Search

This article deals with the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China during the early Cold War decades. The traditional historiographical paradigm of the East-West confrontation assumes that any form of cooperation was impossible between the two countries. However, a shift of focus from the political sphere to the economic one reveals how pattern of conduct predating 1949, as well as purely economic reasons, brought actors from both sides to agree on a set of rules for bilateral exchange, and to improve the trade performance despite the highs and lows of the political climate and the bloc allegiance of both countries.

Why do firms facing similar stakeholder issues respond quite differently? The recently introduced strategic cognition view of issue salience and firm responsiveness (hereinafter: issue salience model) seeks to tackle this core question of stakeholder theory. I extend the nascent theorizing with a historical case study in order to rethink the model’s firm-centric perspective. The firm under examination in this historical case study is the Swiss multinational Landis & Gyr (LG) during the Cold War period. Like many other Swiss exportoriented companies in the 1950s and early 1960s, LG was challenged by Swiss pressure groups, which were highly effective at putting an issue on the public agenda: the call to break off trade relations with the communist East. The empirically grounded explanation of issue interpretation and response mechanisms derived from this case study offers two key theoretical implications: First, it shifts our focus outwards, toward the social and political context, in which issues evolve and play out over time. This elaboration seeks to understand the role of the social and political surroundings in constituting firm-specific issue interpretation processes and response outcomes. Second, the findings suggest that the issue salience model emphasizes an overly homogenizing conception of the firm. By pointing towards the tensions and ambiguities in a firm’s collective sensemaking efforts, I start a critique of the theory in order to push this important stream of research further. peerReviewed

By the late-1950s, Soviet oil exports to Western Europe caused widespread concern in a number of Western countries as these feared that Moscow could use oil to weaken their economic interests. At the same time though, other Western countries had no hesitation in developing trade relations with the Soviets, seeing this as a good commercial opportunity. The paramount example of such political nonchalance was Italy’s oil company, ENI. In 1960, ENI signed a barter contract with the Soviets, causing a scandal in the Western oil world: the Italian company’s act was seen as a serious breach of faith by its international allies. As a consequence, ENI’s contract became a serious bone of contention in the country’s bilateral and international relations. This paper analyzes the origins and development of the ENI-Soviet deal, and focuses on the reactions of Italy’s Western allies and the debate it generated at the European Economic Community., В конце 1950-х гг. поставки нефти из СССР в Западную Европу вызвали озабоченность в некоторых европейских странах, которые опасались, что Москва может использовать нефть в целях ослабления их экономических интересов. Однако наряду с этим, другие европейские страны продолжали поддерживать торговые отношения с Советским Союзом, считая их перспективными. Ярким примером такой политической беспечности стала итальянская нефтяная компания ENI (Национальное нефтегазовое учреждение). В 1960 г. она подписала с СССР соглашение о товарообмене, чем вызвала скандал на европейском нефтяном рынке: международные союзники восприняли действия итальянской компании как измену. В результате контракт ENI стал камнем преткновения в двусторонних и многосторонних отношениях Италии с другими странами. В статье рассматриваются предпосылки и этапы развития сотрудничества ENI и СССР, при этом особое внимание уделяется изучению реакции западных союзников Италии и споров, которые это событие вызвало в Европейском экономическом сообществе.

As our trading world becomes more globalized, who benefits and who gets hurt? This paper relies on the Ricardian model to explore the effects of technological improvements in underdeveloped countries on the welfare of developed countries. For example, trading between the United States and China, which has undergone a technological improvement in commodities which China imports and exports, may lead to different welfare implications for both countries. The paper models several scenarios to indicate and demonstrate the arguments for and against globalization. The findings suggest that certain policies should be implemented to maintain and enhance the competitiveness of developed countries.

