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In this short commentary, I propose to read the book as a student of “state capitalism” and “international financial subordination”. The former refers to a set of scholarly debates concerning the changing role of the state in contemporary capitalism. It asks: what are the (geo)political economic determinants and implications of the current aggregate expansion of the state’s role as promoter, supervisor, and owner of capital across the world economy? The latter designates a research agenda dedicated to scrutinizing the sources, manifestations, and implications of developing countries’ per- sistent subordinate positionality in the geographical organization of financial and monetary relations on a planetary scale (Alami et al. 2022). Respatialising Finance is remarkable in its ability to develop a sustained and generative conversation between these two interdisciplinary fields of inquiry., Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101024448

Recent scholarship has narrated the financialization of development, which Gabor (2021) refers to as the Wall Street Consensus (WSC), whose purpose is to facilitate the investment of global capital in Southern infrastructure by institutionalising the distribution of risk, reward and responsibility between investors and states. Gabor’s conceptualization of the ‘de-risking state’ subordinated to global finance capital stands in stark contrast with scholarship on state capitalism, which charts the unprecedented entrepreneurial role played by states as investors and market participants. Our objective in this article is to reconcile the apparent paradox presented by the simultaneous emergence of the WSC and evolution of state capitalism. We argue that the WSC affords de-risking states scope to pursue autonomous strategic visions, and many have responded by embracing infrastructure-led development designed to integrate places within global value chains in ways that foster economic diversification, industrial upgrading and balanced regional growth. We present three examples in which de-risking states have implemented spatialised industrial strategies – Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Kenya’s Vision 2030 and Thailand 4.0. In each of these cases spatialised industrial strategies undertaken by de-risking states have fuelled the proliferation of large-scale infrastructure projects and served to justify political centralization.

In this short commentary, I propose to read the book as a student of “state capitalism” and “international financial subordination”. The former refers to a set of scholarly debates concerning the changing role of the state in contemporary capitalism. It asks: what are the (geo)political economic determinants and implications of the current aggregate expansion of the state’s role as promoter, supervisor, and owner of capital across the world economy? The latter designates a research agenda dedicated to scrutinizing the sources, manifestations, and implications of developing countries’ per- sistent subordinate positionality in the geographical organization of financial and monetary relations on a planetary scale (Alami et al. 2022). Respatialising Finance is remarkable in its ability to develop a sustained and generative conversation between these two interdisciplinary fields of inquiry., Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101024448

In this short commentary, I propose to read the book as a student of “state capitalism” and “international financial subordination”. The former refers to a set of scholarly debates concerning the changing role of the state in contemporary capitalism. It asks: what are the (geo)political economic determinants and implications of the current aggregate expansion of the state’s role as promoter, supervisor, and owner of capital across the world economy? The latter designates a research agenda dedicated to scrutinizing the sources, manifestations, and implications of developing countries’ per- sistent subordinate positionality in the geographical organization of financial and monetary relations on a planetary scale (Alami et al. 2022). Respatialising Finance is remarkable in its ability to develop a sustained and generative conversation between these two interdisciplinary fields of inquiry., Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101024448

The theme issue ‘Making Space for the New State Capitalism’ brings together insights from critical economic geography and heterodox political economy through a series of papers to be published in three installments, each accompanied by an introductory essay written by the guest editors. In this, the first of these introductory commentaries, we highlight some of the potentially productive ambiguities that accompany the new state capitalism rubric. Subsequent introductory commentaries will consider the consequences of embracing relationality, spatiotemporality and uneven development (along with the second group of papers); and the challenges and opportunities of thinking conjuncturally (with the third group of papers).

Recent scholarship has narrated the financialization of development, which Gabor (2021) refers to as the Wall Street Consensus (WSC), whose purpose is to facilitate the investment of global capital in Southern infrastructure by institutionalising the distribution of risk, reward and responsibility between investors and states. Gabor’s conceptualization of the ‘de-risking state’ subordinated to global finance capital stands in stark contrast with scholarship on state capitalism, which charts the unprecedented entrepreneurial role played by states as investors and market participants. Our objective in this article is to reconcile the apparent paradox presented by the simultaneous emergence of the WSC and evolution of state capitalism. We argue that the WSC affords de-risking states scope to pursue autonomous strategic visions, and many have responded by embracing infrastructure-led development designed to integrate places within global value chains in ways that foster economic diversification, industrial upgrading and balanced regional growth. We present three examples in which de-risking states have implemented spatialised industrial strategies – Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Kenya’s Vision 2030 and Thailand 4.0. In each of these cases spatialised industrial strategies undertaken by de-risking states have fuelled the proliferation of large-scale infrastructure projects and served to justify political centralization.

Recent scholarship has narrated the financialization of development, which Gabor (2021) refers to as the Wall Street Consensus (WSC), whose purpose is to facilitate the investment of global capital in Southern infrastructure by institutionalising the distribution of risk, reward and responsibility between investors and states. Gabor’s conceptualization of the ‘de-risking state’ subordinated to global finance capital stands in stark contrast with scholarship on state capitalism, which charts the unprecedented entrepreneurial role played by states as investors and market participants. Our objective in this article is to reconcile the apparent paradox presented by the simultaneous emergence of the WSC and evolution of state capitalism. We argue that the WSC affords de-risking states scope to pursue autonomous strategic visions, and many have responded by embracing infrastructure-led development designed to integrate places within global value chains in ways that foster economic diversification, industrial upgrading and balanced regional growth. We present three examples in which de-risking states have implemented spatialised industrial strategies – Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Kenya’s Vision 2030 and Thailand 4.0. In each of these cases spatialised industrial strategies undertaken by de-risking states have fuelled the proliferation of large-scale infrastructure projects and served to justify political centralization.

