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Acknowledgements: Thanks to Arif Ahmed, David Chalmers, Marta Halina, Richard Holton, participants at Oslo Mind Group, and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks to Aker Scholarship for financial support., Funder: Aker Scholarship, It is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as what it is like to be in a mental state. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning, i.e. a meaning for which the association to the relevant expression is peculiar to a theoretical community. The relevant theoretical community is philosophy and some parts of cognitive science, so on this view, only philosophers and cognitive scientists use the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in the way that is characteristic in the literature on phenomenal consciousness. This claim has important consequences. Firstly, I argue that the phrase says nothing informative about phenomenal consciousness. Secondly, I argue that the fact that non-philosophers use the phrase is not compelling evidence that they believe in phenomenal consciousness. These claims have further consequences for debates about phenomenal consciousness.

Eliminativism is a peripheral (if not dead) position in the current biological function debate, and it is roughly presented as the thesis that function terms are eliminable in biological discourse. While eliminativism is often assumed inadequate, a detailed examination of eliminativism is lacking in current literature. Accordingly, this article provides a critical examination of eliminativism. This examination consists of three parts: a clarification of three supporting arguments for eliminativism (based on historical literature), a unified account of eliminativism (inspired in particular by Larry Wright 1976), and a discussion of its validity and some of its implications. This article concludes by briefly addressing the persistent presence of function terms in biological discourse.

L’objectif de cette thèse est de fournir un cadre théorique pour l’analyse philosophique des pratiques classificatoires en sciences. La classification, définie comme étant un geste épistémique dont l’objectif est de fournir une description du monde par découpage et discrimination, et par mise en relation des catégories ainsi formées, est un point de rencontre naturel entre philosophie et sciences. La tradition des espèces naturelles, considérée en philosophie des sciences comme la principale approche disponible pour l’analyse des pratiques classificatoires, est toutefois lacunaire. Dans le cadre de cette thèse, je démontre les faiblesses de cette approche et le besoin de mobiliser d’autres ressources épistémologiques pour penser la classification. À cet effet, je m’inspire de travaux en philosophie de la mesure s’inscrivant dans un courant de pensée que j’appelle le cohérentisme historique. Ces approches mettent l’accent sur les pratiques inférentielles et sur la charge théorique des observations en plus d’insister sur le dynamisme scientifique et la multitude de facteurs qui l’influencent (principe de respect, impératif de progrès, développements théoriques, nouveaux outils [mathématiques ou matériels], nouvelles données, histoire du champ disciplinaire, structure sociale de la recherche, etc.). Une fois ce cadre d’analyse épistémologique présenté en détail, je le mobilise pour étudier un ensemble de pratiques classificatoires en sciences, soit les pratiques phylogénétiques contemporaines. La phylogénétique est la discipline biologique qui vise à retracer les liens généalogiques qui unissent les êtres vivants. Les gènes et organismes sont ainsi regroupés au sein d’unités taxonomiques qui sont par la suite mises en relation. Ce champ disciplinaire a longtemps été associé de façon intime et exclusive au modèle arborescent, lui-même associé à la théorie de l’évolution par voie de sélection naturelle : les liens phylogénétiques entre organismes sont généralement représentés sous la forme d’un arbre, soit l’Arbre du vivant. Or, les dernières décennies ont vu émerger, au sein de la discipline, un compétiteur : le modèle réticulé. En analysant les différences et similarités qui lient ces deux types de modèles (modèles arborescents et modèles réseaux), je démontre que la transition d’un modèle à l’autre n’influence que superficiellement la pratique puisque la majorité de ses déterminants demeure inchangée. En bref, cette thèse présente un cadre d’analyse philosophique pour appréhender les pratiques classificatoires en sciences. J’importe des principes et des outils issus de travaux de la philosophie de la mesure afin de développer une philosophie de la classification qui comble les lacunes de la tradition des espèces naturelles. En s’ancrant dans ce que j’appelle le cohérentisme historique, cette thèse contribue non seulement à la bonne compréhension des pratiques classificatoires d’un point de vue épistémologique, mais aussi à la bonne compréhension des pratiques phylogénétiques contemporaines et de l’importante transition qui éloigne cette discipline de son modèle classique, soit l’Arbre du vivant., The main objective of this dissertation is to offer a philosophical framework for the analysis of scientific classificatory practices. Classification, here defined as an epistemic action that describes the world by breaking down phenomena into categories and by establishing relevant relationships between these categories, is a natural bridge between philosophy and science. The tradition of natural kinds, which is currently the main approach in philosophy of science for analysing classificatory practices, has important shortcomings when it comes to epistemologically analyzing scientific classification. In this dissertation, I highlight these weaknesses and the consequent need to develop a novel framework for tackling classificatory practices. To achieve this, I draw on an existing trend in philosophy of measurement, which I coined historical coherentism. This approach is centered on the analysis of inferential practices and stresses the importance of the theoretical charge of observations. It also focuses on the dynamic nature of scientific fields and on the variety of factors that determine scientific progress (principle of respect, imperative of progress, theoretical developments, mathematical and material innovations, new data, the history of a field of research, the social structure of the scientific community, etc.). After the detailed presentation and exploration of this epistemological framework, I use it to tackle a set of scientific classificatory practices, namely contemporary phylogenetic practices. Phylogenetics is the biological discipline that aims to reconstruct the genealogical relationships uniting living beings. Genes and organisms are grouped into operative taxonomic units, and these units are then connected within a system. Since its inception, phylogenetics has been intimately tied to tree-based models, with these tree-based models themselves tied to the theory of evolution by means of natural selection: the phylogenetic system connecting all living organisms takes the form of a tree, the Tree of Life. In the last few decades, however, an alternative type of models has gained more attention and support within the field: network-based models. Using historical coherentism, I analyze the differences and similarities between the two competing types of models (tree-based models and network-based models) and show that the transition from one to the other only superficially changes phylogenetic practices. Indeed, many factors that constrain these practices remain unchanged whether researchers use tree-based or network-based models. In short, this thesis presents a philosophical framework for the analysis of classificatory practices in sciences. I use various principles and tools imported from the philosophy of measurement to develop a philosophy of classification that covers the weaknesses of the tradition of natural kinds. By anchoring my work in historical coherentism, I contribute not only to our understanding of classificatory practices, from an epistemological perspective, but also to a better understanding of contemporary phylogenetic practices and of the significant transition that leads this discipline away from its classical model, the Tree of Life.

A number of philosophers have argued in favour of extended simples on the grounds that they are needed by fundamental physics. The arguments typically appeal to theories of quantum gravity. To date, the argument in favour of extended simples has ignored the fact that the very existence of spacetime is put under pressure by quantum gravity. We thus consider the case for extended simples in the context of different views on the existence of spacetime. We show that the case for extended simples based on physics is far more complex than has been previously thought. We present and then map this complexity, in order to present a much more textured picture of the argument for extended simples.

Traditional monist theories of art fail to account for the diversity of objects that intuitively strike many as belonging to the category art. Some today argue that the solution to this problem requires the adoption of some version of pluralism to account for the diversity of art. We examine one recent attempt, which holds that the correct account of art must recognize the plurality of concepts of art. However, we criticize this account of concept pluralism as being unable to offer an explanation of why some concept is an art concept. Instead, many of the disagreements over the definition of art could be reconciled by recognizing that works of art can be valued in a plurality of ways. By recognizing a plurality of values for art, we claim further that the definition of art becomes a non-issue.

