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According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, today Syria is the most dangerous place in the world to practice the profession of journalism. At least 30 international and Syrian journalists have been killed covering the Syria conflict since March 2011.1 In addition, several international journalists apparently have been detained by the Assad regime and the units of the opposition armed groups known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The performance of the vastmajority of the national and international journalists reporting from Syria since March 2011 has been invaluable and often courageous. Without their efforts, many of the historic and tragic events in Syria during the past two years would have remained unseen and unreported.

This article argues that it is possible—given the right resources and expertise—to hold individual non-state actors responsible for violations of international humanitarian law (also known as ‘the laws and customs of war’) perpetrated with cyberweapons. It describes jurisdictional elements of violations of the laws and customs of war as well as points that prosecutors and investigators must consider when planning investigations of serious violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated in cyberspace. It addresses how certain theories of individual criminal responsibility for war crimes apply to offences committed by non-state actors during cyberwarfare and identifies particular evidentiary challenges arising from the particular qualities of cyberspace and cyberweapons. Individual accountability for war crimes perpetrated during cyber operations requires new thinking about the application of legal principles and theories during cyber conflict.

Recently, a Trial Chamber at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) recalled that the UN Security Council—and by extension, the entire international community—entruste...

This chapter explores how new technologies challenge the relationship between military thinking and international humanitarian law (IHL). It examines the ways in which IHL can and should impact the development and use of new autonomous weapons systems, cyber weapons, communications and data-analysis technology as well as so-called 'non-lethal' weapons. Recent advances in military technology - in particular the increased use of precision weapons - in accordance with the IHL principles of distinction and proportionality, has led to enhanced compliance with law. The military advantages created for States and organized armed groups in possession of such technologies and capabilities will likely lead, inexorably, to the increasing use of autonomous weapons systems, regardless of their contradictions with IHL. Military professionals and IHL specialists should begin to discuss how and when the law should permit States to use such autonomous platforms during armed conflict. Keywords:autonomous weapons systems; cyber weapons; data-analysis technology; international humanitarian law (IHL); proportionality

This is the introductory chapter of International Humanitarian Law and the Changing Technology of War , which explores the legal challenges for armed forces resulting from the development and use of new military technologies for the conduct of warfare. Th e application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is an attempt to achieve an equitable balance between humanitarian requirements and the necessities of war. The chapter discusses the appropriate standards and test for the formation of new customary international law as the methods of warfare, and matters of 'State practice', evolve so dramatically, at least for those States and non-State actors that can access the new technologies. The book explores the development of autonomous Unmanned Systems (UMS), their implications for IHL, and outlines the approach taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with respect to any new weapon introduced by the military. Keywords:autonomous Unmanned Systems (UMS); cyber warfare; ICRC; international humanitarian law (IHL); military technologies

While no business leaders have yet been charged before the International Criminal Court (ICC), such future proceedings will typically be conducted with reference to the accessorial mode of liability of aiding and abetting, under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. There exist diverse and competing interpretations of Article 25(3)(c). This paper aims to advocate the creation of a dominant interpretation of Article 25(3)(c) and, consequently, to the clarification of the potential responsibility of business leaders who aid or abet crimes under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, in two ways. First, it asks whether Article 25(3)(c) can be interpreted in harmony with the dominant practice on aiding and abetting in international criminal law generally. Second, it presents a case study on the provision of arms by the Russian corporation Rosoboronexport to the Syrian government, which is likely to have committed crimes against humanity since March 2011 and war crimes since mid-2012. The theoretical conclusions are applied to a discussion on the potential criminal responsibility of the Director General of Rosoboronexport for aiding and abetting the commission of international crimes by high-level Syrian officials.