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Part 1 Modern diplomacy and international relations: the traditional and the transitional in statecraft, David Kimche diplomacy in the age of global communication, Eytan Gilboa studying international norms, Arie M. Kacowicz imperialism - predatory or preemptive?, Efraim Karsh new patterns of military intervention, Gil Merom proximate policy-makers, Aharon Klieman. Part 2 Israeli foreign relations: the Palestinian issue - changing Israeli perspectives, Itamar Rabinovich Israeli intervention in intra-Arab affairs, Zeev Maoz "Oom-shmoom" revisited - Israeli attitudes towards the UN and the great powers, 1948-1960, Neil Caplan paving the road to war - Israeli diplomacy and the 1967 crisis, David Tal dynamics of the US-Israel special relationship, Abraham Ben-Zvi contending narratives - the Israeli peace movement's role in the Oslo process, Tamar Hermann. Part 3 Zionism and modern Jewish history: Ahad Ha'am and the Jewish "Volkgeist", Eyal Chowers first encounters - East European Jewry discovers pre-Balfour England, Yaacov Shavit Jewish political culture and Zionist foreign policy, Alan Dowty whose Israel? Jewish-Americans and the transnational battle for Jewish identity, Yossi Shain weaving the future of Israel.

The literature reviewing the origins of the American–Israeli alliance underscores the role of factors related to “the special relationship paradigm” in establishing the infrastructure of this partnership. However, an analysis of the wealth of primary sources indicates that the central precipitant for its establishment was inherent in a cluster of purely strategic developments that unfolded in the Middle East during the second half of the 1950s, culminating in the Jordanian Crisis of July 1958. In the course of this crisis, Israel emerged as the only regional power prepared to take risks for the sake of deterring Egypt from toppling King Hussein's regime in Jordan. It was this experience and the lessons that American policymakers drew from Israel's behavior in the crisis that provided the main impetus for changing Washington's perceptions of Israel, thus establishing the conceptual basis for the alliance.

This article examines the relationship between Israel and the United States in the years immediately preceding the June 1967 War. In doing so, it challenges the widely held view that prior to Israel's victory in that war the United States refrained from any significant strategic relationship with the Jewish state. In particular, by examining in detail the decision of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to sell advanced military hardware – the Hawk short-range anti-aircraft missile, the M-48A Patton tank and the A-4E SkyhawK fighter-bomber – to Israel in the first half of the 1960s, it clearly shows that the seeds of a strategic partnership had been planted prior to Israel's comprehensive defeat of its Arab opponents in 1967.

(1990). Intention, capability and surprise: A comparative analysis. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 19-40.

(1990). Between warning and response: The case of the Yom Kippur War. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence: Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 227-242.

Preface and Acknowledgments1.A Theoretical Framework and Objectives 2.The United States and Israel 1953-1956: Divergence Dominates 3.The United States and Israel 1957-1960: The Emergence of Strategic Convergence4.The United States and Israel 1961-1962: Convergence Dominates 5.Epilogue

As a step toward further conceptualization and differentiation of the problem of surprise attacks, this article suggests a new framework for analyzing the assumptions of decision makers. Two main categories are distinguished: (i) strategic assumptions of possibilities—the explicit and implicit assumptions held by an “observing state” about the conditions and circumstances under which the “observed state” would strike; (2) tactical assumptions of actualities—assumptions that have become realities in the eyes of the observing state, or that are on the verge of realization. Five cases of failures in intelligence estimates are discussed: (1) the Barbarossa Operation; (2) the attack on Pearl Harbor; (3) the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; (4) the Sino-Indian Border War of October 1962; (5) the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973.The analysis indicates that in each case, when discrepancies existed between tactical assumptions of actualities and strategic assumptions of possibilities, the latter prevailed without reassessment of the situation.

(1981). In pursuit of national security: A juxtaposition of American images and policies. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 386-414.

The article juxtaposes the predominant preconceptions and beliefs pertaining to Japanese military capabilities and predisposition to take risks, held by a number of U. S. decision makers on the eve of the Pacific War, with those adhered to during the last phases of that conflagration. The analysis indicates that misperceived notions contributed both to the outbreak of the War and to the manner in which it was terminated. The central lesson emerging from this study in misperception can be formulated as the need to evaluate tactical field information on its own, and to avoid interpreting such data solely in the light of a priori strategic assumptions which inevitably reflect the decision maker's images of an opponent. As the article demonstrates, U. S. policy makers on both occasions analyzed tended to discount the flow of tactical indicators which contradicted their assessments of the opponent's capabilities and propensity to take risks. Thus, as a means for improving the decision-making process, particularly during periods of acute crisis or war (when policy makers are especially susceptible to the influence of preconceived images), the article suggests that increased weight should be given to tactical indicators when these are at variance with strategic assumptions.

During the years following the Second World War, intensive research was undertaken on the subject of response to threat. Confronted with the baffling yet recurrent inability of nations to respond adequately to warnings of an impending attack, many scholars concentrated on such events as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and the outbreak of the Korean War, and produced a voluminous empirical literature, as well as a considerably meagre body of theoretically oriented works. Thus alongside the plethora of works that sought explanations solely in terms of certain specific conditions operating at the time of the event analyzed, a few other inquiries attempted to integrate the case under scrutiny into a broader theoretical context in order to better elucidate the patterns by which nations cope with situations of crisis and threat.