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A critical examination of three recent papers dealing with behavioral versus cognitive interpretations of behavior therapy. Some widely held misconceptions about the behavioristic outlook are corrected, and a strong plea made for permitting the canons of science, rather than personal conviction and predilection, to judge the merits of rival hypotheses. Attention is also called to the fact that the differences between the cognitive and behavioristic perspectives have been exaggerated and that they are largely reflections of different interests in the phenomena being studied.

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the papers by Bransford and Johnson and Clark, Carpenter, and Just on language and cognition. Clark, Carpenter, and Just (CC&J) assumed that an important function of language is to communicate perceptual experience. The key working assumption is that in the structure of English, the way in which alternative interpretations of perceptual experience are encoded can be found. While the locus of the structure of English is not specified, this assumption entails an intuitive examination of the presuppositions of English with reference to perceptual events. The constraints imposed by the latter and how they are realized in the coding system follow a linguistic analysis, rather than vice versa. If it is the constraints of one perceiving objects and relations in Euclidian space that determine the semantic interpretation or coding, then examining the linguistic coding rather than the perceptual one would seem to put the cart before the horse.

The field of computing has grown considerably in recent years and the tasks performed on computers encompass more and more variety in scientific, industrial and business applications. The programming task itself must be defined in very broad terms if one is to cover all the activities performed in all areas where computers are used today.In his paper, Mr. Jacobs defines the programming task in very broad terms. He recognizes that current tests for personnel selection are not satisfactory and suggests that certain tests of cognitive capabilities might prove better instruments for recognizing potential programming skills. However, the predictor variables did not correlate significantly with the criterion variable, success in programming training, and his hypotheses were not supported.

Publisher Summary This chapter presents arguments for a developmental approach for childhood socialization. The contributions of Richard Walters have brought one to the point from which such studies can begin. His work will remain as a superb example of the process-oriented research that is needed to give some idea to understand the role played by imitation in childhood socialization. The problems of first imitations, the production of generalized imitation, and the role of imitation in the socialization of the child have not fully been understood. For this purpose, one needs sophisticated analyses of the modeling problem focusing on a wide variety of temperamental and cognitive vicissitudes as these interact with the contingencies of exposure to models in determining children's tendencies to imitate. Such research will facilitate accounting for some of the problems, for example, the emergence of first imitations), but it should also increase the practical usefulness of the knowledge concerning imitation with respect to child rearing, childhood education, and psychotherapy with children. The case to be made for developmental research on imitation is not a theoretical issue but a question of values.

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses social and informational aspects to cognitive and representational development. On any occasion, performance is a selection from a repertoire of behaviors. Age and experience can expand or constrict the repertoire, although expansion is the usual case during childhood. Age and experience also alter the sense of the right behavior for the right occasion. A good match can be difficult to achieve if it calls for an unknown rule or for juggling more rules and conditions than an individual can manage. A good match can also be difficult to achieve when some particular behaviors are given the status of rituals; they can be used indiscriminately, without regard for the particular occasion, or they can be called right and wrong in a highly restrictive way. In a Brunswickian sense, the match is made difficult in one case by a very high probability that the behavior selected can be the same for every occasion and, in the other case, by a very low probability that performance can be exactly on target.

Investigation of a series of 150 obstetric patients, the majority undergoing caesarean section, showed the expected figure of 2% with factual recall. There was, however, a 17·3% occurrence of unpleasant recall—associated in 10 cases (6·6% of the total) with recall of pain. There was a negative correlation between the giving of a narcotic within six hours of the operation and the occurrence of unpleasant recall. Several other aetiological factors—age, parity, preoperative emotional tension, ventilation, nitrous oxide wash-out with oxygen, and nitrous oxide concentration—were investigated and no relation was found between them and unpleasant recall. It is suggested, therefore, that premedication still has an important function in light anaesthesia, using muscle relaxants, to prevent any form of unpleasant operative awareness.

The use of diazepam for premedication before elective caesarean section increased the incidence of unpleasant recall postoperatively, compared with atropine in a previous study. This finding suggests that diazepam is unsuitable for this type of anaesthesia.

A double-blind trial using folic acid 15 mg. daily and identical placebo was carried out in 51 epileptic patients having a serum folate level below 3·6 ng./ml. Treatment was for a minimum of six months and in 41 patients was for more than one year. There were no significant changes in the frequency of seizures, behaviour, and personality, or in a number of cognitive functions.

