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This article analyses the cost implications of an EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for downstream industries in Germany. The restriction to a few basic industries as envisaged in the EU Commission’s proposal is expected to lead to only a slight increase in input costs for downstream manufacturers. This also holds if the CO2 intensities occurring in the countries of origin are used to determine the level of the border adjustment. One reason for this, apart from the restriction to a few basic materials and to direct emissions, is the small share of imports from third countries. To strengthen the steering effect of a CBAM, the inclusion of emissions at upstream production levels therefore seems manageable, to the extent that they apply to intermediate inputs that are also subject to the EU-ETS. In the long term, a CBAM should not be thought of as an end in itself, but as one of several steps towards an international climate club.

Motivación Una fragmentación geopolítica del comercio mundial, caracterizada por el surgimiento de dos bloques de países que restringen el comercio a los países que no pertenecen al mismo bloque, es un escenario que se ha vuelto más probable en los últimos tiempos. ¿Cómo afecta este riesgo geopolítico a las perspectivas comerciales y económicas de los países de América Latina y el Caribe? Ideas principales •Los países de América Latina y el Caribe difieren tanto en su grado de apertura comercial como en la composición geográfica de sus flujos comerciales. •Por lo tanto, presentan una exposición heterogénea al riesgo de una fragmentación del comercio por motivos geopolíticos. •Se cuantifica esta exposición por países y se analiza cómo América Latina puede aprovechar una mayor integración comercial con la Unión Europea para reducir los costes derivados de una eventual fragmentación del comercio internacional.

Rationale A geopolitical fragmentation of world trade, i.e. the emergence of two blocs that restrict trade with countries in the other bloc, has recently become a more likely prospect. How does this geopolitical risk affect the trade and economic outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean? Takeaways •Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean differ in terms of both their trade openness and the geographical structure of their trade. •They are therefore heterogeneously exposed to the risk of geopolitically fragmented trade. •We quantify each country’s exposure and analyse how Latin America can harness greater trade integration with the European Union to reduce the costs of a potential fragmentation of world trade.

Die anhaltenden Probleme bei der Beschaffung von Vorleistungen belasten die deutsche Wirtschaft. Drei Viertel der Unternehmen berichten derzeit von Produktionsausfällen von im Durchschnitt 7%. Erst ab dem zweiten Halbjahr 2022 wird sich die Situation deutlich verbessern. Aber auch im Jahr 2023 rechnet noch knapp die Hälfte der privatwirtschaftlichen Unternehmen mit Ausfällen. Neben den fehlenden Vorleistungen ist vor allem der Fachkräftemangel eine permanente Produktionsbremse. Ongoing problems with the procurement of intermediates are weighing on the German economy. Three-quarters of companies are currently reporting production losses averaging 7%. The situation will not improve significantly until the second half of 2022. But even in 2023, just under half of private-sector companies still expect shortfalls. In addition to the lack of intermediates, the shortage of skilled workers is a permanent brake on production.

Rules of Origin (RoO) are critical components of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). They are designed to stop products coming into a PTA through the partner that applies the lowest tariff – a phenomenon known as trade deflection. While RoO are necessary, complex RoO may undo the benefits of trade agreements. Using a novel database of RoO, this paper evaluates the incidence and restrictiveness of different types of Product-Specific Rules of Origin (PSRs) across 128 reciprocal PTAs for the period 1990 - 2015. Results, based on a structural gravity model controlling for confounding factors, display wide heterogeneity across different categories of PSRs attached to preferential margins, with more flexible PSRs associated with a significantly stronger trade effect compared to more restrictive ones where exporters do not have a choice among PSRs or have to satisfy multiple PSRs. A simulation exercise reveals that a radical simplification reform leading to the adoption of flexible PSRs providing alternative choices to prove origin would have increased global trade under PTAs on average by between 2.7 and 4 percent during the sample period. Julien Gourdon and Jaime de Melo acknowledge financial support from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche of the French government through the program “Investissements d’avenir” (ANR-10-LABX-14-01).

We use four subsequent EU enlargement waves over three decades (1980s, 1990s, 2000s) to assess the regional effects of macro-institutional changes. Our focus is set on EU internal border regions which are specifically exposed to international integration, but it remains unclear how they benefit from this exposure. Treatment effects for different outcomes (per capita GDP, labor productivity, employment, population, night light emissions) are estimated by comparing the performance of EU internal border regions to overall regional development trends in the EU. We find significant border effects that build up over time and decay with spatial distance to the enlargement border. While per capita GDP, labor productivity levels and night light emissions develop positively on average, negative effects are found for the employment rate in border regions. However, effects can be specific to enlargement waves and country groups considered: Border regions in established member countries mainly gain from EU enlargement in terms of increasing their GDP per capita and labor productivity levels but face lower employment rates and population decline. However, border regions in new member countries, particularly in 2004 and 2007, most significantly gain through population and employment increases. This complex pattern of effects makes a straight 'winner-loser' categorization difficult and poses challenges to policy support for EU border regions. Wir nutzen die vier Erweiterungswellen der EU aus den 1980er, 1990er und 2000er, um die regionalen Auswirkungen dieser Erweiterungen auf die Grenzregionen an den betroffenen Binnengrenzen zu untersuchen. Diese EU-Grenzregionen, die durch die Erweiterung in das Zentrum der EU rücken, erfahren die Effekte der wirtschaftlichen Integration in besonderem Maße, wobei vorab unklar bleibt, wie sich diese auswirken. Wir untersuchen die Effekte auf verschiedene Kennziffern: Pro-Kopf-BIP, Arbeitsproduktivität, Beschäftigung, Bevölkerung, nächtliche Lichtemissionen. Wir finden signifikante Grenzeffekte, die sich im Laufe der Zeit aufbauen und mit der räumlichen Entfernung zur Erweiterungsgrenze abnehmen. Während sich das Pro-Kopf-BIP, das Niveau der Arbeitsproduktivität und die nächtlichen Lichtemissionen im Durchschnitt positiv entwickeln, finden wir negative Effekte für die Beschäftigungsquote. Die Effekte sind jedoch spezifisch für die betrachteten Erweiterungswellen und Ländergruppen: Grenzregionen in etablierten Mitgliedsländern profitieren vor allem durch eine Steigerung des Pro-Kopf-BIP und der Arbeitsproduktivität, erfahren aber niedrigere Beschäftigungsquoten und einen Bevölkerungsrückgang. Die Grenzregionen in den neuen Mitgliedsländern profitieren hingegen am stärksten durch Bevölkerungs- und Beschäftigungszuwächse, insbesondere in den Jahren 2004 und 2007. Dieses komplexe Muster von Effekten macht eine eindeutige "Gewinner-Verlierer"-Kategorisierung schwierig und stellt eine Herausforderung für die politische Unterstützung der EU-Grenzregionen.

