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Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, mediation in armed conflicts have become a popular way of conflict resolution and a valuable tool for states to promote their interests.The paper argues that mediation has been instrumentalised by Russia and has been used as atool in expanding Russian foreign policy in the Russian Near and Far Abroad. Coercion through military support is a cornerstone in Russian mediation strategy as it is used to maximise the leverage over the adversaries in the conflict and secure the best outcome for both Russia and the party that it supports. The paper will use the realism theory to examine four different cases where Russia was a third-party mediator, and it will try to shed light on the interests that Russia pursued through its participation in the mediation as well as the role of coercion in the Russian mediation strategy.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, mediation in armed conflicts have become a popular way of conflict resolution and a valuable tool for states to promote their interests.The paper argues that mediation has been instrumentalised by Russia and has been used as atool in expanding Russian foreign policy in the Russian Near and Far Abroad. Coercion through military support is a cornerstone in Russian mediation strategy as it is used to maximise the leverage over the adversaries in the conflict and secure the best outcome for both Russia and the party that it supports. The paper will use the realism theory to examine four different cases where Russia was a third-party mediator, and it will try to shed light on the interests that Russia pursued through its participation in the mediation as well as the role of coercion in the Russian mediation strategy.

Almost unanimously, official speeches and documents and, at the same time, a large number of academic texts in the West brand Russia as a “revisionist” power. Especially since the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Moscow and the start of the Donbas conflict in 2014, the Eurasian state has been considered as a “spoiler” of international politics, supposedly in search of the weakening of the values, rules and institutions of the so-called “Liberal International Order”. This article aims to problematize this statement by arguing that the category of revisionism does not constitute a one-dimensional international state behaviour, or an objective one. On the other hand, following Murray (2019), revisionism, in addition to its domestic roots, is built through social interactions with other countries, as part of a state’s struggle for recognition. After a review of the literature on this concept and the position of Murray's theory, this article analyses the motives and strategies of Russia in the post-Cold War international order, as well as the capabilities that support its foreign policy. In this light, it will assess the “degree” of revisionism in Russia’s international relations of recent years., Casi de modo unánime, discursos y documentos oficiales y, a la par, un gran número de textos académicos en Occidente tildan a Rusia como una potencia revisionista. Sobre todo, a partir de la toma de Crimea y Sebastopol por parte de Moscú y el inicio del conflicto en el Donbás en el año 2014, se le considera al Estado eurasiático como un spoiler de la política internacional, en búsqueda del debilitamiento de los valores, las reglas e instituciones del denominado «Orden Internacional Liberal». El presente artículo se propone problematizar esta afirmación al postular que la categoría del revisionismo no constituye una proyección internacional unidimensional, ni tampoco objetiva. Por otro lado, siguiendo a Murray (2019), el revisionismo, además de emerger al interior de un Estado, también se construye a través de las interacciones sociales con otros Estados, como efecto de su pugna por el reconocimiento. Luego de una revisión de la literatura sobre dicho concepto y la ubicación de la teoría de Murray en ella, el presente artículo indaga en los motivos y las estrategias de Rusia en el orden pos Guerra Fría, así como las capacidades que sustentan su política exterior. Bajo esta luz, se evaluará el grado de revisionismo en la proyección internacional rusa de los últimos años.

This dissertation explains the evolution of Turkey-Russia relations in 2001 2020. Turkey and Russia are two of the most critical powerhouses of Central Eurasia. In the past, the Russian Empire played a significant role in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and Turkey took part in containing the USSR during the Cold War. In 2001 2020, however, Turkey and Russia invested in bilateral trade and established partnerships in the defense and energy sectors. Two countries also worked together to resolve several regional conflicts, including the Syrian Crisis. Despite this trend’s regional and global significance, the literature suffers from an inadequacy of extensive research on Turkey-Russia relations. Thus, an insightful explanation of their bilateral relations will contribute to understanding the most recent dynamics in the Turkey-Russia nexus and the political dynamics in multiple regions. This research addresses the following question: How did Turkey and Russia’s cooperation prevail over the competition between them in 2001-2020? To address this question, I consider that the Turkey Russia nexus is a formation created by two ‘composite’ states. They interact with one another at strategic, normative, and economic dimensions in the context of turbulent regional and global political dynamics. I argue that the Western influence in the region was a defining phenomenon over the way Turkey-Russia relations took their form. In 2001-2020, the weakening of the US-led Western hegemonic power in Central Eurasia and the assertive foreign policy strategies of Turkey and Russia caused the Turkey-Russia nexus to develop outside of (and often in opposition to) the Western hegemonic influence.

The following comparative case study examines Russian foreign policy since the creation of the Russian Federation. The study aims to explain if and to what extent the Russian interference in armed conflicts have changed during Vladimir Putin's administration compared to Boris Yeltsin's. The study seeks systemic explanations to Russian involvement in armed conflicts by examining them from a structural realist perspective, and seeks cultural and indigenous russian explanations to russian involvement by examining them from a putinist perspective. The result shows that the reasons for Russian interference in armed conflict have changed during Vladimir Putin’s reign, due to the fact that the Russian interference in the Syrian war marks the first example of Russian global revisionism since the creation of the Russian Federation. However, the result is not due to Vladimir Putin himself, but cultural and structural reasons that have affected Russian leaders for centuries.

