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The commercial paper (CP) market is an important source of short-term funding for highly-rated financial and nonfinancial firms, with over $1 trillion in outstanding assets. The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and the COVID-19 crisis in March 2020 both demonstrated the fragility of the CP market, which seized up in both crises and only recovered following interventions from the Federal Reserve in the form of several liquidity facilities.

The shortage of women and historically underrepresented racial and ethnic groups in the economics profession has received considerable public attention in the past several years. The American Economic Association (AEA), the professional organization for economists, has been taking steps to address criticism that the economics discipline is unwelcoming to women and underrepresented minorities.

We attempt to replicate 67 papers published in 13 well-regarded economics journals using author-provided replication files that include both data and code. Some journals in our sample require data and code replication files, and other journals do not require such files. Aside from 6 papers that use confidential data, we obtain data and code replication files for 29 of 35 papers (83%) that are required to provide such files as a condition of publication, compared to 11 of 26 papers (42%) that are not required to provide data and code replication files. We successfully replicate the key qualitative result of 22 of 67 papers (33%) without contacting the authors. Excluding the 6 papers that use confidential data and the 2 papers that use software we do not possess, we replicate 29 of 59 papers (49%) with assistance from the authors. Because we are able to replicate less than half of the papers in our sample even with help from the authors, we assert that economics research is usually not replicable. We conclude with recommendations on improving replication of economics research.

Time is a significant cost of conducting transactions, and theoretical models predict that transactions costs significantly affect the type of media of exchange buyers use. However, there is little empirical work documenting the magnitude of this effect. This paper uses grocery store scanner data to examine how time affects consumer choices of checks and debit cards. On average, check transactions take thirty percent longer than debit card transactions. This time difference is a significant factor in the choice to use a debit card over a check and offers empirical evidence for transactions costs affecting the use of media of exchange.

The Main Street Lending Program (Main Street) was one of several new credit facilities launched by the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Federal Reserve published draft terms for Main Street on April 9, 2020, and the program started purchasing loan participations on July 6, 2020, with the goal of supporting lending to a wide range of small and medium-sized businesses that were in sound financial condition before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. When the program’s draft terms were first circulated, pandemic-related closures were taking hold throughout the economy, firms were sharply drawing down their existing credit lines, and credit market conditions were extremely tight. Against this backdrop, Main Street was intended to support the flow of credit to small and, especially, medium-sized firms and nonprofit organizations, as such entities were often too large to benefit from the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and too small to benefit directly from Federal Reserve facilities supporting the corporate bond and commercial paper markets.

Among the most sifnificant international developments of the last decade has been the emergence of an exchange rate system characterized by the widespread floating of major currencies. At times during the 1970's, the dollar and other currencies have fluctuated widely in value with respect to one another. The desire to understand better the implications of these exchange rate movements for trade flows, international capital movements, inflation rates, and other important economic variables has generated a substantial research effort. The paper provides a survey of recent contributions to this effort by Federal Reserve System economists, mainly work done in 1979.

This paper offers a fresh perspective on fundamental issues in using official incorporation records to corroborate the identity of corporate entities by comparing two publicly-available sets of information, namely, business registry incorporation records and reference data from the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) system, with some focus on the monitoring function performed by LEI issuers as agents for LEI data users. Three modes of analysis are used to consider these issues, high-level analysis of LEI system data about U.S. entities with LEIs, interviews conducted with U.S. business registries, and entity-level comparisons of business registry and LEI records for entities with LEIs incorporated in the states of Ohio and Massachusetts. The fresh perspective provided here includes attention to key comparison issues such as truncation of Legal Names in official records; significant state-level variation in requirements to provide business address information in incorporation records or periodic reports; recognition that some key business register data may not be readily available or available only at a cost; whether in this context enhancements can be made to the expectations for, and disclosures by, LEI issuers in their monitoring role; and to what extent the high incidence of non-renewal of LEIs might play a role in the quality of LEI reference data. The paper develops measures of scope and degree for many key issues that can arise in using business registry information within an identity-corroboration context. The exceptional transparency of the LEI system allows for detailed comparisons that connect its data quality and value proposition with its sources and methods.