The aim of this article is to examine how and why – in the current legal context, and because of some relevant changes that are ripening – the legal practice is supported by a solid professional ethics of the legal roles, summed up in the respect of the rule of law. Other elements that in the past seemed crucial to explain the legal order nowadays are inadequate and a legal theory without considering the role of lawyers is incomplete. After indicating the changes in the background, it will follow an analysis of the legal professional ethics and the reasons of its specificity. Against what is supported by the recent literature about eliminativism in legal philosophy, the perspective of professional ethics implies an inquiry about the concept of law and the question about the autonomy of law from Politics and morality. The answer to these questions requires to confute three thesis: the irrelevance of the concept of law for its practice; the realistic reduction of law to power; the moral monism in the field of obligations. El objetivo de este articulo es el de examinar como y por que –en la situacion actual del derecho y a partir de algunos cambios importantes que estan madurando– la practica juridica reposa sobre una solida etica profesional del jurista, que puede a su vez resumirse en el respeto de la rule of law. Otros elementos que en el pasado parecian centrales en la comprension del orden juridico hoy muestran su debilidad, y una teoria del derecho que no tenga en cuenta el rol del jurista resulta incompleta. Despues de senalar los cambios principales que hacen de marco a la problematica, se expondra en breve que se debe entender por etica profesional del jurista y las razones de su especificidad. Contrariamente a cuanto sostiene la reciente literatura sobre el eliminativismo en filosofia del derecho, la perspectiva de la etica profesional implica indagar el concepto de derecho, ademas de preguntarse en que consiste la autonomia del juridico respecto a la politica y a la moral. La respuesta a estas preguntas exige la confutacion de tres tesis: la de la irrelevancia del concepto de derecho a fines practicos; la de la realistica reduccion del derecho a poder; el monismo moral en tema de obligaciones.

G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form 'p, but I don't believe that p' are inherently absurd. John Turri strongly disagrees with the consensus evaluation of such assertions as inherently absurd and offers a counterexample according to which it is possible to say 'Eliminativism is true, but of course I don't believe it's true' sincerely and without any absurdity. I argue in this paper that Turri's attempt misses the point entirely, for the most natural interpretations of his counterexample are either absurd or do not represent genuinely Moorean assertions. The critical analysis of Turri's counterexample will enable me to reach the general conclusion that precludes the possibility of omissive Moorean assertions that are inherently non-absurd (regardless of their content), at least if we hold that our assertions ought to have some normative function.

Pre trideset godina, Vilijem Remzi, Stiven Stič i Džozef Geron su u zajedničkom radu izneli argument u prilog sledećeg kondicionala: ako konekcionistički modeli koji implementiraju paralelno distriburirano procesiranje predstavljaju vernu sliku ljudskih kognitivnih procesa, onda je eliminativizam u pogledu propozicijskih stavova ispravna teza. Korolar njihovog argumenta, ukoliko se pokaže kao zdrav, jeste da za zdravorazumsku psihologiju nema mesta u savremenoj kognitivnoj nauci. Ovakvo viđenje konekcionizma – kao hipoteze o kognitivnoj arhitekturi kompatibilne sa eliminativizmom – karakteristično je i za Pola Čerčlanda, radikalnog protivnika zdravorazumske psihologije. Cilj ovog rada je da se ispita u kojoj meri sadašnji metodološki rafinirani konekcionistički modeli, bazirani na neuronskim mrežama dugog kratkoročnog pamćenja, potvrđuju argumente kako Remzija i kolega, tako i Čerčlanda. Argumentovaću u prilog eliminativizma ograničenog uticaja. Naime, tvrdiću da to što konekcionistička kognitivna nauka nema potrebu za zdravorazumskom psihologijom qua teorijom ne povlači za sobom nelegitimnost zdravorazumske psihologije per se u drugim naučnim domenima, ukoliko se zdravorazumska psihologija shvati kao korisna heuristika. Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul Churchland, a radical opponent of folk psychology and a prominent supporter of eliminative materialism. I aim to examine whether current connectionist models based on long-short term memory (LSTM) neural networks can back up these arguments in favor of eliminativism. Nonetheless, I will rather put my faith in the eliminativism of the limited domain. This position amount to the following claim: even though that connectionist cognitive science has no need whatsoever for folk psychology qua theory, this does not entail illegitimacy of folk psychology per se in other scientific domains, most notably in humanities, but only if one sees folk psychology as mere heuristics.

Is animal culture a real entity or is it rather just in the eye of the beholder? The concept of culture began to be increasingly used in the context of animal behaviour research around the 1960s. Despite its success, it is not clear that it represents what philosophers have traditionally thought to be a natural kind. In this article I will show, however, how conceiving of animal culture in this fashion has played a role in the “culture wars”, and what lessons we can draw from this. First, an analysis of the epistemological landscape of author keywords related to the concept of animal cultures is presented, thus vindicating the centrality of the concept in describing a broad range of findings. A minimal definition that encompasses the multiple strands of research incorporating the notion of culture is proposed. I then systematically enumerate the ways in which culture thus conceived cannot be considered a natural kind in the study of animal behaviour. This is accomplished by reviewing the efforts and possibilities of anchoring the elusive idea in specific mechanisms, homologies, selection pressures, homeostatic property clusters, or alternatively, its reduction or elimination. Finally, a plausible interpretation of the scientific status of the animal culture concept is suggested that is compatible with both its well established use in animal behaviour research and its inferential limitations. Culture plays the role of a well-established epistemic kind, a node that connects different areas of research on common themes.

In this chapter, we examine a radical philosophical position about consciousness: eliminativism. Eliminativists claim that consciousness does not exist and/or that talk of consciousness should be eliminated from science. These are strong positions to take, and require serious defence. To evaluate these positions, the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the difference between entity eliminativism and discourse eliminativism and outline the typical strategies used to support each. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the kinds of consciousness we refer to throughout the chapter. Section 4 focuses on entity eliminativist arguments about consciousness: Dennett’s classic eliminativist argument (4.1); a rebooted version of Dennett’s argument (4.2); and recent arguments for ‘illusionism’ (4.3). In Section 5, we examine discourse eliminativist arguments about consciousness: methodological arguments from scientific behaviourism (5.1); arguments based on the empirical accessibility of phenomenal consciousness (5.2); and a stronger version of discourse eliminativism aimed at both phenomenal and access consciousness (5.3). In Section 6, we offer a brief conclusion

Given how central free will and moral responsibility are for theology, Christian theologians should not remain at the sidelines when scientists and philosophers debate recent empirical results about human agency. In this article, the core notion of free will is identified with the agent's cognitive ability to exert control over his or her actions thereby making moral responsibility possible. Then three scientifically inspired arguments for free will skepticism are outlined: the argument from eliminativism, the argument from determinism and the argument from epiphenomenalism. The remainder of the article explores novel responses to these arguments and draws some theological implications from them.

No Elimination, no Reduction, no Integration: Then What? Sciences of the Mind, Neuroscience and the Instrumental Model. Since the publication of Neurophilosophy in 1986, several accounts have been offered in philosophy of what the relations between psychology and neuroscience should be -namely, eliminativism, reductionism, and the more recent integrative model which construes psychological explanation as a mere sketch of a mechanistic, neurocognitive explanation. In this paper a critical discussion of these various attempts is offered. In particular, presenting psychology as a component of the wider, multidisciplinary program of neuroscience comes with the risk of neglecting what the researchers involved in the different sciences of the mind worry about, and the very reason why they value neuroscience as an essential tool to reach the goals constitutive of their disciplines. Accordingly, I suggest an alternative model to understand the usefulness of neuroscience to psychology., Depuis la publication de Neurophilosophie en 1986, plusieurs théories ont visé à rendre compte en philosophie de ce que les relations entre psychologie et neurosciences devraient être – en particulier, l’éliminativisme, le réductionnisme et le modèle intégratif plus récent qui conçoit l’explication psychologique comme une simple esquisse par rapport à l’explication neurocognitive de type mécaniste. Cet article présente une discussion critique de ces modèles. En particulier, faire de la psychologie un composant à l’intérieur du programme multidisciplinaire plus large des neurosciences peut conduire à négliger les préoccupations des chercheurs dans les diverses sciences de l’esprit et à méconnaître les raisons pour lesquelles ils attachent de l’importance aux neurosciences lorsqu’ils cherchent à atteindre les buts qui sont constitutifs de leurs disciplines. En conséquence, un modèle alternatif est proposé pour penser l’utilité que peuvent avoir les neurosciences pour la psychologie., Forest Denis. Ni élimination, ni réduction, ni intégration, alors quoi ? Sciences de l’esprit, neurosciences et modèle instrumental. In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°69, 2018/1-2. Les Neurosciences au sein des Sciences de la Cognition entre Neuroenthousiasme et Neuroscepticisme. pp. 167-185.