After satisfactory performance of the transition countries in 2000, their growth slowed down in 2001 as the external conditions deteriorated. This tendency was checked in the second half of 2002. Industrial production and exports have generally strengthened since then - though in some countries apparently only temporarily. Expanding consumption was the major factor supporting growth in the year 2002 as the capital formation was generally weak in the more advanced countries and only moderately strong in the less advanced ones. The contribution of foreign trade to GDP growth in 2002 seems on the whole positive, excepting Russia and most post-Yugoslav countries. Despite weak growth in the EU, exports of the accession countries (and of Ukraine) performed quite well. This must be attributed to the ongoing growth in labour productivity and related cost improvements in industry which kept exports competitive. Gains in labour productivity are generally associated with some cuts in employment, adding to unemployment which is generally high, or very high, and unlikely to go down significantly even in the medium run. There has been a continuous decline in inflation. In most cases the disinflation is gradual and appears to be little affected by the monetary and fiscal policies. Inertial cost-price adjustments are likely to continue in the foreseeable future. The remarkable strength of the national currencies appears to have had a fairly limited impact on the performance of trade and production so far. The recent years' exchange rate trends may have reflected financial (or even speculative) developments so that a potential for adjustments, involving devaluation, may be there. But the likelihood of major adjustments seems rather small because the solid capital inflows will continue even in the medium term, especially in view of the prospective EU membership of the candidate countries. The general concern over potential loss of competitiveness due to overvaluation remains still valid. However, the productivity and efficiency gains may offset the negative consequences of real appreciation and the process has been associated with quality and price gains in export activities. It is not clear yet how sustainable the process of productivity improvements will be. Most probably high levels of investment (including green-field FDI) are needed to maintain its momentum. Growth acceleration in 2003-04 is possible provided the business climate in the EU improves. Otherwise growth rates will be roughly the same as in 2002. In any case the average rate of catching-up vis-à-vis the EU will stay at about 2 percentage points per year.

Despite the unfavourable external economic climate over the past three years, the transition countries have displayed a reasonably good growth performance. The region as a whole has expanded more rapidly than the EU; it is also catching up in terms of productivity - especially in manufacturing. As of mid-2003, there are few signs of the protracted global economic slowdown threatening the transition countries' short- and medium-term growth prospects to any marked degree. Scheduled to join the EU in May 2004, a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe which have attracted appreciable amounts of FDI recently improved their competitive position by securing larger export shares in the EU market. Russia continues to cash in on high revenues from energy exports; its GDP growth is accelerating while investments recover. Whereas some of the latecomers to reform and stabilization in the Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) have been rapidly catching up in many respects, the situation in most countries in the Western Balkans remains precarious. The economies of the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe will grow on average by about 3% in both 2003 and 2004 - somewhat faster than over the period 2001 2002 and outstripping the eurozone again. A slow, but steady acceleration of GDP growth is forecast for Poland. Russia and Ukraine will also experience swifter growth in 2003, only to take time out in 2004. Inflation continues to drop to single-digit annual rates throughout the region (with the exception of Romania, Serbia & Montenegro and Russia), yet it is still higher than in the eurozone (except perhaps for the Czech Republic and Poland). Unemployment displays a similar pattern. Given the current gaps in labour productivity and efficiency reserves, the present modest rates of economic growth do not make for the creation of additional jobs. Although generally quite high, current account deficits in the EU accession countries are of no immediate concern as their financing is secured via capital inflows. This is not the case in the Western Balkans; Russia and Ukraine, however, continue to enjoy current account surpluses, with Russia slowly starting to attract an increasing volume of FDI as well.

After satisfactory performance of the transition countries in 2000, growth slowed down in 2001 as the external conditions deteriorated. This tendency has not been checked in the first quarter of 2002. Industrial production has weakened, in some countries even declined. Expanding consumption has been the major growth factor. Also capital formation weakened, or contracted. This does not augur well for economic growth in the medium-term future. The contribution of foreign trade to GDP growth seems neutral - excepting the Czech Republic and Hungary (probably positive). This is due to external conditions weak growth in the EU. Lower world prices of energy had a negative impact on growth in Russia. The current account deficits in the advanced transition countries will remain relatively low (and the high Slovak deficit is expected to go down). In Yugoslavia the high current account deficits will continue. The Russian current account surplus, which is declining sharply, will still remain very large. Current account deficits will continue to be financed largely, and safely, by inflows of foreign direct investment. The slowdown of industrial production and producer prices affects firms' financial position. This is compensated by rising labour productivity, achieved primarily through cuts in employment. Unemployment is high, or very high. It is unlikely to go down significantly even in the medium run. However, the associated social problems will probably have no destabilizing political consequences (except Poland). The remarkable strength of the national currencies appears to have a fairly limited impact on the performance of trade and production. The recent exchange rate trends may have reflected financial (or even speculative) developments so that a potential for adjustments, involving devaluation, may be there. But the likelihood of major adjustments seems rather small because the solid capital inflows will continue even in the medium term, especially in view of prospective EU membership of the candidate countries. The general concern over loss of competitiveness due to overvaluation remains still valid. However, alternative measures of real appreciation suggest that the currencies of the transition countries may actually have been depreciating in real terms. Competitiveness need not have suffered - the more so as the process has been associated with quality and price gains in export activities. Given the external conditions, the overall growth in transition countries in 2002 will be weaker than in 2001. Acceleration in 2003 is possible provided the business climate in the EU improves. The average rate of catching-up vis-à-vis the EU will stay at about 2 percentage points per year.