Spillovers from China to global financial markets have been found to be small owing to China's limited integration in the global financial system. In this paper, however, we provide evidence that China constitutes an important driver of the global financial cycle. We argue that because of China's importance for global consumption, stronger Chinese growth raises global growth prospects, inducing an increase in global risk sentiment and an expansion in global asset prices and global credit. Two contributions are key to this finding: (1) We construct a measure of China's credit impulse to identify Chinese policy-induced demand shocks. Our approach takes advantage of the fact that a primary tool of China's stabilization policy-encompassing monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies-is controlling the amount of credit in the economy. Without China's credit impulse, it is difficult to discern global financial spillovers; (2) We estimate an alternative measure of Chinese GDP growth that captures its business cycle given data concerns about the smoothness of official GDP data. Without China's alternative GDP measure, it is difficult to attribute any global cycle movements to economic developments in China.

This paper examines estimates of, and drivers for, the sacrifice ratio in the United States. Three approaches are employed. The first reviews the literature on what sacrifice ratio might be expected. The second studies a generic disinflation experiment using 40 estimated macro models of the U.S. economy, calculating a distribution of sacrifice ratios. Those sacrifice ratios are high by historical standards and the paper discusses some stories for why this is so. The role of expectations formation and the credibility of policy is emphasized. The third approach gets under the hood of drivers of the output cost of disinflation by carrying out a selection of disinflation experiments using the FRB/US model, varying certain characteristics of the model’s expectations formation mechanism. Pinning down a precise measure for the output cost of disinflation is challenging. But the literature and policy experiments do offer some guidance on how the sacrifice ratio can be reduced.

This paper presents a stylized framework of bank risk‐taking to help clarify the concept of “double materiality,” the idea that supervisory authorities should consider both the risks that banks face from climate change and the impact of a bank’s actions on climate change. The paper shows that the concept of double materiality can be coherently embedded in a microprudential framework, but the practical implications could be quite similar to the implications of a single materiality perspective. The importance of a double materiality perspective becomes larger when one considers macroprudential objectives driven by financial sector externalities. The framework illustrates the critical importance of being clear on the supervisory mandate and objectives when assessing policy alternatives.

The value of assets in the digital ecosystem has grown rapidly, amid periods of high volatility. Does the digital financial system create new potential challenges to financial stability? This paper explores this question using the Federal Reserve’s framework for analyzing vulnerabilities in the traditional financial system. The digital asset ecosystem has recently proven itself highly fragile. However adverse digital asset markets shocks have had limited spillovers to the traditional financial system. Currently, the digital asset ecosystem does not provide significant financial services outside the ecosystem, and it exhibits limited interconnections with the traditional financial system. The paper describes emerging vulnerabilities that could present risks to financial stability in the future if the digital asset ecosystem becomes more systemic, including: run risks among large stablecoins, valuation pressures in crypto-assets, fragilities of DeFi platforms, growing interconnectedness, and a general lack of regulation.

This paper develops a framework for studying the effects of higher trade openness on the wage distribution that emphasizes within-industry labor reallocation across firms, strong skill-productivity complementarities in production and heterogenous fixed export costs across firms. Assuming no entry in the industry, an autarkic economy that opens to trade experiences a pervasive rise in wage inequality; a trade liberalization in a trading economy increases inequality at the lower end of the distribution, but may reduce it elsewhere. Assuming free entry, opening to trade could result in pervasively higher inequality or wage polarization. The analysis highlights the importance of new exporters (extensive margin) in shaping the aggregate relative demand for skills, a channel controlled by the distribution of fixed export costs in the model.

Widespread adoption of just-in-time (JIT) production has reduced inventory holdings. This paper finds that JIT creates a trade-off between firm profitability and vulnerability to large shocks. Empirically, JIT adopters experience higher sales and less volatility while also exhibiting heightened cyclicality and sensitivity to natural disasters. I explain these facts in a structurally estimated general equilibrium model where firms can adopt JIT. Relative to a no-JIT economy, the estimated model implies a 1.3% increase in firm value. At the same time, an unanticipated shock results in a roughly 15% deeper output contraction. This occurs because firms "stock out" or hoard materials.

