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This work was supported by a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust (TRT0171). Embracing accountability to others for one’s responsibilities within relationships is important for flourishing, yet underexamined. An interdisciplinary team defined the construct of accountability and developed an 11-item single-factor Accountability Scale. In national samples with US census demographic representation (total N = 1257), we conducted psychometric analyses using methods from classical test theory (exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses) and item response theory. The Accountability Scale demonstrated internal consistency, construct validity, test-retest reliability, and incremental validity. Accountability correlated positively with relational variables (agreeableness, empathy) responsibility-oriented variables (conscientiousness, self-regulation), virtues (gratitude, forgiveness, limitations-owning humility), relational repair, perceived meaning presence, and flourishing, inversely with symptoms (personality disorders, temper, anxiety, depression), and weakly with searching for meaning and social desirability. Accountability scores superseded demographic variables, conscientiousness, and agreeableness to predict relational repair, perceived presence of meaning in life, and flourishing. We offer the accountability construct and scale to advance human flourishing research and applied work. Publisher PDF

This paper considers whether a divine-command theory of moral obligation (DCT) could justify morally horrible acts, partly by examining Kierkegaard’s writings. It argues that only the commands of a God who is essentially good could be morally justified, and thus no defensible version of a DCT could actually justify horrible acts. In Works of Love Kierkegaard defends such a DCT, and thus is committed to the claim that any actual commands of God must be aimed at the good. This is consistent with the claim that if we knew that a command that is alleged to be from God is directed at what is bad, the command must not be authentic. The issue raised by Fear and Trembling, where Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes de Silentio considers the “binding of Isaac” story, thus raises crucial epistemic issues, which cannot be settled without considering how one might come to know that a purported revelation from God is authentic, as well as how one might come to believe that some particular moral belief is wrong. The paper defends the view that if one knew that a revelation from God was authentic, then one could be justified in holding a moral view on some particular issue, such as veganism, that clashes with the dominant views of one’s contemporaries.

Funding: We are grateful to the Templeton Religion Trust (Grant TRT 0171) for generous support that made this research possible. Welcoming accountability is a responsive and responsible virtue that can be shown in relation to people or to God, a higher power, or transcendent guide. Our interdisciplinary team defined transcendent accountability (TA) and developed a 10-item scale using classical and item response theory methods. Across diverse US samples (total N = 990) the scale exhibited internal consistency, construct validity, incremental validity, known-groups validity, and test-retest reliability. TA showed positive correlations with religious and spiritual variables, transcendent virtues (gratitude to God, eschatological hope), human virtues (gratitude, accountability, forgiveness), relationality (agreeableness, empathy), responsibility (conscientiousness, self-regulation), values-congruent autonomy, meaning, and flourishing. It had inverse correlations with negative attitudes and symptoms (personality disorder, anxiety, depression), and weak associations with searching for meaning and social desirability. TA predicted unique variance in spiritual flourishing, meaning, and relational repair. Transcendent accountability is a valuable construct that complements gratitude to God (GTG) and advances positive psychology. Publisher PDF

This chapter distinguishes the relation of accountability from the virtue that a person may have who plays the role of being accountable well. An analysis of the relation of accountability focuses on the accountor, the person who holds someone accountable, and the accountee, the person held accountable. It is crucial to have a clear view of the standing the accountor has. Various types of accountability relationships are described, which turn out not to be exclusively hierarchical in character, but can be reciprocal, horizontal, and voluntary. Accountability can be global and to a transcendent reality such as God as well. The chapter concludes with an account of the approach to virtue ethics taken in the book and a preview of the remainder of the book.