The report provides an overview of macroeconomic developments in 2001 and discusses prospects for 2002 and 2003. It covers twelve transition countries Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. It also includes Bosnia-Herzegovina, albeit not fully, for want of data. By the second half of 2001, the slowdown in global economic growth in leading economies had developed into stagnation, whereas in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) GDP kept on growing; some of the latter countries even recorded growth rates higher than in 2000. That notwithstanding, data related to the final months of 2001 point to a slowdown in GDP growth as well, as industrial output growth faded and foreign trade lost its dynamics. In most of the CEECs, inflation dropped to rates lower than a year before, yet still higher than the EU average. Towards the end of 2001, instances of a month-to-month decline in consumer and producer prices became frequent, inducing a trend towards more stability. The more advanced CEECs except Slovenia experienced nominal appreciation of their currencies, in most cases for the first time in years. This implied strong real appreciation, yet given the slowdown in GDP and import growth, it did not lead to huge trade and current account deficits. There is, however, every danger of real appreciation veering out of control in the future. The central banks' interest rate policy varied greatly in the individual countries. Whereas the Czech national bank followed the example set by the US Federal Reserve Bank, others opted to maintain high nominal and real interest rates. In the first half of 2002, most of the CEECs will not experience very much growth in GDP, industrial output and exports. In the second half, improvements in the EU business climate should boost growth again. Should these optimistic expectations materialize, high GDP growth will be back on track in 2003.

For the first time since the transformation began, all transition economies recorded GDP growth in the year 2000. Some of the traditional 'losers' grew much faster than the traditional 'winners' of the transition process. The average growth rate in the region more than doubled and the differences in the rates of GDP change narrowed significantly. No currency, current account, or banking crises occurred and all countries managed to accommodate the shock of high oil prices. The highest growth rates were recorded in countries with a very low base, under exceptionally favourable external conditions. Strong growth in the EU contributed to the growth acceleration in most more advanced countries. Expansion of exports and imports did not yet generally reduce trade deficits and current account deficits are still a major problem for some countries, though the inflows of foreign capital have so far made their financing unproblematic. Growing industrial production was almost everywhere combined with some contraction in employment. Labour productivity improved, but rates of unemployment generally increased. The process of disinflation was perturbed by rising world market energy prices and hikes in rates of indirect taxation. With the coming slowdown of growth in the EU, the export sectors of the transition countries will come under pressure in 2001. On account of higher levels of technological development and the existing degree of integration into the world economy, the Hungarian, Slovenian - and to a lesser degree also the Czech and Slovak - industry will be in a better position to withstand the deterioration in the EU business climate. Nonetheless, the expected rate of GDP growth will drop to 3% on average in 2001. The expansion of trade (and current account) deficits will be moderated due to the stabilization of the world oil market. Weakening growth in the EU may have serious consequences particularly for Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania. The recent tendencies in Poland indicate that the growth slowdown here may be more pronounced than elsewhere. Poland (and to a much lesser degree Bulgaria) seems more vulnerable to the negative effects of high current account deficits than other countries. Unless oil prices slump dramatically, the recovery in Russia will continue, though at a lower pace. The recovery in Russia will also be supporting growth in Ukraine. The prospects for 2002 are so far uncertain, though a moderate acceleration of GDP growth in the transition countries is likely. But much will depend on the degree of the growth slowdown in the EU and on the resultant adjustments in the transition countries. Whether or not growth accelerates in the EU remains to be seen; even if it is strong, the current uncertainties are likely to result in downscaling of investment activities (including greenfield foreign direct investment) in the transition countries.

