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Background We previously described experiences of clinicians who published adverse drug reaction reports. We now report on threats and intimidations leveled against clinicians and scientists who received publicly documented threats after communicating safety, efficacy, or data integrity findings contrary to corporate interests. Methods Data on threats and intimidations were obtained from transcripts of governmental hearings or agencies, university-affiliated reports, media interviews, and investigative journalism articles. Content and timing of threats and intimidation, subsequent harms, numbers of persons seriously injured or who died from individual toxicities, financial payments from sponsors related to safety, efficacy, or data integrity concerns, and civil settlements and criminal findings were evaluated. Findings Twenty-six individuals who communicated safety, efficacy, or data integrity concerns were targets of threats and intimidation from corporate employees (twenty-three individuals) or regulatory personnel (three). Seventeen individuals identified instances where pharmaceutical sponsors submitted fraudulent data in support of regulatory approval of a drug or device. Scientist and clinician communications were followed by drug/device withdrawals (fourteen drugs/devices), black box warnings (six drugs), withdrawal of a sponsor’s application for regulatory approval (one device), and delay of approval of a sponsor’s application for regulatory approval (one drug). Actions mainly occurred after persons communicated with pharmaceutical employees (fourteen). Intimidation efforts by corporate personnel included threats of lawsuits (eighteen individuals), hiring private investigators (nine), and public disparagement at conferences (eleven). Related intimidation efforts carried out by academia or regulatory agency superiors included threats of: loss of positions (six), loss of grant funding (two), delays in decisions regarding tenure (two); or reassignment to a low-level position (one). Academic harms included lost: hospital or university appointments (nine and six, respectively), grant funding (two), chairperson title of an international clinical trial group (one), and journal editorial board position (one). Corporate harms included payment of $1 million to defense attorneys in three cases filed against clinicians. Interpretation Threats and intimidation carried out by corporate employees and/or academic supervisors followed public communication of concerns regarding patient safety, drug efficacy, or data integrity, including instances where sponsors were identified as having submitted fraudulent data to regulatory or government agencies. Consideration should be given to filing criminal charges against pharmaceutical executives who are discovered by scientists or clinicians to have knowingly submitted fraudulent data to regulatory or governmental agencies, rather than causing the scientists and clinicians who submit such reports to risk losing their reputations and occupations.

The EU, the USA, and Japan account for the majority of biological pharmacotherapy use worldwide. Biosimilar regulatory approval pathways were authorised in the EU (2006), in Japan (2009), and in the USA (2015), to facilitate approval of biological drugs that are highly similar to reference products and to encourage market competition. Between 2007 and 2020, 33 biosimilars for oncology were approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA), 16 by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and ten by the Japan Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA). Some of these approved applications were initially rejected because of manufacturing concerns (four of 36 [11%] with the EMA, seven of 16 [44%] with the FDA, none of ten for the PMDA). Median times from initial regulatory submission before approval of oncology biosimilars were 1·5 years (EMA), 1·3 years (FDA), and 0·9 years (PMDA). Pharmacists can substitute biosimilars for reference biologics in some EU countries, but not in the USA or Japan. US regulation prohibits substitution, unless the biosimilar has been approved as interchangeable, a designation not yet achieved for any biosimilar in the USA. Japan does not permit biosimilar substitution, as prescribers must include the product name on each prescription and that specific product must be given to the patient. Policy Reviews published in 2014 and 2016 in The Lancet Oncology focused on premarket and postmarket policies for oncology biosimilars before most of these drugs received regulatory approval. In this Policy Review from the Southern Network on Adverse Reactions, we identify factors preventing the effective launch of oncology biosimilars. Introduction to the market has been more challenging with therapeutic than for supportive care oncology biosimilars. Addressing region-specific competition barriers and educational needs would improve the regulatory approval process and market launches for these biologics, therefore expanding patient access to these products in the EU, the USA, and Japan.

Erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs) are available to treat chemotherapy-induced anemia (CIA). In 2007-2008, regulatory notifications advised of venous thromboembolism and mortality risks while the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services' restricted ESA initiation to patients with hemoglobin