In this paper I argue that, by combining eliminativist and fictionalist approaches toward the sub-personal representational posits of predictive processing, we arrive at an empirically robust and yet metaphysically innocuous cognitive scientific framework. I begin the paper by providing a non-representational account of the five key posits of predictive processing ("prediction-signal", "error-signal", "prior", "likelihood", and "posterior probability"). Then, I motivate a fictionalist approach toward the remaining indispensable representational posits of predictive processing, and explain how representation can play an epistemologically indispensable role within predictive processing explanations without thereby requiring that representation metaphysically exists. Finally, I outline four consequences of accepting this approach and explain why they are beneficial: (1) we arrive at a victory for metaphysical eliminativism in the 'representation wars'; (2) my account fits with extant empirical practice; (3) my account provides guidance for future research; and, (4) my account provides the beginnings of a response to Mark Sprevak's IBE problem for fictionalist approaches toward sub-personal representation.

El present treball exposa la teoria de l'emergència social de Dave Elder-Vass, i pretén mostrar com supera algunes crítiques que s'han fet per part d'eliminativistes com Tobias Hansson Wahlberg o Gustav Ramström. Les conclusions obtingudes presenten una teoria emergent que fa front als principis ontològics i metodològics d'alguns autors individualistes, i encoratja la recerca teórica en el camp de la filosofia de les ciències socials amb l'objectiu de resoldre aquest enfrontament teòric. El presente trabajo expone la teoría de la emergencia social de Dave Elder-Vass, y pretende mostrar cómo supera algunas críticas que se han hecho por parte de eliminativistas como Tobias Hansson Wahlberg o Gustav Ramström. Las conclusiones obtenidas presentan una teoría emergente que hace frente a los principios ontológicos y metodológicos de algunos autores individualistas, y anima a la investigación teórica en el campo de la filosofía de las ciencias sociales con el objetivo de resolver este enfrentamiento teórico. The present work presents Dave Elder-Vass's theory of social emergence, and tries to show how does overcome some critiques that have been made from eliminativists as Tobias Hansson Wahlberg or Gustav Ramström. The obtained conclusions show an emergent theory that faces the ontological and methodological principles of some individualist authors, and encourage theoretical research in the field of the philosophy of the social sciences with the objective of resolving this theoretical clash.

Eternalism, the view that what we regard locally as being located in the past, the present and the future equally exists, is the best ontological account of temporal existence in line with special and general relativity. However, special and general relativity are not fundamental theories and several research programs aim at finding a more fundamental theory of quantum gravity weaving together all we know from relativistic physics and quantum physics. Interestingly, some of these approaches assert that time is not fundamental. If time is not fundamental, what does it entail for eternalism and the standard debate over existence in time? First, I will argue that the non-fundamentality of time to be found in string theory entails standard eternalism. Second, I will argue that the non-fundamentality of time to be found in loop quantum gravity entails atemporal eternalism, namely a novel position in the spirit of standard eternalism.

Error theorists about race face a challenge from the occurrence of diseases and other health ailments that, appear, to be tracked by groups that are carved out by racial terms. If race does indeed allow us to make useful medical distinctions, then it would seem foolish or even a form of medical injustice to deny its reality. This paper provides a response to the stated challenge. First, by primarily using the work of Anthony Appiah, I will describe the error theorist position and its arguments for the non-reality of race. From here, I demonstrate the extent to which medical professionals grant the race is a scientifically arbitrary term and give arguments for accepting race as an alternative that may even be more medically useful. Finally, I advance an eliminativist argument to further motivate the notion that race, if it is truly not necessary, should be eliminated from use. Master of Arts Error theorists about race face a challenge from the occurrence of diseases and other health ailments that, appear, to be tracked by groups that are carved out by racial terms. If race does indeed allow us to make useful medical distinctions, then it would seem foolish or even a form of medical injustice to deny its reality. This paper provides a response to the stated challenge. First, by primarily using the work of Anthony Appiah, I will describe the error theorist position and its arguments for the non-reality of race. From here, I demonstrate the extent to which medical professionals grant the race is a scientifically arbitrary term and give arguments for accepting race as an alternative that may even be more medically useful. Finally, I advance an eliminativist argument to further motivate the notion that race, if it is truly not necessary, should be eliminated from use.

There occurred in the twentieth century the most remarkable episode in the history of human thought. A number of thinkers denied the existence of something we know with certainty to exist: consciousness, conscious experience. Others held back from the Denial, as we may call it, but claimed that it might be true-a claim no less remarkable than the Denial. This paper documents some aspects of this episode, with particular reference to two things. First, the development of two views which are forms of the Denial -philosophical behaviourism, and functionalism considered as a doctrine in the philosophy of mind- from a view that does not in any way involve the Denial: psychological methodological behaviourism. Second, the rise of a way of understanding naturalism -materialist or physicalist naturalism- that wrongly takes naturalism to entail the Denial. Resumen Uno de los episodios más notables en la historia del pensamiento humano ocurrió en el siglo XX. Varios pensadores negaron la existencia de algo que sabemos con certeza que existe: la conciencia o la experiencia consciente. Otros, aunque se contuvieron de llegar al punto de la Negación -como podemos llamarlo-, afirmaron que podría ser cierta -una tesis no menos notable que la Negación. Este texto documenta algunos aspectos de este episodio, con particular referencia a dos cosas. En primer lugar, el desarrollo de dos puntos de vista que son formas de la Negación- el conductismo filosófico y el funcionalismo en la filosofía de la mente- a partir de una perspectiva que no implica de ninguna manera la Negación: el conductismo psicológico metodológico. En segundo lugar, el surgimiento de una forma de entender el naturalismo -el naturalismo materialista o fisicalista- que interpreta erróneamente que el naturalismo implica la Negación.

Under the label of scientific metaphysics, many naturalist metaphysicians are moving away from a priori conceptual analysis and instead seek scientific explanations that will help bring forward a unified understanding of the world. This paper first reviews how our classical assumptions about ordinary objects fail to be true in light of quantum mechanics. The paper then explores how our experiences of ordinary objects arise by reflecting on how our neural system operates algorithmically. Contemporary models and simulations in computational neuroscience are shown to provide a theoretical framework that does not conflict with existing fundamental physical theories, and nonetheless helps us make sense of the manifest image. It is argued that we must largely explain how the manifest image arises in algorithmic terms, so that we can pursue a metaphysics about ordinary objects that is scientifically well founded.