The volume and commodity structure of EU trade with the transition countries in central and eastern Europe (CEECs) is estimated on the assumption that it will follow the pattern of trade among market economies. A gravity-type approach at the level of product groups is used, combining geography and factor-proportions theory of international trade. It is shown that there is still considerable potential for a further rise in East-West trade if the CEECs? national product is valued at purchasing power parities, instead of market exchange rates. Considering divergent income levels and distance between East and West, the EU?s comparative advantages are in specialised-supplier, scale-intensive and science-based goods, whereas the CEECs? comparative advantages are in labour-intensive and resource-intensive goods. The intersectoral specialisation pattern will become "flatter" and the share of intra-industry trade will grow when the income differentials decrease.

This report provides an overview of macro-economic developments in 1999 and discusses the economic outlook for the next two years. It covers twelve transition countries Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia (FYRM), Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In a few graphs and tables as well as in some passages of the text the Baltic States have been included, together with Germany as a reference country, so as to provide a broader view. In the recent past, more or less all transition countries were confronted with a slowdown of economic growth or even an intensifying GDP decline. GDP growth rates tumbled from quarter to quarter. The trend bottomed out in late 1998 or early 1999. Despite this general tendency, the contrast between individual countries was striking. In the second quarter of 1999 growth rates started to rise once more in one group of countries -- and GDP shrinkage diminished in the other. For all countries more recent data point to an improving business climate. Industrial output statistics reveal a quite similar tendency a downswing in 1998 and an upswing in 1999 in all CEECs plus Russia. Labour productivity growth rates in industry behaved correspondingly In most of the countries, they turned negative in 1998 and rose in 1999. Unit labour costs in euro terms rose in most of the countries during the slump but relaxed thereafter. From a longer-term point of view, only three of the transition countries considered in this report -- Hungary, Poland and Slovenia -- give the impression of having been relatively successful. They were able to achieve and maintain GDP growth. Other economies started growing substantially at some point of time, only to experience severe setbacks later. The phenomenon of permanent or re-emergent transitional recession has appeared in countries where the transformation of the financial and non-financial corporate sector has been incomplete, thus restricting the efficiency of the new institutions and institutional settings. In most of the countries related problems are persisting, so that we can expect some temporary upswing for this and the coming year, but no smooth continuation of growth at high rates. The WIIW forecasts a strengthening of the positive signals now visible. Thus, in 2000 in almost all transition countries GDP growth will be better than it was in 1999 and may strengthen further in 2001. Over the next few years, most of the countries will encounter difficulties in their attempts to secure high GDP growth, while simultaneously limiting their current account deficits. Countries with two-digit inflation rates will enjoy some measure of decline, while those that already enjoyed relatively low rates in the past will experience some increase. An unemployment rate of around 12% seems to be establishing itself as the norm for the transition countries.

International audience; Through a review of historical, epigraphical and archaeological sources, the case of the duplex towns in the Rhône valley can be taken up again. Facts concerning the following sites are being re-examined and discussed. Its seems that duplex towns have been widely overemphasized and most of them must only have been settlements for river crossing. With this new reading of evidence, the question of the river crossing (pontoon bridges, fords, bridges) during Antiquity can be posed. Other notions being considered: twin towns, territory and east-west trade especially.; Une analyse critique des sources érudites, épigraphiques et archéologiques permet de reprendre le dossier des « sites doubles » de la vallée du Rhône. Les données concernant les sites d'Andance (07) et Andancette (26), Tain-l'Hermitage (26) et Tournon (07), Valence (26) et Granges-lès-Valence (07), Bourg-Saint-Andéol (07) et Pierrelatte (26) sont reprises et critiquées. Les « sites doubles » paraissent avoir été largement surévalués et pour beaucoup seraient de simples sites de passage d'une rive à l'autre. Cette relecture des sources permet de poser le problème de la traversée du fleuve (bacs, gués, ponts) durant l'Antiquité. Sont abordées aussi les notions de villes jumelles, de territoire et surtout de commerce est-ouest.