It is widely recognized that the diagnosis of hysteria is infrequently applied to male patients and very commonly to female ones. A paper by Robins et al. 1 suggests that hysteria in men is extremely rare, if indeed it occurs at all, and there is general agreement that an initial diagnosis of hysteria in males is somewhat of a clinical anomaly. 2 It should be noted that grave hysterical symptoms (e.g., conversion reactions, dissociative phenomena) have been observed in male patients, but these individuals tend not to manifest the type of cognitive and personality organization that is characteristic of the hysterical individual. 3 It is especially in regard to the hysterical personality, character, or "style" that the male patient is a rarity, and it is in this sense that the word hysteria will be used in the present paper. In explaining the preponderance of female hysterics, psychoanalytic theorists have focused on differences in preoedipal and oedipal developmental tasks that the two sexes must master. 4 It is my opinion, however, that theories of libidinal development offer only a partial explanation of the sex difference in hysteria and that social and cultural factors play a major role. Although the importance of such extrapsychic factors has not been fully appreciated, neither have these factors been entirely ignored. Marmor, 5 for example, has noted that the traits characteristic of the hysterical personality are feminine ones and are thus more acceptable in women than in men. Chodoff and Lyons 3 have commented that the hysterical personality "is a picture of women in the words of men and … what the description sounds like amounts to a caricature of femininity!" But beyond noting that the concept of hysteria involves a description of traditionally feminine qualities, the theoretical and diagnostic significance of this observation has not been explored. The plan of the present paper is first to review the diagnostic indications and behavioral characteristics of this patient group in order to outline with some specificity the criteria that will lead to a diagnosis of hysterical personality. Next it will be demonstrated how a girl's immediate social environment puts enormous pressure on her to develop a style of cognition and personality that will lend itself to this diagnosis on the clinical test battery or diagnostic interview. In this regard, it will be noted how the ego-constricting effects of a feminine socialization process may too readily be confused with the effects of massive repression. Finally, certain conceptual tangles that have resulted from the overlap between the hysterical character and the feminine character will be outlined.

This paper describes some cases of interand intra-informant variability which cannot be explained in terms of social and contextual factors, and which do not seem to require probabilistic models to account for them. Analysis of several Zinacanteco speech taxonomies suggests that what are called variant responses are often only incomplete responses, and that if the cognitive system is represented as a taxonomy, then it is a taxonomy which is made up of a number of partial taxonomies, each of which is produced by a different informant or group of informants or by the same informant on different occasions. A frequently used method of 'controlled eliciting' is shown to be inherently incapable of guaranteeing the elicitation of complete taxonomies in every interview. For this reason, it is urged that before constructing a model of a cognitive system it is first necessary to establish what is 'real' cognitive variation by recognizing and eliminating that variation which results from methodological indeterminacy. (Ethnoscience, cognition, variability, methodology, controlled eliciting, folk taxonomy, speech, Maya languages.) Ethnoscientists have assumed that the members of each community have a common system for perceiving and organizing phenomena in their world of experience. They have viewed their task as one of discovering the principles according to which people order their experience (Goodenough I957). The early studies in ethnoscience did not mention informant variability. Since the object of the investigation was to elicit a taxonomy which would be representative of the community, it was essential that the responses elicited remain stable, not only from informant to informant, but also from interview to interview with the same informant (Metzger & Williams I966). Yet in practice [i] The fieldwork for this paper was supported by NIMH Predoctoral fellowship MH20,345 and was carried out under the sponsorship of Professor Evon Z. Vogt, director of the Harvard Chiapas Project, which provided much of the logistical support for my research. I gratefully acknowledge the support of these institutions and Professor Vogt's interest and encouragement. I owe a great debt to Professor Duane G. Metzger, who first introduced me to the method of controlled eliciting during the summer of I964. I would also like to thank Dell Hymes and Joan Rubin for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

This paper describes an approach to the problem of how particular pre-existing systems of cognitive structures in individuals could be brought to bear on the design and evaluation of an instructional unit. The paper takes the understanding and active use of spatial prepositions as an example of a general instructional goal, and (1) analyzes cognitive systems involved in different uses of prepositions, introducing natural units called “components”; (2) discusses in detail how pre-existing sensorymotor and conceptual knowledge is related to the instructional situation in order to build the desired components naturally; and (3) cites existing psychological research illustrating how research can be used to discover the types of components to look for in individuals.

This paper describes an attempt to increase the amount of self-directed, self-relevant learning in a senior-level course in organizational psychology. In most colleges, learning outcomes from most courses, including those in psychology, stress cognitive over personal learning, especially over personal learning related to the student's future identity and career.' Furthermore, the learning process is usually one in which the teacher's needs and goals are dominant. Our major goal in this course was to change both the process and the content of student learning in order to promote the personal growth and self-understanding of the student. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the process and outcomes of this experiment. Then we would like to share with the reader some of the

of two kinds of role-taking (empathy)-(a) an intuitional kind associated with Rorschachian inner creation (movement responsivity ) , with feeling, and with experience in its Eslebnis sense, and (b) an injere~ziial kind associated with Rorschachian rationality (form responsivity), with prediction, and with experience in its Erfahrung sense (Stark, 1968a), and (3) suggested that "drama" clusters with the former, i.e., with intuitional role-taking, inner creation, feeling, and Erlebnzs (Stark, 1968b). In this paper, I should like to begin to suggest the same about Ferdinand Toennies' concept of Gemeinschaft, i.e., that it too clusters with intuitional roletaking, inner creation, feeling, and Erlebnis (and Gesellschaft with inferential role-taking, rationality, prediction, and Erfahrung). I say "begin" because the suggestion will be presented in three parts, each a separate paper. The firsr (this one) deals with what David Bakan (1956, 1967) means by "a philosophy of epistemological loneliness." Specifically, it relates his interpretation of British Empiricism to Toennies' Gemeinschaft-Gerellrchaft distinction--or more precisely, it interprets his interpretation in terms of Toennies' distinction. The second part deals with Bakan's Dr~ality of Hz(man Existence (1966) treating it as a variation on Toennies' theme. The third and last part deals with Toennies' Community and Society (Gemeinschaft r~nd Gesellschaft), relating it to earlier macerials in the series. Although in these three papers I shall be referring only to Gemeinschaft, what I say about it is intended to apply as well to the concepts that John McKinney and Charles Loornis (Toennies, 1963) relate to Gemeinschaft-Emile Durkheim's "mechanical sol,darity," Charles Horton Cooley's "primary group," Robert Redfield's "folk society," Howard Becker's "sacred societies" ("folk" and "prescribed"), Pitirim Sorokin's "familistic relationship," Max Weber's "?uertsational," "affektz~ell," and "traditional" orientations, and Talcott Parsons' pattern