Erdgas ist für Deutschland in den letzten drei Dekaden immer wichtiger geworden, sei es für das Heizen von Gebäuden, die Bereitstellung von Prozesswärme in der Industrie oder die Stromerzeugung. Dabei ist die Importabhängigkeit bei Erdgas in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten auf fast 100 Prozent angestiegen, wobei der größte Teil der Importe aus Russland kam. Dementsprechend schwer wurde die deutsche Energieversorgung im vergangenen Jahr durch den Ausfall seines größten Gaslieferanten getroffen. Ein Teil davon kann inzwischen durch den vermehrten Import von Flüssiggas kompensiert werden. Vor allem die USA schickten LNG-Tanker in Richtung Europa. Die geringere LNG-Nachfrage aus China, dem größten LNG-Käufer, kam aus EU-Sicht zur richtigen Zeit und schaffte auf dem Weltmarkt die freien Kapazitäten, die in Europa dringend benötigt wurden. Damit trug LNG ebenso wie die Gaseinsparungen von Haushalten und Industrie sowie zusätzliche Pipelineimporte aus Norwegen ganz entscheidend zur Sicherung der Versorgungslage bei. Deutschland, das erst seit Ende letzten Jahres ein eigenes LNG-Terminal betreibt, profitierte 2022 von LNG-Terminals in Belgien und den Niederlanden. Bis Sommer 2024 werden an der deutschen Nord- und Ostseeküste weitere schwimmende LNG-Terminals entstehen und schrittweise die Gasversorgung in Deutschland sicherstellen.

Die import- und exportseitige Abhängigkeit deutscher Industriebranchen von China auf der Vorleistungsebene wird hier mit einer Auswertung der internationalen Input-Output-Tabellen von FIGARO (Full International and Global Accounts for Research in Input-Output Analysis) ermittelt, die von Eurostat mit Datenstand 2020 zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Auf der Importseite ermöglichen die FIGARO-Daten einen besseren Blick auf die Importabhängigkeit der Industriebranchen als die übliche Außenhandelsstatistik, weil bei Letzterer auch die Importe aus China mit einfließen, die in den hiesigen Endverbrauch gehen. Die FIGARO-Daten liefern dagegen die Importe der Wirtschaftszweige. In der Gesamtschau ist Deutschlands Industrie auf dieser Datenbasis im internationalen Vergleich nicht übermäßig von China abhängig. Im Jahr 2020 kamen im Industriedurchschnitt rund 6,6 Prozent aller ausländischen Vorleistungslieferungen aus China. Bezieht man die inländischen Vorleistungen mit ein, liegt der Anteil Chinas an allen in- und ausländischen Vorleistungslieferungen bei 2,2 Prozent im Industriedurchschnitt. Dagegen ist die Industrie Japans, das sehr viel näher an China liegt, mit einem Anteil an allen ausländischen Vorleistungen von fast 20 Prozent deutlich abhängiger von chinesischen Zulieferern. Russland (16,5 Prozent), die USA (13,9 Prozent) und Tschechien (11,8 Prozent) weisen unter den hier betrachteten elf Industrieländern ebenfalls zweistellige Anteile im Industriedurchschnitt auf [...] Insgesamt ist China als Lieferant und Abnehmer von Vorleistungen im Industriedurchschnitt zwar bedeutsam, aber nicht in einem überragenden Ausmaß. Allerdings gibt es einige Branchen mit relativ starken Abhängigkeiten auf der Vorleistungsebene, in der verwendeten Datenabgrenzung ist dies vor allem die Elektroindustrie. Hier geht es zeitnah um mehr Diversifizierung, also eine stärkere Streuung der Lieferanten und Abnehmer auf andere Länder, um die Abhängigkeiten von China zu reduzieren. Dies ist in erster Linie Aufgabe der Unternehmen. Die Firmen brauchen aber Flankierung durch die Politik, sei es durch Freihandelsabkommen mit anderen Partnerländern oder durch Delegationsreisen sowie mehr Investitions- und Exportkreditgarantien. The import and export dependency of German manufacturing branches on China at the intermediate input level is calculated here by evaluating the international input-output tables of FIGARO (Full International and Global Accounts for Research in Input-Output Analysis), which are provided by Eurostat with data as of 2020. On the import side, FIGARO data provide a better picture of the import dependency of industrial branches than the usual foreign trade statistics, because the latter also include imports from China that go into final demand here. The FIGARO data, in contrast, provide imports by manufacturing industries. Overall, on this data basis, Germany's industry is not overly dependent on China in an international comparison. In 2020, an industry average of around 6.6 percent of all foreign intermediate inputs came from China. If domestic intermediate inputs are included, China's share of all domestic and foreign intermediate inputs is 2.2 percent on average for German industry. By contrast, the industry in Japan, which is much closer to China, is a lot more dependent on Chinese suppliers, with a share of almost 20 percent of all foreign intermediate inputs. Russia (16.5 percent), the USA (13.9 percent) and the Czech Republic (11.8 percent) also have double-digit shares in the industrial average among the eleven industrialized countries considered here [...] Overall, China is significant as a supplier and buyer of intermediate inputs in the industrial average, but not to an outstanding extent. However, there are some sectors with relatively strong dependencies at the intermediate input level; according to the data definition used here, this is primarily the electrical industry. In the short term, the aim here is to achieve greater diversification, i.e., a broadening of trade relations with other countries as suppliers and customers for German industry, in order to reduce dependencies on China. This is primarily the task of the companies. However, companies need political support, be it in the form of free trade agreements with other partner countries or delegation trips, as well as more investment and export credit guarantees.