Recent events, historical evidence and geographical proximity suggest that the six EFTAns and twelve Central and East European countries (CEECs) are natural trading partners. This paper evaluates this suggestion by estimating the potential for EFTA-CEEC trade using the gravity model of Wang and Winters (1991). The findings show that even at 1989 CEEC income levels, EFTA-CEEC trade should have been four times greater than it was. Thus the CEEC markets should have been as important to Austria, Iceland and Switzerland as were the EFTA markets. A second estimation is carried out assuming that CEECs' incomes catch up to 70% of the EC's by 2005, 2010 and 2020. In this scenario, EFTA-CEEC trade grows at double digit rates for decades, finally attaining a level where CEEC markets account for almost a fifth of EFTA members' exports to all of Europe.

This article examines the changing political climate in Eastern Europe as the basis for changes in the conditions of East-West trade. The authors argue that gas trade is set to rise in general, because the security of supply issue recedes into the background while gas from the USSR becomes a very goodchoice in counter-trade or joint ventures. The environmental factor will play an increasing role in favour of gas use, and the energy policy of the European Community will become more important in both Eastern and Western Europe.

The recent political events in eastern Europe have set stage for a strengthening of east-west relations but, so far, progress on the economic front has not been very impressive. This lack of economic dynamism may have historical roots. For the last 40 years the east European economies have been shaped to fulfil socialist needs, particularly those in the Soviet Union. Hence, a return to the pre-war patterns of east-west trade is not for tomorrow. This note tries to outline the changes in east-west economic relations from the Treaty of Versailles to the Gorbachev era. First it looks into the economic impact of the "cold war"; then it examines the changes between 1950 and 1980; and, finally, considers the prospects open by the new political environment.

As liberalization takes on convincing shape and substance in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, international entrepreneurs the world over are entertaining visions of capitalizing on new business opportunities. No doubt the transformation of heretofore centrally directed economies into more nearly market economies will bring such opportunities, and will entail significant, if not dramatic, changes in the international commerce of these economies. ; is article presents an overview of trade between the "newly liberalizing countries," or NLCs, and the rest of the world, and tenders some suggestions on how that trade might develop. Special attention is given to commerce between the United States and the NLCs. Some general observations on the creditworthiness of the NLCs are also presented

The past four years have witnessed a marked increase in the economic activity between East and West. The volume of foreign trade rose strongly; but as Eastern exports showed only slight increases while their imports from the West went up by leaps and bounds, the deficits of the Comecon countries became ever greater — an imbalance which has given rise to a number of problems.

The SDI technology initiative, which is directed towards military ends, and its civil counterpart Eureka pose a challenge to relations between East and West and within the Western world. Professor Rolf Hasse analyses their implications for security and competition.

The aims of this paper are to examine the role of licensing in the strategy of Western firms aimed at increasing their share in East European markets and to establish the pattern of their licensing policy pursued there. It is also expected that, as a by-product of this study, some other important features of East-West trade in licenses will be found out.

This study is a review of the political and economic issues that are involved in East-West trade and technology transfer in the 1980's. Using unclassified sources, specific instances of technology transfer are evaluated and assessments as to its impact are made. The analysis provides evidence that the Soviet Union and their allies derive relative advantage from East-West trade--one which not only provides greater net economic benefits to the East, but also is creating serious security concerns in the West. The main conclusion of the research undertaken is that the nature and severity of the problem have been greatly underestimated by both scholars and government officials. http://archive.org/details/thepoliticalimpl1094522034 Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

There are significant differences between the United States and Western Europe on policy towards East-West trade. Some of this is attributable to the divergent economic interests of different countries, but all countries' policies are influenced by political as well as economic considerations. This paper focuses on the role of expectations in distinguishing between the view of economic relations as giving rise to positive linkages with political relations and the alternative view of economic ties as providing political leverage. Multinational cooperation may be an important channel through which the economic system reacts to political risks, and a formal model is presented to analyse this issue. The conclusion of the paper is that there may be only very limited scope for the use of trade embargoes as a political and strategic tool.