Empirical evidence suggests that recessions have long-run effects on the economy's productive capacity. Recent literature embeds endogenous growth mechanisms within business cycle models to account for these "scarring" effects. The optimal conduct of monetary policy in these settings, however, remains largely unexplored. This paper augments the standard sticky-price New Keynesian (NK) to allow for endogenous dynamics in aggregate productivity. The model has a representation similar to the two-equation NK model, with an additional condition linking productivity growth to current and expected future output gaps. Absent state contingency in the subsidies that correct the externalities associated with productivity growth, optimal monetary policy sets inflation above target whenever the subsidies fall short of the externalities. In the recovery from a spell at the ZLB, the optimal discretionary policy sets inflation temporarily above target, helping mitigate the long-run damage. Following a cost-push shock that creates inflationary pressure, the central bank tolerates a larger rise in inflation than in a model with exogenous productivity. The gains from commitment include the central bank's ability to make credible promises about future output gaps in a way that allows it to manipulate current productivity growth.

This paper studies the impact of unanticipated monetary policy news around FOMC announcements on secondary market corporate loan spreads. I find that the reaction of loan spreads to monetary policy news is weaker than that of bond spreads: following an unanticipated monetary policy tightening (easing) shock, loan spreads do not increase (decrease) as much as bond spreads do. Decomposition of the spreads into compensations for expected defaults and risk premiums shows that differential reactions of loan and bond risk premiums are the main driver of the differential spread reactions. This paper further finds that the weaker loan spread reactions to monetary policy shocks are more pronounced for riskier loans. Lastly, reactions of primary market loan spreads to monetary policy shocks are also muted. These findings highlight heterogeneous impacts of monetary policy across different types of corporate credit markets, possibly reflecting heterogeneous investor demand responses to monetary policy in those markets.

This paper studies an import model that incorporates both static crosscountry interdependence and dynamic dependence in firm-level decisions. I find that the benefit of sourcing from one country increases as a firm imports from more countries. Furthermore, using a partial identification approach under the revealed preferences assumption, I provide evidence for the sunk costs of importing, which make establishing relationships with new sellers costlier than maintaining existing ones. The coexistence of cross-country interdependence and sunk costs implies that temporary trade policy changes can have long-lasting effects on both the targeted and non-targeted markets through firm-level decisions.

Stablecoins have experienced tremendous growth in the past year, serving as a possible breakthrough innovation in the future of payments. In this paper, we discuss the current use cases and growth opportunities of stablecoins, and we analyze the potential for stablecoins to broadly impact the banking system. The impact of stablecoin adoption on traditional banking and credit provision can vary depending on the sources of inflow and the composition of stablecoin reserves. Among the various scenarios, a two-tiered banking system can both support stablecoin issuance and maintain traditional forms of credit creation. In contrast, a narrow bank approach for digital currencies can lead to disintermediation of traditional banking, but may provide the most stable peg to fiat currencies. Additionally, dollar-pegged stablecoins backed by adequately safe and liquid collateral can potentially serve as a digital safe haven currency during periods of crypto market distress.

This paper investigates how corporate tax changes affect workers’ earnings. We use a dataset of U.S. worker-level W-2 filings matched with corporate tax returns and study the implementation of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD). We find the DPAD tax rate reduction has a substantial effect on the distribution of annual wage earnings within a firm. Earnings of workers at the top of their firm’s earnings distribution rise relative to those at the bottom of the distribution. We estimate a semi-elasticity of average earnings of 1.1 with respect to the DPAD marginal tax rate reduction, while the semi-elasticity of median earnings is notably smaller—0.5. Furthermore, we estimate a semi-elasticity of 1.3 at the 95th percentile of workers’ earnings and 2.7 at the 99th percentile. This trend of larger semi-elasticities at the top of the earnings distribution is especially pronounced for small firms. Looking at overall employment effects, we see no change overall, but the number of employees rises at small firms and declines at large firms. In contrast, we find that capital investment rises for large firms, suggesting that the DPAD also resulted in domestic capitallabor substitution for large corporations. Our paper has significant implications for assessing the progressivity of the U.S. tax code and for analyzing the effect of corporate tax policy changes on the U.S. income distribution.