Biosimilar filgrastims are primarily indicated for chemotherapy-induced neutropenia prevention. They are less expensive formulations of branded filgrastim, and biosimilar filgrastim was the first biosimilar oncology drug administered in European Union (EU) countries, Japan, and the U.S. Fourteen biosimilar filgrastims have been marketed in EU countries, Japan, the U.S., and Canada since 2008, 2012, 2015, and 2016, respectively. We reviewed experiences and policies for biosimilar filgrastim markets in EU countries and Japan, where uptake has been rapid, and in the U.S. and Canada, where experience is rapidly emerging. U.S. regulations for designating biosimilar interchangeability are under development, and such regulations have not been developed in most other countries. Pharmaceutical substitution is allowed for new filgrastim starts in some EU countries and in Canada, but not Japan and the U.S. In EU countries, biosimilar adoption is facilitated with favorable hospital tender offers. U.S. adoption is reportedly 24%, while the second filgrastim biosimilar is priced 30% lower than branded filgrastim and 20% lower than the first biosimilar filgrastim approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Utilization is about 60% in EU countries, where biosimilar filgrastim is marketed at a 30%–40% discount. In Japan, biosimilar filgrastim utilization is 45%, primarily because of 35% discounts negotiated by Central Insurance and hospital-only markets. Overall, biosimilar filgrastim adoption barriers are small in many EU countries and Japan and are diminishing in Canada in the U.S. Policies facilitating improved U.S. adoption of biosimilar filgrastim, based on positive experiences in EU countries and Japan, including favorable insurance coverage; larger price discount relative to reference filgrastim pricing; closing of the “rebate trap” with transparent pricing information; formal educational efforts of patients, physicians, caregivers, and providers; and allowance of pharmaceutical substitution of biosimilar versus reference filgrastim, should be considered. Implications for Practice We reviewed experiences and policies for biosimilar filgrastims in Europe, Japan, Canada, and the U.S. Postmarketing harmonization of regulatory policies for biosimilar filgrastims has not occurred. Acceptance of biosimilar filgrastims for branded filgrastim, increasing in the U.S. and in Canada, is commonplace in Japan and Europe. In the U.S., some factors, accepted in Europe or Japan, could improve uptake, including acceptance of biosimilars as safe and effective; larger cost savings, decreasing “rebate traps” where pharmaceutical benefit managers support branded filgrastim, decreased use of patent litigation/challenges, and allowing pharmacists to routinely substitute biosimilar for branded filgrastim.

Background: Adverse drug/device reactions (ADRs) can result in severe patient harm. We define very serious ADRs as being associated with severe toxicity, as measured on the Common Toxicity Criteria Adverse Events (CTCAE)) scale, following use of drugs or devices with large sales, large financial settlements, and large numbers of injured persons. We report on impacts on patients, clinicians, and manufacturers following very serious ADR reporting. Methods: We reviewed clinician identified very serious ADRs published between 1997 and 2019. Drugs and devices associated with reports of very serious ADRs were identified. Included drugs or devices had market removal discussed at Food and Drug Advisory (FDA) Advisory Committee meetings, were published by clinicians, had sales > $1 billion, were associated with CTCAE Grade 4 or 5 toxicity effects, and had either >$1 billion in settlements or >1,000 injured patients. Data sources included journals, Congressional transcripts, and news reports. We reviewed data on: 1) timing of ADR reports, Boxed warnings, and product withdrawals, and 2) patient, clinician, and manufacturer impacts. Binomial analysis was used to compare sales pre- and post-FDA Advisory Committee meetings. Findings: Twenty very serious ADRs involved fifteen drugs and one device. Legal settlements totaled $38.4 billion for 753,900 injured persons. Eleven of 18 clinicians (61%) reported harms, including verbal threats from manufacturer (five) and loss of a faculty position (one). Annual sales decreased 94% from $29.1 billion pre-FDA meeting to $4.9 billion afterwards (p

Pulmonary fibrosis includes several lung disorders characterized by progressive fibrosis, of which idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF) is a particularly severe form with a median survival time of 3...

Erythropoisis stimulating agent (ESA) use was addressed in Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Oncology Drug Advisory Committee (ODAC) meetings between 2004 and 2008. FDA safety-focused regulatory actions occurred in 2007 and 2008. In 2007, black box warnings advised of early death and venous thromboembolism (VTE) risks with ESAs in oncology. In 2010, a Risk Evaluation Strategies (REMS) was initiated, with cancer patient consent that mortality and VTE risks were noted with ESAs. We report warnings and REMS impacts on ESA utilization among Veterans Administration (VA) cancer patients with chemotherapy-induced anemia (CIA). Data were from Veterans Affairs database (2003-2012). Epoetin and darbepoetin use were primary outcomes. Segmented linear regression was used to estimate changes in ESA use levels and trends, clinical appropriateness, and adverse events (VTEs) among chemotherapy-treated cancer patients. To estimate changes in level of drug prescription rate after policy actions, model-specific indicator variables as covariates based on specific actions were included. ESA use fell by 95% and 90% from 2005, for epoetin and darbepoetin, from 22% and 11%, respectively, to 1% and 1%, respectively, among cancer patients with CIA, respectively (p