We revisit the natural experiments of division and unification of Germany now that more time has passed and more data have become available. We show that local market access shocks are not symmetric in time. The negative shock to local market access following the division of Germany lead to a fast and strong downward adjustment of the size of West-German cities near the new border. In contrast, the positive shock of reunification did not lead to any change in their relative size, even three decades after the German reunification.

We present a novel two-stage gravity specification with period-varying bilateral trade cost terms. We test our specification to confirm the benchmark result on declining international distance elasticities over time, using two new data sets. Analyzing period-varying bilateral trade cost derived from our specification offers additional insights: first, globalization has erased more than a third of the effect of distance on trade cost, mostly until the mid-nineties. Second, identifying period-varying bilateral trade cost separately for domestic vs. international trade offers a natural illustration to globalization - international trade cost are less persistent than domestic trade cost. Finally, reflecting the importance of general equilibrium adjustment, total bilateral trade cost - relating partial bilateral trade cost to multilateral resistances - are more appropriate to reflect globalization than partial bilateral trade cost.

This paper considers the evolution of global transportation usage over the past half century and its implications for supply chains. Transportation usage per unit of real output has more than doubled as costs decreased by a third. Participation of emerging economies in world trade and longer-distance trade between countries contribute to this usage increase, thereby encouraging longer supply chains. We discuss technological advances over this period, and their interactions with endogenous responses from transportation costs and supply chain linkages. Supply chains involving more countries and longer distances are reflective of reliable and efficient transportation, but are also more exposed to disruptions, highlighting the importance of considering the interconnectedness of transportation and supply chains in policymaking and future work.

Do economic sanctions affect internal support of sanctioned countries' governments? To answer this question, we focus on the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 and identify their effect on voting behavior in both presidential and parliamentary elections. On the economic side, the sanctions significantly hurt Russia's foreign trade - with regional-level variation. We use trade losses caused by the sanctions as measure for regional sanction exposure. For identification, we rely on a structural gravity model that allows us to compare observed trade flows to counterfactual flows in the absence of sanctions. Difference-in-differences estimations reveal that regime support significantly increases in response to the sanctions, at the expense of voting support of Communist parties. For the average Russian district, sanction exposure increases the vote share gained by president Putin and his party by 13 percent. Event studies and placebo estimations confirm the validity of our results.

Sanktionen stellen Zwangsmaßnahmen dar, die bei der Bewältigung politischer Spannungen zwischen Nationen eine lange und wiederkehrende Stellung einnehmen. Sie werden sowohl einseitig als auch in Staatenbündnissen verhängt und besonders nach dem 2. Weltkrieg mit zunehmender Häufigkeit eingesetzt. Während im letzten Jahrhundert, insbesondere vor dem 2. Weltkrieg, Handelsbeschränkungen und umfassende Wirtschaftsblockaden die vorherrschenden Sanktionsinstrumente darstellten, werden heute in einer stärker integrierten und globalisierten Welt Sanktionen in verschiedenen weiteren Formen verhängt, einschließlich internationaler Finanzbeschränkungen, Reiseverbote, Handelseinschränkungen für bestimmte Gütergruppen, Aufhebung militärischer Hilfen und spezifische Einschränkungen, wie beispielsweise Flugverbote und Hafensperrungen. Sanctions represent a prominent coercive tool that has been utilised extensively in addressing political tensions between na-tions. These measures are imposed both unilaterally and in alliances of states, and have become increasingly prevalent since the Sec-ond World War. In the previous century, particularly before the WWII, trade restrictions and comprehensive economic blockades were the dominant tools to sanction. In contrast, in today's more interconnected and globalised world, sanctions take on a variety of forms, such as international financial restrictions, travel bans, trade restrictions on specific goods, cancellation of military aid, and targeted measures like flight bans and port closures. The increasing demand for and use of international sanctions raises a fundamental ques-tion: Do sanctions lead to political success?

Convergence and economic and social cohesion remain priorities for the EU, beyond failures to achieve the objectives of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy. Convergence and territorial cohesion, as a prerequisite for sustainable and durable development, have been the fundamental objectives that generated and developed the strategic planning in the EU, including through the two global strategies, ‘Lisbon’ and ‘Europe 2020’. The sustainability of these processes, even in periods of high economic growth, is questionable since real national convergence is based in many countries, including Romania, on large and widening divergences between regions and counties. In recent years, Romania has seen one of the most enhanced improvements in convergence compared to the EU average, from 60% in 2016 to 69% of the European average in 2019 respectively. During the same period, disparities between regions and counties have deepened. More than 10 years after EU accession and participation in the Community cohesion policy, there is still a third of the counties with less than 70% of the national average of gross domestic product per capita. The health crisis has deeply affected economic activity, but in a differentiated way, depending on the specific territorial economic structures. As a result, the objective of improved and sustainable real convergence, by bringing regions and counties closer together in terms of their level of development, is receding. The economic situation in the counties in 2020 indirectly provides support for assessing the impact of the pandemic on the territorial cohesion process. The implicit conclusion revealed by the latest statistical data is that the level of development has been the support for better resilience to the health crisis. Although the restrictions on international movement and the closure of tourist and industrial capacities have had general validity, the counties with a higher degree of disparity have been more affected.

The European Semester (ES) and the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) have been introduced with the purpose to promote flexibility and adaptation to national circumstances in the governance of fiscal policies. To assess whether the ES has contributed to reconcile economic and social objectives, we measured, through the distance to frontier (DTF) score methodology, the distance of each member country from a benchmark based on EU aims and values defined in the EU treaties. Results show that EU member countries are far from the benchmark and CSRs have not prevented a progressive deterioration of stability and cohesion from an economic, political and social perspective. A content analysis of the CSRs issued from 2011 to 2018 and a comparison with the DTF scores reveal a weak connection between member countries’ performance and CSRs. Despite the social content of many CSRs, we actually observe a “commodification” of their goals. CSRs promote a society functional to flexible and competitive markets, and compatible with the requirements of fiscal discipline and sustainability. This neoliberal approach apparently played a role in the EU deterioration and makes the “socialization” of the ES a process with ambiguous implications for European citizens. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41294-021-00171-2.