Chapter 6 begins an exploration of global accountability. Many people have a sense that they are accountable for how they live their lives as a whole. Often these people are religious and see themselves as accountable in this way to God, but many people who are not believers still see themselves as accountable. This chapter first provides a taxonomy of various ways of understanding and explaining global accountability. Secular accountability sees this as accountability to other humans, either oneself (Kant), other people (social contract views), or the human moral community (Darwall). Transcendent accountability by contrast holds that global accountability requires a transcendent ground, either a personal God (theistic accountability), some metaphysical reality, or some transcendent principle. This chapter mainly explores secular accountability and argues that all three forms face two difficult problems: (1) the source of normativity problem; (2) the problem of providing determinate content for what we humans are accountable for doing.

This chapter explores various forms of transcendent accountability, which see global accountability as requiring some higher, transcendent ground. Since some might see transcendence as a high cost, the chapter first argues that giving up global accountability also would come at a high cost, as can be seen by a brief look at popular culture and some exploration of human psychological tendencies. Transcendent accountability comes in three forms: theistic accountability sees it as accountability to a personal God. Metaphysical accountability rejects a personal God and thus rejects literal accountability, but claims that there is a metaphysical order or structure, which is often called karma, that provides an existential equivalent. Ideal accountability believes we are accountable for living in accord with transcendent principles, but denies we are accountable to a person. This chapter argues that all three forms of accountability have insights and strong points, but that theistic accountability can incorporate the strengths of the other two views. However, the other views, without a personal God, cannot account for the possibility of grace and mercy, which accountable humans certainly need. It also argues, contrary to some popular understandings of God, that accountability to God is not grounded in divine punishment. A loving God would not punish for retributive reasons but would only correct and discipline humans for their ultimate good.

This chapter suggests that accountability is part of a cluster of virtues that support each other, such that someone lacking one of these virtues completely would find it very difficult to have the other virtues in the cluster. The vices that are contrary to these supporting virtues would thus also be characteristics that block or impede the virtue of accountability. The main supporting virtues that are analyzed are humility, honesty, and practical wisdom. Humility, following the work of Robert Roberts, is seen as a lack or low degree of the desire for self-importance, the quality of a person who gets a false sense of worth by comparison with others. Self-importance is connected to such “vices of pride” as arrogance, domination, and snobbery. Honesty is understood, following Christian Miller’s work, as the quality of someone who does not distort reality (or “the facts”) as that person sees reality. Honesty, both to oneself and towards those to whom one is accountable, is essential to excellence as an accountable person. Finally, practical wisdom, again following Christian Miller, is seen as an indispensable help to exercising accountability, enabling a person to understand standing and its limits, and recognize when expectations are reasonable and what ways of fulfilling them are reasonable.

This chapter looks at the empirical evidence for the reality and importance of accountability as a virtue. A virtue should manifest itself in the way its possessors act and think. The chapter begins by describing the work of an interdisciplinary team of scholars who developed two psychometric survey instruments to measure the virtue of accountability: the interpersonal accountability scale and the transcendent accountability scale. Statistical analysis of research done with the scales shows that there is good evidence for their reliability as picking out a genuine trait. Preliminary research also suggests that the trait is linked to important measures of human well-being. The chapter then looks at empirical evidence from the team’s new work as well as existing surveys that use items that plausibly measure accountability, and shows there is already considerable evidence that accountability, like other virtues, is connected to human flourishing in a number of ways. These include a sense of meaning, political and social engagement, as well as fostering relational repair after harm has been done to a relationship. The chapter then looks at the role accountability plays in current thinking in the business world, where it is increasingly recognized that the task of the leader is to cultivate a “culture of accountability.” Accountability also plays a vital and pervasive role in “12-step” organizations that seek to help people overcome addictions and achieve other important goals. Finally, many people are seeking “accountability partners” for various ends, sometimes even over the internet.