This paper demonstrates that the measured stock of China's holding of U.S. assets could be much higher than indicated by the U.S. net international investment position data due to unrecorded historical Chinese in ows into an increasingly popular global safe haven asset: U.S. residential real estate. We first use aggregate capital ows data to show that the increase in unrecorded capital in ows in the U.S. balance of payment accounts over the past decade is mainly linked to in ows from China into U.S. housing markets. Then, using a unique web traffic dataset that provides a direct measure of Chinese demand for U.S. housing at the zip code level, we estimate via a difference-in-difference matching framework that house prices in major U.S. cities that are highly exposed to demand from China have on average grown 7 percentage points faster than similar neighborhoods with low exposure over the period 2010-2016. These average excess price growth gaps co-move closely with macro-level measures of U.S. capital in ows from China, and tend to widen following periods of economic stress in China, suggesting that Chinese households view U.S. housing as a safe haven asset.

This paper examines the use of location quotients, a measure of regional business activity relative to the national benchmark, as an indicator of sectoral agglomeration in small cities and towns, and as a measure of industry specialization that might impact the number of new business startups in these places. Using establishment-level data on businesses located in Maine, our findings suggest that the addition of one "hypothetical" establishment in very small towns leads to a dramatic change in the magnitude of the region-industry location quotient. At population sizes of about 4,100 or more people, however, location quotients are reasonably stable. Regression results from an analysis of the relationship between new business activity and regional industry specialization show that the effect of location quotients on business startups switches from "inelastic" to "elastic" at a population size cutoff of about 2,600 residents. Overall, our findings suggest that researchers and practitioners should exercise caution when using location quotients to study small regions.

This paper proposes a "double adverse selection channel" of international transmission. It shows, theoretically and empirically, that financial systems with both global and local banks exhibit double adverse selection in credit allocation across firms. Global (local) banks have a comparative advantage in extracting information on global (local) risk, and this double information asymmetry creates a segmented credit market where each bank lends to the worst firms in terms of the unobserved risk factor. Given a bank funding (e.g., monetary policy) shock, double adverse selection affects firm financing at the extensive and price margins, generating spillover and amplification effects across countries.

This paper provides a brief history of the U.S. financial regulatory perimeter, a legal cordon comprised of "positive" and "negative" restrictions on the conduct of banking organizations. Today's regulatory perimeter faces a wide range of challenges, from disaggregation, to new commercial entrants, to new varieties of charters (and new uses of legacy charters). We situate these challenges in the longer history of American banking, identifying a pattern in debates about the nature, shape, and position of the perimeter: outside-in pressure, inside-out pressure, and reform and expansion. We also observe a shift in this pattern, beginning roughly three decades ago, which gradually made the perimeter broader, more complex, and arguably more permeable. We show this trend graphically in an animation accompanying this paper.

David Hendry has made–and continues to make–pivotal contributions to the econometrics of empirical economic modeling, economic forecasting, econometrics software, substantive empirical economic model design, and economic policy. This paper reviews his contributions by topic, emphasizing the overlaps between different strands in his research and the importance of real-world problems in motivating that research.

Arkansas has been a popular place to study the effects of rate ceilings because of its exceptionally low interest rate ceiling. This paper examines the effects of the Arkansas rate ceiling on credit use by nonprime consumers in Arkansas, who are especially vulnerable to credit rationing because of the low ceiling. We compare the level and composition of consumer debt of nonprime consumers in Arkansas with that of prime Arkansas consumers and also non-prime consumers in the neighboring states. We find that nonprime consumers in Arkansas are less likely to have consumer debt and, conditional on having debt, have slightly lower levels of consumer debt than prime Arkansas consumers and nonprime consumers in neighboring states. Types of credit used by nonprime consumers in Arkansas tend to differ from those of the comparison groups. Notable is much lower use of consumer finance loans, traditionally an important source of credit for higher risk consumers. This finding suggests rate-based rationing of risky consumers. Also notable is lower use of bank credit despite federal preemption of the rate ceiling for banks. This result is consistent with banks’ traditional avoidance of risky lending.