The theme issue 'Making Space for the New State Capitalism' brings together insights from critical economic geography and heterodox political economy through a series of papers to be published in three installments, each accompanied by an introductory essay written by the guest editors. In this, the first of these introductory commentaries, we highlight some of the potentially productive ambiguities that accompany the new state capitalism rubric. Subsequent introductory commentaries will consider the consequences of embracing relationality, spatiotemporality and uneven development (along with the second group of papers); and the challenges and opportunities of thinking conjuncturally (with the third group of papers).

Recent scholarship has narrated the financialization of development, which Gabor (2021) refers to as the Wall Street Consensus (WSC), whose purpose is to facilitate the investment of global capital in Southern infrastructure by institutionalising the distribution of risk, reward and responsibility between investors and states. Gabor’s conceptualization of the ‘de-risking state’ subordinated to global finance capital stands in stark contrast with scholarship on state capitalism, which charts the unprecedented entrepreneurial role played by states as investors and market participants. Our objective in this article is to reconcile the apparent paradox presented by the simultaneous emergence of the WSC and evolution of state capitalism. We argue that the WSC affords de-risking states scope to pursue autonomous strategic visions, and many have responded by embracing infrastructure-led development designed to integrate places within global value chains in ways that foster economic diversification, industrial upgrading and balanced regional growth. We present three examples in which de-risking states have implemented spatialised industrial strategies – Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Kenya’s Vision 2030 and Thailand 4.0. In each of these cases spatialised industrial strategies undertaken by de-risking states have fuelled the proliferation of large-scale infrastructure projects and served to justify political centralization.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, there have been increasing levels of Chinese investment in Europe. A significant portion of these investments originate from government sources, otherwise known as state capital. The growing volume of these flows has generated much scrutiny because they challenge long-held beliefs about the limited role of government in the economy that has characterised the global spread of neoliberalism. This dissertation argues that Chinese state capital investment in Europe has not only subverted expectations about the appropriate role of government in economic governance, but also how it has engendered renewed forms of government intervention in European polities. Through in-depth case studies in Belgium, Ireland and Serbia, the findings show how Chinese state capital has been invested through sovereign wealth funds, private multinational corporations and global financial professionals that defy conventional understandings of the boundary between public and private enterprise.

In this short commentary, I propose to read the book as a student of “state capitalism” and “international financial subordination”. The former refers to a set of scholarly debates concerning the changing role of the state in contemporary capitalism. It asks: what are the (geo)political economic determinants and implications of the current aggregate expansion of the state’s role as promoter, supervisor, and owner of capital across the world economy? The latter designates a research agenda dedicated to scrutinizing the sources, manifestations, and implications of developing countries’ per- sistent subordinate positionality in the geographical organization of financial and monetary relations on a planetary scale (Alami et al. 2022). Respatialising Finance is remarkable in its ability to develop a sustained and generative conversation between these two interdisciplinary fields of inquiry., Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101024448

In this short commentary, I propose to read the book as a student of “state capitalism” and “international financial subordination”. The former refers to a set of scholarly debates concerning the changing role of the state in contemporary capitalism. It asks: what are the (geo)political economic determinants and implications of the current aggregate expansion of the state’s role as promoter, supervisor, and owner of capital across the world economy? The latter designates a research agenda dedicated to scrutinizing the sources, manifestations, and implications of developing countries’ per- sistent subordinate positionality in the geographical organization of financial and monetary relations on a planetary scale (Alami et al. 2022). Respatialising Finance is remarkable in its ability to develop a sustained and generative conversation between these two interdisciplinary fields of inquiry., Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101024448

China's participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been a rollercoaster of milestones and frictions. China has emerged as a leading trading nation, which has contributed to the expansion of world trade. Some of its trading partners, however, and most vocally the United States, complain that China has reached its new status by eluding its WTO commitments. Under President Trump, the United States reacted strongly against China, almost bringing the WTO (but not China!) to its knees. These actions have been criticized in different ways: Some underline their unilateral character (and the ensuing legal issues they raise), whereas others focus on the regime-neutrality of the WTO, which should, in principle, be able to accommodate Western liberal democracies, developing countries, and socialist countries like China equally. In this short Article, we argue that staying idle is no solution to the China issue and that addressing it through unilateral actions is no solution either. Both approaches would only deepen the current WTO crisis. In our view, the only viable solution for the WTO system requires adding new disciplines to the existing multilateral rules., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Recent scholarship has narrated the financialization of development, which Gabor (2021) refers to as the Wall Street Consensus (WSC), whose purpose is to facilitate the investment of global capital in Southern infrastructure by institutionalising the distribution of risk, reward and responsibility between investors and states. Gabor’s conceptualization of the ‘de-risking state’ subordinated to global finance capital stands in stark contrast with scholarship on state capitalism, which charts the unprecedented entrepreneurial role played by states as investors and market participants. Our objective in this article is to reconcile the apparent paradox presented by the simultaneous emergence of the WSC and evolution of state capitalism. We argue that the WSC affords de-risking states scope to pursue autonomous strategic visions, and many have responded by embracing infrastructure-led development designed to integrate places within global value chains in ways that foster economic diversification, industrial upgrading and balanced regional growth. We present three examples in which de-risking states have implemented spatialised industrial strategies – Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Kenya’s Vision 2030 and Thailand 4.0. In each of these cases spatialised industrial strategies undertaken by de-risking states have fuelled the proliferation of large-scale infrastructure projects and served to justify political centralization.

