology, model and structure of the economy, model of the financial sector, highly speculative markets in shares and currencies). The article explains an extremely limited role of the internal (primarily retail) investors in determining dynamics of the financial market. The central role of non-resident actors (global financial institutions and institutional investors) in the dynamics of the markets of Russian and Brazil is established. We demonstrate that for Russia and Brazil sources of foreign portfolio investments coincide. This includes Anglo-Saxon centers, specifically the US and British offshore jurisdictions, and the global centers of secondary importance (the Netherlands and Luxembourg). The decision making models of global investors in Russian and Brazil are examined: stock prices are driven by the oil prices, and in part by the US stock market, and rouble and real exchange rates follows oil prices and the EUR-USD currency pair. Analysis and conclusions made in the article are supported by a significant volume of statistical modelling.

Political economy theory expects politicians to use budget deficits to engineer an election-timed boom, known as the political business cycle. We challenge and contextualize this view by incorporating the financial constraints faced by governments into an electoral framework. We argue theoretically that the extent of ownership dispersion among creditors has important effects for governments’ policy autonomy. Specifically, we contend that when highly indebted governments become more reliant on international bond markets—as opposed to traditional bank lending—politicians alter the way they respond to domestic constituents. In an econometric test of 16 Latin American countries, from 1961 to 2011, we show that financial decentralization breeds austerity. More specifically, we find that politicians exhibit more fiscal discipline when they fund a greater share of their spending through decentralized bond markets. Furthermore, we find this disciplining effect to be particularly strong during election periods.

Turbulence in foreign exchange markets and currency dumping/manipulation cultivate further mistrust in international economic relations. At the same time, both phenomena could potentially prove to be a cause of systemic risk. For example, foreign currency exposures were a key vulnerability behind the series of emerging market crises in 1997-98. The global financial crisis of 2008 also showed that currency mismatches are not just a concern for emerging markets. This chapter argues that currency mistrust exposes as flawed the notion that an international financial order may exist separately from the global monetary and trade and investment orders on a self-standing basis through the technocratic standards promulgated by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board, notwithstanding the importance of such standards. While said separation achieved a great deal in terms of integration of regulation and governance of international finance in the past three decades, at the same time, it has worked to promote financialization and the global shadow banking sector. The paradox of the separation of the three international economic orders, albeit for defensible reasons, has given rise to massive rent-seeking by the global financial services industry. It has also undermined all efforts to create coherent international structures for the governance and regulation of global finance, since these could be defended only if they were seen as integral mechanisms to buttress the global trade and investment order. Finally, the chapter proposes a transparent and objective benchmark for the approximation of currency values which could be the first step towards the reversal of the current trend towards currency and trade wars. Such reversal is the sole path towards rebuilding the trust required to augment the governance structures of global finance.

This article offers new theoretical and empirical insights to explain the resilience of US Treasury securities as the world’s premier safe or “risk-free” asset. The standard explanation of resilience emphasizes the relative safety of US Treasuries due to a shortage of safe assets in the global political economy. The analysis here goes beyond the standard explanation to highlight the importance of domestic politics in reinforcing the safe status of US Treasury securities. In particular, the research shows how a formidable “bond” of interests unites domestic and foreign owners of the public debt and works to sustain US power in global finance. Foreigners, who now own roughly half of the US public debt, have something to gain from their domestic counterparts. The top 1% of US households, which dominate domestic ownership of US Treasuries, has considerable political clout, thus alleviating foreign concerns about the creditworthiness of the US federal government. Domestic owners, in turn, benefit from the seemingly insatiable foreign appetite for US Treasury securities. In supplying the US federal government and US households with cheap credit, foreign investors in US Treasuries help to deflect challenges to the top 1% within the wealth and income hierarchy.

This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 645763. Distinctive political compromises prevailed and explained various brands of capitalism observed from WWII to the early 1990s. Is this key finding by régulation research been still valid given the wide diffusion of common structural changes since the 2000s: slow productivity in the industrialized world, overwhelming impact of finance, rise of inequalities within many Nation-States in response to deregulation, social and political polarization, open conflict between capitalism and democracy, the trading place between mature and emerging economies? These stylized facts challenge most economic theories but they can be explained by an institutionalist and historical approach that also helps in redesigning a relevant macroeconomic approach. Each capitalism brand displays specific complementarities among institutional forms and their growing interactions imply more their complementarity than their frontal competition. Consequently, all capitalisms have been transformed but they do not converge towards a canonical configuration. The rise of nationalist movements may challenge the present international relations but they should not underestimate the economic and social costs of their protectionist strategy.