This paper explores an under-studied channel for school finance inequality: property assessment. School districts have historically relied on local tax revenues (typically property taxes) to fund schools, which can generate disparities in funding across districts. Many states passed school finance reforms that give more state funding to poorer districts. These formulas typically discourage school districts from offsetting state funding by reducing local tax rates (“crowd out”). However, many reforms have not adequately addressed another source of inequality: property assessment accuracy and equity. Moreover, state reform can unintentionally subsidize property underassessment. We analyze a state government intervention to address property assessment inequities within and across school districts. We use difference-in-differences and county- and school district-level administrative data to find the intervention boosted assessments by 32 percent. Assessment equity improved substantially and local property revenues temporarily increased by 17 percent. Local fiscal and institutional capacity played a role in assessment inequity pre-reform. Our results suggest that underassessment can compound funding inequality across districts in states that rely on property wealth to fund schools. Therefore, effective state oversight in property assessments is needed to ensure the integrity of funding systems that distribute state funding to districts on the basis of their assessed property wealth.

This paper investigates how bank supervisors’ enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) influence the allocation of mortgage lending across demographic groups underlying a banks’ borrower base. Specifically, we investigate how banks’ mortgage lending to minority borrowers relative to white borrowers changes following the resolution of severe EDOs. We hypothesize that improvements in management control systems imposed by EDOs serve as channels through which EDOs affect a bank’s borrower base generally, and minority lending specifically. We empirically examine how changes in loan policies and internal governance mechanisms specified in EDOs influence banks’ mortgage lending decisions. We find that relative to white borrowers, mortgage lending to minority borrowers significantly increases following the resolution of EDOs, where this positive effect increases with the strictness of bank supervisors and severity of the EDO. Consistent with management controls serving as channels for this change, there is a more pronounced effect on minority lending when an EDO mandates improvements in lending policies and stronger internal governance over lending decisions.

This paper examines whether the measurement of trend inflation can be improved by using wage data in a dynamic factor model of disaggregated prices and wages for the United States. The model features time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility. An estimate of trend inflation is a time-varying distributed lag of prices and wages, where the weight on a series depends on its time-varying volatility, persistence, and comovement with other series. The results show that wages inform estimates of trend inflation. The weight on wages was highest around 1980, drifted down through the 2000s, and returned to its 1980s value by 2022. In addition, inflation in the 2020s appears to have unmoored moderately from the 2 percent range that prevailed for decades, as the role of the persistent component of inflation increased in recent year. However, accounting for wages lowers the model's view of the increase in the volatility of trend inflation.

This paper investigates contagion in financial networks through both debt and collateral markets. We find that the role of collateral is mitigating counterparty exposures and reducing contagion but has a phase transition property. Contagion can change dramatically depending on the amount of collateral relative to the debt exposures. When there is an abundance of collateral (leverage is low), then collateral can fully cover debt exposures, and the network structure does not matter. When there is an adequate amount of collateral (leverage is moderate), then collateral can mitigate counterparty contagion, and having more links in the network reduces contagion, as interlinkages act as a diversifying mechanism. When collateral is not enough (leverage is high) and agents in the network are too interconnected, then the collateral price can plummet to zero and the whole network can collapse. Therefore, we show the importance of the interaction between the level of collateral and interconnectedness across agents. The model also provides the minimum collateral-to-debt ratio (haircut) to attain a robust macroprudential state for a given network structure and aggregate state.