China’s “economic juggernaut” is often noted to have arisen from successful market reforms carried out in the context of high state capacity. In contrast, we demonstrate that crucial reforms to replace central planning with markets have stalled as a result of major barriers of two types: institutional and ideational. Focusing on the electricity sector, we find that market reforms pushed by China’s central government are hindered by deep inefficiencies that arise from the legacy plan and “plan-derived” institutions of subnational governments and grid companies, against which the central state has been largely ineffective. We also uncover fascinating ideational differences of the nature and purpose of “markets” that show how they often are envisioned more as a way to extend the planner’s “toolbox,” or to offer “salvation” for ailing incumbent firms, rather than to induce efficiency. Our empirical focus on three prominent types of “market-oriented” experiments in the electric power sector demonstrate clear limits to state capacity, limits that emanate from state actors rather than merely industry, despite high-priority central government goals of increasing efficiency, integrating renewable energy, and reducing emissions from the electricity sector.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

This article opens a conversation between uneven and combined development (U&CD) and state capitalism studies. It reflects on the potential of U&CD to answer the following questions: why has there been an aggregate expansion of the state’s role as promoter, supervisor and owner of capital across the world capitalist economy since the turn of the millennium, and why has this taken an uneven and combined form? I argue that U&CD as an evolving research programme holds great potential in creatively expanding the study of state capitalism and its multi-scalar geographies. It is particularly well positioned to help us elucidate the multilinear and interactive character of present-day state capitalism. U&CD’s heuristics of ‘societal multiplicity’, ‘combination’ and ‘hybridisation’ can help us trace the combinatorial dynamics which result in the cumulative expansion of state prerogatives and their cascading impacts across policy realms and geographic space. Yet the causal mechanisms identified by U&CD (the ‘whip of external necessity’, ‘the privilege of historic backwardness’ and ‘the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’) are unable to grasp contemporary state capitalist transformations in their historical and geographical fullness, notably due to a tendency to misread spatial unevenness as temporal dislocation. Theorising state capitalism requires that we examine the role of multiple and interacting capitalist states in politically mediating historically determinate transformations in the capitalist labour process, and their ramifications in terms of the temporal and geographical dynamics of value production and circulation. Thus, looking at U&CD from the perspective of the new state capitalism reveals both its analytical strengths and limitations for GPE., Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101024448.

This article opens a conversation between uneven and combined development (U&CD) and state capitalism studies. It reflects on the potential of U&CD to answer the following questions: why has there been an aggregate expansion of the state’s role as promoter, supervisor and owner of capital across the world capitalist economy since the turn of the millennium, and why has this taken an uneven and combined form? I argue that U&CD as an evolving research programme holds great potential in creatively expanding the study of state capitalism and its multi-scalar geographies. It is particularly well positioned to help us elucidate the multilinear and interactive character of present-day state capitalism. U&CD’s heuristics of ‘societal multiplicity’, ‘combination’ and ‘hybridisation’ can help us trace the combinatorial dynamics which result in the cumulative expansion of state prerogatives and their cascading impacts across policy realms and geographic space. Yet the causal mechanisms identified by U&CD (the ‘whip of external necessity’, ‘the privilege of historic backwardness’ and ‘the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’) are unable to grasp contemporary state capitalist transformations in their historical and geographical fullness, notably due to a tendency to misread spatial unevenness as temporal dislocation. Theorising state capitalism requires that we examine the role of multiple and interacting capitalist states in politically mediating historically determinate transformations in the capitalist labour process, and their ramifications in terms of the temporal and geographical dynamics of value production and circulation. Thus, looking at U&CD from the perspective of the new state capitalism reveals both its analytical strengths and limitations for GPE., Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101024448.

State enterprises, sovereign funds, and other state–capital hybrids have become major engines of global capitalism. How can we explain their global rise and organizational transformation into increasingly sophisticated and globally competitive forms? Why do they increasingly emulate the practices and organizational goals of comparable private-sector entities, adopt the techniques of modern finance, resort to mixed ownership, and extend their operations across geographic space? After critically engaging with arguments that emphasize the role of firm strategies, developmentalist logics, financialized norms, and Polanyian double movements, we develop an explanatory model of organizational change grounded in historic–geographic materialism and economic geographies of the firm. We locate the expansion of state ownership (the role of states as owners) in the historic development and geographic remaking of global capitalism and, in particular, the emergence of a new constellation of international divisions of labor. This created the conditions for a massive round of centralization of capital as state property (the mass of capital controlled by states) since the early 2000s. The modern, marketized, globally spread state–capital hybrid emerged as an organizational fix to mediate the geographic contradictions and imperatives associated with this process. Purposive organizational adaption consisted in developing new skills, operational capabilities, and mixed-ownership structures in order to leverage the financial system, allow for the development of liquid forms of state property, and facilitate the expansion of the latter into global circuits of capital. As such, the article contributes to debates on the role of the state in global value chains, the firm-state nexus, and state capitalism.

