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In public safety oversight authorities are traditionally assumed responsible of safeguarding operation and promoting safety by defining prescriptions and observing that they are complied with. Regulated entities on their side are assumed responsibility for complying. While this compliance-based approach has contributed to current levels of safety, it is increasingly debated that it has limitations in yielding further safety achievements, that it represents a “one-size-fits-all” model regardless of diverse performance and needs in companies, and that its focus on standardization and proceduralization has negative side effects. Furthermore, the focus on means applied may seem off-target compared to focusing directly on safety outcomes achieved. Such arguments underlie contemporary developments into rational data-driven approaches introducing quantifiable safety goals, performance measurements, analysis of data and rational decision-making as basis for improvements. This approach aims at responsibilizing industry for safety outcomes, whereas authorities become responsible for monitoring and intervening whenever analysis of recorded outcome data deems so. A third approach relying on on-site survey interaction focused on concrete observations as offset for dialogue on technical, operational and managerial issues concerning safe operation has been implemented by an Authority in a specific context of passenger ship safety oversight. Taking offset in a maritime context this thesis examines these three approaches with a view to how they lead to distinct power relations in terms of responsibilization and empowerment. Major consequences for oversight effectiveness have also been touched. It is argued that although compliance-based and data-driven approaches apply different means, they rest on similar basic presumptions of linearity, predictability and rational decision making. These ideal perspectives may hold in part, but are not capable of grasping complex dynamics inherent

In public safety oversight authorities are traditionally assumed responsible of safeguarding operation and promoting safety by defining prescriptions and observing that they are complied with. Regulated entities on their side are assumed responsibility for complying. While this compliance-based approach has contributed to current levels of safety, it is increasingly debated that it has limitations in yielding further safety achievements, that it represents a “one-size-fits-all” model regardless of diverse performance and needs in companies, and that its focus on standardization and proceduralization has negative side effects. Furthermore, the focus on means applied may seem off-target compared to focusing directly on safety outcomes achieved. Such arguments underlie contemporary developments into rational data-driven approaches introducing quantifiable safety goals, performance measurements, analysis of data and rational decision-making as basis for improvements. This approach aims at responsibilizing industry for safety outcomes, whereas authorities become responsible for monitoring and intervening whenever analysis of recorded outcome data deems so. A third approach relying on on-site survey interaction focused on concrete observations as offset for dialogue on technical, operational and managerial issues concerning safe operation has been implemented by an Authority in a specific context of passenger ship safety oversight. Taking offset in a maritime context this thesis examines these three approaches with a view to how they lead to distinct power relations in terms of responsibilization and empowerment. Major consequences for oversight effectiveness have also been touched. It is argued that although compliance-based and data-driven approaches apply different means, they rest on similar basic presumptions of linearity, predictability and rational decision making. These ideal perspectives may hold in part, but are not capable of grasping complex dynamics inherent

In public safety oversight authorities are traditionally assumed responsible of safeguarding operation and promoting safety by defining prescriptions and observing that they are complied with. Regulated entities on their side are assumed responsibility for complying. While this compliance-based approach has contributed to current levels of safety, it is increasingly debated that it has limitations in yielding further safety achievements, that it represents a “one-size-fits-all” model regardless of diverse performance and needs in companies, and that its focus on standardization and proceduralization has negative side effects. Furthermore, the focus on means applied may seem off-target compared to focusing directly on safety outcomes achieved. Such arguments underlie contemporary developments into rational data-driven approaches introducing quantifiable safety goals, performance measurements, analysis of data and rational decision-making as basis for improvements. This approach aims at responsibilizing industry for safety outcomes, whereas authorities become responsible for monitoring and intervening whenever analysis of recorded outcome data deems so. A third approach relying on on-site survey interaction focused on concrete observations as offset for dialogue on technical, operational and managerial issues concerning safe operation has been implemented by an Authority in a specific context of passenger ship safety oversight. Taking offset in a maritime context this thesis examines these three approaches with a view to how they lead to distinct power relations in terms of responsibilization and empowerment. Major consequences for oversight effectiveness have also been touched. It is argued that although compliance-based and data-driven approaches apply different means, they rest on similar basic presumptions of linearity, predictability and rational decision making. These ideal perspectives may hold in part, but are not capable of grasping complex dynamics inherent

In public safety oversight authorities are traditionally assumed responsible of safeguarding operation and promoting safety by defining prescriptions and observing that they are complied with. Regulated entities on their side are assumed responsibility for complying. While this compliance-based approach has contributed to current levels of safety, it is increasingly debated that it has limitations in yielding further safety achievements, that it represents a “one-size-fits-all” model regardless of diverse performance and needs in companies, and that its focus on standardization and proceduralization has negative side effects. Furthermore, the focus on means applied may seem off-target compared to focusing directly on safety outcomes achieved. Such arguments underlie contemporary developments into rational data-driven approaches introducing quantifiable safety goals, performance measurements, analysis of data and rational decision-making as basis for improvements. This approach aims at responsibilizing industry for safety outcomes, whereas authorities become responsible for monitoring and intervening whenever analysis of recorded outcome data deems so. A third approach relying on on-site survey interaction focused on concrete observations as offset for dialogue on technical, operational and managerial issues concerning safe operation has been implemented by an Authority in a specific context of passenger ship safety oversight. Taking offset in a maritime context this thesis examines these three approaches with a view to how they lead to distinct power relations in terms of responsibilization and empowerment. Major consequences for oversight effectiveness have also been touched. It is argued that although compliance-based and data-driven approaches apply different means, they rest on similar basic presumptions of linearity, predictability and rational decision making. These ideal perspectives may hold in part, but are not capable of grasping complex dynamics inherent

These guidelines will assist states, oversight agencies, and rail transit agencies in developing safety and security programs to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). These requirements were published in the Federal Register on December 27, 1995 as "Rail Fixed Guideway Systems: State Safety Oversight". These guidelines are directed at states and rail transit systems receiving Federal funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas. These guidelines are organized by the key steps that states, oversight agencies, and rail transit systems must take in establishing and administering effective rail safety and security oversight programs.