Kilpatrick describes the curriculum program of the School Mathematics Study Group and its philosophy. Mathematical structure, rather than psychological theory, has played the instrumental role in shaping the program. An interesting issue is joined, essentially the same issue provoked by the Karplus paper, i.e., the issue of spontaneous aevelopment in children's thinking versus acceleration of this development through formal instruction and altering the child's experience. The compatibility of certain features of the SMSG curriculum with the results of Piaget's studies are enumerated. The paper concludes with a discussion of the National Longitudinal Study of Mathematical Abilities.

Synesthesia is defined in this paper as a sensory phenomenon in which a stimulus in one sense mode is interpreted in terms appropriate to some other sense mode. The paper deals explicitly with auditory-visual synesthesia or chromesthesia. The model proposes two cognitive spaces for the two sense modes, differing from each other only in terms of what is called a modal axis. Two separate sub-populations of individuals are hypothesized, one made up of persons who can collapse their cognitive space along the modal axis. These people are assumed to be those who regularly experience synesthesia. Persons who do not regularly experience synesthesia axe assumed either (a) to be unable to collapse their cognitive space, or (b) to do so in a different way. Subjeats in the study rated colors and adjectives as to their appropriate- ness in describing musical selections. Estimates of color and adjective spaces were computed by cluster analyses based upon the ratings. The color space closely resembled the three-dimensional color solid, and fit well with the adjective space. Subsamples selected as extreme groups on the basis of synesthesia experience showed identical adjective spaces but different color spaces, as would be predicted from the model.

I am perhaps being bold, not to say foolish, to undertake tq speak to the topic of this paper. My reasons for consenting to do so spring from my own need to explore why, after seventy-five years of research and investigation, there has not emerged a coherent construct within which we can examine reading. Two aphorisms point up my dilemma. "Experience keeps a dear school but fools will learn in no other". (Benjamin Franklin) Yet, on the other hand, as an old Welsh proverb states, "Experience is the fool's best teacher; the wise do not need it". This paper, then, will attempt first to suggest why this failure has occurred, and then will indicate some points of departure which may be productive for the gradual evolution of theories. More questions will be posed than answers given, but it was Einstein who reminded us that the asking of the right questions may lead to greater knowledge than the discovery of scientific facts. Yet again, I must counteract this with another adage "The greater fool may ask more than the wisest man can answer". The following topics will be discussed briefly in the remainder of this paper: the reasons for the failure to evolve theories, model making in reading, some questions concerning the assimilation of meaning, and triad of sources for a reading model.

This paper deals briefly with a few clinical observations made in the course of studies of changes in subjective experience reported by young patients in the early stages of schizophrenia. These studies aimed at delineating the early schizophrenic clinical picture in as specific a manner as possible with a view to later experimental validation, and the clinical findings concerning a group of forty young schizophrenics have been reported elsewhere (Chapman, 1966). The observations on which this paper is based were obtained by the same method of examination and interview technique as previously reported, the observer deliberately identifying with the patient, adopting his particular style of communication and encouraging him in the direct projection of his experiences. Thus these observations have been taken out of a matrix of abnormalities in cognitive function found in schizophrenic patients, and have to do chiefly with their visual imagery and motility. Before proceeding to present and discuss these observations it may be worth while to provide a background against which to view them, by referring first to what we know of normal imagery, and second to the breakdown in perception and cognition found in the patients from whom these observations were derived.

A retrospective clinical and statistical evaluation of the development of a ‘therapeutic milieu’ with a new concept is made. The effectiveness of this milieu for fifty hospitalized adolescents (thirty boys and twenty girls) in the Adolescent Service of Fairlawn Center is studied and reported. The new concept, defined as introduction of ‘normality as average’ standards and as prearranged expectations, have been incorporated into the structural and living system of the adolescent's life. This concept has been introduced as a principle governing the expectations of the therapeutic milieu. It is suggested that ‘normality as average’ expectations in the therapeutic milieu protects the already prevailing normalized culture of the ward; furthermore, it challenges the adolescent who denies the presence of conflicts. More significantly, ‘normality as average’ expectation reinforces the process of developmental ‘socialization’ which is so necessary for hospitalized adolescents. Five important components required for the stability of a therapeutic milieu for adolescents are categorically discussed. Emphasis has been laid on the staff-patient-staff communication and intradisciplinary communication to prevent the pathological parental attitudes from becoming the anatomy of the attitudes of the staff. It is suggested that equally distributed authority be delegated to all staff dealing with adolescent behaviour in the milieu. The paper reviewed a two-year retrospective study of the conditions of all patients at discharge. The effectiveness of a ‘normality as average’ expectations in the milieu has been correlated with a gradual and progressive decline in the frequency and the intensity of daily major vandalism. This paper focuses on the significance of the development of the cognitive process thinking in adolescence. The effect of this thinking of the adolescent and the cognitive approach in the milieu on the patient's syntaxic judgment is emphasized. Such a capability is viewed as being challenging to him, and is used as an avenue of communication to his behavioural confession and his emotional denial.