This article opens a conversation between uneven and combined development (U&CD) and state capitalism studies. It reflects on the potential of U&CD to answer the following questions: why has there been an aggregate expansion of the state’s role as promoter, supervisor and owner of capital across the world capitalist economy since the turn of the millennium, and why has this taken an uneven and combined form? I argue that U&CD as an evolving research programme holds great potential in creatively expanding the study of state capitalism and its multi-scalar geographies. It is particularly well positioned to help us elucidate the multilinear and interactive character of present-day state capitalism. U&CD’s heuristics of ‘societal multiplicity’, ‘combination’ and ‘hybridisation’ can help us trace the combinatorial dynamics which result in the cumulative expansion of state prerogatives and their cascading impacts across policy realms and geographic space. Yet the causal mechanisms identified by U&CD (the ‘whip of external necessity’, ‘the privilege of historic backwardness’ and ‘the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’) are unable to grasp contemporary state capitalist transformations in their historical and geographical fullness, notably due to a tendency to misread spatial unevenness as temporal dislocation. Theorising state capitalism requires that we examine the role of multiple and interacting capitalist states in politically mediating historically determinate transformations in the capitalist labour process, and their ramifications in terms of the temporal and geographical dynamics of value production and circulation. Thus, looking at U&CD from the perspective of the new state capitalism reveals both its analytical strengths and limitations for GPE., Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101024448.

State enterprises, sovereign funds, and other state–capital hybrids have become major engines of global capitalism. How can we explain their global rise and organizational transformation into increasingly sophisticated and globally competitive forms? Why do they increasingly emulate the practices and organizational goals of comparable private-sector entities, adopt the techniques of modern finance, resort to mixed ownership, and extend their operations across geographic space? After critically engaging with arguments that emphasize the role of firm strategies, developmentalist logics, financialized norms, and Polanyian double movements, we develop an explanatory model of organizational change grounded in historic–geographic materialism and economic geographies of the firm. We locate the expansion of state ownership (the role of states as owners) in the historic development and geographic remaking of global capitalism and, in particular, the emergence of a new constellation of international divisions of labor. This created the conditions for a massive round of centralization of capital as state property (the mass of capital controlled by states) since the early 2000s. The modern, marketized, globally spread state–capital hybrid emerged as an organizational fix to mediate the geographic contradictions and imperatives associated with this process. Purposive organizational adaption consisted in developing new skills, operational capabilities, and mixed-ownership structures in order to leverage the financial system, allow for the development of liquid forms of state property, and facilitate the expansion of the latter into global circuits of capital. As such, the article contributes to debates on the role of the state in global value chains, the firm-state nexus, and state capitalism.

Covid-19 accelerated the transformations that have been taking place in the international life since 2008. These have been materialized in, a competition between economic giants, a weakening in the world governance, a reconfiguration of capitalism with technology and a breakdown of the trust of societies in democracy. This has led to a new reconfiguration of material capacities, institutions and ideas, and demonstrates that what the world is currently experiencing is the closing of a historical cycle and the weakening of the hegemonic structure of the United States. Based on this panorama, the opportunities and challenges presented by the new emerging countries are analyzed in the light of the concept of power, illustrated by critical theory., La Covid-19 aceleró las transformaciones que se estaban presentando en la vida internacional desde 2008, materializadas en una competición entre gigantes económicos, un debilitamiento en la gobernanza mundial, una reconfiguración del capitalismo con la tecnología y un resquebrajamiento de la confianza de las sociedades en la democracia. Lo anterior ha llevado a una nueva reconfiguración de capacidades materiales, instituciones e ideas, demostrando así que lo que actualmente vive el mundo es el cierre de un ciclo histórico y el debilitamiento de la estructura hegemónica de Estados Unidos. Con base en ese panorama, se analizan las oportunidades y desafíos que presentan los nuevos países emergentes a la luz del concepto del poder, ilustrado por la teoría crítica.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their liabilities have been extensively examined in the literature. However, less attention has been paid to how SOEs overcome such liabilities and even flourish in a market transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one. This study explores how China's SOEs continue to thrive in a system where state and market logics co-exist. The state appears to arrange an institutional field favoring SOEs, which are likely to transact and interact with co-located market-based firms, from which they acquire market logic elements through knowledge spillover. Three different market-based forms-previous SOEs that have been privatized, new privately owned enterprises, and foreign-owned enterprises- enhance the survival chances of SOEs. Each market-based form is established for different reasons and operate through different processes, incorporating market logic elements and developing the ease of communication that affect how SOEs obtain market logic elements. Furthermore, government affiliation and industry structure generate different levels of support and demands for SOEs, and thus not all SOEs benefit equally from obtaining market logic elements.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

In the post-2008 global economy infrastructure development and financing have risen to the top of the development agenda, emerging as a contested field for global investments involving seemingly divergent interests, objectives, rationalities and practices. Whereas multilateral development banks such as the World Bank advocate the market-based Public-Private Partnership (PPP) aimed at attracting private finance and deepening marketized governance, China is forging a state-capitalist alternative through its Belt and Road Initiative. These models are far from mutually exclusive. Through a conjunctural approach, this research examines the broader trade and financial interdependencies in which these models are entangled, and the geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives enframing the emergent infrastructure regime. Developing nations caught in the crosscurrents of these approaches and interests face uncertain risks and possibilities. In Indonesia I show how these approaches are grounded in infrastructure projects, framed by competition between China and Japan. Specifically, in Jakarta, I examine the coming together of these models, visions and practices as they articulate with the political-economies of city and state, and their path-dependent restructuring precipitated by the speculative 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. I show how political interests and developmental objectives of state and city governments are entangled with the speculative capital accumulation strategies of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), shaping the speculative state-space of the post-colonial metropolis. With a number of new rail transit projects in the city-region driving a boom in Transit-Oriented Development, SOEs speculate on market conditions and the ‘world-class city’ dreams of middle-class residents to leverage their propertied assets. In the territorially and institutionally fragmented landscape of metropolitan Jakarta this financial speculation is equally premised on political speculation around