In this paper, we propose three lines of argumentation against Nannini’s eliminativist approach towards consciousness and the Self. First, we argue that the premises he uses to argue for eliminativism can equally well be used to draw a completely different conclusion in favor of naturalistic dualism according to which phenomenal consciousness irreducibly emerges from a physical substrate by virtue of certain psychophysical laws of nature. Nannini proposes that in contrast to dualistic theses which represent the manifest image of the world, eliminativism represents the world’s scientific image just as classical physics and theories of relativity respectively represent the world’s manifest image and scientific image. And if developments in a scientific field reveal a conflict between these two images we should always vote for the scientific image. In our second line of argument, we challenge this claim by comparing two rival interpretations of quantum mechanics, i.e. the Copenhagen and Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, we argue that Nannini’s identification of consciousness and the Self as illusions does not shed any light on the hard problem of consciousness since illusions themselves are instances of phenomenal experiences and need to be explained.

The understanding of the ordinary objects of our daily experience implies a definition of spatiotemporal and intersubjective levels of permanence. This is due to the fact that these objects, whose existence we defend against eliminativism and mereological nihilism, can be said to endure or perdure, at least in our experiences and our discourses about them. This existence in time and space and between subjects of experience cannot be defined by mere logical features. That is why we choose a contextualist approach of objects, and study perceptual situations where identifications and categorizations occur, especially at the early stages of objectification and objectivation which babies are able to achieve. The newborn and the young child indeed need to gain object permanence, a phenomenon first described by Gestalt psychologists like Michotte and Piaget's school of developmental psychology, and which has been even more accurately studied by cognitive psychologists such as Elizabeth Spelke, Dominique Baillargeon, Susan Carey or Susan Gelman. We defend the thesis that three types of object permanence can be distinguished (perceptual, social and logical-linguistic). Object transcendence can be described as an emergent feature of these stages. Babies acquire these levels of objectivity through normal and universal phases of development, even though different cultural environments can influence rhythms of maturation and the intentional behaviors relating to objects, which children develop. To access ordinary objects, infants need natural concepts (affordantial concepts and innate modular abilities - quite common among animals -, which are embodied and developed through social stimulations), experiential concepts (prototypical and essentialist tendencies, stimulated by joint attention and social phenomena that also occur in the animal world), and inherited lexical concepts. Nativism and constructivism work together and a realist, naturalist and emergentist approach of our cognitions of objects and their representations (understood only as a functional ability to register distal objects from proximal stimuli) enables us to overcome classical oppositions between direct and indirect realism, conceptualism and anti-conceptualism, as well as the continuity-thesis and the discontinuity-thesis between human and non-human beings., Ce travail participe aux recherches contemporaines qui s'attachent à améliorer notre compréhension de ce que nous appelons les « objets d'expérience », et en particulier des objets ordinaires. Il s'arrête sur une dimension qui leur apparaît propre, leur permanence, c'est-à-dire leur continuité spatio-temporelle, telle que nous pouvons la constater et en faire usage dans l'expérience perceptive ou le discours, et leur identité intersubjective – en dépit des différentes visées qu'autrui et moi pouvons avoir sur eux. L'objet est pluriel, son identité, qui n'est pas simplement logique, manque de critères nets, mais cela ne peut remettre en question son existence, comme le voudraient les éliminativistes que nous affrontons. Mais les universalistes, les intellectualistes et tous les idéalistes sémantiques qui, à l'inverse, voient des objets partout, par notre seul pouvoir de les penser, confondent objet réel et objet de pensée. Nous défendons un réalisme contextualiste de l'objet ordinaire qui en précise l'existence dans les contextes où il fait sens d'en parler, et d'abord le contexte perceptif, puisqu'il semble définitoire des normes d'objectification et d'objectivation les plus courantes dans nos pratiques identificatoires, réidentificatoires et catégorisantes, de s'inscrire au sein de la perception et de l'action. Ce sont des processus plus ou moins simples cognitivement et plus ou moins répandus éthologiquement qui sont enjeu selon les cas. Cette pluralité implique d'en explorer les terrains, en particulier dans le plus jeune âge lorsque beaucoup des normes réglant notre saisie cognitive du réel sont en formation. C'est pourquoi notre investigation choisit rapidement de se faire philosophie de la connaissance afin de comprendre la genèse des objets ordinaires dont nous parlons, plutôt que d'essayer de dresser de façon abstraite une liste exhaustive de leurs critères d'identité. Nous défendons que la permanence de l'objet peut être comprise à trois niveaux, perceptif, social et logicolinguistique. Le bébé atteint ces niveaux d'objectivité par des concepts naturels (concepts affordantiels et modules innés, qui ont une inscription corporelle et un développement social), des concepts expérientiels (prototypiques et essentialisants, aidés par nos activités humaines de socialisation et d'attention partagée, qu'on trouve aussi dans le monde animal), et des concepts lexicaux, hérités de notre langue. C'est l'occasion de remettre en cause l'opposition trop facile entre l'inné et l'acquis, ou le nativisme et le constructivisme. À chacun de ces niveaux, il y a des raisons d'utiliser, en un sens non mentaliste mais naturaliste et fonctionnaliste, la notion de représentation, pour comprendre ce qui fait la transcendance de ces objets distaux, traités à partir des stimuli proximaux mais différents d'eux. On peut user d'un discours réaliste à leur sujet, sans présupposer que celui-ci se fonde sur des capacités cognitives rationnelles propositionnelles, synthétiques, inférentielles ou judicatives de haut niveau et nécessairement spécifiques à l'humain, mais sans céder non plus aux oppositions classiques entre réalisme indirect et réalisme direct, ou conceptualisme et non-conceptualisme. De même, on défendra, au-delà des débats entre continuisme et discontinuisme sur l'humain et l'animal, un émergentisme qui pense à la fois la continuité des espèces et leurs différences chaque fois propres dans leur rapport aux objets de leur environnement, tels qu'ils sont visés dans des normes naturelles et sociales.

En este artículo, propongo una taxonomía general de diferentes de formas de eliminativismo. Para alcanzar este propósito, comienzo por explorar el eliminativismo desde una perspectiva amplia, proporcionando un cuadro comparativo de proyectos eliminativistas en dominios distintos. Esta exploración muestra cómo el término ‘eliminativismo’ es utilizado para caracterizar una familia de diversos tipos de argumentos y afirmaciones eliminativistas relacionados. La taxonomía propuesta es un intento de sistematización de dichos argumentos y afirmaciones., In this paper, I propose a general taxonomy of different forms of eliminativism. In order to do so, I begin by exploring eliminativism from a broad perspective, providing a comparative picture of eliminativist projects in different domains. This exploration shows that eliminativism is a label used for a family of related types of eliminativist arguments and claims. The proposed taxonomy is an attempt to systematise those arguments and claims.

Resumen En el presente artículo me concentraré en el estudio filosófico de los delirios, como un caso ejemplificador del vínculo que pueden establecer la filosofía de la mente y la psiquiatría. Frente a versiones radicalmente naturalistas, que proponen variantes reduccionistas o eliminativistas para la explicación de ciertos fenómenos mentales y sus variantes “anormales”, defenderé una versión moderada de la perspectiva naturalista. Al respecto, señalaré que retener algún grado de simpatía hacia el naturalismo en las investigaciones filosóficas sobre los delirios es necesario para desarrollar teorías sobre las creencias empíricamente informadas que no resulten contradictorias con los desarrollos actuales en psicología cognitiva y neurociencias. No obstante, afirmaré también que una perspectiva exclusivamente naturalista -tanto por parte de la filosofía como de la psiquiatría mismaes incapaz de dar cuenta del contexto normativo en donde juegan las creencias. Los criterios normativos, especialmente externos (sociales y pragmáticos) que se emplean para clasificar ciertas creencias como delirantes no resultan inteligibles bajo una explicación puramente natural. Por el contrario, para comprender las creencias delirantes qua delirantes, será preciso acercarnos a un abordaje híbrido que pueda contemplar las causas naturales del fenómeno así como su evaluación normativa. Abstract This paper focuses on the philosophical study of delusions as an example of the link that can be established between the philosophy of mind and psychiatry. Against radically naturalistic versions that suggest reductionist or eliminative variables to explain certain mental phenomena and their ‘abnormal’ variables, I will stand up for a toned-down version of the naturalistic perspective. In this sense, I will point out that it is necessary to keep some level of sympathy towards naturalism in the philosophical research on delusions to develop the theories about the empirically informed beliefs that do not contradict the current developments on cognitive psychology and neurosciences. Nevertheless, I will also state that an exclusively naturalist perspective -from both philosophy and psychiatry itselfcannot render an account of the regulatory context within which beliefs develop. Normative, particularly external, criteria (social and pragmatic) used to classify certain beliefs as delirious are not intelligible under a purely natural explanation. Conversely, to understand delusional beliefs as delusional, it will be necessary to take an interest in a hybrid approach that considers the natural causes of the phenomenon as well as its normative assessment.