This paper is the outcome of fieldwork carried out in Arnhem Land during 1968.After a brief introduction to Piaget's theory of the development of causal thinking, the manifestations of pre-causality are described. Using a standard questionnaire developed by Canadian workers, the author has examined in English 21 transitional Aboriginal children, aged from 11 to 12 years, with regard to their concepts of the dream process, the nature of life, the origin of night and the movement of clouds. Criteria for the rating of the level of concept development are described and the performance of the children has been scored accordingly. This is compared with norms for Canadian children. Important and markedly significant differences emerge, particularly in concepts of the nature of life and the origin of night. To eliminate the possibility of language bias, a number of the children were examined in the vernacular. Their performances did not change significantly.Possible reasons for the marked differences between Aboriginal and western children are discussed. The evidence suggests that a relative lack of verbal and material stimulation in critical pre-school years is the most significant factor. The paper ends with a consideration of the ethnocentrism implicit in studies of this nature, and examples are given of the complex modes of thinking found in adult Aborigines.

This paper represents a further attempt at assessing the functional significance of non-intellectual factors in learning in a college classroom sirnation. Specifically, the intent of this paper is to assess the relative differences in the long-term effects of dogmatism and academic aptitude on the retention of materials in a single college course in particular, and on all college performance in general. The construct of dogmatism, introduced and defined by Rokeach (1954, 1960), provides the general framework for this research. Our concern is with the closed cognitive suucrure of dogmatic persons, and the concomitant of such closedness-resistance to change of systems of beliefs. In the first attempt to demonstrate the relationship between dogmatism and learning, Ehrlich ( 1961 ) tested and confirmed two interrelated hypotheses: (a ) dogmatism was found to be inversely related to the degree of learning in an introductory sociology course; and (b) the relationship between dogmatism and learning was independent of academic aptitude. As was expected, low dogmatic Ss entered the sociology classroom with a higher level of learning, learned more as a result of classroom exposure, and retained this information to a significantly greater degree than the more dogmatic Ss. The data presented here represent a re-study of the same population after a time lapse of five years, in contrast to the first study in which the time lapse was 5 to 6 months. Such a time span permits not only a re-examination of the original findings, but also an examination of Ss' overaU college grades, i.e., their cumulative point-hour ratio (CPH). METHOD Subjects.-The original sample consisted of 100 students enrolled in four introductory sociology sections, who were present for both the first and second administration of the test battery, and for whom Ohio State Psychological Examination (OSPE) scores were available from the university. For the final administration, by mail, only 90 of the original 100 respondents could be contacted; and from these 65 completed returns (72%) were received? P~ocedwe.-During the first week of the academic quarter Ss were given Rokeach's dogmatism scale and a 40 item true-false test of sociological knowl'The overlap in returns bemeern this follow-up and the earlier one (~hrlich, 1961) was minimal and did not allow fo: a simultaneous analysis of all four time periods. For only 41% of the original sample were questionnaires available for all rime periods, and these Ss were biased sinnificantlv in the direction of being lowest on doemacism and

This paper discusses ail exploration of the large literature of develop mental change over the age range from five to seven years. The analysis was set in motion by some findings of change in children's learning in this age range (White, 1966a) and its ultimate aim is to try to understand the mechanisms of children's learning in a broad context . . . that is, in the context of the cognitive and developmental mechanisms which regulate what the child can absorb from his experience. I have been led by the analysis into some newer research lines, an attempt to survey the co incidence of a number of behavior changes in the same child (Super and White, 1970), and some studies of children's ability to order series of pictures into a representation of a temporal sequence (White and Evans, 1970), but I will speak here primarily about the literature analysis. One good justification for a literature review in this age range is the situation created by the sheer diversity and quantity of reported research findings. That diversity makes it impossible for any research program to explore all the signs of change at this time, and it has led to some segrega tion among channels of facts and hypotheses dealing with the age range. In the present paper, continuing several previous efforts (White, 1965, 1966b, 1968), I hope to explore further the literature of change. To a psychologist, what is most interesting about this age range is its association with the emergence in some strength of adult-like powers of reasoning, symbolization, or operational thought. Historically, psycholo gists have sustained a largely-frustrated preoccupation with the analysis of man's higher faculties. We have had diverse theories about them. We have had a psychometry of intelligence. We have had a polyglot research literature on reasoning, abstraction, concept formation, and symbolism. And yet it all does not seem to have jelled into a satisfying and cohesive picture. Now we find, again and again in the literature, the conclusion that a higher level of thought is emergent in the seven year old, that con clusion arising out of a hundred-odd particularities of behavior change. The theoretical possibilities offered by this have already been signifi cantly capitalized upon by developmental theorists. We owe many of our