A comparative historical perspective shows how globalization and the specificities of China’s rapid growth era limit its hegemonic potential in the twenty-first century global economy. Although state capitalism and openness to foreign capital facilitated China’s economic transformation, interactions among three forms of capital—state, private, and foreign—have produced developmental dynamics that constrain China’s capacity to assume the position of the world’s economic hegemon. These include (1) the compromised competitiveness of China’s corporate sector due to the domination of state-owned enterprises, (2) limits on the ability of Chinese firms to develop leading transnational corporations, and (3) early openness to and continued dependence on foreign capital. Moreover, the party-state’s efforts to ameliorate these constraints arouse external suspicion rather than support a Chinese-led hegemonic order based on consent and shared interests. These historically conditioned realities should temper expectations that China is converging teleologically toward a familiar hegemonic role in the international economy. © The Author(s) 2020.

A comparative historical perspective shows how globalization and the specificities of China’s rapid growth era limit its hegemonic potential in the twenty-first century global economy. Although state capitalism and openness to foreign capital facilitated China’s economic transformation, interactions among three forms of capital—state, private, and foreign—have produced developmental dynamics that constrain China’s capacity to assume the position of the world’s economic hegemon. These include (1) the compromised competitiveness of China’s corporate sector due to the domination of state-owned enterprises, (2) limits on the ability of Chinese firms to develop leading transnational corporations, and (3) early openness to and continued dependence on foreign capital. Moreover, the party-state’s efforts to ameliorate these constraints arouse external suspicion rather than support a Chinese-led hegemonic order based on consent and shared interests. These historically conditioned realities should temper expectations that China is converging teleologically toward a familiar hegemonic role in the international economy. © The Author(s) 2020.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

In the post-2008 global economy infrastructure development and financing have risen to the top of the development agenda, emerging as a contested field for global investments involving seemingly divergent interests, objectives, rationalities and practices. Whereas multilateral development banks such as the World Bank advocate the market-based Public-Private Partnership (PPP) aimed at attracting private finance and deepening marketized governance, China is forging a state-capitalist alternative through its Belt and Road Initiative. These models are far from mutually exclusive. Through a conjunctural approach, this research examines the broader trade and financial interdependencies in which these models are entangled, and the geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives enframing the emergent infrastructure regime. Developing nations caught in the crosscurrents of these approaches and interests face uncertain risks and possibilities. In Indonesia I show how these approaches are grounded in infrastructure projects, framed by competition between China and Japan. Specifically, in Jakarta, I examine the coming together of these models, visions and practices as they articulate with the political-economies of city and state, and their path-dependent restructuring precipitated by the speculative 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. I show how political interests and developmental objectives of state and city governments are entangled with the speculative capital accumulation strategies of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), shaping the speculative state-space of the post-colonial metropolis. With a number of new rail transit projects in the city-region driving a boom in Transit-Oriented Development, SOEs speculate on market conditions and the ‘world-class city’ dreams of middle-class residents to leverage their propertied assets. In the territorially and institutionally fragmented landscape of metropolitan Jakarta this financial speculation is equally premised on political speculation around

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

The article examines emerging financial capitalism in Russia and its recent developments, the rise of collateralised finance and trading in repo markets. The main conclusion is that a combination of sophisticated speculative practices with a strong state presence in financial markets is a distinctive feature of Russia after 2008. The decoupling of the financial system from the credit supply to the real sector is still continuing after the collapse of Communism. The role of the capital markets is restricted to short-term liquidity management in money markets, which rose after 2011 due to an increased provision of state liquidity. The existence of a large monetary overhang accumulated within the Russian banking system and its interconnectedness with collateralised markets are discussed. The development stages of the repo markets and the main collateral types are considered in relation to the expansion of the state liquidity supply. This study provides an additional perspective within the ongoing debate on contemporary state capitalism in emerging markets.

This dissertation analyzes the political economy of green bonds and global green bond standards in China. This research explains two puzzles: (1) Why did China’s green bond market grow faster than other emerging economies? (2) Why do some Chinese green bond issuers comply with international standards – the Green Bond Principles (GBP) or the Climate Bonds Standard (CBS), while others do not? Regarding the first question, this study argues that state capitalism, transnational climate governance, and support from top-level leadership are critical driving forces of the rapid development of green finance in China. In answering the second question, the variation in Chinese green bond issuers’ compliance with international standards is determined by domestic regulatory agencies’ preferences, firms’ ties, and firm characteristics. Specifically, bond issuers will be more likely to comply with GBP and CBS when (1) domestic regulators encourage compliance with global standards or (2) the issuers have more political connections or Western linkages. Moreover, this study finds that firms’ Western linkages could further moderate the effect of regulators’ preferences.