This chapter analyses the key notion of the standing possessed by the accountor. Practical authority is described as a special type of standing. A person with standing can reasonably expect and request certain behaviors from an accountee, including giving an account, but the person with authority can order or demand certain actions. The chapter argues that it is a mistake to think that accountability only has relevance for cases of wrongdoing. Rather, the cooperative work of accountors and accountees often enhances the value of good outcomes. The standing possessed by human accountors is always limited to a particular domain and even within that domain is limited. The chapter then describes in detail nine key features of the person who has the virtue of accountability as well as some conditions which facilitate the manifestation of the virtue. These include both an embrace of the reasonable expectations of the person with standing and a willingness to protest or resist expectations or demands that are unreasonable, because they either are not within the proper domain or exceed appropriate limits within a domain. The possibility of this resistance shows the virtue is not identical with servility and is consistent with a reasonable kind of autonomy. The virtue of accountability is linked to common projects with good goals.

This chapter begins with a summary of what has been accomplished in the previous eight chapters, in which the nature of accountability as a virtue has been defined and developed, and its importance for ethics and religion defended. Understanding accountability as a virtue could have a profound, positive impact on society. The chapter then focuses on the connection between accountability and punishment, since our current understanding of accountability focuses largely on holding people accountable in negative ways. The chapter argues that punishment, while not central in the motivation of the person who has the virtue, can play an educative role in the formation of the virtue, as well as providing protection for society. Nevertheless, recognizing the nature of the virtue and the limits of punishment would provide strong support for the restorative justice movement, which seeks to help people become accountable and seeks alternatives to incarceration which can help heal relationships. There is evidence that prisons themselves can be transformed through programs, many religious in character, which seek to help inmates develop a sense of accountability, one grounded in a new sense of identity. In addition to restorative justice, there is need for restorative prisons. The impact that recognizing accountability with respect to criminal justice is just one example from many possibilities of how the concept could be a help in the quest for human well-being and flourishing.

One objection to seeing accountability as an important virtue is that if this were the case, the virtue would have been recognized in other times and by other cultures. This chapter argues that accountability, or something very similar, has been recognized in this way, only by other names. The ancient Hebrew virtue of “the fear of the Lord” is analyzed as a particularly important instance of accountability, accountability to God. The Confucian virtue of “filial piety” is then described as another instance of accountability, found in Chinese culture. Finally, the western virtue tradition is briefly described, and it is argued that accountability can be found there also, understood as a sub-virtue of justice. Particularly, Thomas Aquinas described a virtue like accountability, but called it “obedience.” The chapter argues that the virtuous quality thus designated would be better described as accountability, as it turns out to be a quality that a superior can exercise towards someone under the superior’s authority, as well as one that can be exercised in peer relationships, and thus is not essentially tied to obeying a superior. Describing this virtue as accountability allows it to be seen as having an important role in a more democratic or egalitarian society.

This chapter first looks at the relation between accountability, understood as a relation, and moral obligations. Philosopher Stephen Darwall has argued that all moral obligations are linked to accountability, but even if this view is too strong, it seems correct that many obligations have this character, and this provides a reason for thinking that the virtue of accountability has great importance for the moral life as a whole. The chapter then provides a deeper description of accountability as a virtue by describing its central features and the motivational profile of one who has the virtue. The motivation is pluralistic, but the person who welcomes being accountable is not primarily motivated by fear of punishment. Finally, it looks at some objections to believing that accountability is a virtue, particularly the claim that it is simply a new name for another virtue. Accountability is not identical to conscientiousness or agreeableness or their conjunction. Accountability is best understood as a sub-virtue of justice, understood as a personal virtue.

This book shows that accountability can be understood as a significant, forward-looking virtue, an excellence possessed by those who embrace being accountable to those who have proper standing, when that standing is being exercised appropriately. Today accountability is usually understood in terms of holding someone accountable for bad actions, but we should also look at people who welcome being accountable to others and carry out the role in an excellent manner. The book gives a fine-grained description of the virtue and how it is exercised, including an account of the motivational profile of those with the virtue. It examines the relation of accountability to other virtues, such as honesty and humility, as well as opposing vices, such as self-deception, arrogance, and servility. Though the virtue of accountability is compatible with autonomy, recognizing the importance of the virtue does justice to the social character of humans. The book explores the history of this virtue in other cultures and historical eras, showing that the virtue is widely recognized, even if it is somewhat eclipsed in modern western societies. Many people believe they are globally accountable, accountable for how they live their lives as a whole. This means that the virtue is not only central to ethics, but connects the ethical life to religious concerns, since global accountability points humans towards a transcendent ground of their accountability. The book discusses empirical evidence for the virtue and its significance, and concludes by looking at the implications of accountability for the transformation of the criminal justice system as an example of how a renewed emphasis on this virtue could enhance society.