This paper reviews the implications of a number of experimental results for a test between two different types of models of perceptual processing: models that assume a limitation of perceptual capacity vs models that postulate independent, parallel perceptual channels. The results of recent “detection” experiments (e.g., Estes & Taylor, 1966) have been consistent with the limited-capacity model developed by Rumelhart (1970) . The same results, however, are predicted by the “ICC” independent-parallel-channels model, an extension of work by Eriksen and Spencer (1969) developed in the present paper. This model emphasizes the interaction of two factors: decisional properties of the detection task, plus perceptual confusion phenomena known to occur under tachistoscopic conditions. Two experiments relevant to a test between the ICC and Rumelhart conceptions are reported. Experiment I involved a “time-sharing” paradigm that varied the demands of two detection tasks performed within a single trial. Experiment II involved the elimination of certain perceptual confusion phenomena. The results of Expts I and II appeared consistent with the ICC model but inconsistent with the Rumelhart model. After consideration of alternative limited-capacity models, it was concluded that: (1) a decision-confusion interaction is a necessary component of information-processing models, and that (2) the ICC independent-parallel-channels model is sufficient to account for the broad spectrum of experimental results reviewed.

The purpose of this paper is to develop further the rationale for Fiedler's prediction that a task-oriented (low LPC) leader will tend to be more effective where the situation is either very favorable or very unfavorable for the leader to exert influence and that a relations-oriented (high LPC) leader will tend to be more effective in situations intermediate in favorability. Specifically, this paper will attempt to clarify what the least preferred co-worker (LPC) score actually measures and will try to show how the behavior patterns of the two types of leaders differ.

THE question of the cognitive status of ethical utterances cannot be settled without a discussion of the nature of cognitive utterance in general. For this reason the similarities and differences between statements expressing scientific propositions and statements expressing moral judgements need to be explored. This, in part, is the concern of my paper. I shall conclude that the similarities are substantial enough to justify us in regarding moral utterances as cognitive. At the same time, the concluding section of the paper will show that, in virtue of possessing some features of its own, moral inquiry cannot be fully assimilated to the procedures of natural sciences.

James says the history of philosophy is largely the history of a certain clash of temperaments. Boring suspects that a methodological difference he finds among psychologists stems from temperamental differences—but he leaves such differences largely “unreduced.” Murphy speaks of the “basic temperamental or emotional incompatibility of the promachine and antimachine theorists.” Following their lead, the present paper asks whether anything would be different about the history of Western thought, including the theorizing of contemporary scholars and scientists, if nobody to this moment had produced the equivalent of a Rorschach movement response. The paper's answer involves (1) suggesting differences between movement and all other Rorschach response dimensions, (2) illustrating the significance of these suggested differences, (3) applying the foregoing to theorizing in scientific psychology, and (4) suggesting commonality among the intellectual controversies of ancient and contemporary thinkers.

This paper explores the the justificatory status of etestimony, the electronic transmission of testimony through such electronic media as e-mail, the web, instant messaging, and file-sharing. I argue that e-testimony introduces complexities in justification and cognitive management generally which should be of special interest to epistemologists and cognitive scientists. In contrast to ordinary non-technology mediated testimony, e-testimony is an impoverished stimulus. Users have to assess the epistemic and non-epistemic risks of accessing e-testimony with very little supporting information. This raises the cognitive overhead of such judgments. The paper explores mechanisms for reducing this cognitive overhead and more effectively managing e-testimony, including automated filtering and automated censorship of the incoming e-testimony stream. It is argued that such solutions may not reduce cognitive load, since epistemic responsibility still resides with the individual recipient of e-testimony.

Much of the literature on learning disabilities which has dealt with the child's perception of space has seemed to view problems in spatial perception as primarily lack of accuracy or veridicality, e.g., poor organization or distortion of assumed spatial “givens.” This paper examines other factors which are important in the child's spatial functioning, and which can be helpful in understanding and remediating problems in the learning problem child. Specifically, this paper outlines a distinction between topological versus Euclidean-geometric conceptions of space, action-function space in contrast to perceptual space, and impersonal space in contrast to interpersonal space.

This paper examines the character traits of the hysterical personality and raises the question: Are these traits distinguishable from so-called normal “traits” feminine, and if not, how can this be understood? The paper presents a brief historical review of hysteria and describes the emergence of traits commonly considered hysterical. The conclusion is that there is not a clear distinction between “hysterical” traits and those traits often considered “feminine,” and this is discussed in view of past understanding and in light of recent contributions from psychoanalysts, other scientific disciplines, and the women's movement.