A comparative historical perspective shows how globalization and the specificities of China’s rapid growth era limit its hegemonic potential in the twenty-first century global economy. Although state capitalism and openness to foreign capital facilitated China’s economic transformation, interactions among three forms of capital—state, private, and foreign—have produced developmental dynamics that constrain China’s capacity to assume the position of the world’s economic hegemon. These include (1) the compromised competitiveness of China’s corporate sector due to the domination of state-owned enterprises, (2) limits on the ability of Chinese firms to develop leading transnational corporations, and (3) early openness to and continued dependence on foreign capital. Moreover, the party-state’s efforts to ameliorate these constraints arouse external suspicion rather than support a Chinese-led hegemonic order based on consent and shared interests. These historically conditioned realities should temper expectations that China is converging teleologically toward a familiar hegemonic role in the international economy. © The Author(s) 2020.

© 2020, Hui Situ, Carol Tilt, Pi-Shen Seet. Purpose: In a state capitalist country such as China, an important influence on company reporting is the government, which can influence company decision-making. The nature and impact of how the Chinese government uses its symbolic power to promote corporate environmental reporting (CER) have been under-studied, and therefore, this paper aims to address this gap in the literature by investigating the various strategies the Chinese government uses to influence CER and how political ideology plays a key role. Design/methodology/approach: This study uses discourse analysis to examine the annual reports and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports from seven Chinese companies between 2007 and 2011. And the data analysis presented is informed by Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic power. Findings: The Chinese government, through exercising the symbolic power, manages to build consensus, so that the Chinese government's political ideology becomes the habitus which is deeply embedded in the companies' perception of practices. In China, the government dominates the field and owns the economic capital. In order to accumulate symbolic capital, companies must adhere to political ideology, which helps them maintain and improve their social position and ultimately reward them with more economic capital. The findings show that the CER provided by Chinese companies is a symbolic product of this process. Originality/value: The paper provides contributions around the themes of symbolic power wielded by the government that influence not only state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but also firms in the private sector. This paper also provides an important contribution to understanding, in the context of a strong ideologically based political system (such as China), how political ideology influences companies' decision-making in the field of CER.

The purpose of this research article is to analyze with a qualitative methodology the manifestations of state capitalism in the Cuban economy. The term transition implies that a certain society is transformed into another, therefore it presents characteristics of both, this period culminates when society is transformed into the essential and the new relations of production irreversibly succeed, are based on the appropriate technical material base and they demonstrate their advantages from the social point of view in relation to the old relations of production, the inheritance of the old society persists for a long time in the new one. In the imperialist phase, the social revolution is triggered easier in the periphery than in the centers, it is necessary to create the material technical basis of socialism due to economic underdevelopment, so that the transition period becomes long, complex and requires the use of state capitalism., El propósito del presente artículo de investigación es analizar, mediante una perspectiva cualitativa, las manifestaciones del capitalismo de Estado en la economía cubana. El término transición implica que determinada sociedad se transforma en otra, por tanto, presenta caracteres de ambas. Este período culmina cuando la sociedad es transformada en lo esencial y las nuevas relaciones de producción triunfan de manera irreversible, se sustentan en la base técnico material apropiada, demuestran sus ventajas desde el punto de vista social en relación con las viejas relaciones de producción, y persisten por largo tiempo la herencia de la vieja sociedad en la nueva. En la fase imperialista, la revolución social se desencadena más fácil en la periferia que en los centros, se necesita crear la base técnica material del socialismo debido al subdesarrollo económico, por lo que el período de transición se torna largo, complejo, y se requiere la utilizacióndel capitalismo de Estado.

© 2020, Hui Situ, Carol Tilt, Pi-Shen Seet. Purpose: In a state capitalist country such as China, an important influence on company reporting is the government, which can influence company decision-making. The nature and impact of how the Chinese government uses its symbolic power to promote corporate environmental reporting (CER) have been under-studied, and therefore, this paper aims to address this gap in the literature by investigating the various strategies the Chinese government uses to influence CER and how political ideology plays a key role. Design/methodology/approach: This study uses discourse analysis to examine the annual reports and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports from seven Chinese companies between 2007 and 2011. And the data analysis presented is informed by Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic power. Findings: The Chinese government, through exercising the symbolic power, manages to build consensus, so that the Chinese government's political ideology becomes the habitus which is deeply embedded in the companies' perception of practices. In China, the government dominates the field and owns the economic capital. In order to accumulate symbolic capital, companies must adhere to political ideology, which helps them maintain and improve their social position and ultimately reward them with more economic capital. The findings show that the CER provided by Chinese companies is a symbolic product of this process. Originality/value: The paper provides contributions around the themes of symbolic power wielded by the government that influence not only state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but also firms in the private sector. This paper also provides an important contribution to understanding, in the context of a strong ideologically based political system (such as China), how political ideology influences companies' decision-making in the field of CER.

El propósito del presente artículo de investigación es analizar, mediante una perspectiva cualitativa, las manifestaciones del capitalismo de Estado en la economía cubana. El término transición implica que determinada sociedad se transforma en otra, por tanto, presenta caracteres de ambas. Este período culmina cuando la sociedad es transformada en lo esencial y las nuevas relaciones de producción triunfan de manera irreversible, se sustentan en la base técnico material apropiada, demuestran sus ventajas desde el punto de vista social en relación con las viejas relaciones de producción, y persisten por largo tiempo la herencia de la vieja sociedad en la nueva. En la fase imperialista, la revolución social se desencadena más fácil en la periferia que en los centros, se necesita crear la base técnica material del socialismo debido al subdesarrollo económico, por lo que el período de transición se torna largo, complejo, y se requiere la utilización del capitalismo de Estado., The purpose of this research article is to analyze with a qualitative methodology the manifestations of state capitalism in the Cuban economy. The term transition implies that a certain society is transformed into another, therefore it presents characteristics of both, this period culminates when society is transformed into the essential and the new relations of production irreversibly succeed, are based on the appropriate technical material base and they demonstrate their advantages from the social point of view in relation to the old relations of production, the inheritance of the old society persists for a long time in the new one. In the imperialist phase, the social revolution is triggered easier in the periphery than in the centers, it is necessary to create the material technical basis of socialism due to economic underdevelopment, so that the transition period becomes long, complex and requires the use of state capitalism.