Článek je koncipován jako přehled diplomatické kariéry hraběte Nikolaje Pavloviče Ignatěva (1832-1908). Svou první zahraniční misi absolvoval jako vojenský atašé ve Velké Británii (1856-1857). Úspěšně vedl mise do Buchary a Chivy (1858) a do Pekingu (1860). Byl jedním z prvních ruských diplomatů, kteří považovali Velkou Británii za hlavního konkurenta Ruska, a stal se jedním z tvůrců tzv. Velké hry (Great Game), soupeření Ruska s Británií o vliv ve Střední Asii a na Středním východě. V letech 1861-1864 vedl Asijské oddělení Ministerstva zahraničních věcí, takže se zabýval také Osmanskou říší. Zároveň bylo jeho politické myšlení ovlivněno ideologií panslavismu. Ignatěv pokračoval jako velvyslanec v Konstantinopoli v letech 1864-1877 a sebevědomě posílil pozici Ruska v Bosporu a na Balkáně.Právě v Konstantinopoli si získal značnou mezinárodní slávu, ale výrazně negativní kvůli nepřátelství s Brity. I když byl schopným diplomatem, byl též velmi upovídaným intrikánem, což ho nakonec stálo kariéru. Ignatěv ztělesňoval ruské imperiální ambice, jak tradiční, tak i nové: proti Osmanské říši, Střední Asii, Dálnému východu. Byl jedním z prvních představitelů nové, divoké generace diplomatů, kteří příliš nevěřili ve spolupráci s evropskými mocnostmi (na rozdíl od kancléře A. K. Gorčakova a jeho okruhu) a spoléhal se více na ruskou moc. Ignatěv se také nebál využít rostoucího nacionalismu malých slovanských národů a panslavistických tendencí v Rusku a mezi balkánskými Slovany po krymské válce.Díky tomu všemu představoval typ diplomata, který se v ruské zahraniční politice stal běžnějším ve druhé polovině 19. století., The article is conceived as an overview of the diplomatic career of Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev (1832-1908). He completed his first foreign mission as a military attaché in the United Kingdom (1856-1857). He successfully led missions to Bukhara and Khiva (1858) and Beijing (1860). He was one of the first Russian diplomats to consider Great Britain as the main competitor of the Russian Empire and became one of the creators of the Great Game, Russia‘s rivalry with Britain for influence in Central Asia and the Middle East. In 1861-1864, he headed the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so he also dealt with the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, his political thinking was influenced by the ideology of Panslavism. Ignatiev continued as an ambassador in Constantinople in 1864-1877 and confidently strengthened the position of Russia in the Bosphorus and the Balkans. It was in Constantinople that he earned considerable international fame, but significantly negative due to hostility with the British. Although he was a capable diplomat, he was also a very talkative schemer, which eventually cost him a career. Ignatiev personified Russia‘s imperial ambitions, both traditional and new: against the Ottoman Empire, Central Asia, the Far East. He was one of the first representatives of a new, ferocious generation of diplomats who did not believe very much in cooperation with European powers (unlike Chancellor A. K. Gorchakov and his circle) and relied more on Russian power. Ignatiev was also not afraid to exploit the growing nationalism of the small Slavic nations and the pan-Slavist tendencies in Russia and among the Balkan Slavs after the Crimean War. By all of this, he was a type of diplomat who had become more common in Russian foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century.

Представлены вопросы современного военного сотрудничества России. Автор анализирует влияние последних событий на военное взаимодействие России и иностранных государств., The text presents issues of contemporary military cooperation between Russia and foreign states. The author analyzes the impact of recent events on the military interaction between Russia and foreign states.

The following comparative case study examines Russian foreign policy since the creation of the Russian Federation. The study aims to explain if and to what extent the Russian interference in armed conflicts have changed during Vladimir Putin's administration compared to Boris Yeltsin's. The study seeks systemic explanations to Russian involvement in armed conflicts by examining them from a structural realist perspective, and seeks cultural and indigenous russian explanations to russian involvement by examining them from a putinist perspective. The result shows that the reasons for Russian interference in armed conflict have changed during Vladimir Putin’s reign, due to the fact that the Russian interference in the Syrian war marks the first example of Russian global revisionism since the creation of the Russian Federation. However, the result is not due to Vladimir Putin himself, but cultural and structural reasons that have affected Russian leaders for centuries.

By agreeing to The Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) at the United Nations World Summit in 2005, and later adopting a resolution reaffirming the support, the Russian federation accepted a responsibility of the international community to protect populations of other states, if the state itself manifestly fails to protect its own populations. However, Russia has acted in an inconsistent way by exercising its commitment to the R2P principle occasionally. The purpose of this study is to give an answer to the question of why Russia has acted in an inconsistent way to The Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Analyzing the inconsistency puzzle through the realist, liberal and constructivist lens, questioning why Russia has accepted an R2P intervention regarding Libya to halt ongoing mass atrocities, but repeatedly has vetoed against R2P interventions regarding Syria and recently regarding Venezuela, the study concludes that a combination of the three approaches is needed to explain and understand Russia’s inconsistent reaction. Second, it concludes that Russia acted inconsistently because President Medvedev was affected by, and agreeing with, international norms, thereby accepting an R2P into Libya, while President Putin was affected by, and wanted to hold on to the Russian identity. By rejecting R2P interventions in the Syria and Venezuela cases, Putin thereby secured Russian national interests, using a liberal narrative as a pretext for the actions.

