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International audience; When a farmer joins an agricultural cooperative, he or she undertakes to participate in the cooperative economically, as a co-operator, and also in its administration, as an associate. Yet, today, researchers and directors of cooperatives are observing a drop in member participation in both spheres. The goal of this paper is to build a typology of the members of grain farmer agricultural cooperatives in France, based on the members' participation, and then use a multinomial probit model to identify the factors that come into play and result in a member belonging to a given category in the typology. We make the hypothesis that attitudes with respect to organizational involvement and the member's confidence in his or her cooperative can explain these differences in behavior, along with individual variables tied to the member and his or her farm business, and variables associated with the cooperative to which the member belongs. Following the analysis of the participation behavior of the 290 members in the sample, the members can be grouped into three distinct categories: " individualists, " " good soldiers, " and " engaged. " The results of the multinomial probit model on these three categories show, in particular, that attitude toward organizational involvement has a significant effect, as do the presence of storage on the farm and the size of the cooperative on the probability of being an " individualist " rather than a " good soldier " or " engaged. "; En adhérant à une coopérative agricole, les agriculteurs s'engagent à participer économiquement à celle-ci en tant que coopérateurs et également à participer à son gouvernement, en tant qu'associés. Or aujourd'hui, les chercheurs et directeurs de coopératives constatent une baisse de ces deux niveaux de participation. Cet article a pour objectif de construire une typologie des adhérents de coopératives agricoles du secteur céréalier français au regard de leurs comportements de participation puis d'identifier les déterminants qui expliquent l'appartenance des adhérents à une des classes de la typologie a partir d'un modèle probit multinomial. Nous faisons l'hypothèse que les attitudes de confiance et d'implication organisationnelles manifestées par l'adhérent envers sa coopérative peuvent expliquer ces différences de comportements aux côtés de variables individuelles à l'adhérent et son exploitation agricole et de variables liées à la coopérative a laquelle il adhère.L'analyse des comportements de participation permet de regrouper les 290 adhérents de l'échantillon en trois classes distinctes: « les individualistes », « les bons soldats » et « les engagés ». Les résultats du probit multinomial sur ces 3 classes montrent notamment un effet significatif de l'attitude d'implication organisationnelle, de la présence de stockage à la ferme et de la taille de la coopérative sur la probabilité d'être individualiste par rapport aux deux autres classes.

When a manufacturer contracts secretly with competing retailers he is subject to opportunism, and linear or non-linear tariffs may not allow the manufacturer to maintain monopoly prices. To analyse the effects of RPM, O'Brien-Shaffer (1992) use a concept of contract equilibrium which concentrates on pairwise deviations thereby questioning the robustness of the analysis. This paper emphasises the distinction between the contract equilibrium and standard non-cooperative concepts. We advocate for some caution in the use of the former concept, as if overlooks an inexistence problem. We then confirm the intuition that RPM can help solve the manufacturer's commitment problem. This confirms that O'Brien-Shaffer's insight is robust and validates the courts' reluctance against RPM.