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We investigate the trading of corporate bonds on alternative trading system (ATS) platforms. We draw a key distinction between request-for-quote (RFQ) and electronic communication network (ECN) trading protocols, which balance investors' preference for immediacy and anonymity. Trades on ATS platforms are smaller and more likely to involve investment-grade bonds. Trades on ATS platforms are more probable for older, less actively traded bonds from smaller issues and for bonds traded by more dealers where inventory is high. Moreover, dealer participation on ATS platforms is associated with lower customer transaction costs of between 24 and 32 basis points.

Productive firms can access credit markets directly by issuing corporate bonds or by borrowing through financial intermediaries. In this paper, we study the cyclical properties of corporate credit provision through these two types of debt instruments in major advanced economies. We argue that the cyclicality of corporate credit is closely related to the cyclicality of the types of financial intermediaries active in the provision of credit. When a debt instrument is held by institutions that manage their balance sheets through debt issuance, credit provision through that instrument is procyclical. But when a debt instrument is held by institutions that manage their balance sheets through equity issuance, credit provision through that instrument is countercyclical. We show that cross-country differences in the cyclicality of corporate credit can be ascribed to differences in the composition of the aggregate financial sector, and not to differences in the balance sheet management practices of each type of financial intermediary.

Which markets do institutions use to change exposure to credit risk? Using a unique data set of transactions in corporate bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) by large financial institutions, we show that simultaneous transactions in both markets are rare, with an average institution having an 11 percent probability of transacting in both the CDS and bond markets in the same entity in an average week. When institutions do transact in both markets simultaneously, they increase their speculative positions in CDS by 13 cents per dollar of bond transactions, and their hedging positions by 13 cents per dollar of bond transactions. We find evidence that, during the post-crisis rule implementation period, the incentive to use paired transactions is reduced but so is the incentive to take naked positions in the CDS market. When single name contracts become eligible for central clearing, globally systemically important institutions become more likely to use single name CDS contracts. Finally, we show that, in the aggregate, U.S. globally systemically important institutions reduce their exposure to corporate credit risk in the rule implementation period, primarily through reducing the amount of credit protection sold in the index CDS market.

This paper examines market liquidity in the post-crisis era, in light of concerns that regulatory changes might have reduced banks' ability and willingness to make markets. We begin with a discussion of the broader trading environment, including a discussion of regulations and their potential effect on dealer balance sheets and market making, but also considering plausible alternative drivers of market liquidity. Using both high- and low-frequency data on U.S. Treasury securities and corporate bonds, we then investigate empirically whether liquidity has in fact deteriorated, and we review market behavior around three key post-crisis events. Overall, our findings, and those of recent papers we survey, do not suggest a significant decline in bond market liquidity. We conclude with ideas for future research, including the evaluation of additional data, methodological improvements, and closer analyses of liquidity risk and the interplay between market liquidity and funding liquidity.

The misalignment between corporate bond and credit default swap (CDS) spreads (i.e., CDSbond basis) during the 2007-09 financial crisis is often attributed to corporate bond dealers shedding off their inventory, right when liquidity was scarce. This paper documents evidence against this widespread perception. In the months following Lehman's collapse, dealers, including proprietary trading desks in investment banks, provided liquidity in response to the large selling by clients. Corporate bond inventory of dealers rose sharply as a result. Although providing liquidity, limits to arbitrage, possibly in the form of limited capital, obstructed the convergence of the basis. We further show that the unwinding of precrisis 'basis trades' by hedge funds is the main driver of the large negative basis. Price drops following Lehman's collapse were concentrated among bonds with available CDS contracts and high activity in basis trades. Overall, our results indicate that hedge funds that serve as alternative liquidity providers at times, not dealers, caused the disruption in the credit market.

The rapid growth of the credit default swap (CDS) market and the increased number of defaults in recent years have led to major changes in the way CDS contracts are settled when default occurs. Auctions are increasingly the mechanism used to settle these contracts, replacing physical transfers of defaulted bonds between CDS sellers and buyers. Indeed, auctions will become a standard feature of all recent CDS contracts from now on. In this paper, we examine all of the CDS auctions conducted to date and evaluate their efficacy by comparing the auction outcomes to prices of the underlying bonds in the secondary market. The auctions appear to have served their purpose, as we find no evidence of inefficiency in the process: Participation is high, open interest is low, and the auction prices are close to the prices observed in the bond market before and after each auction has occurred. We qualify our conclusions by noting that relatively few auctions have taken place thus far.