Global finance, combining offshore banking and universal banks to drive a broader globalization process, has transformed the modus operandi of the world economy. This requires a new "meta-economic" framework in which short-term portfolio-investment flows are treated as the dominant phenomenon they have become. Organized by global finance, these layered bi-directional flows between center and periphery manage a tension between financial concentration and monetary fragmentation. The resulting imbalances express the asymmetries built into that tension and render the exchange rate a more strategic policy variable than ever. As finanças globais, combinando a operação bancária offshore e bancos universais para conduzir um processo de globalização mais amplo, tem transformado o modus operandi da economia mundial. Isto exige um novo quadro "meta-econômico", em que os fluxos de carteira de investimento a curto prazo são tratados como o fenômeno dominante no qual eles se tornaram. Organizado pela finança global, esses fluxos bidirecionais em camadas entre o centro e a periferia gerenciam uma tensão entre a concentração financeira e a fragmentação monetária. Os desequilíbrios resultantes expressam as assimetrias embutidas nessa tensão e transforam a taxa de câmbio na política estratégia mais variável do que nunca.

This article explores and elucidates the activities of transnational networks as regulatory intermediaries. Specifically, I examine their role in the regulation of banks, as far as they facilitate exchanges between global regulators (GRs)—such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision or the Financial Stability Board—and local regulators (LRs), such as national regulatory agencies or legislatures. I find that transgovernmental network intermediaries produce benefits both for GRs, which employ them to disseminate their rules; and for LRs, which use them to obtain influence, advice, and information. Networks promote collaborative intermediation horizontally, without compromising sovereignty, and require only soft organizational structures with low operational costs. Network intermediation is a key ingredient in facilitating local regulatory activities and in providing tools and cognitive resources to LRs. Network intermediaries blur the global-local boundary, however, as some of their members operate as LRs and simultaneously participate directly in GRs. The author acknowledges the supportive funding by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (project CSO2012-39693, The Political Economy of Regulatory Agencies).

WOS: 000409545700003 The 2008-2009 financial crisis was the largest since Great Depression of the 1930s. Several reasons were asserted on why such a massive crisis happened in the first place. However, most of the explanations put forth were about proximate causes of the crisis and very little attention was given to the underlying and fundamental causes of it. The causes of the global financial crisis were, ostensibly, the formation of a housing bubble and ensuing subprime mortgage crisis in the US economy. However, the true story of the crisis is much more complicated than this. Actually, the fundamental causes, which stemmed from systemic problems in the global economy, paved the way for economic instabilities throughout the world and numerous financial crises occurred from 1980s on. These fundamental causes include (a) failure of transforming economies from extensive-production to intensive-production, (b) the rise of the neoliberalism, (c) ensuing financialization of the world economy and (d) global instabilities witnessed in the neoliberal era.

The European Union is one of the world's largest financial jurisdictions, and after the global financial crisis has been increasingly active in international financial regulatory fora. What affects its ability (or otherwise) to shape international financial regulation? This analysis focuses at the EU level, arguing that the cohesiveness of the EU position has greater analytical leverage than alternative explanations based on market size, regulatory capacity and representation in international fora. Empirically, the article examines a variety of case studies of low, medium and high EU influence across the main segments of the financial sector (banking, securities markets and insurance) after the global financial crisis. © 2014 © 2014 Taylor & Francis.