Motivated by cognitive theories verifying that investors have limited capacity to process information, we study the effects of information overload on stock market dynamics. We construct an information overload index using textual analysis tools on daily data from The New York Times since 1885. We structure our empirical analysis around a discrete-time learning model, which links information overload with asset prices and trading volume when investors are attention constrained. We find that our index is associated with lower trading volume and predicts higher market returns for up to 18 months, even after controlling for standard predictors and other news-based measures. Information overload also affects the cross-section of stock returns: Investors require higher risk premia to hold small, high beta, high volatile, and unprofitable stocks. Such findings are consistent with theories emphasizing that information overload increases information and estimation risk and deteriorates investors' decision accuracy amid their limited attention.

In this paper, I show that the decline in household consumption during unemployment spells depends on both liquid and illiquid asset positions. I also provide evidence that unemployment spells predict the withdrawal of illiquid assets, particularly when households have few liquid assets. Motivated by these findings, I embed endogenous unemployment risk in a two-asset heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model. The model is consistent with the above evidence and provides a new propagation mechanism for aggregate shocks due to a flight-to-liquidity that occurs when unemployment risk rises. This mechanism implies that unemployment insurance plays an important role as an automatic stabilizer, particularly when monetary policy is constrained.

This paper studies the patterns of internal liquidity management and their effect on bank lending, using a novel branch-level dataset of Brazilian banks. Our results suggest that internal liquidity management increases during times of financial stress. Privately owned banks are most affected by a liquidity shock, and increase the level of internal funding to maintain their branch lending, while their government-owned competitors react strategically. Private and government banks increase the funding of branches in concentrated and riskier areas. This funding translates into more lending, as the sensitivity of lending to internal funding remains high after the liquidity shock. Altogether, this paper provides branch-level evidence of the way that banks ration internal liquidity, both in normal times and in times of stress, and the effect this has on bank lending.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented shift of consumption from services to goods. We study this demand reallocation in a multi-sector model featuring sticky prices, input-output linkages, and labor reallocation costs. Reallocation costs hamper the increase in the supply of goods, causing inflationary pressures. These pressures are amplified by the fact that goods prices are more flexible than services prices. We estimate the model allowing for demand reallocation, sectoral productivity, and aggregate labor supply shocks. The demand reallocation shock explains a large portion of the rise in U.S. inflation in the aftermath of the pandemic.

We assess the quantitative relevance of expectations-driven sovereign debt crises, focusing on the Southern European crisis of the early 2010’s and the Argentine default of 2001. The source of multiplicity is the one in Calvo (1988). Key for multiplicity is an output process featuring long periods of either high growth or stagnation that we estimate using data for those countries. We find that expectations-driven debt crises are quantitatively relevant but state dependent, as they only occur during stagnations. Expectations are a major driver explaining default rates and credit spread differences between Spain and Argentina.

We provide evidence for a causal link between the US economy and the global financial cycle. Using intraday data, we show that US macroeconomic news releases have large and significant effects on global risky asset prices. Stock price indexes of 27 countries, the VIX, and commodity prices all jump instantaneously upon news releases. The responses of stock indexes co-move across countries and are large - often comparable in size to the response of the S&P 500. Further, US macroeconomic news explains on average 23 percent of the quarterly variation in foreign stock markets. The joint behavior of stock prices, bond yields, and risk premia suggests that systematic US monetary policy reactions to news do not drive the estimated effects. Instead, the evidence points to a direct effect on investor’ risk-taking capacity. Our findings show that a byproduct of the United States' central position in the global financial system is that news about its business cycle has large effects on global financial conditions.

Detractors have warned that Private Equity (PE) funds tend to over-lever their portfolio companies because of an option-like payoff, building up default risk and debt overhang. This paper argues PE-ownership leads to substantially higher levels of optimal (value-maximizing) leverage, by reducing the expected cost of financial distress. Using data from a large sample of PE buyouts, I estimate a dynamic trade-off model where leverage is chosen by the PE investor. The model is able to explain both the level and change in leverage documented empirically following buyouts. The increase in optimal leverage is driven primarily by a reduction in the portfolio company's asset volatility and, to a lesser extent, an increase in asset return. Counterfactual analysis shows significant loss in firmvalue if PE sub-optimally chose lower leverage. Consistent with lower asset volatility, additional tests show PE-backed firms experience lower volatility of sales and receive greater equity injections for distress resolution, compared to non PE-backed firms. Overall, my findings broaden our understanding of factors that drive buyout leverage.