The concept of biodiversity has played a central role within conservation biology over the last thirty years. Precisely how it should be understood, however, is a matter of ongoing debate. In this paper we defend what we call a classic multidimensional conception of biodiversity. We begin by introducing two arguments for eliminating the concept of biodiversity from conservation biology, both of which have been put forward in a recent paper by Santana (Biol Philos 29:761–780. doi: 10.1007/s10539-014-9426-2 , 2014). The first argument is against the concept’s scientific usefulness. The other is against its value as a target of conservation. We show that neither of these objections is successful against the classic multidimensional conception of biodiversity. Biodiversity thus understood is important from a scientific perspective, because it plays important explanatory roles within contemporary ecology. Moreover, although it does not encompass all valuable features of the natural world, this does not show that we should abandon it as a target of conservation. Instead, biodiversity should be conceived as one of many grounds of value associated with ecosystems. This is consistent with concluding that a central aim of conservationists should be to protect biodiversity.

En el presente artículo me concentraré en el estudio filosófico de los delirios, como un caso ejemplificador del vínculo que pueden establecer la filosofía de la mente y la psiquiatría. Frente a versiones radicalmente naturalistas, que proponen variantes reduccionistas o eliminativistas para la explicación de ciertos fenómenos mentales y sus variantes “anormales”, defenderé una versión moderada de la perspectiva naturalista. Al respecto, señalaré que retener algún grado de simpatía hacia el naturalismo en las investigaciones filosóficas sobre los delirios es necesario para desarrollar teorías sobre las creencias empíricamente informadas que no resulten contradictorias con los desarrollos actuales en psicología cognitiva y neurociencias. No obstante, afirmaré también que una perspectiva exclusivamente naturalista -tanto por parte de la filosofía como de la psiquiatría misma- es incapaz de dar cuenta del contexto normativo en donde juegan las creencias. Los criterios normativos, especialmente externos (sociales y pragmáticos) que se emplean para clasificar ciertas creencias como delirantes no resultan inteligibles bajo una explicación puramente natural. Por el contrario, para comprender las creencias delirantes qua delirantes, será preciso acercarnos a un abordaje híbrido que pueda contemplar las causas naturales del fenómeno así como su evaluación normativa., This paper focuses on the philosophical study of delusions as an example of the link that can be established between the philosophy of mind and psychiatry. Against radically naturalistic versions that suggest reductionist or eliminativist variables to explain certain mental phenomena and their ‘abnormal’ variables, I will stand up for a toned-down version of the naturalistic perspective. In this sense, I will point out that it is necessary to keep some level of sympathy towards naturalism in the philosophical research on delusions to develop the theories about the empirically informed beliefs that do not contradict the current developments on cognitive psychology and neurosciences. Nevertheless, I will also state that an exclusively naturalist perspective –from both philosophy and psychiatry itself- cannot render an account of the regulatory context within which beliefs develop. Normative, particularly external, criteria (social and pragmatic) used to classify certain beliefs as delirious are not intelligible under a purely natural explanation. Conversely, to understand delusional beliefs as delusional, it will be necessary to take an interest in a hybrid approach that considers the natural causes of the phenomenon as well as its normative assessment.

Ovaj se rad bavi Frank Jacksonovim argumentom iz znanja, poznatim misaonim eksperimentom iz područja filozofije uma čija je glavna svrha kritiziranje istinitosti fizikalizma, prema kojem je sve što postoji u svijetu fizičke prirode. U argumentu se tvrdi da postoje neka intrinzična svojstva vizualnih iskustava boja (kvalije) koja se ne mogu reducirati na fizička svojstva, iz čega se zaključuje da je fizikalizam pogrešan. Postoje različiti odgovori na ovaj izazov, kako dualistički, tako i fizikalistički, a u ovom se radu bavim dvama fizikalističkim odgovorima na argument iz znanja; prva je Dennettova eliminativistička strategija, a druga Perryjeva antiredukcionistička strategija. Raspravu vodim na dvije razine - na konceptualnoj i logičko – semantičkoj. Dennett rješava problem tako da tvrdi da kvalije ne postoje, što znači da negira postojanje fenomenoloških pojmova i fenomenološkog sadržaja. Perry tvrdi da kvalije postoje i da su identične fizičkim svojstvima, ali određena vjerovanja o njima imaju tzv. refleksivni sadržaj koji se može opisati pomoću posebne vrste fenomenoloških pojmova koje on naziva demonstrativnim ili rekognicijskim pojmovima. Uspoređujući njihove prijedloge, zaključujem da je Perryjev antiredukcionistički odgovor uvjerljiviji, jer eliminativizam ne može objasniti postojanje različitih načina spoznavanja svjesnih iskustava i njegovih svojstava (kvalija), koji je po mom mišljenju glavni uzrok neutemeljenih pretpostavki koje nalazimo u argumentu iz znanja., The subject matter of this thesis is Frank Jackson´s knowledge argument, a famous example of a thought experiment that aims at disproving the basic contention of physicalism that everything that exists is physical in nature. It is claimed that physicalism cannot accommodate the existence of qualia, the intrinsic properties of experiences such as the visual experience of colors. There are different responses to this challenge, some dualist, others physicalist in nature, and the main task of this paper is to explore in detail two physicalist theories or solutions to the problem of the knowledge argument; first Dennett´s eliminativist, and then Perry´s antireductionist strategy, and by keeping in mind the basic distinction between conceptual and logical – semantical levels of discussion. Dennett is denying the existence of qualia in every sense of the term, so he is trying to eliminate both the use of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal content from every kind of meaningful philosophical discourse. Perry is advancing the opposite idea, claiming that phenomenal experiences and their qualia are real and that first-person beliefs about them should be analyzed in terms of demonstrative / recognitional concepts and reflexive content. After comparing Dennett´s and Perry´s ideas on the matter, I conclude that Perry´s proposal is more plausible, primarily because eliminativism cannot explain the possibility of there being different ways of thinking or representing qualia or subjective qualities of experience (from the first person, and the third person perspective).