Macroeconomic convergence is critical for member states to achieve the level of harmonization required for establishing a stable and resilient monetary union. The East African Community (EAC) member states, therefore, established set targets for macroeconomic convergence, intending to eliminate exchange rate uncertainty within the bloc and reduce the costs of the monetary union. However, recent empirical studies indicate that the rate of convergence of the member states to the set macroeconomic targets has been very slow, resulting in high exchange rate uncertainty within the region. It is against this backdrop that this research was conceptualized to examine the influence of convergence in macroeconomic variables on the exchange rate uncertainty of EAC states using secondary panel data. The study made use of standard deviation and the Levin Lin Chu (LLC) test to determine convergence and unit root respectively. The panel ordinary least squares (OLS) regression findings showed that all the explanatory variables had a negatively significant effect on exchange rate uncertainty. This implies that convergence in macroeconomic variables among the member countries slows exchange rate uncertainty. Thus, policy should be made towards controlling this negative effect resulting from macroeconomic variables as East Africa bids for monetary union.

This paper explores the impact of infrastructure on trade connectivity among ASEAN and three Asian countries—India, China, and Japan. Our study is mainly motivated by the increased infrastructure investment and trade among these countries in recent years. The main results of trade network analysis include high trade density and interconnectedness among ASEAN, India, China, and Japan. There are specific “trade intensive paths” among the few countries in the group. It highlights the “export hubs” or main “suppliers of intermediate goods” in the region. Further, the paper analyzed the nexus between trade connectivity and infrastructure by applying the panel fixed effects method and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. Moreover, the robustness of the results is tested by estimating two-stage least square. Hard infrastructure, foreign direct investment plays a crucial role in bringing the nexus to trade connectivity. Reducing trade barriers and improving infrastructure quality are essential for deepening regional trade integration.

Im November 2020 wurde das RCEP-Abkommen als größtes Freihandelsabkommen der Welt von Brunei, Kambodscha, Indonesien, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, den Philippinen, Singapur, Thailand, Vietnam sowie Australien, China, Japan, Neuseeland und Südkorea unterzeichnet. Bis Ende 2022 soll das Abkommen ratifiziert sein und in Kraft treten. Zusammen entfallen auf die Mitgliedsländer 25 % des internationalen Waren- und Dienstleistungsverkehrs. Es stellt sich die Frage, welche positiven und negativen Auswirkungen das Freihandelsabkommen für die Mitgliedsländer sowie die EU haben wird. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a multilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and five Asia-Pacific countries, with which ASEAN has existing FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region. It was initiated with the aim to broaden and deepen regional trade and investment among the signatories. The agreement was finalised and signed in November 2020. It is now the largest free trade agreement in the world. The article examines the expected effects and their implications for the EU. It also outlines strategic ways in which the EU could respond to this new agreement.

This paper explores the link between trade liberalization and firms’ performance in Egypt combining macro and micro data. Using the Economic Census of Egypt 2013, we examine the association between tariffs and non-tariffs measures (NTM) imposed on intermediate input sand total factor productivity (TFP). In a first step TFP is estimated as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas/Translog production function and in thesecond, TFP is regressed on weighted tariffs and NTM imposed on intermediate inputs. Egyptian input-output tables are used to construct the weights. Our main findings show a positive and significant association between imported inputs and value-added and a significantly negative relationship between tariffs and TFP.

Vielerorts wurde aufgrund der COVID-19 Pandemie hinterfragt, ob die derzeitige globale wirtschaftliche Vernetzung weiterhin wünschenswert sei, und ob nicht eine Re-Regionalisierung der Produktion angestrebt werden sollte. Im Rahmen dieses Beitrags erörtern wir deshalb die Bedeutung des Freihandels, im Speziellen der ausländischen Endnachfrage, für die Wertschöpfung in Deutschland und Österreich. Es zeigt sich, dass sowohl Deutschland als auch Österreich eng in globale Wertschöpfungsketten integriert sind und eine vergleichsweise zentrale Position einnehmen. Darüber hinaus wird deutlich, dass rund ein Drittel der Wertschöpfung in Deutschland und Österreich schließlich im Ausland konsumiert oder investiert wird. In Industriebranchen ist der Anteil der im Ausland der Endnachfrage zugeführten Wertschöpfung deutlich höher und beträgt in einzelnen Branchen über 80 %. Auch für einzelne im Außenhandel wichtige Dienstleistungsbranchen wie dem Großhandel oder Finanzdienstleistungen ist die globale Verflechtung zentral. Aufgrund der hohen volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten, die mit einer Re-Regionalisierung aufgrund von möglichen Vergeltungsmaßnahmen sowie möglichen mittelfristigen Verlusten von Spezialisierungsvorteilen einhergehen, sollte die COVID-19 Pandemie nicht als Anlass für eine Rückkehr zu einer protektionistischeren Handelspolitik herangezogen werden. Vielmehr soll das Ziel der Wirtschaftspolitik sein, die Rolle deutscher und österreichischer Unternehmen im Außenhandel und globalen Wertschöpfungsketten durch eine Steigerung der Produktivität zu stärken und eine Weiterentwicklung der europäischen und weltweiten Integration voranzutreiben.

In this article, we aim to estimate what the cost of Covid-19 has been in terms of unemployment for Spain. We use a simple autoregressive model to simulate what the unemployment rate would have been without the pandemic and we compare this with the actual values. We also forecast the unemployment rate for 2021 and 2022 to analyse the persistence of the pandemic shock to unemployment.

Digitalisation has spread to every corner of our lives and transformed how we pay. In this new era, a digital euro would guarantee that citizens in the euro area can maintain costless access to a simple, universally accepted, safe and trusted means of payment. A digital euro would not replace cash, but rather complement it. The Eurosystem will continue to ensure the access to cash across the euro area. A digital euro would give an additional choice about how to pay and make it easier to do so, contributing to accessibility and inclusion. It would support the digitalisation of the European economy and actively encourage innovation in retail payments.