We review the "climate action plans" of Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) and the progress they are making toward achieving them. G-SIBs have identified the drivers of climate risk and their transmission channels to credit and other risks. Additionally, some have started to measure and model these risks. While most GSIBs have committed to fully offsetting their emissions by mid-century, they are only beginning to measure financed emissions resulting from their loans and investments, which comprise the vast majority of their emissions. G-SIBs have also committed to increase green finance and have started to do so. All told, despite some progress by large global banks to address climate change considerations, much work lies ahead to properly measure and disclose climate-related risks, and to better align financing activities with their net-zero targets.

Using firm-level data, this paper shows that the Portuguese financial crisis was a period of intensified productivity-enhancing reallocation. Aggregate productivity gains, both in manufacturing and services, came from relatively higher contributions of entering and exiting firms and from reallocation of resources between surviving firms. At the microlevel, the crisis reduced the probability of survival for high- and low-productivity firms, but it hit low-productivity firms disproportionately harder. We also found important heterogeneous effects across economic sectors regarding input reallocation that underline the importance of using data for the entire economy whenever similar studies are conducted.

This paper documents that an appreciation of the U.S. dollar is associated with a reduction in the supply of commercial and industrial loans by U.S. banks. An increase in the broad dollar index by 2.5 points (one standard deviation) reduces U.S. banks' corporate loan originations by 10 percent. This decline is driven by a reduction in the demand for loans on the secondary market where prices fall and liquidity worsens when the dollar appreciates, with stronger effects for riskier loans. Today, the main buyers of U.S. corporate loans---and, hence, suppliers of funding for these loans---are institutional investors, in particular mutual funds, which experience outflows when the dollar appreciates. A shift of traditional financial intermediation to these relatively unregulated entities, which are more sensitive to global developments, has led to the emergence of this new channel through which the dollar affects the U.S. economy, which we term the secondary market channel.

This paper uses public data disclosed in eight bank holding companies' "living wills", or Resolution Plans, to examine and test how operational resilience can contribute to financial system stability. The banks, each subject to the Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC) supervisory program, interact in a complex network of Financial Market Utilities (FMUs). By employing complementary public data on operational exposures and benchmarks for operational disruption developed in existing research, we construct plausible estimates of how various disruption events would impact the financial system. This paper provides a tangible, reproducible example of how concepts discussed in recent regulatory agency guidance on operational resilience can be employed for risk analysis and scenario testing. It also demonstrates how network mapping can aid in this type of analysis. The estimates generated here indicate that disruptions stemming from tail-end operational risk events extend beyond absolute financial losses, and are likely to be large enough to pose a systemic risk to the financial system.

This paper outlines a model of demand segmentation in the federal funds market with two types of borrowers - the "interest on reserves (IOR) arbitrage'' type and the "regulatory'' type - which have different reservation prices and cannot always be separated. When fed funds trade above IOR, the "regulatory" type is revealed and consequently pays an interest rate closer to its real reservation price, pushing the fed funds rate further up. When fed funds trade below IOR, a decrease in the fed funds rate encourages entry in the market for IOR arbitrage purposes thus counteracting the downward pressure on the fed funds rate. We use probit regression models and daily data for the period April 2018 to February 2020 to provide empirical support for this model. We find the following: 1) When fed funds trade above IOR, there is, on average, a 10 percentage points increase in the probability that the fed funds rate increases the following period. Furthermore, analysis using confidential bank-level data shows that this increase in the probability is higher for banks that report their liquidity profile daily and that were present all trading days during this period. 2) When the fed funds trade below IOR, the probability of a decrease in the fed funds rate decreases with the widening of the spread between the fed funds rate and IOR.