Introduction: Adverse drug/device reactions (ADRs) can result in severe patient harm. We operationally define titanic ADRs as Common Toxicity Criteria Adverse Events grade 4 or 5 that follow use of drugs or devices that have large sales, large safety financial settlements, and affect large numbers of persons. We report on the impact of titanic ADRs identified between 1997 and 2019. Methods: We reviewed clinician reported titanic ADRs. Data sources included Food and Drug Advisory (FDA) Advisory Committee transcripts, news reports, and medical journals. We reviewed data on timing of titanic ADR reports, Boxed warnings, product withdrawals, and impacts on patients, clinicians, and manufacturers. Results: Overall, twenty titanic ADRs involved 15 drugs and 1 device. Legal settlements totaled $38.4 billion for 874,000 persons reportedly developing titanic ADRs. Five clinicians reported receiving threats from manufacturers’ employees, one clinician lost a university faculty position, and five clinicians were not invited to FDA meetings where their safety findings were discussed. Annual sales for 9 still patented drugs and 1 device decreased 78% from $21.3 billion pre-ADR report to $3.9 billion afterwards. Following FDA approval, the median time to titanic ADRs reporting was 7.5 years. Fourteen drugs received Box warnings a median of 7.5 years following titanic ADR reporting. Six drugs and 1 device were withdrawn from marketing (median of 5 years after titanic ADR reporting). Conclusion: Overall, 874,000 persons were purportedly injured by fifteen drugs and one device that caused titanic ADRs, reputational harms were reported by eleven clinicians , and $38.4 billion in legal settlements were paid . Because titanic ADRs impacts are so large, and investigative processes not always transparent, policy makers should develop an independently funded drug safety board. Funding Statement: This work received support from the National Cancer Institute (1R01 A102713 (CLB), https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/nih-almanac/national-cancer-institute-nci; the American Cancer Society (IRG-13-043-01), https://www.cancer.org/; and an unrestricted grant from Doris Levkoff Meddin. Declaration of Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

INTRODUCTION: Ciprofloxacin, levofloxacin, and moxifloxacin belong to the fluoroquinolone class of antibiotics and are amongst the most commonly prescribed antibiotics. In 2018 and 2019, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Medicine Agency (EMA) requested that manufacturers harmonize FQ safety information related to neuropsychiatric, aortic dissection, and long-term disability. The authors hypothesize that FDA and EMA epidemiologists support a strong association between these drugs and the three toxicities. AREAS COVERED: Studies of FQ-associated neuropsychiatric toxicity, long-term disability, and aortic ruptures/dissections. Clinical sources include FDA Advisory Committee documents, a 2014 Citizen Petition filed with the FDA requesting safety information additions to FQ labels for neuropsychiatric toxicities (partially granted in 2018), an under-review Citizen Petition under review by the FDA requesting a FQ Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy, and safety notifications from the EMA. EXPERT OPINION: FDA and the EMA reports state that neuropsychiatric toxicity, long-term disability, and aortic dissections//aneurysms occur with all FQs. Disability and neuropsychiatric toxicity can occur after one dose or several months after FQs. United States’ and European’ regulators warn physicians not to prescribe FQs for uncomplicated acute urinary tract infection, sinusitis, or bronchitis, unless other possible choices are tried first, as risks outweigh benefits in these settings.

Oncology-associated adverse drug/device reactions can be fatal. Some clinicians who treat single patients with severe oncology-associated toxicities have researched case series and published this information. We investigated motivations and experiences of select individuals leading such efforts. Clinicians treating individual patients who developed oncology-associated serious adverse drug events were asked to participate. Inclusion criteria included having index patient information, reporting case series, and being collaborative with investigators from two National Institutes of Health funded pharmacovigilance networks. Thirty-minute interviews addressed investigational motivation, feedback from pharmaceutical manufacturers, FDA personnel, and academic leadership, and recommendations for improving pharmacovigilance. Responses were analyzed using constant comparative methods of qualitative analysis. Overall, 18 clinicians met inclusion criteria and 14 interviewees are included. Primary motivations were scientific curiosity, expressed by six clinicians. A less common theme was public health related (three clinicians). Six clinicians received feedback characterized as supportive from academic leaders, while four clinicians received feedback characterized as negative. Three clinicians reported that following the case series publication they were invited to speak at academic institutions worldwide. Responses from pharmaceutical manufacturers were characterized as negative by 12 clinicians. One clinician’s wife called the post-reporting time the “Maalox month,” while another clinician reported that the manufacturer collaboratively offered to identify additional cases of the toxicity. Responses from FDA employees were characterized as collaborative for two clinicians, neutral for five clinicians, unresponsive for negative by six clinicians. Three clinicians endorsed developing improved reporting mechanisms for individual physicians, while 11 clinicians endorsed safety activities that should be undertaken by persons other than a motivated clinician who personally treats a patient with a severe adverse drug/ device reaction. Our study provides some of the first reports of clinician motivations and experiences with reporting serious or potentially fatal oncology-associated adverse drug or device reactions. Overall, it appears that negative feedback from pharmaceutical manufacturers and mixed feedback from the academic community and/or the FDA were reported. Big data, registries, Data Safety Monitoring Boards, and pharmacogenetic studies may facilitate improved pharmacovigilance efforts for oncology-associated adverse drug reactions. These initiatives overcome concerns related to complacency, indifference, ignorance, and system-level problems as barriers to documenting and reporting adverse drug events- barriers that have been previously reported for clinician reporting of serious adverse drug reactions.