Stmzmary.-This paper reports an analysis of descriptions of children with IQs of 155 or better. It is suggested that these children be distinguished from gifted children by the :abel exceptionally gifred. The paper reports some important cognitive differences between the two groups as well as the high rare of early parental loss among historically famous highly intelligent persons. This finding is discussed in the light of how certain parent-child relationships might contribute to the development of cognidve giftedness into high level of creative behavior. Cox (1926) snggested that an IQ of 155 or higher characterized her Sample of geniuses; Galton (1869) defined true eminence as thac occurring once among 4000 men, which converts to an IQ close to 160. Galton believed such eminence was based on exceptionally high, inborn, ability. Review of the literature shows far less information regarding what could be termed the exceptionally gifted childrerz, i.e., IQs 155 or higher than we have regarding gifred children, i.e., IQs up to 135 or 140. Missing is a discrimination berween levels of giftedness such as that required to graduate from college from that level or type of giftedness which might be required to become eminent, i.e., become a Nobel laurea te. Earlier (Albert., 1969) we reviewed social science articles from 1927 to 1965. There were 135 articles regarding genius. The period of greatest interest was 1920 to 1930. After World War I1 interest shifts almost completely to giftedness and creativity. We now rarely see references to study of genius, although "genius" often anchors the highest limits of creativity and intelligence. Early interest in geni~~s was considerably different from professional interest in creativity and giftedness. A large part took up questions of pathology, heredity, and demography (45% of the references) ; much of the interest in creativity related to personality dynamics and cognitive processes and the conditions and characteristics related to or contributing to creativity (37%), and much less with the question of psychopathology, pathology, or ill health. Giftedness is very much a matter dealing with the education, the training or the identification of the gifted (68%). Nonetheless one of the main results of works on genius was to keep social scientists aware of productive people, who, by their very achievements have continuously raised questions concerning the bases of D 'Pars of this paper were presented at the Western Psychological Association meeting June 1969, Vancouver. Canada. The author expresses his thanks to Pirzer College for its support in this research.

In a previous paper, Davies and Beech (4) presented data obtained from both clinical observations and psychological tests on normal subjects under the influence of Sernyl. In that paper an account was given of the chemical constitution and action of the drug. It is not necessary to say more here than that this compound is a synthetic cyclohexylamine derivative that was introduced into anaesthetic practice because of its ability to produce analgesia without loss of consciousness. It appears to act mainly at the thalamic level and produces changes in the reception of sensory stimuli. Post-operatively, however, psychiatric disturbances were common and the use of the drug in anaesthetic practice was curtailed. Our interest in Sernyl has centred upon its psychotomimetic effects and its possible mode of action. It has, in fact, been suggested that normal individuals under the influence of Sernyl behave, in some respects, like schizophrenic patients and that this similarity is most striking in the case of thinking processes. In the further investigation of the effects of this drug it was therefore decided to test the hypothesis that Sernyl produces mental disturbances which are characteristic of thought-disordered schizophrenics.

Once in each of the last three decades, at least one personality theorist has colnmenced on psychology's general indifference to cognition concerned with the f~~cure (Murphy, 1936; Rapaporc, 1946; Allporr, 1955). In this paper I should like to suggest that the picture is changing-that there is in progress a redefinition of intelligence to include foresight and planning. I should especially like to suggest in addition chat the Rorschach test has from its inception provided us with a crude measure of apric~tde in this area. Much of the paper will deal with cognitive attributes of individuals scoring high in Rorschach movement categories. Porteus, of course, has long used the words foresight and planning in connection with his Maze Test. But since his 1950 pronouncement chat "it is time to come out boldly for the inclusion of planning in OLI~ statement of the nature of intelligence" (p. lo), he has been echoed, intentionally or not, by workers in diverse areas. Singer and Herman, for example, suggest that "the ability to defer immediate motor response . . . with the consequent resort to . . . fantasy gives man a control of his future through imagery and planning" (1954, p. 329). Shoben has included "the capacity for foresight and the self-imposed control of behavior through the anticipation of its ouccorne" within his "basic

This series of studies represents an effort to extend the subtractive method of Bonders to the analysis of depth of processing in simple classification tasks. The stimuli are always pairs of items (letters, nonsense forms, digits) to which S must respond "same" or "different" as quickly as possible. Levels of instruction are physical identity (e.g., AA), name identity (e.g., Aa), and rule identity (e.g., both vowels). By use of the subtractive method, times for matches at each level are analyzed. The emphasis is not placed upon the times themselves but upon their relevance for understanding the operations and mechanisms involved in perceptual matching, naming, and classifying. Nearly 100 years ago the Dutch physiologist Donders presented a paper (Bonders, 1868) on the time for simple cognitive operations. This wellknown paper initiated the use of the subtractive method of latency analysis to measure the time for internal mental processes such as recognition and choice. Although the subtractive method has received a good deal of criticism (Boring, 1950), there is once again active interest in pursuing it. Recent work includes detailed analysis of successive stages in simple reaction time (McGill, 1963), separation of recognition from choice time (Taylor, 1966), effect of task variables such as S-R compatibility upon the component times (Broadbent & Gregory, 1965), and development of dynamic decision models to predict and explain various components of choice time (Fitts, 1966; Stone, 1960).

The major purpose of this paper will be to discuss the effects of attitudes on the learning of problem-solving subject matter. But before turning to the reasoning behind the implied relationship, it is important to define operationally what is meant by both problem-solving and attitudes. While the cognitive processes were one of the first aspects of behavior studied by early experimental psychologists, the terms used in discussing different types of cognitive activities (thinking, problem-solving, decision-making and creativity) have still not been clearly disentangled from one another. And, while a definition of terms cannot solve the confusion, it can still identify the point of view considered in this paper. An individual can be considered thinking when through the use of symbols or images he internally represents or “constructs a model of” the world or some aspect of it, whether that part of the world is immediately present or not (1). Thus, reverie, reminiscence, fantasy, dreaming and remembering are all thinking activities and also more directed efforts, such as reintegrating past experiences to solve a problem, or consciously weighing two courses of action to make a decision.