Cet article se penche sur le consensus selon lequel la crise financière globale résulterait essentiellement, voir uniquement, d’une entreprise de dérégulation financière. Selon ces interprétations, le rôle traditionnellement joué par l’État dans la régulation de la finance se serait effrité en parallèle à la montée en puissance des institutions financières. Le corolaire de ces analyses est que le retour à une plus grande régulation serait l’avenue à privilégier afin d’amorcer une sortie de crise. L’analyse des auteurs visent à remettre en question autant la lecture dominante de la période dite de « dérégulation » que des causes de la crise. Enfin, elle défend que le diagnostic de la crise financière globale doit être établi sur de nouvelles bases qui permettent de mieux la contextualiser dans le cadre des contradictions de l’État américain contemporain., If a single root cause has predominated in explanations of the current global financial crisis, it is “deregulation”. Lack of state oversight of financial markets is widely cited as having permitted the perilous over-leveraging of financial institutions, based on weakly securitized debt, that has brought about the present debacle.This diagnosis of the cause of the crisis also steers towards a particular solution: if deregulation allowed markets to get out of control, then we must look to re-regulation as the way out. The authors’s argument seeks to underscore the limitations of the “deregulation thesis”. The authors propose a new approach to the financial crisis in the context of the contradictions of the contemporary neoliberal American State., Este artículo analiza la idea establecida, según el cual la crisis financiera global resultaría en última instancia – y únicamente – de una empresa de desregulación financiera. De acuerdo a esta interpretación, el rol tradicional jugado por el Estado en la regulación de las finanzas habría sido erosionado de manera paralela al aumento del poder de las instituciones financieras. El corolario de este análisis es que el regreso a una etapa de mayor regulación sería la alternativa a privilegiar, con el fin de iniciar una salida de la crisis. El análisis de los autores se orienta a poner en cuestión no sólo la lectura predominante del mencionado periodo de “desregulación” sino también las causas de la crisis. En definitiva, el análisis sostiene que el diagnostico de la crisis financiera global debe establecerse sobre nuevas bases que permitan contextualizarla en el cuadro de las contradicciones el Estado Americano Contemporáneo.

Focusing on a highly significant governmental intervention in the global financial market crisis – the US Treasury Department’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) of autumn 2008 – this article makes a threefold contribution to the growing literature concerned with the interstices of finance and security. First, the TARP is shown to have attempted to govern the turbulence not simply as a crisis of the markets, the banks and Wall Street, but as a problem of the biopolitical security of the US population. US$700 billion worth of toxic assets were to be purchased by the TARP in order to restore the opportunities afforded by uncertain global financial circulations for individual wealth and well-being. Second, by conceptualizing and exploring the TARP in Foucauldian terms as an ‘apparatus of security’, the article demonstrates how this concept can hold together analytical concerns with the biopolitical rationality of power, on the one hand, and the contingent, processual and lively forms taken by specific governmental orderings, on the other. The TARP apparatus certainly amounted to a biopolitical intervention in the crisis, but it only emerged from the relation between the discursive, material and institutional elements that made it possible. Third, the unplanned transformation of the TARP into an apparatus that targeted bank solvency and recapitalization rather than toxic assets is held, in effect, to have been a key moment that heralded a move towards techniques of preparedness and resilience designed to mitigate the dangers of uncertain global financial circulations.

Widely regarded as a watershed moment in the governance of the present global financial crisis, the US Treasury's Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) of spring 2009 undertook to ‘stress test’ the solvency of the largest American banks by projecting their capital adequacy going forward. The SCAP is shown to have been an important intervention that restored market confidence in US banks because it rigorously embraced and acted through a subtle but significant change in the repertoires of risk management, a very public turn to anticipatory techniques designed to ensure preparedness for low-probability, high-impact events. And, as the subsequent failures of stress-testing exercises to inspire confidence in European banking are also shown to demonstrate, the performative power of these anticipatory techniques itself turns on their seemingly precise methodological application and animation by a positive affective charge.

This article examines banks' positions on the 2014 proposals for EU banking structural reforms. Centralization of authority in banking regulation and supervision has been a legislative priority in the European Union (EU) since 2008 in order to address regulatory shortcomings in the aftermath of the global finanical crisis. European decision makers have introduced more stringent capital adequacy requirements and transferred greater powers to the European Supervisory Authorites. In 2014, the European Commission put forward a proposal for banking structural reforms comprised of two elements: a ban on proprietary trading and mandatory separation of some trading activities from the deposit-taking entity. We refer to 'regulatory cascading' in order to conceptualize the rapid and successive introduction of legislative packages designed to fix problems and gaps in the EU banking regulatory framework. Our analysis shows that the majority of European banks and financial services associations are opposed to further banking structural reforms at the EU level. We find evidence that banks domiciled in member states that have already passed reforms prefer those over EU alternatives. Large internationalized banks are most opposed to further EU banking structural reforms.