Why did the Biblical writers see the fear of the Lord as a virtue that is conducive to human flourishing? It is difficult for contemporary readers to understand how fear of anything can be virtuous. I propose that the fear of the Lord should be understood as accountability to God. I defend the claim that someone who displays excellence in an accountability relationship does display a virtue, and that this virtue is particularly valuable when exercised in relation to God. If we reject an individualistic view of moral motivation inspired by Kant, we can see that being held accountable does not necessarily diminish personal autonomy. The primary motivation for the person who has the virtue of accountability is not fear of punishment, but a desire to do what is right because it is right, rooted in an appreciation of the standing of one to whom one is accountable.

As scholars who have been engaged in interdisciplinary emic measure development, we provide our reflections on the prospects and perils of this kind of engagement. We contrast the approach we have in mind with other interdisciplinary activities; we commend engaging social scientists, philosophers, and theologians in collaboration across all of the phases of the measurement development process from the from the development of theory, through the creation of items, to the completion of construct validity work. We describe the values that emerge from interdisciplinary collaboration for emic Christian measure development: overcoming disciplinary limitations, benefiting from distinct knowledge traditions, generating new insights, and increasing communication beyond academic guilds. We next cover three kinds of challenges and obstacles that may weaken the likelihood of success. First, social scientists and philosophers/theologians may have certain assumptions about those from the other disciplines and each practitioner may be unaware of critical concepts of disciplines outside their own. Second, approaches to both method and content differ. Third, researchers from various fields are socialized into contrasting forms and conventions of dissemination. In the final section, we suggest means for overcoming these challenges through careful planning and the cultivation of collegial dispositions, such as intellectual humility, humor, hospitality, and trust.

[Excerpt] What might a normative objection to atheism be? There are a number of possibilities. One kind of normative objection to atheism would consist of arguments against atheism that take normativity in general or some particular kind of normativity or even particular normative facts as their starting point. Such arguments would try to show that atheism cannot adequately explain this starting point, or at least show that atheism seems less probable on the basis of these features. In many cases such argument would be combined with arguments that the features in question can be explained if theism is true. What are commonly called moral arguments for theism would be arguments of this kind. (In general any positive argument for theism can also be construed as an objection to atheism, although there could be objections to atheism that are not arguments for theism.) A second possible thing one might mean by a normative objection to atheism would be an argument that atheism is itself practically bad in some way. Perhaps atheism is bad for the atheist, or perhaps atheism produces bad consequences for others. A good example, which will be discussed later, might be Immanuel Kant’s well‐known argument that atheism leads to a kind of moral despair, which is incompatible with the moral faith needed to live as one ought. Another example could be the common claim that atheism undermines moral character in some way, and thus that atheists are more likely to be morally inferior in some respect. Interestingly, there is quite a bit of empirical support for something in the neighborhood of this claim. A good deal of research shows that serious religious believers, who regularly attend a church, synagogue, or mosque, are significantly more likely to help others in a variety of ways. Religious people on average give more to charity than non‐religious people, and they also give more of their time to helping others. This is true not just of gifts made to religious institutions. Religious people are also more likely than non‐believers to give to non‐religious charities.1 However, since these are obviously empirical claims and not deeply philosophical, I shall not give these findings any further consideration. It is clearly not possible in a single article to give a comprehensive treatment of such arguments. What I shall attempt to do in this chapter is describe a number of arguments of both of these two kinds that I regard as among the more promising ones, analyzing both their strengths and possible weak points.