En los últimos años se ha gestado un vínculo particular entre la Filosofía de la Mente y la Psiquiatría, bajo el convencimiento de que esta área de la filosofía podría brindar herramientas conceptuales a la Psiquiatría para la comprensión de los trastornos mentales, así como la Psiquiatría podría nutrir con aportes teóricos y evidencia empírica a la Filosofía de la Mente. En el presente artículo me concentraré en el estudio filosófico de los delirios, como un caso ejemplificador del vínculo que pueden establecer las disciplinas mencionadas. Frente a versiones radicalmente naturalistas, que proponen variantes reduccionistas o eliminativistas para la explicación de ciertos fenómenos mentales y sus variantes ?anormales?, defenderé una versión moderada de la perspectiva naturalista. Al respecto, señalaré que retener algún grado de simpatía hacia el naturalismo en las investigaciones filosóficas sobre los delirios es necesario para desarrollar teorías sobre las creencias empíricamente informadas que no resulten contradictorias con los desarrollos actuales en psicología cognitiva y neurociencias. No obstante, afirmaré también que una perspectiva exclusivamente naturalista -tanto por parte de la filosofía como de la psiquiatría misma- será incapaz de dar cuenta del contexto normativo bajo el cual juegan las creencias. Los criterios normativos, especialmente externos (sociales y pragmáticos) que se emplean para clasificar a ciertas creencias como delirantes no resultan inteligibles bajo una explicación puramente natural. Por el contrario, para comprender a las creencias delirantes qua delirantes, será preciso acercarnos a un abordaje híbrido que pueda contemplar las causas naturales del fenómeno como así también su evaluación normativa. This paper focuses on the philosophical study of delusions as an example of the link that can be established between the philosophy of mind and psychiatry. Against radically naturalistic versions that suggest reductionist or eliminative variables to explain certain men- tal phenomena and their ‘abnormal’ variables, I will stand up for a toned-down version of the naturalistic perspective. In this sense, I will point out that it is necessary to keep some level of sympathy towards naturalism in the philosophical research on delusions to develop the theories about the empirically informed beliefs that do not contradict the current developments on cognitive psychology and neurosciences. Nevertheless, I will also state that an exclusively naturalist perspec - tive –from both philosophy and psychiatry itself- cannot render an account of the regulatory context within which beliefs develop. Nor - mative, particularly external, criteria (social and pragmatic) used to classify certain beliefs as delirious are not intelligible under a purely natural explanation. Conversely, to understand delusional beliefs as delusional, it will be necessary to take an interest in a hybrid approach that considers the natural causes of the phenomenon as well as its normative assessment Fil: Vilatta, María Emilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina

I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limitations are here taken as opportunities for reflecting on the fate of enactivism in its relations with representationalism and anti-representationalism.

Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of science in recent decades. This paper asks the question why this shift of thinking has occurred, and where it is leading us. We provide an explanation which, if correct, entails that we should expect pluralism and eliminativism to transform other debates currently unaffected, and for good reasons. We then consider the question under what circumstances eliminativism will be appropriate, arguing that it depends not only on the term in question, but also on the context of discussion and details of the debate at hand. The resultant selective eliminativism is an appealing compromise for various ‘pluralists’ and ‘eliminativists’ who are currently locking horns.

U radu analiziram realistički, eliminativistički i instrumentalistički pristup prema mentalnom diskursu pučke psihologije. Temeljna ideja razmatranje je pučke psihologije kao teorije koja objašnjava i predviđa ponašanje. Ako je pučka psihologija teorija, onda se mora moći reducirati na ili inkorporirati u dobro učvršćene znanstvene fizikalne teorije, neuroznanost prvenstveno. Pitanje je, je li tako nešto barem principijelno moguće? Trebamo li očekivati znanstvenu redukciju entiteta pučke psihologije ili je realno za očekivati njenu eliminaciju iz znanstvenog objašnjenja i predviđanja ponašanja utoliko, ukoliko se ne može uspostaviti veza s fizikalnim znanostima? Ili pak, treba li pučku psihologiju tretirati kao apstraktnu teoriju koja je opravdana u upotrebi, ali nema znanstveno fizikalnih relacija između njenih entiteta i entiteta fizikalnih znanosti? Rad započinjem sa svakodnevnom zdravorazumskom upotrebom pučke psihologije u objašnjenju i predviđanju ponašanja, zatim ukratko izlažem realističku poziciju i njene poteškoće. U sljedećem dijelu iznosim eliminativističku poziciju i njezin doseg u raspravi te prelazim na obećavajuću poziciju instrumentalizma. U konačnici, zalažem se za transformaciju instrumentalističke pozicije u blaži oblik realizma na način da se uvede pojam razasute uzročnosti., In this paper I analyse realist, eliminativist, and instrumentalist approach towards mental discourse on folk psychology. The basic idea is to examine folk psychology as a theory which explains and predicts behaviour. If folk psychology is a theory, then it must be reducible to or incorporated into a well-founded scientific physical theory, neuroscience foremost. The question is, is such a thing, even in principle, possible? Should we expect the scientific reduction of the entity of folk psychology or is it realistic to expect its elimination from scientific explanation and prediction of behaviour insofar as it is not possible to establish a connection with physical sciences? Or are we perhaps supposed to treat folk psychology as an abstract theory which is justified in its application, but has no scientific physical relations between its entities, and the entities of physical sciences? I begin this paper with the everyday, common sense use of folk psychology in explaining and predicting behaviour, and I follow up with a brief presentation of realist perspective and its issues. Afterwards, I lay out eliminativist perspective and its reach in the debate, and pass on to the promising perspective of instrumentalism. Finally, I endorse a transformation of the perspective of instrumentalism into a milder form of realism by introducing the notion of scattered causality.

"Reductionism, Emergence and Levels of Reality. The Importance of Being Borderline" is a book written by S. Chibbaro, L. Rondoni, A. Vulpiani. (Urbanomic, London, May 8, 2016); International audience; In this review-essay, Giuseppe Longo outlines some important reasons for reading Sergio Chibbaro, Lamberto Rondoni, and Angelo Vulpiani’s Reductionism, Emergence and Levels of Reality: The Importance of Being Borderline, and reflects on the damage done by reductionist models of, and in, scienceThis book arrives at a most suitable time. A critique of reductionism originating from within physics may be the most effective way to halt and repair the damage caused by the misuse of physicalist reductionism in biology and in other sciences. I strongly recommend this book to all scientifically educated persons and, in particular, to biologists, and physicists studying biological phenomena. The authors, three working physicists, address the complex theoretical dynamics that connect theories and knowledge levels within physics, a science where, I would dare to say, ‘reduction’ never applies....

International audience; The paper begins with a typology of nonlinguists based on categories that are not discrete. To be a nonlinguist is not a permanent state but an activity that can be practiced at a particular point in time and in a particular place even by linguists themselves. There is in this sense a nonlinguist position that can always be traded for another position. Examples of activities that belong only debatably to folk linguistics will be examined. These examples will be used to challenge the relations posited between the 'identities' of nonlinguists and the nature of their activities. Secondly, following on from Paveau 2007 and 2008a, the paper will examine the complex epistemological and philosophical issue of the validity of folk linguistics, a question clearly linked to (and subsumed by) the validity of the folk sciences more generally. In particular, the paper will examine the concepts of knowledge and epilinguistic awareness, which provide arguments in favor of an integrational position , i.e. an anti-eliminative position: folk propositions are not necessarily false beliefs that must be eliminated from the sphere of science, but constitute perceptive, subjective and incomplete forms of knowledge that need to be incorporated into the scientific data of linguistics.

I argue that Descartes is not a reductionist about life, but dissolves or eliminates the category entirely. This is surprising both because he repeatedly refers to the life of humans, animals, and plants and because he appears to rely on the category of life to construct his physiology and medicine. Various attempts have been made in the scholarship to attribute a principled concept of life to Descartes. Most recently, Detlefsen (2016) has argued that Descartes “is a *reductionist* with respect to explanation of life phenomena but not an eliminativist with respect to life itself” (143). I show that all these attempts either result in arbitrariness or force Descartes’s wider philosophical project into incoherence. I argue that Descartes’s ontological commitments make a principled concept of life impossible, that he does not need such a concept, and that his project ends up more coherent without one.