In a nutshell, the main message of the book is how to prevent new financial crisis, how to re – regulate financial industry (private banks), how to limit excessive credit creation by the commercial bankers, without sufficient influence on the money supply by the central banks and regulators, all in order to prevent boom - bust Mynskian cycles and instability of disinflationary phase of financial cycles when there is a deflation threat that is devastating for the unemployment (deflationary spiral) and social/political stability. „A key theme of this book is the danger of too much debt. Beyond the certain level, increasing leverage makes the economy more fragile“ (p. 134). What is important also is that dr. Adair Turner challenges the conventional wisdom of the financial intermediation of the banks, in which banks create money (lending to the corporate sector of economy) on the basis of deposits collection (of households). Dr. Turner suggests how to solve dilemma between debt (debt overhang) and the devil (financial crisis and secular stagnation) within new paradigm for post – crisis economics? „Pre – crisis orthodoy combined total anathema against fiat money finance with an almost totaly relaxed atitude to private credit creation. Optimal future policy must reflect reality that we face a choice of dangers and must combine far tighter controls on private credit creation with the disciplined use of fiat money finance when nedeed“ (p. 240). He also explained theoretical flaws of pre – crisis orthodoxy, why central bankers and policymakers did not see financial crisis is coming? The book provides nicely written and well structured review of monetary economics and main currents of post – crisis monetary theories. It is necessary reading for bankers, policymakers, central bank and government decision - makers, in advanced as well in emerging economies, in designing post – crisis financial and economic policies.

Using a data set covering about 277,000 firms across 79 countries over the period 2004-11, this paper examines the evolution of firms capital structure during the global financial crisis and its aftermath in 2010-11. The study finds that firm leverage and debt maturity declined in advanced economies and developing countries, even in countries that did not experience a crisis. The deleveraging and maturity reduction were particularly significant for privately held firms, including small and medium enterprises. For small and medium-size enterprises, these effects were larger in countries with less efficient legal systems, weaker information-sharing mechanisms, shallower banking systems, and more restrictions on bank entry. In contrast, there is weaker evidence of a significant decline of leverage and debt maturity among firms listed on a stock exchange, which are typically much larger than other firms and likely benefit from the spare tire of easier access to capital market financing.

Legitimacy is an important question to ask of the theory and practice of global governance. In this introduction, we make two propositions that are used to push thinking about these issues forward. Firstly, in analytical terms we outline a spectrum between legitimacy and legitimization which is aimed to capture the diverse set of approaches to this subject and to develop an engaged and reformist attitude that refuses the either-or distinction in favour of a methodologically pluralist logic of ‘both and’. Secondly, in political terms, we argue that discussions of legitimate global governance in both policy and academic circles can carry a ‘Trojan horse’ quality whereby the ambiguity of the term might allow a point of intervention for more ambitious ethical objectives.

This background note focuses on the use of bond buybacks and bond exchanges in the domestic government securities market. The objective is to provide an overview of their functions and of the procedures that facilitate their implementation, using country examples as illustrations.

Why do countries liberalize capital controls? The literature identifies a range of possible reasons. Yet, despite considerable advances, the impact of international non-governmental organizations has yet to be considered. In fact, surprisingly, systematic analysis of the role of international non-governmental organizations in the diffusion of economic openness, financial or otherwise, has not been pursued previously. We offer the first such analysis by advancing the idea of ‘climatic mimesis,’ which refers to the cultural climate for policymaking that results from country ties to international non-governmental organizations. International non-governmental organizations shape capital account regulation by altering the cultural climate in a country such that liberalization becomes a more problematic policy choice. Our statistical analysis of data from developing countries reveals that international non-governmental organization ties inhibited liberalization, as did relatively high public debt and concentrated domestic banking sectors. The presence of an International Monetary Fund program and liberalization by economic competitors encouraged it. We suggest that these findings have important implications for understanding the potential for convergence and divergence in an era of globalization.

Corporate governance (CG) success stories in Vietnam are part of the International Finance Corporation’s ongoing efforts to raise greater awareness of the merits of CG. These success stories in Vietnam can serve as a guiding light for the immediate benefit and long-term value of CG to corporate development. The Law on Enterprise 2005, implemented in July 2006, marked the first introduction of a formal legal framework on CG in Vietnam. CG practice in Vietnam is expected to undergo sweeping changes when the revised Law on Enterprise (LOE) 2014 comes into effect on 1st July 2015. The revised LOE 2014 ensures independence of the Board of Directors, seeks to eliminate conflict of interest, and to improve accountability as part of Vietnamese government’s drive to ensure better CG.