Philosophers such as Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud have developed “global hermeneutical perspectives” on human nature. This paper argues that Christian faith also provides such a perspective, which is termed the “no-neutrality thesis.” Humans were created to serve God, but they have rebelled against their rightful sovereign, and this rebellion may show itself in morality. If moral obligations are God’s requirements, then the human rebellion might provide motivation for rejecting objective moral obligations. Thus the noneutrality thesis may help us understand some forms of antirealism. It may even shed light on some forms of nontheistic realism.

In this article I compare the kryptic model of the Incarnation, developed by Andrew Loke, with two other models, the “two-minds” model and the kenotic model. All three models succeed in showing the logical coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and I concede that Loke’s model has some of the advantages of both of the other two, while avoiding some perceived disadvantages. However, I argue that Loke’s model also has some of the disadvantages of both of the other models. In conclusion I argue that the alleged superiority of the kryptic model over a kenotic model vanishes if one is willing to question the reliability of our a priori rational intuitions about the nature of God on the basis of a view of the divine nature that seems to fit better with the biblical picture of God.

Although accountability is a fundamental part of human life, it is something we often do not like. We do not like it when the presence or gaze of another places demands on us. In Christian ethics today there is a massive swing away from talk about God’s commands and God’s law and toward virtue ethics. There is nothing wrong with recognizing the importance of the virtues. But an ethic of virtue cannot in this life replace or supplant an ethic of law. Biblically, there is no competition between God’s law and the virtues God wants to instill in us. Rather, God’s law is a gracious gift that is an essential tool in acquiring the virtues God wants us to have, one of which is in fact faithful obedience. Evans concludes by offering theological reflections that can help Christians recover a sense of gratitude and joy for our accountability to God.

Stephen Darwall has developed an account of moral obligations as grounded in “second-personal reasons,” which was developed in conversation with early modern “theological voluntarists” who were divine command theorists. For Darwall, morality does not require accountability to God, humans as autonomous moral agents are the source of moral obligations. In this paper, I try to show that Darwall is vulnerable to some objections made against divine command theories. There are responses Darwall could make that have parallels to those given by divine command theorists. However, those responses require moral realism, while Darwall’s project is often seen as being inspired by metaethical constructivism. Finally, I suggest that Darwall’s view could be further strengthened by the addition of God to the story.

This article responds to articles by Joshua Furnal and Lee Barrett on the relation of Kierkegaard's thought to Catholic theology. I express appreciation for Furnal's claim that Kierkegaard had a deep impact on Vatican ii and suggest this was made possible by Kierkegaard's commitment to the early Christian fathers, which makes him a “ressourcement” theologian. Barrett's view of Kierkegaard's account of the relation between nature and grace is also applauded, and I suggest another way Kierkegaard can be seen as reconciling Protestant and Catholic thought on this issue. I conclude by putting this discussion into the broader context of Kierkegaard's positive reception by many different strands of Christianity, suggesting that this is made possible by Kierkegaard's commitment to something like “mere Christianity” in C.S. Lewis's sense, along with his fervent defence of passion and subjectivity as the elements that give life to religious faith.

This chapter considers an argument from design, meant for those without a technical scientific background, and based on Thomas Reid’s concept of natural signs. For Reid, sensations function as natural signs in perception when some object in the world causes sensations, on the basis of which one is disposed to form beliefs and concepts about those objects. This establishes direct, non-inferential knowledge of what we perceive. If God exists, it is plausible that He would make himself known by means of natural signs. One kind of natural sign would be the perceived design in nature. According to both externalist and internalist accounts of knowledge, natural signs of God offer justification for a person to believe in God. The justification could be non-inferential but the sign could also be the basis of an argument of the type explained in this chapter. The chapter ends by responding to an objection from evolution against apparent design.