ZusammenfassungDie Volksrepublik China will wichtige Stadte ihrer sudostlichen Kustenprovinz Guangdong eng mit Hongkong und Macao verbinden Geplant ist ein integrierter Wirtschaftsraum, der bis spatestens 2035 eine globale Fuhrungsrolle einnehmen soll Die Grundidee ist nicht neu, nimmt aber zunehmend Gestalt an Es gibt allerdings auch grose Hindernisse Alternate abstract:Economic cooperation among mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao has deepened quickly since 2019 A roadmap for China’s southeastern province Guangdong promotes a common development of nine municipalities within the Pearl River Delta and the two Special Administrative Regions The Chinese government wants this combined Greater Bay Area to become a highly innovative city cluster with world-class technologies and industries Fully integrated transport networks and many pilot schemes are on their way They will probably end the “one country, two systems“-principle much before schedule However, the ambitious plan faces impediments such as political tensions, trade confl icts and the COVID-19 pandemic

In this paper, we offer a new framework to measure cross-border supply chain fragmentation and its impact on the global trade elasticity. Firstly, we introduce the supply chain fragmentation ratio that sums the volume of imports by all countries that participate in a particular supply chain. We find that supply chain fragmentation slowed down after 2010 for most goods, but not for services. We demonstrate the importance of using trade and production data at constant prices in measuring fragmentation trends. Secondly, we quantify the impact of fragmentation on the elasticity of trade to world GDP, extending the framework of Bems et al. (Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 101(3):308–312, 2011). We account for trade effects from fragmentation within supply chains as well as asymmetric shocks to final demand. We find that the declining pace of fragmentation accounted for more than a third of the decline in the global trade elasticity after 2010. Supplementary information The online version of this article (10.1057/s41308-021-00134-8)

The position of information and communication technology (ICT) services is growing in the European Union (EU) trade, however to different extend in different EU countries. The article aims to identify trade positions of the EU Member States in intra-EU trade and extra-EU trade in ICT services and to assess changes that have taken place in the years 2013–2018. The importance of the EU Member States in trade in ICT services is assessed, followed by the analysis of their trade positions in terms of selected indices. We discovered that countries of the highest importance for the intra-EU and extra-EU trade in ICT services are not holding the best positions in trade in this area, except for Ireland. Additionally, leaders in ICT services trade do better in extra-EU trade rankings than in the EU Internal Market, since the distance does not matter to business operations consequent to the digitalization of economic activities.

This research focuses on the impact of German exports on exports of the other selected EU countries. We used the Global VAR approach to build a robust trade model between 23 EU countries, the USA, and China. By stressing this model with different shocks, we were able to observe how exports of the EU countries react to German loss of competitiveness and decline of demand from Germany. Based on our simulation, we could identify countries which i. are Germany’s competitors and would benefit from German loss of competitiveness, ii. are tied with German trade so tightly that loss of German competitiveness would negatively affect their exports.

The purpose of this paper is to answer the question as to why Germany is cautious towards a faster enlargement of the euro area. The usual explanation focuses on concerns that some of the candidate countries are not economically ready to adopt the common currency and their membership could destabilize the monetary union. However, such an approach does not take into account other factors that may influence Germany’s reluctance to speed up the enlargement process. One of them is the conviction that the existing division of integration does not translate into economic costs and a long-term political cleavage in the EU. Another argument explaining Germany’s position is their doubt about the economic policy preferences of the candidates which may prove to be crucial in the upcoming reform of the euro area governance. Some of them can drift towards more interventionism and support for the debtors’ positions which is at odds with German interest.

The euro area emerged from the euro crisis without meeting the conditions presented by the theory of optimum currency area. The decisive policy that ended this crisis was the Outright Monetary Transactions policy. Besides, the quantitative easing policy supports the economy of the euro area after this crisis. To examine the impact of these supranational monetary policies on the business cycles in the euro area, which is not covered by optimum currency area theory, we use a Kaldorian two-country model featuring a monetary union and imperfect capital mobility. We find that an increase in government bond purchases is a stabilizing factor, whereas an extreme increase in the degree of counter-cyclical fiscal policy is a destabilizing factor. Nevertheless, as long as the fiscal and monetary policies of two countries are not extremely active, but active to a certain extent, the equilibrium point becomes locally stable. Furthermore, even if the business cycles are not synchronized, the purchase of government bonds of a particular country is effective in stabilizing the business cycles of both countries. From these results, we suggest that the euro area satisfies the metacriteria of an optimum currency area through the implementation of a government bond purchase system by a supranational central bank system.

In the 21st century integration processes within regional associations of developing countries intensified significantly. These processes cover almost all developing countries and their quantitative indicators are increasing. The purpose of this article is to describe integration processes in the Arab world using the example of the Cooperation Council for the Arab states of the Gulf – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is most successful integration association in the Arab world lasting almost 40 years. Throughout this period integration process among the Gulf group states, and consequently their level of socio economic development went through significant changes, having significant research interest and practical implications. The novelty of this research is related to identification of new trends in regional economic integration among the GCC member states, specifically their focus on joint development of innovation component. Research concluded that over the period of 2010 through 2018 integration efforts of the Gulf group states were focused primarily on scientific, humanitarian and innovation activities, rather than pure trade, investments, and project efforts. This article is based on statistical and comparative analysis and systematic approach. Statistical analysis is based on the data provided by UNCTAD to ensure data compatibility.

In recent decades, global value chains (GVCs) gave national economies new opportunities to increase competitiveness by placing some segments of production processes in foreign locations with lower costs. The purpose of this work is to identify what factors influenced the integration of the Netherlands into GVCs, and also to consider the features of this integration from a sectoral and geographical point of view. The basic methodology for assessing the characteristics of the participation of the Netherlands in GVCs is the input-output approach. For a number of reasons, the UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database was chosen as the statistical background of the study. Based on the calculations, the authors came to the conclusion that the Netherlands has one of the highest GVCs participation rates: 78% compared with the global average of 51%. The high level of Netherlands GVC involvement is due to its deep backward linkages. The Netherlands is one of the few cases where the share of foreign value added (FVA) in gross exports exceeds the share of domestic value added (DVA): 54% versus 46%. However, forward links in Dutch value added chains are much weaker. The main factor that influenced the development of upstream ties was the high level of re-exports in the country’s gross exports, which was facilitated by the Netherlands’ status as a European transit and offshore center. Another factor that facilitated country’s upstream relations was the industrial nature of economy, which relies heavily on the import of foreign components. The most GVC integrated industries are Dutch chemical, food, agriculture industries and the manufacture of electrical appliances. The most important Dutch GVC partners are Germany and China.