By agreeing to The Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) at the United Nations World Summit in 2005, and later adopting a resolution reaffirming the support, the Russian federation accepted a responsibility of the international community to protect populations of other states, if the state itself manifestly fails to protect its own populations. However, Russia has acted in an inconsistent way by exercising its commitment to the R2P principle occasionally. The purpose of this study is to give an answer to the question of why Russia has acted in an inconsistent way to The Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Analyzing the inconsistency puzzle through the realist, liberal and constructivist lens, questioning why Russia has accepted an R2P intervention regarding Libya to halt ongoing mass atrocities, but repeatedly has vetoed against R2P interventions regarding Syria and recently regarding Venezuela, the study concludes that a combination of the three approaches is needed to explain and understand Russia’s inconsistent reaction. Second, it concludes that Russia acted inconsistently because President Medvedev was affected by, and agreeing with, international norms, thereby accepting an R2P into Libya, while President Putin was affected by, and wanted to hold on to the Russian identity. By rejecting R2P interventions in the Syria and Venezuela cases, Putin thereby secured Russian national interests, using a liberal narrative as a pretext for the actions.

Sir Rodric Braithwaite was educated at Christ’s College, University of Cambridge, from where he went to serve in HM Diplomatic Service, having worked in Jakarta, Moscow, Washington, Warsaw, Rome, and Brussels, where he was a member of the British delegation to the European Community. From 1988 to 1992, Sir Rodric served as HM Ambassador in the Soviet Union during the decisive years of the Perestroika and the first British ambassador in Russia. Subsequently, he was appointed foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister in the second John Major ministry and chaired the UK Joint Intelligence Committee between 1992 and 1993. He was appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (GCMG) in 1994. As a career diplomat, Sir Rodric gained decades of insight into the troubled relations between Russia and West, having taken part in numerous negotiations on arms control. His affinity with the decision-making circles in both Russia and Britain alongside with the mastery of the Russian language allow him to skillfully dissect the underlying causes of ups-and-downs in Moscow’s relationship with the West, employing the works of both English- and Russian-speaking analysts. Among his recent books are Across the Moscow River (2002), Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (2006), Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 (2012), Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation (2017). In this essay, Sir Rodric reminisces of the years spent as a diplomat and provides his view on the usefulness and applicability of historical lessons while devising a foreign policy course., Представлено эссе сэра Родрика Брейтвейта, выпускника Колледжа Христа Кембриджского университета. После завершения учебы он поступил на службу в Министерство иностранных дел Великобритании и занимал дипломатические посты в таких городах, как Джакарта, Москва, Вашингтон, Варшава, Рим и Брюссель; в последнем он работал в качестве члена британской делегации в Европейском сообществе. В 1988–1992 гг. сэр Родрик был послом Великобритании в СССР в ходе решающих лет перестройки и впоследствии стал первым британским послом в Российской Федерации, позднее был назначен советником премьер-министра по внешней политике во втором кабинете Джона Мейджора, в 1992–1993 гг. возглавлял Объединенный разведывательный комитет Великобритании. В 1994 г. был титулован рыцарем Большого Креста ордена Святых Михаила и Георгия. Будучи ветераном дипломатической службы, сэр Родрик в течение многих десятилетий был близко знаком с основными вопросами непростых отношений между Россией и Западом, в том числе принимал участие в многочисленных переговорах по контролю над вооружениями. Его контакты в политическом истеблишменте как России, так и Великобритании, а также владение русским языком позволяют ему точно анализировать причины взлетов и падений в отношениях Москвы с западными соседями, привлекая работы англо- и русскоязычных аналитиков. В числе его недавних работ – Across the Moscow River (2002), Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (2006), Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 (2012), Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation (2017). В настоящем эссе сэр Родрик проводит обзор своей дипломатической практики и рассуждает о пользе и применимости исторических примеров во внешней политике.

This article contains a talk between Andrey Sushentsov, head of the MGIMO University Institute for International Studies and Professor William Wohlforth, a leading American international relations theorist and one of the founders of neoclassical realism. Having received his PhD in Yale, Wohlforth began his career as a specialist on Russia. One of his key works is the study of the driving forces behind the foreign policy of early USSR. His studies have also focused on the issue of the global balance of power and superpower dynamics. Overall, Wohlforth has authored or edited nine books and some 60 articles or chapters on a wide range of topics from US foreign policy strategy to the Cold War. Thus, the changes in Russian foreign policy and its global influence have always remained in the focus of Wohlforth’s attention. Wohlforth is currently a member of the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, mainly teaching and researching international security and foreign policy issues. Since 2018, he has been in charge of the Laboratory of International Trends Analysis at MGIMO which carries out applied research in the field of international issues. The talk considers issues concerning the strategic culture of Russian policy, focusing on the biographic and academic foundations of the scholar’s interest in Russia, and his collaboration with Russian specialists., Представлена беседа директора Института международных исследований МГИМО Университета Андрея Сушенцова и ведущего американского теоретика-международника, одного из основателей школы неоклассического реализма профессора Уильяма Уолфорта. Защитив диссертацию в Йеле, путь в науке Уолфорт начинал как специалист по России, а одной из его ключевых работ стало исследование движущих сил внешней политики раннего СССР. В его работах также затрагивались вопросы глобального баланса сил и динамики отношений между сверхдержавами. Профессор Уолфорт является автором или редактором девяти книг и порядка 60 статей или глав, посвященных широкому кругу вопросов – от внешнеполитической стратегии США до политики эпохи холодной войны. Изменения в российской внешней политике и степени влияния России на мировой арене неизменно оставались в фокусе внимания Уолфорта. С 2018 г. профессор Уолфорт руководит Лабораторией анализа международных процессов в МГИМО, где реализуются прикладные исследования международных проблем. В беседе затрагиваются вопросы стратегической культуры российской политики, раскрываются биографические и научные основы интереса американского иследователя к России, его взаимодействие с российскими специалистами.