El propósito del presente artículo de investigación es analizar, mediante una perspectiva cualitativa, las manifestaciones del capitalismo de Estado en la economía cubana. El término transición implica que determinada sociedad se transforma en otra, por tanto, presenta caracteres de ambas. Este período culmina cuando la sociedad es transformada en lo esencial y las nuevas relaciones de producción triunfan de manera irreversible, se sustentan en la base técnico material apropiada, demuestran sus ventajas desde el punto de vista social en relación con las viejas relaciones de producción, y persisten por largo tiempo la herencia de la vieja sociedad en la nueva. En la fase imperialista, la revolución social se desencadena más fácil en la periferia que en los centros, se necesita crear la base técnica material del socialismo debido al subdesarrollo económico, por lo que el período de transición se torna largo, complejo, y se requiere la utilización del capitalismo de Estado., The purpose of this research article is to analyze with a qualitative methodology the manifestations of state capitalism in the Cuban economy. The term transition implies that a certain society is transformed into another, therefore it presents characteristics of both, this period culminates when society is transformed into the essential and the new relations of production irreversibly succeed, are based on the appropriate technical material base and they demonstrate their advantages from the social point of view in relation to the old relations of production, the inheritance of the old society persists for a long time in the new one. In the imperialist phase, the social revolution is triggered easier in the periphery than in the centers, it is necessary to create the material technical basis of socialism due to economic underdevelopment, so that the transition period becomes long, complex and requires the use of state capitalism.

China’s unique economic system poses increasing challenges to the world trading system and attracts growing academic and policy debates. WTO members have frequently resorted to antidumping measures in dealing with price distortions caused by Chinese government influence in the economy. The Appellate Body’s decision in the recent EU – Biodiesel dispute starts to remove the flexibility of condemning state intervention and price distortions under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement through antidumping measures. This decision, read with the relevant WTO jurisprudence on the “ordinary course of trade” test and subsidies, suggests that price distortions resulting from state intervention should be addressed under other WTO rules. Therefore, it is necessary for WTO members to shift their focus to, and explore the capacity of, the other rules to overcome the challenges arising from China’s state capitalism.

This document analyzes the independent Marxist ideas that were developed by the Trinidadian C.L.R. James in his American stage (1938-1953) with the group known as the Johnson-Forest Tendency. C.L.R. James elaborates on philosophical studies in the Hegelian logic to give methodical depth to his criticisms regarding the Orthodox Marxism and to his analysis on state capitalism and social conditions of the exploited groups of his time, creating deeper studies on the black population of the United States of America., Resumo Este artigo analisa as ideias marxistas independentes desenvolvidas pela C.L.R. James em seu palco americano (1938-1953), no grupo conhecido como Tendência Johnson-Forest. O autor desenvolve estudos filosóficos sobre a lógica hegeliana para aprofundar metodicamente suas críticas ao marxismo ortodoxo e suas análises sobre o capitalismo de Estado e as condições sociais dos grupos explorados de sua época, com ênfase no estudo da população negra dos Estados Unidos., Resumen Este artículo analiza las ideas marxistas independientes desarrolladas por el trinitense C.L.R. James en su etapa americana (1938-1953), en el grupo conocido como Tendencia Johnson-Forest. El autor desarrolla estudios filosóficos sobre la lógica hegeliana para dar profundidad metódica a sus críticas del marxismo ortodoxo, y a sus análisis sobre el capitalismo de Estado y las condiciones sociales de los grupos explotados de su tiempo, con énfasis en el estudio de la población negra de Estados Unidos.

Die Art und Weise, wie das Verhältnis von Staat und Unternehmen in Indien seit den 1980er Jahren restrukturiert wurde, liefert wichtige Lektionen für das Verständnis des modernen Kapitalismus in großen Schwellenländern, auch im Kontrast zum traditionellen Modell des ostasiatischen Entwicklungsstaats. Ausgehend vom historischen Entstehungskontext entwickeln wir eine Charakterisierung des Staatskapitalismus in den indischen Ballungszentren als "staatlich durchdrungene Marktökonomie", bevor wir die Schattenseiten dieses Modells, insbesondere gravierende Ungleichheit, skizzieren, die - trotz aller wirtschaftlichen Dynamik des Kapitalismus in großen Schwellenländern wie Indien - notwendig mit diesem Wirtschaftsmodell verbunden sind., A study of the transforming relationship between state and business in India since the 1980s allows us to derive important insights into the functioning of modern capitalism in large emerging markets, also in contrast to the traditional model of the East Asian developmental state. Departing from the context of historical formation, we are characterizing state capitalism in major Indian urban areas as a "statepermeated market economy". However, in spite of all economic dynamism, this economic model is necessarily bound up with considerable down sides, including most notably severe inequality.