Purpose: The purpose of this article is to illustrate China’s influence on global economy through data comparative analysis of national interdependence anditsrelationto especially the economic impact in time of a major event such as a new coronavirus. Design/methodology/approach: The author analyzes the impact of the epidemic on the Chinese economy and how it can be transmitted to other countries through the global industrial chain according to the proportion of China in the world economy. In this study, the author used literature analysis, statistical methods, inductive methods, and descriptive research methods. Findings: The author found through research thatin the era of globalization, each country’s economic operations and people’s lives are inseparable from other countries. The role of different countries in the international division of labor is becoming clearer. In the face of global disasters, such as this epidemic, when a country’s economy is affected, it will be transmitted to other countries through the global value chain in different ways. The method and the results of transmission will be affected by the different policies of each country. Originality/value: Globalization has both positive and negative effects on human beings. Overall, the author considers that positive effects are greater than negative. The author proposes that a mechanism for efficient collaboration and communication should be established between countries. This mechanism requires the country to be transparent in information disclosure and highly coordinated policy formulation. Through coordinated and joints efforts of all countries wecan minimize the impact of global supply chain disruptions.

Purpose: The article presents the results of the study of the main trends, factors and conditions of interregional interaction of the subjects of the federation in the field of infrastructure development of the economic space of the South of Russia, as one of the manifestations of general globalization processes. The purpose of the article is to justify the need to rationalize the processes of interregional interaction for the qualitative improvement of the infrastructure of the South Russian macro-region, to stimulate the growth of its competitive advantages, formed through the effective interaction of the regions of the South of Russia. Design/methodology/approach: The methodological basis of the article, based on the principles of a systemic approach, is formed on the basis of theories of regional reproduction and evolutionary development and it is specified using the approaches of the theory of managing the development of complex socio-economic systems, cluster theory, provisions of institutional regionalism, strategic management, concepts of economic globalism. Findings: The results of the work are reflected in the conclusions presented in the article on the effectiveness of cooperation between neighboring regions based on the commonality of the natural conditions of the economic and geographical zone and their production and economic activities, nature management specialization and positioning in the system of social division of labor. Important results are: identification of promising areas of interregional cooperation in the infrastructure development of the economic space of the South of Russia and the design of adequate institutional mechanisms for its provision. Originality/value: The scientific novelty obtained as a result of the study consists in identifying a sign of multidimensional morphology of the economic space and proving the provision that the economically motivating basis of partnership cooperation is the convergence of strategic interests on the idea of ​ ​ joint development of participating regions in the economic space of the macro-region. This was the basis for the search development of copyright recommendations for the use of: the advantages of the cluster model, the potential of the “power field” of market-gravitational attraction, as well as the scheme for the formation of division-network deployment of service objects, the idea of ​ ​ transforming the landscape and geo-economic terrain and the concept of the development of the socio-settlement network within the existing administrative-territorial division of the country.

Substantial capital outflows across Europe following the 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis and 201 European Sovereign Debt crisis raise concerns regarding potential capital outflows from the economies of Central and Eastern European countries. To shed light on country-level factors that can mitigate crisis and potential capital outflows across these countries, this article investigates which factors have influenced the evolution of their current accounts. Our analyses, using dynamic ordinary least squares, suggest that the long-run determinants of the current account have indeed changed over time, and threshold cointegrated estimates also confirm that, for each country, the parameters are dependent on thresholds for certain variables and there is significant heterogeneity across the countries. Our overall results are robust to complementary analyses, such as threshold estimation approach. We comment on some possible implications of these differences.

Scholars have long feared that regional economic specialization, fostered by freer trade, would make the European Union vulnerable to economic downturn. The most acute concerns have been over the adoption of the common currency: by adopting the euro, countries renounce their ability to meet an asymmetric shock with independent revaluations of their currencies. We systematically test the prediction that regional specialization increases vulnerability to economic downturn using a novel dataset that covers all of the EU’s subnational regions and major sectors of the economy between 2000 and 2013. We find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the most specialized regions actually fared better during the 2008-09 global financial crisis. Specialized regions performed worse only in states that remained outside the Eurozone. The heightened vulnerability of non-Eurozone states cannot be attributed to fiscal or social policy failures. Rather, our results suggest the common currency may have helped Eurozone members share risk. This bodes well for the resiliency of the EU, even as it navigates another economic downturn from the asymmetric impact of the novel coronavirus. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at (10.1007/s11558-020-09410-0)

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is a Free Trade Area (FTA) regional trade agreement in Africa. Currently, Ethiopia is negotiating to join COMESA FTA. This study assesses the impact of three regional trade arrangements, COMESA FTA, customs unions, and the European Partnership Agreement (EPA) on the economy of Ethiopia. The analysis is based on a static Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, version 9 database. Unlike previous studies, the customs union scenarios are designed at the detailed Harmonized System (HS) level. COMESA FTA (scenario 1) with standard GTAP model results in a welfare loss for Ethiopia due to negative terms of trade and investment-saving effect, but with unemployment closure (scenario 2); Ethiopia enjoys a welfare gain mainly due to endowment effect. In scenario 3 (COMESA customs union) and scenario 4 (European Partnership Agreement), Ethiopia loses due to negative terms of trade and investment-saving effect. There is a large increase in demand for unskilled labor force in Ethiopia by around US$23 million, US$112 million, and US$43 million for scenario 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Moreover, there is a positive output effect for oilseeds, leather, and basic metals across all scenarios. The world, as a whole, enjoys welfare gains with COMESA FTA (scenario 1 and 2). However, with scenario 3 and 4, there is an overall welfare loss. There is no strong reason for Ethiopia to move to the customs union, and the EPA in the short run. Therefore, a transition period is necessary, but it is recommended for Ethiopia to join COMESA FTA.