Existentialist theology is a term used to describe the work of a number of theologians, chiefly from the twentieth century, whose writings were strongly influenced by the literary and philosophical movement known as existentialism. Because of the diversity of the movement, it is difficult to say much that is illuminating about existentialist theology as a whole. In general, however, these theologians attempt to understand God in relation to the situation of the concretely existing human individual. Their analysis of human existence is one that emphasizes the freedom of individuals to shape their own identities through choices, and the paradoxical, ambiguous or even absurd character of the reality that humans encounter. Religious faith is seen as closely related to feelings of alienation and despair; faith may grow out of such emotions or it may provide the key to overcoming them, or both these relations may be present at once. Though the designation of any particular theologian as ‘existentialist’ is a controversial matter, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich are among the more important thinkers whose work exhibits existentialist themes. The entire movement has been strongly influenced, directly or indirectly, by the nineteenth-century Danish philosopher-theologian Søren Kierkegaard, while the works of the Russian novelist Fëdor Dostoevskii and the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, both from the late nineteenth century, have also been important.

This paper explains and defends a divine command account of moral obligations. A divine command account of moral obligations is distinguished from a general theological voluntarism which grounds all moral truth in the divine will. God’s commands ground moral duties, but truths about the good are grounded in the nature of God and God’s creation. Such an account does not see a divine command account as a rival to a natural law view of the good or as a rival to virtue ethics. The three types of account are complementary. A divine command account of moral obligation is attractive for both theological and philosophical reasons, and those strengths are made clear. In conclusion the paper considers and responds to a number of objections often raised against such an account, including the so-called Euthyphro objection—an objection that stems from Cudworth, and an objection that hinges on the way God’s commands are promulgated.

This chapter explores the multiple roles the Spirit plays in giving humans moral knowledge—more precisely, how the Spirit makes possible an understanding of God’s requirements for his human creatures. The author works with a “divine command theory” of moral obligations, according to which our moral duties are grounded in God’s will, insofar as that will has been communicated. He recounts several significant theological and philosophical advantages of this perspective. This divine command theory is no rival to natural law accounts of the good or to virtue ethics. Rather, the three approaches are complementary aspects of a Christian ethic.

This article argues that Platonism provides a plausible account of wisdom, one that is especially attractive for Christians. Christian Platonism sees wisdom as conceptual understanding; it is a “knowledge of the Forms.” To be convincing this view requires us to see understanding as including an appreciation of the relations between concepts as well as the value of the possible ways of being that concepts disclose. If the Forms are Divine Ideas, then we can see why God is both supremely wise and the source of all human wisdom. The account of wisdom provided helps explain the relation between wisdom and knowledge, the connection between wisdom and emotion, and much about how wisdom is acquired. The view also helps explain why someone who lacks extensive propositional knowledge can still be wise, and it helps us see why an understanding of the Biblical narrative and participation in the life of the Church can be important aids in the development of wisdom.