This background note is intended to assist debt management offices (DMOs) in assessing whether a bond placement scheme combining auctions and syndications is an appropriate strategy in their markets and, if so, to assist them in designing the corresponding procedures.

Thesis aim of this draft background note is to provide public debt managers with an overview of the matters that need to be considered by debt management offices planning to provide a securities lending facility to their primary dealers.

This research asks why the European Union (EU) 'uploads' financial regulation to international regulatory fora in some (few) cases, 'downloads' it in (many) other cases or neither. It uses the concept of 'regulatory capacity' with reference to the EU and the USA. It argues that the presence (or absence) of robust domestic regulatory templates strengthen (or weaken) the ability of these jurisdictions to shape international standards produced by regulatory fora. Timing is also important in that whichever of the two manages to be out in front and shape international standards in a given sector wins first-mover advantages. The paper considers variations across the main financial services (banking, securities and insurance) as well as over time. © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

The paper provides information and discuses abouth the impact of the global financial crisis on the SMEs and entrepreneurship behavior, with a scope on Macedonian economy and Market. The first part represents brief information for the importance of SMEs in normal times and in times of crisis for the economy of one country...

The desirability of a transactions tax in the foreign exchange market, or Tobin tax, depends on whether the tax deters short-term, destabilizing trade. While supporters claim that the tax would be a deterrent for short-term capital flows, critics contend that the deterrent capability of the tax would be limited. This paper attempts to resolve some lingering questions about the arithmetic of a transactions tax, and concludes that a tax would raise the required return from trade for any time horizon, and thus deter all trades driven by small expected capital gains (i.e., smaller than the square of one plus the tax rate), and not necessarily those driven by a short horizon of the investor. The paper then explores the consequences of this result on the effectiveness of the tax within competing paradigms and concludes that a Tobin tax is not likely to be an effective means to reach the declared objectives. JEL Codes: F31, H87, PSL Quarterly Review, V. 56, N. 227 (2003)

The macro-developmental approach for explaining cross-border investment has been extended and refined, but the main emphasis in research has been in the manufacturing (real sector) industry. Despite the strategic importance of banking in economic development, there has been no corresponding economic emphasis and respective research. The sudden rise of Japanese banks in the capacity of multinationals in global finance from the 1970s is explored within a macro-developmental, stage-theoretic framework. JEL Codes: G21, Moneta e Credito, V. 46, N. 183 (1993)

International audience; This article investigates the geography of finance through a study of the behavior of large equity investors who are key actors in capitalism. The main argument is based on their expectations in "finance-driven" capitalism: large equity investors require high returns on invested capital in a shorter time and are said to be impatient. The article focuses on their portfolio turnover in relation to geographic factors and their attachment to a specific model of capitalism. The U.S. "market-based" model is presented as a benchmark, since U.S. investors trade securities most frequently relative to other international equity investors. Our empirical findings on the proximity of investors in various models of capitalism with U.S. "impatient" investors contribute to a growing literature on the economic importance of geography in understanding global finance.

The practical aspects of functioning the international financial services market in the context of the global economy are studied. The preconditions of qualitative changes and the characteristics of transformation of the international financial services market in terms of the global financial crisis are detected. У статті досліджені практичні аспекти функціонування міжнародного ринку фінансових послуг у контексті розвитку глобальної економіки. Виявлені якісні зміни та охарактеризована трансформація міжнародного ринку фінансових послуг під впливом глобальної фінансово-економічної кризи 2008−2009 рр.

Twenty years after the fall of the iron curtain - which for decades had separated East from West - most countries of Central and Eastern Europe are now members of the European Union; some have even adopted the euro. Nonetheless, these countries have also remained exceptionally vulnerable to upset, including those that originate beyond their immediate sphere of influence as revealed by the global financial crisis. This paper explains this with the governance of finance, i.e., the allocation of de jure and de facto responsibilities for financial systems, which deprives host countries of capital flows of critical policy tools.