In den letzten Jahren konnte eine starke Zunahme der Bedeutung von multinationalen Unternehmen von außerhalb der traditionellen Triade der Weltökonomie (Japan, Nordamerika und Westeuropa sowie Australien) beobachtet werden. Auffällig ist dabei, dass eine besonders enge Beziehung mit dem Heimatstaat ein typisches Merkmal vieler multinationaler Unternehmen aus Schwellenländern ist. Zum einen geht es dabei um binnenstaatliche Maßnahmen, die das Wachstum dieser Unternehmen in ihren Heimatländern befördert haben, z.B. durch finanzielle Unterstützung oder regulatorische Maßnahmen, die gezielt auf die Bedürfnisse dieser Unternehmen ausgerichtet waren. Zum anderen geht es um die Unterstützung durch den Staat bei der Multinationalisierung dieser Unternehmen, beispielsweise in Form von diplomatischer Unterstützung für den Zugang zu natürlichen Ressourcen in anderen Ländern oder durch die Aushandlung bilateraler oder multilateraler Abkommen. Abschließend wird kurz zusammengefasst, welches Konfliktpotential zwischen den großen Schwellenländern und den etablierten Wirtschaftsmächten sich aus diesem besonders engen Verhältnis von Staat und großen Unternehmen in Schwellenländern in den nächsten Jahrzehnten ergeben kann., During the last years, we have been witnessing a strongly increasing role for multinational companies from outside of the traditional triad of the world economy (Japan, North America and Western Europe, as well as Australia). It is striking that a particularly close relationship with the home country state is among the most important features of emerging markets multinationals. This relationship features two sides: On the one hand, home state governments have implemented several domestic measures in order to support company growth, e.g. via financial support or regulatory measures tailored towards the requirements of these companies. On the other hand, home state governments have supported the transnational expansion of these companies, for example via diplomatic means for the access towards natural resources in other countries, or via the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements. The article concludes with summarizing potential conflicts between emerging powers and the triad, due to the particularly close relationship between emerging markets’ states and multinational companies.

This article critically analyses the recent reinvigoration of state capitalist economic strategies, guided by neodevelopmentalist political thought, in Brazil and Argentina. It makes use of analytical tools drawn from materialist state theory and dependency perspectives to show how the chances, limits and contradictions of these projects are shaped by the basic dynamics of peripheral capitalism. Thus, while both the Brazilian and Argentine state capitalist strategies have been relatively successful on many counts, especially compared to the previously dominant neoliberal paradigm, their social and economic balance has remained ambiguous overall. While in the Brazilian case there has been no fundamental break with the historical pattern of exclusionary growth, Argentina has achieved better social results, but at the price of heightened political instability. Neither country has managed to overcome classical problems of dependent development, such as a dependence on primary goods exports., Dieser Artikel untersucht kritisch das jüngste, durch neodesarrollistisches politisches Denken angeleitete Wiedererstarken staatskapitalistischer Wirtschaftsstrategien in Brasilien und Argentinien. Unter Verwendung analytischer Werkzeuge aus materialistischer Staatstheorie und Dependenzperspektiven zeigt er, inwiefern die Chancen, Grenzen und Widersprüche dieser Projekte durch die grundlegenden Dynamiken des peripheren Kapitalismus beeinflusst werden. Obwohl sowohl der brasilianische als auch der argentinische Staatskapitalismus insbesondere im Vergleich zum zuvor dominanten neoliberalen Paradigma in vielen Aspekten relativ erfolgreich waren, blieb ihre soziale und ökonomische Bilanz daher insgesamt widersprüchlich. Während im brasilianischen Fall kein grundlegender Bruch mit dem historischen Muster ausschließenden Wachstums vollzogen wurde, hat Argentinien bessere soziale Ergebnisse erzielt, allerdings um den Preis höherer politischer Instabilität. Keines der beiden Länder hat klassische Probleme abhängiger Entwicklung, etwa die Abhängigkeit von Primärgüterexporten, überwinden können.

Die Herausbildung staatlich durchdrungener Marktökonomien in großen Schwellenländern wie Brasilien, China oder Indien ist ein mehr als überfälliger Anlass, den Westzentrismus der aktuellen Krisendiskussionsowie der Literatur zu den "Varieties of Capitalism" zu verlassen und sich mit den Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschieden des Kapitalismus in diesen Ländern zu beschäftigen. Wir sprechen hierbei vom Staatskapitalismus 3.0, also einer dritten Welle des Staatskapitalismus mit ihren länderbezogenen Variationen. Dieser in den Themenschwerpunkt einführende Beitrag gibt erstens einen Überblick über die historischen Wellen des Staatskapitalismus. Zweitens werden die weiteren Beiträge des Schwerpunktes vorgestellt und in den Kontext der dritten Welle des Staatskapitalismus gestellt. Schließlich folgen drittens einige Implikationen für die gegenwärtige Kapitalismusforschung, die aus der Untersuchung von politischen Ökonomien jenseits der OECD-Welt zu ziehen sind., The evolution of state-permeated market economies in large emerging markets such as Brazil, China or India is a good reason for departing from the Eurocentrism of current debates about the economic crisis, as well as of the "Varieties of Capitalism"-literature. In order to capture the commonalities and differences among these economies, we speak of "state capitalism 3.0", i.e. a third wave of state capitalism with country-specific variations. In this introduction to the thematic issue, we first give an overview on the various historical waves of state capitalism. Next, we introduce the individual contributions to the thematic issue, by relating them to the third wave of state capitalism. Finally, we highlight a number of implications for contemporary research on capitalism, based on our comparative studies of political economies outside of the OECD area.