There is broad agreement among commentators and analysts that Russia seeks to undermine the US-led liberal international order. At the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the nature and extent of the challenge Moscow poses, the underlying drivers of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. In this article, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between three major perspectives. In brief, the first suggests that Russia is a ‘revanchist power’ that seeks to overturn the very foundations of the liberal world order. The second perspective holds that Russia is a ‘defensive power’ that works for incremental changes within the existing order. The third perspective contends that Russia is an ‘aggressive isolationist’, meaning that the Putin regime deliberately plays a spoiler role in international affairs to boost its domestic legitimacy. This article describes in detail the arguments of the three perspectives; it shows that each suffers from explanatory shortcomings and defects; and it outlines how the contributions to this special issue address the identified shortcomings.

There is broad agreement among commentators and analysts that Russia seeks to undermine the US-led liberal international order. At the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the nature and extent of the challenge Moscow poses, the underlying drivers of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. In this article, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between three major perspectives. In brief, the first suggests that Russia is a ‘revanchist power’ that seeks to overturn the very foundations of the liberal world order. The second perspective holds that Russia is a ‘defensive power’ that works for incremental changes within the existing order. The third perspective contends that Russia is an ‘aggressive isolationist’, meaning that the Putin regime deliberately plays a spoiler role in international affairs to boost its domestic legitimacy. This article describes in detail the arguments of the three perspectives; it shows that each suffers from explanatory shortcomings and defects; and it outlines how the contributions to this special issue address the identified shortcomings.

There is broad agreement among commentators and analysts that Russia seeks to undermine the US-led liberal international order. At the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the nature and extent of the challenge Moscow poses, the underlying drivers of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. In this article, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between three major perspectives. In brief, the first suggests that Russia is a ‘revanchist power’ that seeks to overturn the very foundations of the liberal world order. The second perspective holds that Russia is a ‘defensive power’ that works for incremental changes within the existing order. The third perspective contends that Russia is an ‘aggressive isolationist’, meaning that the Putin regime deliberately plays a spoiler role in international affairs to boost its domestic legitimacy. This article describes in detail the arguments of the three perspectives; it shows that each suffers from explanatory shortcomings and defects; and it outlines how the contributions to this special issue address the identified shortcomings.

There is broad agreement among commentators and analysts that Russia seeks to undermine the US-led liberal international order. At the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the nature and extent of the challenge Moscow poses, the underlying drivers of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. In this article, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between three major perspectives. In brief, the first suggests that Russia is a ‘revanchist power’ that seeks to overturn the very foundations of the liberal world order. The second perspective holds that Russia is a ‘defensive power’ that works for incremental changes within the existing order. The third perspective contends that Russia is an ‘aggressive isolationist’, meaning that the Putin regime deliberately plays a spoiler role in international affairs to boost its domestic legitimacy. This article describes in detail the arguments of the three perspectives; it shows that each suffers from explanatory shortcomings and defects; and it outlines how the contributions to this special issue address the identified shortcomings.

There is broad agreement among commentators and analysts that Russia seeks to undermine the US-led liberal international order. At the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the nature and extent of the challenge Moscow poses, the underlying drivers of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. In this article, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between three major perspectives. In brief, the first suggests that Russia is a ‘revanchist power’ that seeks to overturn the very foundations of the liberal world order. The second perspective holds that Russia is a ‘defensive power’ that works for incremental changes within the existing order. The third perspective contends that Russia is an ‘aggressive isolationist’, meaning that the Putin regime deliberately plays a spoiler role in international affairs to boost its domestic legitimacy. This article describes in detail the arguments of the three perspectives; it shows that each suffers from explanatory shortcomings and defects; and it outlines how the contributions to this special issue address the identified shortcomings.

Even the most obvious actions require justification. The need for justification of peacebuilding involvements is always present. This thesis argues that justification is particularly needed when there is a prevalent power asymmetry between an external state and a host community. The dissertation addresses how the attempts of states to justify their engagement in peacebuilding should be evaluated in the light of justification theory. The study’s research questions are addressed by developing a theoretical framework based on justification theory that is combined with empirical case studies. As a result, the starting-point for this dissertation is both descriptive and normative. It builds upon and develops the theory of justification offered by Rainer Forst, by testing Forst’s formal criteria of reciprocity and generality on two case studies, the Republic of South Africa and the Russian Federation. The thesis attempts to scrutinize the role played by the justifications made by external states engaged in peacebuilding. The focus on how Russia and South Africa view, act, and try to justify their peacebuilding efforts, serves to further nuance our theoretical understanding of the justification of external states in peacebuilding processes. The study is exploring which justification strategies are being used and how. By combining ethical analysis with empirical research and by building on an analysis of the case studies, the study presents two typologies of the attempts at justification which Russia and South Africa make in their foreign policy discourse. In order to accomplish this, the thesis uses different methods, including case studies, expert interviews, and document analysis. This study is written within the critical discipline of social ethics. By making a critical analysis of the official Russian and South African foreign policy discourses on peace engagements, this dissertation aims to contribute to existing literature both empirically and theoretically. The anal

Even the most obvious actions require justification. The need for justification of peacebuilding involvements is always present. This thesis argues that justification is particularly needed when there is a prevalent power asymmetry between an external state and a host community. The dissertation addresses how the attempts of states to justify their engagement in peacebuilding should be evaluated in the light of justification theory. The study’s research questions are addressed by developing a theoretical framework based on justification theory that is combined with empirical case studies. As a result, the starting-point for this dissertation is both descriptive and normative. It builds upon and develops the theory of justification offered by Rainer Forst, by testing Forst’s formal criteria of reciprocity and generality on two case studies, the Republic of South Africa and the Russian Federation. The thesis attempts to scrutinize the role played by the justifications made by external states engaged in peacebuilding. The focus on how Russia and South Africa view, act, and try to justify their peacebuilding efforts, serves to further nuance our theoretical understanding of the justification of external states in peacebuilding processes. The study is exploring which justification strategies are being used and how. By combining ethical analysis with empirical research and by building on an analysis of the case studies, the study presents two typologies of the attempts at justification which Russia and South Africa make in their foreign policy discourse. In order to accomplish this, the thesis uses different methods, including case studies, expert interviews, and document analysis. This study is written within the critical discipline of social ethics. By making a critical analysis of the official Russian and South African foreign policy discourses on peace engagements, this dissertation aims to contribute to existing literature both empirically and theoretically. The anal

