Search

Since its advent in 2011, boson-sampling has been a preferred candidate for demonstrating quantum advantage because of its simplicity and near-term requirements compared to other quantum algorithms. We propose to use a variant, called coarse-grained boson-sampling (CGBS), as a quantum Proof-of-Work (PoW) scheme for blockchain consensus. The users perform boson-sampling using input states that depend on the current block information, and commit their samples to the network. Afterward, CGBS strategies are determined which can be used to both validate samples and to reward successful miners. By combining rewards to miners committing honest samples together with penalties to miners committing dishonest samples, a Nash equilibrium is found that incentivizes honest nodes. The scheme works for both Fock state boson sampling and Gaussian boson sampling and provides dramatic speedup and energy savings relative to computation by classical hardware., 21 pages, 6 figures

We show a new algorithm and its implementation for multiplying bit-polynomials of large degrees. The algorithm is based on evaluating polynomials at a specific set comprising a natural set for evaluation with additive FFT and a high order element under Frobenius map of $\mathbb{F}_{2}$. With the high order element, we can derive more values of the polynomials under Frobenius map. Besides, we also adapt the additive FFT to efficiently evaluate polynomials at the set with an encoding process. For the implementation, we reorder the computations in the additive FFT for reducing the number of memory writes and hiding the latency for reads. The algebraic operations, including field multiplication, bit-matrix transpose, and bit-matrix multiplication, are implemented with efficient SIMD instructions. As a result, we effect a software of best known efficiency, shown in our experiments.

We set new speed records for multiplying long polynomials over finite fields of characteristic two. Our multiplication algorithm is based on an additive FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) by Lin, Chung, and Huang in 2014 comparing to previously best results based on multiplicative FFTs. Both methods have similar complexity for arithmetic operations on underlying finite field; however, our implementation shows that the additive FFT has less overhead. For further optimization, we employ a tower field construction because the multipliers in the additive FFT naturally fall into small subfields, which leads to speed-ups using table-lookup instructions in modern CPUs. Benchmarks show that our method saves about $40 \%$ computing time when multiplying polynomials of $2^{28}$ and $2^{29}$ bits comparing to previous multiplicative FFT implementations.

In the literature, J.-P. Cheng et al. have proposed the MIMO-OFDM PHY integrated (MOPI) scheme for achieving physical-layer security in practice without using any cryptographic ciphers. The MOPI scheme uses channel sounding and physical-layer network coding (PNC) to prevent eavesdroppers from learning the channel state information (CSI). Nevertheless, due to the use of multiple antennas for PNC at transmitter and beamforming at receiver, it is not possible to have spatial multiplexing nor use space-time codes in our previous MOPI scheme. In this paper, we propose a variant of the MOPI scheme, called P-MOPI, that works with a cryptographic cipher and utilizes precoding matrix index (PMI) as an efficient key-exchange mechanism. With channel sounding, the PMI is only known between the transmitter and the legal receiver. The shared key can then be used, e.g., as the seed to generate pseudo random bit sequences for securing subsequent transmissions using a stream cipher. By applying the same techniques at independent subcarriers of the OFDM system, the P-MOPI scheme easily allows two communicating parties to exchange over 100 secret bits. As a result, not only secure communication but also the MIMO gain can be guaranteed by using the P-MOPI scheme., 6 pages, 4 figures, topic on physical layer security in information theory

By design, smart contracts' data and computations are public to all participants. In this paper, we study how to create smart contracts with parameters that need to stay secret. We propose a way to keep some of the parameters off-chain, while guaranteeing correctness of the computation, using a combination of a commitment scheme and a zero-knowledge proof system. We describe an implementation of our construction, based on ethereum smart contracts and zk-SNARKS. We also provide a small example and a cost analysis of our approach.

The well-known Signed ElGamal scheme consists of ElGamal encryption with a non-interactive Schnorr proof of knowledge. While this scheme should be intuitively secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model, its security has not yet been proven nor disproven so far, without relying on further non-standard assumptions like the generic group model. Currently, the best known positive result is that Signed ElGamal is non-malleable under chosen-plaintext attacks. In this paper we provide evidence that proving Signed ElGamal to be CCA secure in the random oracle model is hard. That is, building on previous work of Shoup and Gennaro (Eurocrypt'98), Seurin and Treger (CT-RSA 2013), and Bernhard et al. (PKC 2015), we exclude a large class of potential reductions that could be used to establish CCA security of the scheme.