Many ethical systems hold that there are obligations to love and value all human beings. This essay assumes the existence of such universal obligations, and argues that a divine command meta-ethical theory provides a better account of these obligations than secular meta-ethical theories, such as the evolutionary biology and contractual meta-ethical accounts that are favored by many psychologists. God's command to humans to love their neighbors as themselves not only explains the existence of such obligations, but also gives a plausible account of the psychological motivation for acting in accord with such a duty. ********** Many ethical theories hold that human beings have at least some moral obligations that extend to all human persons. A famous example can be found in the renowned theory of Immanuel Kant. Kant (1785/1993) gives a number of different formulations of "the Categorical Imperative," which he claims is the supreme principle of morality. One of the best-known is as follows: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means" (p. 36). Kant holds that every human person, every member of "humanity," has intrinsic worth or dignity and therefore must be treated as an "end" and never simply viewed merely as a means to some other person's happiness. Such an ethic clearly implies that the moral obligations of a human moral agent cannot be limited to people who belong to the same family, ethnic group, nation, or race as that agent. Let us call an ethic that posits obligations that transcend such distinctions a "universal ethic." I shall not take this term as implying that moral obligations are limited to human persons. A universal ethic may also hold that there are obligations to animals, and, if there are any such creatures, aliens from other worlds. (Not to mention God and angels, if Christianity is true.) However, a universal ethic must at least hold that moral obligations apply to all human persons, regardless of gender, class, nationality, etc. Kant's ethic is by no means the only example of a universal ethic. Utilitarians, while fundamentally disagreeing with Kant about the nature and ground of moral obligations, also typically hold that such obligations are universal in character. John Stuart Mill (1998), the most famous proponent of this type of ethic, says that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness" (p. 55). To apply such an ethic, one must of course determine whose happiness must be taken into account. Here Mill says clearly that the answer is simply the happiness of anyone who may be affected by an action (p. 64). It is true that most often it is the case that human actions only affect a limited number of people, and thus the moral agent only needs to consider the particular people who will be affected rather than something so grand as the happiness of all humankind (pp. 65-66). Nevertheless, Mill says that the end of morality is "the greatest amount of happiness altogether," and he believes the moral agent must not only consider the happiness of "all mankind" but should even go beyond the consideration of human persons to the happiness of "the whole sentient creation" (p. 59). The concept of a universal ethic is by no means alien to psychologists. Arguably, such an ethic provides the foundation for the American Psychological Association's (2002) Code of Ethics. (1) Principle D, for example, dealing with "Justice," affirms that "psychologists recognize that fairness and justice entitle all persons to access to and benefit from the contributions of psychology and to equality in the processes, procedures, and services being conducted by psychologists" (p. 1062). Principle E strikes a similarly universalist tone, affirming that "psychologists respect the dignity and worth of all people" (p. …

What is truly beautiful? For Soren Kierkegaard the beautiful is to be found in an integrated self, one that is freely chosen. This article explores Kierkegaard's "aesthetic" stage of existence through the character of Augusto Perez, the protagonist of Miguel de Unamuno's novel, Niebla. After establishing a solid link between Unamuno and Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's "ethical" stage is used to critique the "aesthetic" stage on aesthetic grounds, on the basis of the beauty found in life's work, a calling. The conclusion is that the sphere of the "aesthetic" does not achieve Kierkegaard's "aesthetics" of an integrated, fully existing self.

In Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling , the pseudonymous author, Johannes de silentio, argues that either it must be true that religious faith can justify Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac on God’s command (as described in the biblical story in Genesis 22) or else Abraham is a murderer. The conclusion silentio defends has a disjunctive character, and he frequently admits that a person can reasonably deny that it could ever be right to kill one’s child, even if God commanded the act. However, such a person must, on pain of inconsistency, condemn Abraham. For example, in considering Problem I (whether there is such a thing as a teleological suspension of the ethical), silentio admits the possibility that Hegel is right in claiming that the individual who as an individual puts himself above “the universal” thereby does wrong. However, silentio argues that consistency requires that in making such a judgment, Hegel condemns Abraham’s action in being willing to sacrifice Isaac, since such an action is surely not something that can be seen as universal. Hegel’s view implies that Abraham “ought to have been remanded and exposed as a murderer” (FT 47/SKS 4, 149). It appears then that silentio wants to put some of his readers, namely Jews and Christians who revere Abraham as the “father of faith,” in a difficult spot. If they regard Abraham as an exemplar of faith, someone to be imitated, as did the writer of Hebrews , who describes Abraham as one of the heroes of faith, then it appears they must be willing to judge that Abraham acted rightly in being willing to sacrifice Isaac at the command of God. However, if Abraham was right in his actions, consistency seems to demand that the same judgment of approval be given to a hypothetical contemporary who has received a similar command from God. Of course secular readers may feel no strain here; many will unhesitatingly judge both that Abraham was wrong in his willingness to sacrifice Isaac and that a contemporary who intended such an action would be morally in the wrong. However, the choice is not so easy for those still committed to a religious tradition that venerates Abraham. Silentio in effect challenges such readers either to give up their admiration for Abraham or else admit the possibility that genuine faith might require a person to sacrifice a child.