It seems evident that every problem and also that one dealt with in this volume can be considered in a twofold way; namely quasi-objectively, tending to neglect the observer, and subjectively, emphasizing the role of the observer in the description. For both modes of view this volume provides excellent examples. From the quasi-objective standpoint, biogenesis has been treated from the viewpoints of irreversible thermodynamics (8) (11) (12), information theory (4) (16) or even by combining these with the theory of selection (3) (7). Of special importance in this respect is the paper of EIGEN that recently appeared elsewhere (5). How valuable these approaches, especially the last mentioned, ever may be, they are nonetheless able to illuminate the problem from one side only, which by necessity must be supplemented by another one in which is sufficiently enough demonstrated how strongly scientific propositions, mainly those of general character, are influenced by the mode of description (or, even, by the mode of cognition). Indeed, this point has been emphasized by two important papers in this volume (13) (14). This problem ultimately amounts to the question of what must happen in the human mind that enables an origin, i.e. the emergence of the entirely new, to be recognized, and, in addition, treated according to scientific criteria. One has to ponder on whether the recognition of an origin is the result of an active mental construction during the performance of cognition.

Future computer systems, to assist the practicing physician, may take many forms. Some may, as independent automata, prepare and present specific diagnoses or identify and recommend specified courses of therapy. Others may assist by augmenting the physician's processes of reasoning to enhance both his diagnostic ability and his therapeutic decisions. Such systems will serve as prosthetic extensions of human cognition and will function as integrated manmachine systems combining the unique features of both the man and machine to the solution of diagnostic and therapeutic problems. This latter type of synergetic automaton must have the ability to answer any question submitted by the physician within its information content. Thus, it must be able to interpret the question and derive the answer in a simulation of the human ability to use knowledge. To achieve this, basic research is needed to develop a general system for the organization of disciplinary information and general programs for its utilization. Such research involves the development of a simulation, suitable for computer application, of the primitive pattern of human objectification and the fundamental processes of organization. This paper presents the first operational stage of a computer system constructed for the study of one aspect of this problem. The study involved the modeling of gross objects of the physical world, their attributes and relationships; the subject area used was human gross anatomy and the object set, a male human body. The output of the computer system is demonstrated, comments are given, the system is described, and plans for subsequent research discussed. The paper is written primarily as a progress report on the first operational stage of an experimental system.

SummaryThe aim of this paper was to stress the importance of the adaptive cognitive functioning of man in the causation of prejudice. It was felt that this approach has the merits of economy, credibility and testability of explanation which are not always shared by views seeking the psychological causes of intergroup tensions in the evolutionary past of the species or in unconscious motivation. Three cognitive processes were considered from the point of view of their relevance to the genesis of prejudice in an individual: categorization, assimilation, and search for conceptual coherence.Though the paper was not concerned either with discussing ways to reduce prejudice or with outlining in any detail designs for future research, it is my belief that the general approach adopted here has implications, both for social action and for research, which have not been as yet consistently and fully taken into account.

The paper presents a model of the human being, stressing the importance of relatively independent but interacting personality subsystems. The homeostatic system the drive system, and the affect system are the three motivational systems. The central assumption is that the affect system is the primary motivational system; affect is inherently motivating. The principal characteristics of the affect system and its relations with other personality subsystems are discussed. It was assumed that behavior that is uniquely human--constructive interpersonal relating, complex cognitive processes, creative activity--can be best understood and predicted when we conceive of affect as the motivating, cue-producing experience. The theory of anxiety (fear-terror), as well as the activation of fear and fear activators is discussed with emphasis on other affects and cognitive constructions as causes of fear. The problems of fear phenomenology, and fear socialization are considered. The paper concludes with a discussion of affect-affect dynamics, the relationships of fear to other affects in both adaptive and maladaptive functioning. It is maintained that anxiety facilitates only defense or escape and that interest-excitement is the chief facilitator of constructive behavior and creative living. (Author)

This paper attempts to provide a framework for future research on one of the central concepts of contingency theories―uncertainty. After reviewing earlier attempts at defining uncertainty, it offers explicit views of man and environments to guide the reader in the development of the conceptualization and definition of uncertainty as a psychological state of the individual. This concept of uncertainty is used to suggest four sources of variability in the perception of uncertainty by individuals: (1) the perception of stability and simplicity in an environment, (2) individual cognitive processes, (3) the variety of an individual's experience, and (4) social expectations of the perception of uncertainty. The paper makes suggestions, based on the concepts presented, for future research concerning uncertainty. These include strategies for methodological testing of uncertainty instruments and explorations of the role of individual characteristics in the perception of uncertainty.

are insisting that we concentrate on the process of writing itself, a process that our traditional approaches have not directly treated. In most classes, teachers deal with what takes place before and after the student writes his paper. Much attention focuses on the principles of rhetoric and the rules of grammar as matters the student must master before actually writing. Class discussions also deal extensively with exemplary models in anthologies that the student is supposed to emulate in his own writing. During the actual process of writing, however, the teacher retires behind his desk, leaving the student to practice his new knowledge about writing. Only when the student fearfully presents his completed paper to the teacher for judgment does the teacher again step forward. He elaborately decorates the paper with marginal comments, returns it to the student with a ritual show of authority, often analyzes its weaknesses in class and, if he has time, discusses it further in an individual conference with the student. The