This paper analyses the integration of China and India into the global economy. To this end, it presents estimates from a gravity model to gauge the overall degree of their trade intensity and the depth of their bilateral trade linkages, as well as selected measures of revealed comparative advantage and economic distance. The paper also reviews the key characteristics of the two countries’ domestic economies that are relevant to their global integration and analyses their financial linkages with the rest of the world. Four main fi ndings stand out. First, considering trade in goods, the overall degree of China’s trade intensity is higher than fundamentals would suggest, whereas the converse is true for India. Second, Chinese goods exports seem to compete increasingly with those of mature economies, while Indian exports remain more low-tech. Third, China’s exports of services tend to complement its exports of goods, while India’s exports are growing only in deregulated sectors, such as IT-related services. Last, China’s and India’s roles in the global financial system are still relatively limited and often complementary to their roles in global trade.

Corporate governance stems from the interplay of legal norms, security regulation, self-regulation and best practices. Recent scandals and frauds have forced governments to update laws on corporate governance: the legislation process has been very fast in some countries, others have lagged. Law and regulation intervene and become effective only ex-post, when damages have been done and malpractice is self-evident. On the contrary, self-regulation is a quicker and more flexible response to changing market conditions and of great impact on the relationship between firms and their environment. A self-regulatory organization (SRO) such as the stock exchange could administer the screening device, based on an indicator developed on the provisions of the corporate governance code issued by the SRO itself.

It has been said that insurance is the last of the financial services to accept radical change (Denney [1995-1996]). Yet there has been a fundamental shift in the geographic location and in the organization of the reinsurance industry in the last six years (Chichilnisky [19966]). Global environmental risks are partly responsible for this change; increased weather volatility and catastrophic risks are difficult to diversify using traditional insurance practices. To provide a map to the future, we need a realistic appraisal of how we got where we are. This is the story of how humans have hedged risks. There are two basic and distinct approaches: statistical and economic. The former is typical of the insurance industry; the latter typifies the securities industry. Both are needed to manage today's catastrophic risks. Neither alone will do. We show how a combination of both leads to efficient outcomes, and is the way to the future (Chichilnisky [1996a, 1996b, 1996d]).

To provide a map to the future, we need a realistic appraisal of how we got where we are. This is the story of how humans have hedged risks. There are two basic and distinct approaches: statistical and economical. The former is typical of the insurance industry; the latter typifies the securities industry. Both are needed to manage today's catastrophic risks. Neither alone will do. I will show below how a combination of both leads to efficient outcomes, and is the way to be the future. Hedging unknown catastrophic risks requires a blend of skills from the securities and the insurance industries. By tapping large and liquid capital markets, reinsurers will be better able to deal with correlated, catastrophic risks. At the end of the intelligent customized use of derivatives and technology will separate the winners from the losers.

Financialization refers to the over-arching presence of the interest of global finance in every sphere of economic life - be it real or financial. Neo-liberalism, globalisation and financialization are three distinct yet mutually inter-related processes which at the present time are furthering the cause of global capitalism world over. The labour ultimately remains the risk-bearing factor in all these processes, which is obvious in terms of flexible labour regime. There is, on the one hand, de-regulation of finance and on the other, re-regulation of labour (through labour flexibility); and to our understanding global finance and its circuits of operation cannot be sustained without this flexible labour regime which ensures more and more transfer of surplus in the direction of finance. Global crisis is inherent in these processes of neoliberal globalisation and financialization through which present day global capitalism wants to thrive. So, an alternative needs to be sought in a pro-labour regime which would negate both financialization and neo-liberal globalization., La "financialisation" est un processus qui suppose la suprématie de l'intérêt financier dans toutes les sphère de la vie économique. La finance n'a désormais plus aucun rapport avec l'activité économique réelle; elle a perdu son rôle traditionnel qui était de faire marcher l'économie réelle en servant de pont entre déficit et surplus. Mais la financialisation se nourrit de la flexibilité de travail qui aide à faire passer le surplus accumulé dans le secteur réel vers le secteur financier. Elle est elle-même est un processus "marchant à la dette", sur lequel se développent les circuits financiers. La crise globale est une réponse systémique au processus de financialisation, qui vit récemment les circuits financiers s'effondrer comme des château de cartes. Le système économique d'aujourd'hui est celui de la domination de l'économie globale par la finance telle que celle-ci fonctionne désormais dans le cadre de la financialisation. L'auteur analyse ici les rapports entre financialisation et flexilibilité du marché du travail et, en conséquence entre financialisation et crise globale.