Even the most obvious actions require justification. The need for justification of peacebuilding involvements is always present. This thesis argues that justification is particularly needed when there is a prevalent power asymmetry between an external state and a host community. The dissertation addresses how the attempts of states to justify their engagement in peacebuilding should be evaluated in the light of justification theory. The study’s research questions are addressed by developing a theoretical framework based on justification theory that is combined with empirical case studies. As a result, the starting-point for this dissertation is both descriptive and normative. It builds upon and develops the theory of justification offered by Rainer Forst, by testing Forst’s formal criteria of reciprocity and generality on two case studies, the Republic of South Africa and the Russian Federation. The thesis attempts to scrutinize the role played by the justifications made by external states engaged in peacebuilding. The focus on how Russia and South Africa view, act, and try to justify their peacebuilding efforts, serves to further nuance our theoretical understanding of the justification of external states in peacebuilding processes. The study is exploring which justification strategies are being used and how. By combining ethical analysis with empirical research and by building on an analysis of the case studies, the study presents two typologies of the attempts at justification which Russia and South Africa make in their foreign policy discourse. In order to accomplish this, the thesis uses different methods, including case studies, expert interviews, and document analysis. This study is written within the critical discipline of social ethics. By making a critical analysis of the official Russian and South African foreign policy discourses on peace engagements, this dissertation aims to contribute to existing literature both empirically and theoretically. The anal

Even the most obvious actions require justification. The need for justification of peacebuilding involvements is always present. This thesis argues that justification is particularly needed when there is a prevalent power asymmetry between an external state and a host community. The dissertation addresses how the attempts of states to justify their engagement in peacebuilding should be evaluated in the light of justification theory. The study’s research questions are addressed by developing a theoretical framework based on justification theory that is combined with empirical case studies. As a result, the starting-point for this dissertation is both descriptive and normative. It builds upon and develops the theory of justification offered by Rainer Forst, by testing Forst’s formal criteria of reciprocity and generality on two case studies, the Republic of South Africa and the Russian Federation. The thesis attempts to scrutinize the role played by the justifications made by external states engaged in peacebuilding. The focus on how Russia and South Africa view, act, and try to justify their peacebuilding efforts, serves to further nuance our theoretical understanding of the justification of external states in peacebuilding processes. The study is exploring which justification strategies are being used and how. By combining ethical analysis with empirical research and by building on an analysis of the case studies, the study presents two typologies of the attempts at justification which Russia and South Africa make in their foreign policy discourse. In order to accomplish this, the thesis uses different methods, including case studies, expert interviews, and document analysis. This study is written within the critical discipline of social ethics. By making a critical analysis of the official Russian and South African foreign policy discourses on peace engagements, this dissertation aims to contribute to existing literature both empirically and theoretically. The anal

Even the most obvious actions require justification. The need for justification of peacebuilding involvements is always present. This thesis argues that justification is particularly needed when there is a prevalent power asymmetry between an external state and a host community. The dissertation addresses how the attempts of states to justify their engagement in peacebuilding should be evaluated in the light of justification theory. The study’s research questions are addressed by developing a theoretical framework based on justification theory that is combined with empirical case studies. As a result, the starting-point for this dissertation is both descriptive and normative. It builds upon and develops the theory of justification offered by Rainer Forst, by testing Forst’s formal criteria of reciprocity and generality on two case studies, the Republic of South Africa and the Russian Federation. The thesis attempts to scrutinize the role played by the justifications made by external states engaged in peacebuilding. The focus on how Russia and South Africa view, act, and try to justify their peacebuilding efforts, serves to further nuance our theoretical understanding of the justification of external states in peacebuilding processes. The study is exploring which justification strategies are being used and how. By combining ethical analysis with empirical research and by building on an analysis of the case studies, the study presents two typologies of the attempts at justification which Russia and South Africa make in their foreign policy discourse. In order to accomplish this, the thesis uses different methods, including case studies, expert interviews, and document analysis. This study is written within the critical discipline of social ethics. By making a critical analysis of the official Russian and South African foreign policy discourses on peace engagements, this dissertation aims to contribute to existing literature both empirically and theoretically. The anal