This paper attempts to examine Pakistan’s trade patterns with South Asian countries by using a gravity model of trade. The main objective of the study is to quantify the long‑run impacts of gravity variables. To achieve this objective, a panel data set for the period 2003 to 2017 has been used. Based on the mixed evidence of the results of panel unit root tests, Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and Panel Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) techniques are applied. The outcome of the PMG and Panel DOLS models justifies the theoretical background of the gravity model and suggests that all the basic gravity variables haveusual signs. The RGDPs and population of both Pakistan and the partner country have a positive impact on their bilateral trade. On the other hand, the distance between the two trading countries and the exchange rate have a negative impact on bilateral trade.The uniqueness of this study is that it measures the impacts of qualitative variables along with basic gravity variables. Language similarities and common borders have a positive impact on bilateral trade. Pakistan has borders with India and Afghanistan, but their trade relations are not worth mentioning. The military conflicts between Pakistan and India, and the political suspicions between Pakistan and Afghanistan hinder their trade relations. W artykule podjęto próbę zbadania wzorców handlowych widocznych w relacjach Pakistanu z krajami Azji Południowej przy użyciu grawitacyjnego modelu handlu. Głównym celem badania było ilościowe określenie długoterminowego wpływu zmiennych grawitacyjnych. Aby osiągnąć ten cel, wykorzystano zestaw danych panelowych dla lat 2003–2017. Ponieważ wyniki testów panelowych pierwiastka jednostkowego były niewiarygodne, zastosowano techniki Pooled Mean Group (PMG) i Panel Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS). Wyniki modeli PMG i Panel DOLS uzasadniają teoretyczne podstawy modelu grawitacyjnego i sugerują, że wszystkie podstawowe zmienne grawitacyjne mają typowe znaki. Realny PKB i liczba ludności zarówno Pakistanu, jak i kraju partnerskiego mają pozytywny wpływ na ich handel dwustronny. Z drugiej strony odległość między dwoma krajami dokonującymi wymiany handlowej oraz kurs walutowy mają negatywny wpływ na handel dwustronny. Wyjątkowość tego badania polega na tym, że mierzy ono jednocześnie wpływ zmiennych jakościowych oraz podstawowych zmiennych grawitacyjnych. Podobieństwa językowe i wspólne granice mają pozytywny wpływ na handel dwustronny. Jednakże, choć Pakistan graniczy z Indiami i Afganistanem, ich relacje handlowe nie są istotne. Konflikty zbrojne między Pakistanem a Indiami oraz polityczna podejrzliwość w relacjach Pakistanu z Afganistanem komplikują ich stosunki handlowe.

The paper contains a deep analysis of exports of Belarus and defines the proposals for its development. Economic comparisons and systematisation, which is based on the official statistical data for 2012–2018, are used in the study. It is concluded that Belarus exports have a poor diversification; export development is largely determined by Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) integrating processes; export support of innovative goods and evolution of a single service market through the enhanced cooperation are possible. A generalised model for the export development of innovative goods and services of the EAEU member states on a cooperative basis is proposed.

Capabilities of African businesses in a transformative role in solving the continent‘s challenges are underestimated and misunderstood. This study examined ease of doing business and financial development from a demand following hypothesis in the West African sub-region, employed Structural Equation Model covering the period of 2004 - 2017. Ten ease of doing business indicators and five distinct financial (capital market) development variables from the World Bank database were used. Findings indicate weak demand following the hypothesis of capital market development: positive and negative, depending on the measure of capital market development from the ease of doing business for West African countries majorly because of inadequate electricity. The indirect effect of the construction permit, property registration, access to credit, minority investors‘ protection and cross-border trading are indirectly significant to capital market development while starting a business, tax-paying, contract enforcement and settling insolvency are insignificant. The study recommended roadshow by West African capital markets to improve the listing of companies and the government should improve on the electricity supply.

European monetary integration must be understood as an additional step towards strengthening the close ties that have been fostered after the Second World War. The aim of this research is to determine the effect of adopting the euro in terms of productivity growth, measured as the total factor productivity (TPF) variation. We used a panel data analysis with two-way fixed effects to estimate the effects of Euro adoption on the productivity growth. Two panels from 1996 to 2016 were used –one comprised 28 countries of EU members; the other only included 13 countries which joined the EU since 2004. Our findings suggest that the productivity growth of the countries that joined in 2004 and adopted the euro was higher compared to those that maintained their own currency. In addition, we find that FDI was the main channel through which the adoption of the euro influenced productivity growth.

In the July/August issue of Intereconomics, Ilona Sologoub argued that increasing the cost of war would limit the ability of an authoritarian state to wage a war. Here, Charles D. Coleman comments on this statement and offers clarification, followed by a reply from Sologoub.

The purpose of this work is to present objectively and documented the evolution of Romania within the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (C.M.E.A. or C.O.M.E.C.O.N.) during 1949-1965. Choosing this period of time is not random: in 1949 COMECON was established at the initiative of Moscow, and the year 1965 represented the peak of the “dissidence” politics of Romania within the Council. The Romanian economy after the Second World War followed largely the same path as the other economies in Eastern Europe that entered the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The war and the new international situation in which Romania found itself at its end determined a dramatic rupture with the economic model followed in the interwar period. In the run-up to the end of the world conflict, the main interest of the hegemonic power in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, was to benefit from the resources of the countries in the area to compensate for the immense damage caused by the war. The exploitation of Eastern European economies intensified after Moscow became aware of the impossibility of obtaining substantial war reparations from Germany.

The euro area crisis was characterised by a negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. The paper aims to indicate the genesis of this phenomenon and to determine the scale of its operation during the crisis and post-crisis conditions, as well as to identify the threats it brings. In addition, the paper discusses the actions that have been taken so far at the euro area level to reduce the feedback loop and the existing challenges in this area. The following hypothesis has been formulated: in the post-crisis conditions the euro area remains vulnerable to the sovereign-bank nexus, which in particular stems from the very legacy of the crisis, bank-based financial system, as well as incomplete reforms of the euro area institutional architecture. The research methods include data selection and evaluation as well as descriptive statistics. The main contribution of the study stems from the adoption of a post-crisis perspective and the assessment of the loop with the use of the most recent data and in relation to the crisis period. The results show that in the post-crisis period, a reduction in interconnectedness has been observed, although it has not been evenly experienced by all euro area countries. At the same time, despite some progress in recent years, institutional reforms aimed at breaking the sovereign-bank nexus are far from complete. Przebieg kryzysu w strefie euro charakteryzowało zjawisko negatywnych sprzężeń zwrotnych między sektorem bankowym a sektorem finansów publicznych. Silne zależności między tymi sektorami warunkowała m.in. dominująca rola banków w systemie finansowym UGiW, narastające nierównowagi makroekonomiczne, a także „braki” w architekturze instytucjonalnej strefy euro. W artykule przedstawiona jest geneza omawianego zjawiska w UGiW, a także istota i skala obustronnego transferu ryzyka w czasie kryzysu i w latach pokryzysowych. Dodatkowo, omówiono dotychczasowe działania w kierunku ograniczenia negatywnych sprzężeń, a także wskazano pozostające wyzwania w tym obszarze.