I focus on two arguments, due to Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks, that move from claims about the sufficiency of one class of causes to the reduction or elimi- nation of another class of entity, via claims about overdetermination. I argue that in order to validate their move from sufficiency to reduction or elimination, both Kim and Merricks must assume that there can be no ‘weak overdetermination’; i.e., that no single effect can have numerically distinct but dependently sufficient causes occurring at the same time. One problem for both arguments is that weak overdetermination isn’t obviously objectionable. That point has been well made before. But I want here to go further than merely shifting the burden of proof onto the advocates of overdetermination arguments. I want to tease out why they are so convinced that we must resist weak overdetermination and explain why their conviction is misguided. Both Merricks and Kim, I shall argue, ultimately rest their case on the same motivating principle, which I call the principle of additional causal powers. This principle, I argue further, should be rejected. It lacks argumentative support, and it begs the question against those at whom the arguments are directed.

In cognitive psychology, concepts are those bodies of knowledge that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings’ higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning, etc.). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby thatconcepts constitute a natural kind. I call this assumption thenatural kind assumption. This article challenges the natural kind assumption. It is argued that a growing body of evidence suggests that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. Hence, the notion of concept is inappropriate, if one aims at formulating scientifically relevant inductive generalizations about the human mind.

Normative guidance is a way of influencing others’ behaviour which operates through the mind (through mental states and processes such as norm understanding, normative reasoning, belief in norm’s validity, choice to follow it, etc.). Knowledge of the relevant aspects of the mind has therefore a clear importance in order to improve normative guidance (increase its efficacy, rationalize it, moralize it, etc.). But the study of the relationship between mind and normativity is a too wide field, impossible to explore in its entirety: selection criteria are needed. In this article I propose some contributions to their elaboration. First, I point out the “phenomenon of normativity” (meant as the conscious experience of norms) as the general scope of the theories of mind relevant for normative guidance, offering a rough sketch of it. Second, I show how, inside this general scope, the theories of mind preferable for the purposes of normative guidance are not necessarily the best one from a scientific point of view. Thirdly, I explore in this light the possible relevance of “Elimitavism”, i.e. the thesis, discussed in the philosophy of mind, that folk psychology concepts, such as propositional attitudes, misrepresent the mind, and that theories of mind built on the folk psychology framework are therefore bad scientific theories to give up in favour of theories framed with totally different concepts, which could be provided by the neurosciences.

International audience; A dispositional monist believes that all properties are essentially causal. Recently, an overdetermination argument has been proposed by Trenton Merricks to support nihilism about ordinary objects. I argue that this argument can be extended to target both nihilism about ordinary objects and nihilism about physical particles when dispositional monism is assumed. It implies that a philosopher who both endorses dispositional monism and takes seriously the overdetermination argument should not believe in the existence of physical particles. I end up by discussing possible objections. I suggest, then, that if we live in a world that is inhabited by causal properties but not by chairs and tables, then we also live in a world without electrons and quarks, a world of dispositional properties, that is, a world of causal fields

For several decades now philosophers have discussed apparent examples of internally inconsistent scientific theories. However, there is still much controversy over how exactly we should conceive of scientific theories in the first place. Here I argue for a new approach, whereby all of the truly important questions about inconsistency in science can be asked and answered without disagreements about theories and theory-content getting in the way. Three examples commonly described as ‘internally inconsistent theories’ are analysed in the light of this approach. In the process, the question ‘Is the theory inconsistent or not?’ is identified as a bad, or at least unimportant, question.

The concept of perlocution has been problematic right since its first articulation by Austin. Two possible ways of clarifying the issue are examined. The “reconstructive” way attempts to avoid the ambiguities in the austinian characterization by establishing taxonomies based in precise criteria. The “eliminative” view, finally adopted, seeks the replacement of perlocutions by a concept better fitted for the study of “the total speech act in the total speech situation”, the concept of the situational frame of an utterance. la noción de perlocución ha resultado problemática desde su primera formulación en Austin (1962). Se exploran dos vías diferentes para su clarificación. la vía reconstructiva examina las ambigüedades incrustadas en la caracterización austiniana y trata de deshacerlas mediante taxonomías basadas en criterios precisos. la vía eliminativa, finalmente adoptada, propone sustituirla por una noción alternativa, la de marco situacional de una emisión, capaz de servir mejor al propósito de estudiar “el acto de habla total en la situación de habla total”.

Does the reference to a mental realm in using the notion of mental disorder lead to a dilemma that consists in either implying a Cartesian account of the mind-body relation or in the need to give up a notion of mental disorder in its own right? Many psychiatrists seem to believe that denying substance dualism requires a purely neurophysiological stance for explaining mental disorder. However, this conviction is based on a limited awareness of the philosophical debate on the mind-body problem. This article discusses the reasonableness of the concept of mental disorder in relation to reductionist and eliminativist strategies in the philosophy of mind. It is concluded that we need a psychological level of explanation that cannot be reduced to neurophysiological findings in order to make sense of mental disorder.

Celem niniejszego artykułu było przedstawienie jednego ze sposobów pogodzenia epistemologicznego antyredukcjonizmu z ontologicznym fizykalizmem - takiego, który wyjaśniałby odmienności zachodzące pomiędzy różnymi naukami. Zostało to uczynione w oparciu o pewien ontologiczny obraz najogólniejszej struktury rzeczywistości, a główna teza głosi, że przyjęcie tego obrazu umożliwia przeprowadzenie wspomnianego pogodzenia. Najpierw dokonany został przegląd argumentów za i przeciw redukcjonizmowi, następnie zostały przedstawione założenia ontologiczne, potem zaprezentowane wcześniej argumenty zanalizowano w świetle tej konstrukcji ontologicznej oraz pewnych faktów z zakresu metodologii i historii nauk szczegółowych. Na końcu z przedstawionej wizji wyciągnięto pewne dodatkowe wnioski, dotyczące zagadnienia analogii jako narzędzia poznania oraz metodologicznego postulatu prostoty. The aim of this article was to present one of the methods of reconcilement of epistemological antireductionism and ontological physicalism, which explains differences between sciences, through an ontological picture of the most general structure of reality. The main thesis held that accepting this perspective allows us to achieve the above-mentioned reconcilement. First, the main arguments for and against physical reductionism were described before the ontological assumptions were presented; then the assumptions were analysed in the light of this ontological construction as well as some facts from the fields of methodology and history of natural sciences. Finally, some conclusions were drawn from the presented vision. They were connected with epistemological status of analogy and methodological postulate of simplicity.

Ce travail traite du problème métaphysique de la composition. Ce problème peut être compris comme un ensemble de questions touchant à l'existence et à la nature des entités complexes et simples. Existe-t-il des entités complexes? Si oui, de quelle nature sont-elles? Comment sont-elles composées? Par quoi sont-elles composées (par des simples ou non)? Nous allons dans un premier temps analyser le paradigme russellien concernant le problème de la composition, à savoir l'atomisme logique. Cette analyse va nous amener à comprendre la façon dont l'outil logique (ici la logique russellienne) peut nous permettre de déterminer une ontologie (l'ontologie des faits) dans laquelle ces différentes questions trouvent des réponses déterminées. Puis nous aborderons le traitement contemporain de cette question qui se base sur la question spéciale de la composition (SCQ) développée par Peter van Inwagen dans Material Beings, et sur l'analyse méréologique. Nous allons alors aborder les différentes théories de la composition et nous allons essayer de justifier l'une d'entre-elles : l'universalisme de la composition. Cette justification nous amènera à développer et justifier une conception des simples (la théorie du Gunk), du temps (le quadridimensionnalisme), et une ontologie de l'étoffe matérielle. Nous achèverons notre travail en essayant de montrer que l'universalisme de la composition prend un sens particulier à l'intérieur des théories du monisme de priorité et du super-substantialisme.