International arms sales are a useful tool in executing a country’s economic and foreign policy strategy. As such, investigating the drivers behind these exports discloses a state’s priorities. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russian arms sales have steadily increased in several geographic areas while Russo-American relations have gradually deteriorated. Therefore, as Putin seeks to foster global multi-polarity in order to challenge the American-dominated geopolitical world order, how is Russia conducting international arms sales and for what reasons? This thesis investigates Russian arms sales to China, India, and the Middle East in order to determine Putin’s motives behind his export agenda. It focuses on analyzing the potential relationships of two main hypotheses: domestic economic factors and international political factors. This thesis argues that while Russian arms sales generated many domestic economic benefits, especially in the early years of Putin’s presidency, international political factors provided the greater impetus behind Russia’s export of military hardware. Specifically, Putin used arms sales to secure both influence and leverage with selected partners with the intent of developing a polycentric world, balancing the United States, and improving Russia’s reputation as a great power. In conclusion, although Putin has achieved some gains from using arms exports as a foreign policy tool, the long-term benefits of his overall strategy are minimal., http://archive.org/details/russianarmssales1094559571, Major, United States Marine Corps, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Nowadays education can not only be studied within the framework of a country's internal politics, because, across national boundaries, education, like all spheres of human activity, tends to be global. And so it becomes one of the resources of the foreign policy of the states: a powerful and long-term perspective tool. Lately, many states support the development of soft power politics, and Education is a part of this strategy as one of the main instruments to create a positive image of the country abroad. Because of this, international collaboration in the field of Education is part of the geopolitical interests of the state. We consider that it is a current issue, not only to study the importance of international educational collaboration within the framework of the social policy of the country, as well as to analyze it from the point of view of international relations. In the article we research the comparative analysis of the foreign cultural policy of Russia and Spain. We describe the experience of the creation of the first Double Degree programs between Russia and Spain in the context of the educational development strategies of the two countries. We analyze the first results of the operation of these programs which represented a very important progress in the international collaboration of the two countries., Hoy en día la Educación no puede ser estudiada solamente en el marco de la política interior de un país, porque, cruzando las fronteras nacionales, la Educación, igual que todas las esferas de la actividad humana, tiende a ser global. Y así se va convirtiendo en uno de los recursos de la política exterior de los estados, recursos potentes y perspectivos a largo plazo. Últimamente, muchos estados apuestan por el desarrollo de la política del poder blando, y la Educación, desde luego, forma parte de esta estrategia como uno de los instrumentos principales de la creación de la imagen positiva del país en el extranjero. Debido a esto, la colaboración internacional en la esfera de la Educación forma parte de la esfera de los intereses geopolíticos del estado. Consideramos muy actual no solamente hacer el estudio de la importancia de la colaboración internacional educativa en el marco de la política social del país, sino analizarla desde el punto de vista de las perspectivas de relaciones internacionales. En el artículo se investiga y se hace el análisis comparativo de la política cultural exterior de Rusia y España; se estudia la experiencia de la creación de los primeros programas de Doble Titulación entre Rusia y España en el contexto de las estrategias del desarrollo de la Educación de los dos países. Se analizan los primeros resultados del funcionamiento de dichos programas, que supusieron un avance muy importante en la colaboración internacional de los dos países.

The collapse of the USSR became a critical point for the development of the independent Russian state and for all its inherent attributes, including the whole complex of foreign policy instruments. The article is an attempt to put the development of the public diplomacy institution in the framework of the evolution of the Russian foreign policy complex after the collapse of the USSR. Taking into consideration the fact that the elaboration of the foreign policy, and in particular the introduction of “soft power” resources into the foreign policy course, is strongly connected with the people’s understanding of the nation’s place on the international stage, it seems appropriate to look at the internal processes of national idea building in post-Soviet Russia. Therefore, the article is a generalized synchronization of three tracks of Russia’s development after the collapse of the USSR: foreign policy concept evolution, national idea building and public diplomacy development., Распад СССР стал переломным моментом в развитии независимого российского государства и всех присущих ему атрибутов, включая весь комплекс внешнеполитических инструментов. В статье предпринята попытка вписать развитие института публичной дипломатии в рамки эволюции комплекса внешней политики России после распада СССР. Принимая во внимание, что формирование внешней политики и в особенности внедрение во внешнеполитический курс ресурсов «мягкой силы» неразрывно связано с народным осознанием места своего государства на мировой арене, видится оправданным проследить внутригосударственные процессы строительства национальной идеи постсоветской России. Таким образом, статья представляет собой обобщенную синхронизацию трех треков развития России в постсоветский период: эволюция внешнеполитической концепции, формирование национальной идеи и становление публичной дипломатии.

With its growing geopolitical inclination, Russian foreign policy has beenconsidered as a resurgence of Eurasianism (Neo-Eurasianism).Notwithstanding its strong geopolitical sense, Eurasianism is multifacetedconcept. It is often associated with philosophical thinking, cultural andpolitical doctrines which changed over time and yet full of contradictions. Thisarticle seeks to find out the influence of Neo-Eurasianism in Russian foreignpolicy. Tracing back the idea of Eurasianism from historical perspective andemploying Graham Smith classification on school of Eurasianism, this articleargues that the rise of Neo-Eurasianism in Russia is driven by the needs todefine and strengthen the spheres of influences. It is mainly motivated byethnocentric sentiments to expand the sphere of influences across the border as a safeguard and protection. Neo-Eurasianism compromises building aforeign policy consensus based on political culture and national awareness.

This article examines the emergence in official Russian political discourse of a conceptual framework centered on the notion of a plurality of coexisting civilizations, each distinguished by certain inherent cultural values. The article champions the view that the rise of this framework to the status of official foreign policy in 2008 can be seen as a crucial step in an increasing “symbolic sovereignization” of Russia driven forward by the Russian government. While Russia's own civilizational identity during the period in question was initially defined as European, the Russian government eventually offered a contending model based on the notion of a self-contained and unique Russian civilization. In the concluding remarks, it is suggested that this development represents a major conceptual turn, the wider political implications of which have become apparent during the still ongoing Ukrainian crisis., State Civilization: The Eurasian Union and the Making of a Russian Civilizational Identity

Many studies have focussed upon Western countries, such as the United States and members of the European Union, and how they engage with foreign publics. There is also an increasing amount of attention being paid to non-Western countries. The debate on soft power, for instance, shows that the concept is perceived and applied in a manner that differs from Nye's vision. This present article seeks to examine and analyse how and why the Russian state engages foreign publics with different communicational means and methods. Relations and approaches are much more pragmatic in the current situation, ideology seems to have been discarded. The current foreign policy concept gives context to positioning Russia, which not only gives Russia a certain role, but one that is set in relation to other international actors. Although, not all countries are treated the same, a different approach based upon a different set of assumptions produces a different understanding as to what programmes and means are needed. This produces a difference in approach between Western countries and those countries on the territory of the Former Soviet Union.

