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We propose an account of cognitive tools that takes into account the process of enculturation by which tools are integrated into our cognitive systems. Drawing on work in cultural evolution and developmental psychology, we argue that cognitive tools are complex entities consisting of physical objects, representational systems, and cognitive practices for the physical manipulation of the tool. We use an extensive case study of spatial navigation to demonstrate the core claims. The account we provide is contrasted with conceptions of cognitive tools that simplify cognition, in particular that they offload cognitive work, or that the tools themselves are temporary developmental scaffolds or props. Enculturation results in transformed cognitive systems, and we can now think and act in new ways with cognitive tools.

Drawing on a range of literature, I introduce two new concepts for understanding and exploring distributed cognition: resilience engineering and degeneracy. By re-examining Ed Hutchins’ (1995) ethnographic study of the navigation team I show how a focus on the developmental acquisition of cognitive practices can draw out several crucial insights that have been overlooked. Firstly, that the way in which agents learn and acquire cognitive practices enables a form of resilience engineering: the process by which the system is able to overcome and adapt to errors and the vagaries of nature. Secondly, that the best way to engineer a resilient system is through promoting degeneracy – how differing structures produce the same function – at the level of cognitive practices. These two features show that focusing on cognitive practices and developmental trajectories is important for both greater explanatory leverage; and is also useful in regard to the practicalities of designing real-world cognitive systems.

The increasing use of geographic information systems (GIS) in everyday life is profoundly shaping how humans navigate and interact with their surroundings. Behavioural and ethnographic experimental research indicates that increased usage of GPS devices is having a significant impact on human neurocognitive systems, especially memory and perception (Gramann et al. 2017). Despite this, there has only been a limited investigation of the implications of the spread of GIS technologies. In this paper, we explore how habitual reliance on GPS technology undermines autonomous decision-making through “nudging” (Sunstein and Thaler 2008)—that is, the alteration of psychological behaviour without the explicit forbidding of choice. In particular, we make a novel distinction between what we refer to as “suggestive nudging”—the suggesting of certain routes to take to get to a destination—and “disclosure nudging”—the normalisation of constant tracking and disclosing of our locations to government and corporate actors. We shall argue that although suggestive and disclosure nudging are in principle separate, that in practice they are intertwined in the design of modern GPS devices. Additionally, since human spatial cognition is highly plastic and susceptible to being sculpted by cultural practices (Hutchins 1995; Levinson 2003), this exacerbates the negative implications of the ‘in practice’ link of suggestive and disclosure nudging by making the latter harder to avoid and opt-out of. We argue that this state of affairs necessitates re-designing GPS devices.

We agree with Bruineberg and colleagues' main claims. However, we urge for a more forceful critique by focusing on the extended mind debate. We argue that even once the Pearl and Friston versions of the Markov blanket have been untangled, that neither is sufficient for tackling and resolving the question of demarcating the boundaries of the mind.

In this paper, we analyse how GPS-based navigation systems are transforming some of our intellectual virtues and then suggest two strategies to improve our practices regarding the use of such epistemic tools. We start by outlining the two main approaches in virtue epistemology, namely virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. We then discuss how navigation systems can undermine five epistemic virtues, namely memory, perception, attention, intellectual autonomy, and intellectual carefulness. We end by considering two possible interlinked ways of trying to remedy this situation: [i] redesigning the epistemic tool to improve the epistemic virtues of memory, perception, and attention; and [ii] the cultivation of cognitive diligence for wayfinding tasks scaffolding intellectual autonomy and carefulness.