The stringency of bank liquidity and capital requirements should depend on their social costs and benefits. This paper investigates their welfare effects and quantifies their welfare costs using sufficient statistics. The special role of banks as liquidity providers is embedded in an otherwise standard general equilibrium growth model. Capital and liquidity requirements mitigate moral hazard from deposit insurance, which, if unchecked, can lead to excessive credit and liquidity risk at banks. However, these regulations are also costly because they reduce the ability of banks to create net liquidity and can distort investment. Equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength of demand for liquidity, yielding two simple sufficient statistics that express the welfare cost of each requirement as a function of observable variables only. Based on U.S. data, the welfare cost of a 10 percent liquidity requirement is equivalent to a permanent loss in consumption of about 0.02%, a modest impact. Even using a conservative estimate, the cost of a similarly-sized increase in the capital requirement is roughly ten times as large. Even so, optimal policy relies on both requirements, as the financial stability benefits of capital requirements are found to be broader.

This paper provides an overview of the literature examining how the introduction of a CBDC would affect the banking sector, financial stability, and the implementation and transmission of monetary policy in a developed economy such as the United States. A CBDC has the potential to improve welfare by reducing financial frictions in deposit markets, by boosting financial inclusion, and by improving the transmission of monetary policy. However, a CBDC also entails noteworthy risks, including the possibility of bank disintermediation and associated contraction in bank credit, as well as potential adverse effects on financial stability. A CBDC also raise important questions regarding monetary policy implementation and the footprint of central banks in the financial system. Ultimately, the effects of a CBDC depend critically on its design features, particularly remuneration.

As of October 2022, the retired share of the U.S. population was nearly 1½ percentage points above its pre-pandemic level (after adjusting for updated population controls to the Current Population Survey), accounting for nearly all of the shortfall in the labor force participation rate. In this paper, we analyze the pandemic-era rise in retirements using a model that accounts for pre-pandemic trends in retirement, the cyclicality of retirement, and other factors. We show that: more than half of the increase in the retired share are “excess retirements” that would likely not have occurred in the absence of the pandemic; excess retirements have been concentrated among cohorts age 65 and older at the start of the pandemic; excess retirements have been largest among the college-educated and whites; and excess retirements reflect in part that worker transitions from the labor force to retirement remain elevated. We also show that failing to account for updated population controls to the Current Population Survey leads to an underestimate of the rise in the retired share over the last few years. We use a cohort-based framework to argue that looking forward, unless the pandemic has permanently affected retirement behavior, excess retirements should eventually fade as those who retired early during the pandemic reach ages when they would have normally retired. Even as excess retirements fade, the retired share will remain well above its pre-pandemic level, reflecting population aging.

Does going public affect the amount and type of corporate tax planning? Using a panel of U.S. corporate tax return data from 1994 to 2018, we show that IPO completion is associated with the implementation of multinational income shifting strategies central to the current international tax policy debate. Specifically, firms (i) expand their foreign tax haven presence, (ii) enter into cross-border agreements that accompany intangible asset transfers to foreign subsidiaries, and (iii) increase their level of foreign related-party payments around the time that they go public. The effects are strongest among firms that switch to more sophisticated tax advisors in the years preceding the IPO. In contrast, we observe little domestic tax planning because large stock option deductions, which increase as a consequence of the IPO, provide large domestic tax shields. The paper contributes to the nascent literature studying IPOs by documenting the types and timing of specific tax strategies that enable public firms to remain lightly taxed in the post-IPO period. Furthermore, the findings imply that U.S. tax policies targeted at early-stage innovative firms are critical for retaining domestically developed IP – and the income earned on such assets – for the U.S. tax base.

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of investment strategies that screen companies based on environmental criteria to hedge climate change risk because physical risks have not yet fully materialized and policies to combat climate change are usually widely anticipated. This paper sidesteps these limitations by analyzing the stock market response to plausibly exogenous changes in expectations about the level of a carbon tax in Germany. The risk-adjusted return on two sustainable investment approaches---screening companies based on environmental scores and on firms' carbon footprint---around the carbon tax news reveals that firms with a high environmental score did not perform any better than those with a low environmental score. In contrast, the stock price of firms with low carbon emissions increased in value relative to those with a high carbon footprint. Carbon intensity explains the cross-sectional reaction to the carbon tax news because it predicts revisions in expected profitability.