Many studies have focussed upon Western countries, such as the United States and members of the European Union, and how they engage with foreign publics. There is also an increasing amount of attention being paid to non-Western countries. The debate on soft power, for instance, shows that the concept is perceived and applied in a manner that differs from Nye's vision. This present article seeks to examine and analyse how and why the Russian state engages foreign publics with different communicational means and methods. Relations and approaches are much more pragmatic in the current situation, ideology seems to have been discarded. The current foreign policy concept gives context to positioning Russia, which not only gives Russia a certain role, but one that is set in relation to other international actors. Although, not all countries are treated the same, a different approach based upon a different set of assumptions produces a different understanding as to what programmes and means are needed. This produces a difference in approach between Western countries and those countries on the territory of the Former Soviet Union. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Статья посвящена проблеме участия неправительственных организаций в работе с национальной диаспорой. Автор исследовал механизм влияния институтов гражданского общества на политику государства в области этноконфессиональной и языковой консолидации соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом. Исследование показало, что ведущая роль в области защиты прав и интересов российских соотечественников ближнего зарубежья принадлежит неправительственным организациям. Автор пришел к выводу, что в России растет количество таких организаций, имеющих целью работу с соотечественниками., The author analyzes what impact civil society has on the state policies that strive to consolidate Russian diasporas in the post-Soviet countries. The author concludes that non-governmental organizations play the major role in advocating the rights and protecting the legitimate interests of Russian compatriots in neighboring countries and demonstrates that the number of these organizations is growing.

Este trabajo de grado hace un análisis de la capacidad que posee Rusia para reposicionar su liderazgo en el sistema internacional mediante la estrategia de política exterior implementada hacia los países de la Comunidad de Estados Independientes (CEI) durante el período 2000-2008., This investigation makes an analysis of the Russian ability to restore its leadership on the international system through its foreign policy towards the CIS countries between the years 2000 - 2008.

This essay presents the argument that analysts, crystal ball readers and general future-tellers generally should to a much higher extent rely on claimed interests of great powers than on resources alone in predictions of future behaviour of great powers. Analysts should analyse what states want to do given what they could do, as much as analyse what states could do based on their resources, or analysts should analyse state policy intentions as much as state policy resources. International Politics (2012) 49, 517-529. doi:10.1057/ip.2012.14; published online 16 March 2012, AuthorCount:1

This essay presents the argument that analysts, crystal ball readers and general future-tellers generally should to a much higher extent rely on claimed interests of great powers than on resources alone in predictions of future behaviour of great powers. Analysts should analyse what states want to do given what they could do, as much as analyse what states could do based on their resources, or analysts should analyse state policy intentions as much as state policy resources.

Power inequalities and mistrust have characterized many interstate relationships. Yet most international relations theories do not take into account power and mistrust when explaining cooperation. While some scholars argue that power relations inhibit cooperation between states, other scholars expect interstate cooperation regardless of the power relations and level of trust. I argue that although states benefit from cooperation, they are also wary of the power relations between states, making cooperation difficult. Successful and cooperative bilateral relationships are formed between strong and weak states that are power asymmetric and have mistrust of one another, but they are built in such as way as to overcome the problem of power asymmetry and distrust. In this dissertation, I answer how and why states that are in power asymmetry and have mistrust of one another are able to build a cooperative bilateral relationship. I argue that states forge a relationship due to strategic needs such as economic or security needs. I have developed a database composed of the whole population of bilateral treaties between Russia and each of the former Soviet republics, and examine all of the bilateral relationships formed between Russia and the former Soviet republics. I find that Russia indeed forged relationships with the former republics based on its strategic interests. However, despite Russia's strategic interests, it had to build a bilateral relationship that would address the issues of mistrust and power asymmetry between the states. To achieve this, Russia and the former Soviet republics created treaty networks, which served to legitimize as well as legalize the independent status of each of the former republics while also increasing the cost to Russia of violating any of the treaties. I argue that strong treaty networks account for a more cooperative relationship between states, allowing both states to cooperate by alleviating the problems of mistrust and power asymmetr

This paper analyzes oil and natural gas resources of Central Asian states as a factor in Russian-Chinese relations. While this topic has been studied extensively over the past two decades, this analysis is unique in that it offers a Chinese perspective. Russia, one of the world's largest energy producers, and China, the world's largest energy consumer, are scrambling for access to Central Asian oil and gas resources and the control over their transportation network. Notwithstanding their differing interests in the Central Asian energy sector, the two great powers have so far been able to avoid conflict over these assets. This paper argues that the lack of visible friction between Russia and China over Central Asian energy resources can be attributed to three main reasons. First, the tensions have been mitigated by the multivector foreign policy conducted by Central Asian leaders. Second, this alleged cooperative Russian-Chinese relationship, despite colliding interests in Central Asia, is in accordance with Russia's and China's larger interests in maintaining their broader strategic partnership. Finally, the 2008 global economic crisis lessened the intensity of the competition between Russia and China in the region's energy sector. The analysis of these determinants, particularly from the Chinese standpoint, provides important references and implications for regional security.

