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Background Little remains known about both Asian and Asian American (A/AA) and non-Asian young adults’ experiences and affective reactions regarding COVID-19 anti-Asian discrimination. To our knowledge, this is the first study that explores the nature and impact of COVID-19 anti-Asian discrimination within a multi-racial sample. Methods This study uses qualitative open-ended responses from a sub-sample of Wave I of the COVID-19 Adult Resilience Experiences Study (CARES) data collected between March to September 2020. Thematic analysis was used to explore two open-ended questions: “Are there experiences we missed in the survey so far that you wish to describe?” and “What are your thoughts about the current social climate?” The data analysis for this study focused on 113 discrimination or racism-related comments. Results A total of 1331 young adults completed an online survey of which 611 provided comments; a multi-racial sample of 95 individuals (65.3% non-Asians, 24.7% A/AA) contributed 113 COVID-19 anti-Asian discrimination or racism-related comments. Two overarching themes were: types of discrimination (societal, interpersonal, intrapersonal) and affective reactions to discrimination (fear, anxiety/distress, hopelessness/depression, and avoidance). Not only did both A/AA and non-Asian participants report witnessing or hearing reports of anti-Asian discrimination, but both groups described having negative affective reactions to anti-Asian discrimination. Conclusion Anti-Asian discrimination in the face of COVID may be more widespread than initial reports indicate. Our finding suggests that anti-Asian discrimination is a societal illness that impacts all populations in the U.S. This calls for cross-racial coalitions and solidarity in the fight against discrimination and racism.

The ongoing “pandemic” involving the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 virus (SARS-CoV-2) has several characteristics that make it unique in the history of pandemics. This entails not only the draconian measures that some countries and individual states within the United States and initiated and made policy, most of which are without precedent or scientific support, but also the completely unscientific way the infection has been handled. For the 1sttime in medical history, major experts in virology, epidemiology, infectious diseases, and vaccinology have not only been ignored, but are also demonized, marginalized and in some instances, become the victim of legal measures that can only be characterized as totalitarian. Discussions involving various scientific opinions have been eliminated, top scientists have been frightened into silence by threats to their careers, physicians have lost their licenses, and the concept of early treatment has been virtually eliminated. Hundreds of thousands of people have died needlessly as a result of, in my opinion and the opinion of others, poorly designed treatment protocols, mostly stemming from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, which have been rigidly enforced among all hospitals. The economic, psychological, and institutional damage caused by these unscientific policies is virtually unmeasurable. Whole generations of young people will suffer irreparable damage, both physical and psychological, possibly forever. The truth must be told.

The article presents results of a study on the dynamics between Donald Trump’s use of terms that relate COVID-19 to China and news media publications concerning this use. Qualitative content analysis with elements of discourse analysis was conducted to 1) describe the case as a type of populist discourse on COVID-19, and 2) illustrate the following hypotheses with the help of empirical material: 1) News media and the dynamics of political communication based on the difference of friend and enemy help legitimizing populist claims and directing public attention toward them while feeding into a narrative of a diffuse category of threats that creates objects of angst and thereby enhances social cohesion. 2) With resources derived from popular culture, populists exploit the culture of political correctness, which is facilitated through the ascription of authenticity. The hypotheses emerged in the course of organizing and preliminarily examining the data collected for an ongoing broader study on populist communication and its repercussions in different public spheres in view of the following assumptions: 1) Political communication is guided by the distinction of friend and enemy. 2) In populist communication, this distinction appears as the difference of ‘the people’ and allegedly corrupt elites, including news media. 3) Angst enhances social cohesion among the audiences of populist speakers directly or mediated by fear. 4) Populist communication is more likely to produce a type of fear that populists benefit from when it depicts the elite as a diffuse category composed of various interlinked enemies. Trump’s contextualized use of the following terms in the time period between March 13 and September 15, 2020, was examined: China flu, China plague, China virus, Chinese plague, Chinese flu, Chinese virus, Wuhan virus, and Kung flu. 38 speeches from Trump’s election campaign or rallies, 28 talks at presidential events or meetings, 47 interviews, 37 press conferences, 35 tweets and seven re-tweets as well as selected news media responses were subjected to analysis. The case has been successfully described as a type of populist discourse on COVID-19 and both hypotheses have been illustrated with empirical material.

When labeling an infectious disease, officially sanctioned scientific names, e.g., “H1N1 virus,” are recommended over place-specific names, e.g., “Spanish flu.” This is due to concerns from policymakers and the WHO that the latter might lead to unintended stigmatization. However, with little empirical support for such negative consequences, authorities might be focusing on limited resources on an overstated issue. This paper empirically investigates the impact of naming against the current backdrop of the 2019–2020 pandemic. The first hypothesis posited that using place-specific names associated with China (e.g., Wuhan Virus or China Virus) leads to greater levels of sinophobia, the negative stigmatization of Chinese individuals. The second hypothesis posited that using a scientific name (e.g., Coronavirus or COVID-19) leads to increased anxiety, risk aversion, beliefs about contagiousness of the virus, and beliefs about mortality rate. Results from two preregistered studies [N(Study 1) = 504; N(Study 2) = 412], conducted across three countries with the first study during the early outbreak (April 2020) and the second study at a later stage of the pandemic (August 2020), found no evidence of any adverse effects of naming on sinophobia and strong support for the null hypothesis using Bayesian analyses. Moreover, analyses found no impact of naming on anxiety, risk aversion, beliefs about contagiousness of the virus, or beliefs about mortality rate, with mild to strong support for the null hypothesis across outcomes. Exploratory analyses also found no evidence for the effect of naming being moderated by political affiliation. In conclusion, results provide no evidence that virus naming impacted individual’s attitudes toward Chinese individuals or perceptions of the virus, with the majority of analyses finding strong support for the null hypothesis. Therefore, based on the current evidence, it appears that the importance given to naming infectious diseases might be inflated.