Many subjects ( Ss ) anticipate that perceptual isolation will be an occasion for pleasant rest, an opportunity to make money by doing nothing, or a chance to commune with their inner selves, but few find it an exhilirating experience. Emotional reactions generally range from boredom to panic. Sources of stress are not as obvious as in stress situations involving electric shock or threat to the ego. This paper will attempt to analyze possible sources of stress within the situation and personalities of Ss by reviewing the results of a number of studies. Data on reported visual and auditory sensations were reviewed in a previous paper 66 and will not be treated extensively here. There will be no direct discussion of the cognitive and perceptual effects of isolation as meas ured by laboratory tests. The paper will concentrate on endurance of subjects in isolation, verbal reports during and

Summary.-Though psychology's only hope of ever becoming a science resides in a phenomenological approach, no mathematical logic presently exists for formalizing adequate:y a comprehensive cognitive psychology. Such a needed epistemic log~c would :ose some rules of inference which positivistic, nonepistemic mathematical :ogics employ. Therefore, if this needed new logic is to provide sufficient deductive power, new rules of inference would be required. The present paper attempts to develop one such new rule of inference. Though psychology's only hope of ever becoming a science resides in a cognitive approach, no mzthematical logic presently exists for formalizing adequately a comprehensive cognitive psychology. Such a needed epistemic logic would lose some rules of inference which positivistic, non-epistemic mathematical logics employ. Therefore, if this needed new logic is to provide sufficient deductive power, new rules of inference would be required. One of us has made all these points previously (La Fave, 1971). The present paper attempts to develop one such new rule of inference. The needed cognitive psychology would find its center in the verb believes. Another very important concept in cognitive psychology (particularly in the areas of social and personality) is that of attitde. Several decades ago (1935) G. W. Allport observed: The concept of attitude is probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology No other term appears more frequently in experimental and theoretical Literature ( p 798). Allport's statement remains essentially accurate today. For these reasons, the likelihood of a new rule of inference maximizing its relevance to or usefulness for cognitive psychology n~ould seem increased if the concepts of belief and attitude were built into that rule. Such incorporation is achieved in the rule of inference developed below. The literature on the psychology of prejudice commonly argues that the negative stereotyping invariably involved leads the bigot into self-contradiction.

Previous research with the variable spontaneous change (Means, 1965) has demonstrated a moderate inverse relationship (-.43) with California F Scale for 23 college students as well as a moderate positive relationship (.46) with the number of activities 26 VA hospital mental patients felt free to perform. The present study (Means & Harper, 1968) attempted to see whether spontaneous change was also related to jndependently sustained cognitive activity, measured by voluntary time in a think tank. Spontaneous change is thought to reflect a natural tendency to change ideas and concepts relatively independently of external contingencies such as rules, schedules, and a complex changing environment. Thus, it was reasoned that persons scoring high on spontaneous change would voluntarily keep themselves reinforced for cognitive activity when given the opportunity to think about anything they liked in a large "empty" room (think tank) for as long as they wished. For 20 undergraduate students from the introductory psychology class who fulfilled a 5-hr. course requirement, spontaneous change was measured as follows. Ss were asked to arrange 4 unequal-length lines on 10 separate 10-in. circles of filter paper. They were instructed to arrange these lines in any manner they wished, to have fun, and to arrange lines so that they liked each arrangement. The arrangements were scored by taking the differences in displacement of angles and distances from the sample lines, summed across drawings for a single spontaneous change score for each S.' After Ss had finished the line arrangements they were taken to the think tank, which was a large lecture hall (seating capacity of 100 students). Ss were instructed to think about anything they wished for as long as they liked, up to 5 hr. Each S was in the room alone and was free to leave if he became bored at any time after a M-hr. commitment. Paper was provided for those who chose to use it. There was a moderate positive product-moment correlation of .58 (p < .01) between time spent in the think tank and spontaneous change on the line-arrangement task. This result, although based on a small N of 20, suggests the importance of cognitive styles with respect to independently pursued activity in a rather unstructured situation.

This paper presents one schizophrenic child’s progress in a two-year communication therapy program based on auditory monitoring and feedback. The goal of such a program is to open the auditory channel to promote the development of awareness in the child of his own communication errors and to develop the awareness of his auditory environment requisite to cognitive and linguistic development. Developments in his auditory monitoring behavior are traced through his changing responses to specific therapy tasks, through the modification of particular language errors, including tangentiality, and through the changes observed in his auditory awareness and accessibility, in and outside therapy.

This paper examines the extent to which preparatory processes are selective (a) between two performance measures, speed and accuracy, (b) within a processing stage, for example, stimulus encoding and response execution, and (c) among possible stimulus presentation times. It is shown that the appearance of selectivity between speed and accuracy depends on whether these variables are considered over the possible preparatory states on a given trial, over the trials within an experimental condition, or over different conditions, and the relevance of this result to the measurement of processing capacity is discussed. Selectivity within processing stages is demonstrated by applying a parametric processing model to data from letter-matching tasks in which the identity of the first letter is probabilistically related to that of the second letter. In these tasks, reaction time differences between physical and name matches and between same and different responses depend on the stimulus and response contingencies and on the stimulus presentation times. Finally, a method is presented for resolving observed error rates into components that reflect the accuracy of each processing stage.