Russian policy in Central Asia is usually analyzed within the context of the “New Great Game” theory. It usually assumes that Russia acts strategically and maximizes regional power. Analysis of real Russian foreign policy in Central Asia shows that this assumption is far from reality. Russian regional policy is chaotic, understanding of the interests is very vague and often contain mutually contradictory elements. The root of this situation can be discovered already in the crisis of Soviet modernization of Central Asia that caused a near-consensus desire of Russian political forces to completely withdraw from the region in 1991. The attempts to re-establish Moscow’s power in the region after that have usually represented non-systemic reactions to specific challenges or opportunities and all attempts to develop coherent understanding of Russian interests and aims in the region have failed. This was one of the important reasons of quick decline of Russian power and influence in the region that can be projected to the future, especially, within the context of recently lost Russian strategic control over energy transportation after realization of Chinese pipeline projects.

Russian policy in Central Asia is usually analyzed within the context of the “New Great Game” theory. It usually assumes that Russia acts strategically and maximizes regional power. Analysis of real Russian foreign policy in Central Asia shows that this assumption is far from reality. Russian regional policy is chaotic, understanding of the interests is very vague and often contain mutually contradictory elements. The root of this situation can be discovered already in the crisis of Soviet modernization of Central Asia that caused a near-consensus desire of Russian political forces to completely withdraw from the region in 1991. The attempts to re-establish Moscow’s power in the region after that have usually represented non-systemic reactions to specific challenges or opportunities and all attempts to develop coherent understanding of Russian interests and aims in the region have failed. This was one of the important reasons of quick decline of Russian power and influence in the region that can be projected to the future, especially, within the context of recently lost Russian strategic control over energy transportation after realization of Chinese pipeline projects.

Russian policy in Central Asia is usually analyzed within the context of the “New Great Game” theory. It usually assumes that Russia acts strategically and maximizes regional power. Analysis of real Russian foreign policy in Central Asia shows that this assumption is far from reality. Russian regional policy is chaotic, understanding of the interests is very vague and often contain mutually contradictory elements. The root of this situation can be discovered already in the crisis of Soviet modernization of Central Asia that caused a near-consensus desire of Russian political forces to completely withdraw from the region in 1991. The attempts to re-establish Moscow’s power in the region after that have usually represented non-systemic reactions to specific challenges or opportunities and all attempts to develop coherent understanding of Russian interests and aims in the region have failed. This was one of the important reasons of quick decline of Russian power and influence in the region that can be projected to the future, especially, within the context of recently lost Russian strategic control over energy transportation after realization of Chinese pipeline projects.

The text deal with the main instruments of foreign policy of Russia at the postsoviet area. Much attention is paid to foreign cultural policy., В статье представлены основные инструменты и средства, с помощью которых реализуются национальные интересы России на постсоветском пространстве. По мнению автора, в реализации внешнеполитических приоритетов России в ближнем зарубежье наряду с военной силой и экономической мощью особая роль принадлежит культуре.

The liberal ideas of New Political Thinking, introduced as the governing paradigm of Soviet foreign policy by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980's, were to a substantial extent "adopted" and applied by the new leadership of post-Soviet Russia, not only in its dealings with the Western world, but also when formulating a foreign policy towards the 14 Newly Independent States. However, by mid-1992, a mere six months after the Soviet collapse, there were clear indications that a dramatic change in Russian foreign policy towards its next-door neighbours had come about. A Realist vision of world politics had replaced Liberalism and Russia declared the entire post-Soviet territory to be its sphere of vital interests. Using Graham T. Allison's Governmental Politics Model and Walter Carlsnaes' Model for explaining foreign policy change, this dissertation analyses the process by which the Russian leadership, in the wake of the Soviet collapse, constructed a language of foreign policy for dealing with the international politics of the post-Soviet sphere. In order to account for the conditions, under which this process took place, Allison's model is complemented by the Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation. The dissertation concludes that Russian President Boris Yeltsin's and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's initial unwillingness and inability to grasp the full extent of the Soviet break-up led to their adopting certain discursive elements, which served to soften the trauma of the new setting, rather than coming to terms with it. Consequently, the Russian leadership was ill equipped to handle the catalogue of complex problems emerging in the post-Soviet sphere. The presence of a discursive arena of a certain type, (defining Russia as a particular sort of actor in world politics), combined with the emergence of local, next-door problems, implied that securitising actors such as Sergei Stankevich and Evgenii Ambartsumov, were given the opportunity to stage "security speec

Under President Putin, Russias foreign policy has adopted the characteristics of Great Power Normalization, a pragmatic, economically focused model described by Andrei Tsygankov. Its tenets include cooperative economic and security relationships with the West, to include tolerance of a Western military presence in the Former Soviet Union FSU a refocused foreign policy toward the FSU designed to secure regional hegemony and a de-emphasis of large-scale integration efforts such as the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS in lieu of bilateral and regionally focused multilateral efforts that elevate geo-economic goals over military presence. Russian foreign policy during President Putins second term of office however, appears to have become more assertive, characterized by increasing conflict with CIS member Georgia, renewed military presence in Central Asia and the Caspian Basin at the expense of a Western presence, and an aggressive energy agenda that has secured Russia large stakes in FSU energy infrastructure and a monopoly on regional oil and gas pipelines that export raw materials to outside markets. This thesis analyzes Russian influence in diplomatic, cultural, economic, and military efforts across two regions, the Caucasus and Central Asia, to determine whether Russia is merely pursuing regional hegemony or establishing neo-imperialistic ties in its backyard., http://archive.org/details/themechanicsofru1094510139, US Air Force (USAF) author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.