ZusammenfassungDie üblichen positiven Effekte von Auslandsinvestitionen gelten für Firmenübernahmen durch chinesische Käufer nur eingeschränkt. Diese Investitionen sind — wie zahlreiche Indizien zeigen — teilweise auch mit einem Technologietransfer verbunden. Damit wird ein schnelles technologisches Aufholen Chinas begünstigt, das in den Industrieländern unter gewissen Annahmen zu Wohlstandsverlusten führen könnte. Dies legen Außenhandelsmodelle nahe, deren Annahmen bei genauerer Prüfung nicht unrealistisch erscheinen.

As a result of previous multilateral negotiations tariff rates are generally low and cannot explain the reasons for recent proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The aim of the paper is to look for other motivations of EU PTAs and to assess their importance for the EU. The main research methods are statistical, review and assessment of WTO documents and critical analysis of literature. First, the present level of tariff protection on selected import markets was estimated. This level illustrates the scale of countries’ interest in their elimination of the existing tariffs. Also the share of preferential imports in the EU extra-trade was calculated and compared with trade on MFN basis. Next, reasons for PTAs were identified. The conclusions prove that 21st century PTAs are mainly motivated not by a reduction of tariffs but by the willingness to reduce the regulatory barriers (contained in rules on public procurement, environmental protection, etc.). The most dynamic trade nowadays involves flows of accessories and services. In this situation the importance of PTAs results from the fact that they serve as instruments eliminating national regulatory barriers faced by exporters of goods and resources on foreign markets. Thus PTAs support production and sales abroad. In the EU political motivations of PTAs are important as well.

ZusammenfassungDie großen Einkommensunterschiede in der Europäischen Union sind maßgebliche Treiber der innereuropäischen Migration und Standortkonkurrenz. Beides hat ärmere Menschen in den reicheren Mitgliedstaaten beunruhigt. In Großbritannien war die Einwanderung ein Hauptmotiv für den Brexit. Der Stand und die Entwicklung der europaweiten Einkommensverteilung zeigt, dass die Ungleichheit in der EU insgesamt höher ist als innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten. Sie erreicht oder überschreitet sogar das Niveau der USA.

Despite being symmetric in its very nature, the Covid-19 shock is affecting European economies in a very asymmetric way, threatening to deepen the divide between core and peripheral countries even more. It is not Covid-19 itself, however, but the contradictions within the EU’s growth model and institutional architecture that would be to blame for such an outcome. The dramatic impact of the economic crisis brought on by the pandemic and the threat that it poses to Eurozone survival seem to have forced a reluctant Germany into action: a minor step, but an important signal. This note analyses the crossroads currently facing Europe—the risk of disintegration vis-a-vis the opportunity for a ‘Hamiltonian moment’—discussing possible future scenarios in the light of past developments.

This paper applies a recently developed ‘structural-political economy’ (SPE) framework to study centrifugal and centripetal forces in two of the crises that impacted on the European integration process: the financial crisis of 2008/9 and its aftermath and the Covid-19 crisis. It emphasises that the cumulative nature of the impact of these two crises forces shifts in interest positions of important political actors (countries, sectors, social constituencies) to address issues of ‘systemic instability’ which pushes innovations in the policy instruments that become available at the EU level. Bargaining processes that characterise the negotiations and outcomes of these crisis responses are complex, they reflect differences in size and urgencies to come to agreements, and they have themselves differentiating impacts on relevant political actors.

The effects of regionalism on trade have been extensively evaluated within a gravity model framework. With the expected exit of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU), the prospect of regional disintegration has brought about a new impetus to studying trade policy effects. Using actual and forecast data for a panel of bilateral imports between the EU15 and the rest of the world, this paper examines the trade effects of EU economic integration agreements (EIAs), their evolution over time and the related counterfactual Brexit trade policy scenarios. Distinct trade effects are obtained for the EU trade related agreements; positive, significant and of similar magnitude for the EU and free trade agreement (FTA) coefficients, but negative and significant (and smaller in magnitude) for the regional economic partnership agreements (EPAs). The subperiod results suggest the positive coefficients of EU and FTA membership tend to diminish over time, implying earlier membership of EIAs came with greater trade benefits. Finally, in generating the predicted values for the trade effects of three alternative counterfactual Brexit scenarios (hard Brexit, hard Brexit plus, global Britain), the findings suggest an asymmetric effect depending on the perspective of the UK versus the EU. Whereas the UK’s trade would decline substantially with all three country groups (the EU, the FTAs and regional EPAs) and rise substantially with the rest of the world, only minor percentage changes are predicted for EU bilateral trade.

There is a long debate among policymakers and academicians regarding whether assessments of international financial integration have significant growth benefits and whether such benefits compensate for the accompanied risks. Recent financial crisis has revived this debate. The previous empirical studies have not been able to establish conclusive presumed benefits of financial integration for economic growth. This paper attempts to analyze the financial openness and total factor productivity (TFP) growth nexususing dynamic panel regression models for a substantial sample of countries ranging from year 1970 to 2014. Different measures of financial openness are incorporated in the dataset. We find evidence that financial integration is associated with higher TFP growth. A range of integration measures (both de jure and de facto) shows robust association with financial integration and TFP growth. The result also suggests that financial development might reduce the marginal effects of financial integration on TFP growth. This finding, however, appears to be influenced by the recent global economic turmoil and excessive private finance, especially in recent years.