Ce travail traite du problème métaphysique de la composition. Ce problème peut être compris comme un ensemble de questions touchant à l'existence et à la nature des entités complexes et simples. Existe-t-il des entités complexes? Si oui, de quelle nature sont-elles? Comment sont-elles composées? Par quoi sont-elles composées (par des simples ou non)? Nous allons dans un premier temps analyser le paradigme russellien concernant le problème de la composition, à savoir l'atomisme logique. Cette analyse va nous amener à comprendre la façon dont l'outil logique (ici la logique russellienne) peut nous permettre de déterminer une ontologie (l'ontologie des faits) dans laquelle ces différentes questions trouvent des réponses déterminées. Puis nous aborderons le traitement contemporain de cette question qui se base sur la question spéciale de la composition (SCQ) développée par Peter van Inwagen dans Material Beings, et sur l'analyse méréologique. Nous allons alors aborder les différentes théories de la composition et nous allons essayer de justifier l'une d'entre-elles : l'universalisme de la composition. Cette justification nous amènera à développer et justifier une conception des simples (la théorie du Gunk), du temps (le quadridimensionnalisme), et une ontologie de l'étoffe matérielle. Nous achèverons notre travail en essayant de montrer que l'universalisme de la composition prend un sens particulier à l'intérieur des théories du monisme de priorité et du super-substantialisme.

Destacando a especificidade de cada um dos dois enfoques quanto à abordagem do psiquismohumano, o conferencista intenciona, designadamente apoiando se entre outras coisas numa analogiasimples e num método original de análise de discurso, demonstrar isso :Contrário às posições dogmáticas (acompanhadas da rejeição mútua) que emanam dosincondicionais partidários entrincheirados em seus respectivos territórios, trabalha nas pontes epossibilidades de cooperação frutífera entre neurociências e psicanálise.Entende como condição essencial para este diálogo que seja redefinido o que nunca deveria terdeixado de inspirar ambas : o enfoque científico, considerado ao mesmo tempo— nas suas variantes adaptadas às ciências da natureza e às ciências humanas,— e na sua preocupação de demonstração e de refutação no que se refere tanto ao caso específicocomo à lei geral.

The paper begins with a typology of nonlinguists based on categories that are not discrete. To be a nonlinguist is not a permanent state but an activity that can be practiced at a particular point in time and in a particular place even by linguists themselves. There is in this sense a nonlinguist position that can always be traded for another position. Examples of activities that belong only debatably to folk linguistics will be examined. These examples will be used to challenge the relations posited between the 'identities' of nonlinguists and the nature of their activities. Secondly, following on from Paveau 2007 and 2008a, the paper will examine the complex epistemological and philosophical issue of the validity of folk linguistics, a question clearly linked to (and subsumed by) the validity of the folk sciences more generally. In particular, the paper will examine the concepts of knowledge and epilinguistic awareness, which provide arguments in favor of an integrational position , i.e. an anti-eliminative position: folk propositions are not necessarily false beliefs that must be eliminated from the sphere of science, but constitute perceptive, subjective and incomplete forms of knowledge that need to be incorporated into the scientific data of linguistics.

O artigo apresenta as principais críticas do eliminativismo contra a existência da psicologia popular. Apresentar-se-á as críticas segundo as quais a psicologia popular náo se relaciona com as demais teorias científicas, a psicologia popular é táo ímpar que parece náo ter desenvolvido nada além do que se desenvolveu até o tempo dos Gregos, a psicologia popular é passiva, quando, em certos casos, deveria ser ativa; e, por fim, a psicologia popular náo é sujeita à falsificaçáo científica, como devem ser as teorias científicas. Mostrar-se-áo os argumentos filosóficos concernentes ao método falsificacionista, notadamente os relacionados à epistemologia. Depois, analisar-se-áo as demais críticas eliminativistas contra a psicologia popular. Mostrar-se-á que tais críticas, tomadas isoladamente, náo sáo suficientes para que se decrete o fim da psicologia popular, mas se concluirá que tais críticas servem de base para sustentar as críticas extrínsecas, as quais podem em conjunto com as intrínsecas serem suficientes para que o materialismo eliminativista tenha sucesso.

I defend a pragmatist reinterpretation of Sellars’s famous manifest-scientific distinction. I claim that in order to do justice to this important distinction we must first recognize, despite what philosophers—including, arguably, Sellars—often make of it, that the distinction does not draw an epistemological or metaphysical boundary between different kinds of objects and events, but a pragmatic boundary between different ways in which we interact with objects and events. Put differently, I argue that the manifest-scientific distinction, in my view, can be best understood, not as a metaphysical distinction between apparent and real objects and events, or an epistemological distinction between perceptible and imperceptible objects and events, but rather as a distinction, which is not necessarily rigid over time, between distinct ways in which we collectively deal, in practice, with objects and events.

The paper analyses the main trends in the discussions about the notion of supervenience in the last decades, putting the emphasis in some crucial problems. The starting point will be the various concepts of supervenience proposed by Jaegwon Kim. Through them, we will identify a dramatic tension between the extremes of eliminativism and dualism (in general, pluralism), being placed in the middle of them the positions of a non-eliminativist reductionism and of a non-dualist epiphenomenism. The open options facing that tension show a very peculiar and valuable sort of philosophical work which could be called “conceptual engineering”. En el trabajo se analizan las principales líneas de desarrollo de la noción de sobreveniencia (o superveniencia) en las últimas décadas, resaltando algunos problemas cruciales. El punto de partida son los diversos conceptos de sobreveniencia propuestos por Jaegwon Kim. A través de ellos se identificará una grave tensión entre los extremos del eliminativismo y del dualismo (más en general pluralismo), situándose en medio de manera muy inestable las posiciones de un reduccionismo no eliminativista y de un epifenomenismo no dualista. Las opciones abiertas frente a esta tensión muestran un tipo peculiar y muy valioso de actividad filosófica que cabría llamar “ingeniería conceptual”.

En la presente Tesis Doctoral se ensaya una disolución del problema mente-cerebro, así como un replanteamiento del problema mente-cuerpo, a través de un estudio de la idea de epigénesis. Exploramos tres momentos clave en su fundamentación filosófica: la embriología alemana del XVIII, la histología/biología del XIX y la neurología, filosofía de la mente y biología evolutiva del XX. Al unísono de su estudio introducimos nuestro planteamiento epigenético del problema mente-cuerpo: la mente no es una sustancia, pero tampoco, como lo quiere el materialismo eliminacionista, un mito: es un proceso dinámico que emerge del complejo funcionar del organismo que conforman el cerebro/sistema nervioso en sus ricas interrelaciones en y con el cuerpo, y de éste con el medio natural y cultural. Cuerpo y cerebro se entrelazan al son de procesos no sólo genéticos, sino también epigenéticos, a través de los cuales las funciones mentales pueden emerger y terminar siendo operativas., This Ph.D. essays a dissolution of the mind-brain problem, and offers a reformulation of the mind-body problem through the study of the idea of epigenesis. We explore three key moments in its philosophical grounding: XVII century´s German Biology, XIX´s Histology and Biology and XX´s Neurology, Philosophy of Mind and Evolutionary Biology. Paralelly, we introduce our epigenetic approach to the mind-body problem: mind is not a substance as defined by the Cartesian tradition, but neither a myth, as eliminativism sees it: it as a dynamical process which emerges from the complex operations maintained both in the organism (conformed by the rich interrelationships between the brain/nervous system and the body), and the ones maintained with the environment (both natural and cultural) by it as a whole. Body and brain intertwine inseparably not only by genetic processes, but also epigenetic ones, through which the mental functions can emerge and end up being operative.