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In 1872, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases, which applied a narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment that effectually eroded the clause from the Constitution. Following Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court compensated by utilizing elastic interpretations of the Due Process Clause in its substantive due process jurisprudence to cover the rights that would have otherwise been protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In more recent years, the Court has heard arguments favoring alternative interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause but has yet to evaluate them thoroughly. By applying the Court’s expressed stare decisis factors, this thesis will evaluate the prudence in overturning the Court’s long-standing Privileges or Immunities Clause precedent established in the Slaughter-House Cases.

Although the Common Law model of precedent and the Civil Law model of precedent differ in certain respects, they are also similar in important respects. In this chapter, I discuss the question of whether the common core of these models, which I call the shared view, can be squared with a theory called reasons holism. I argue (1) that if the usual reasons for following precedent are genuine, then any of these reasons may favor following precedent in some situations, but not in others, and that this threatens the shared view. I also argue, however, (2) that we may coherently conceive of these reasons as conventional reasons, and that therefore the shared view will not be threatened. Moreover, I argue (3) that if ordinary legal reasons are genuine, the ratio decidendi of a precedent cannot be a genuine general norm, that following precedent can therefore not be understood as action in keeping with such a norm, and (4) that no alternative analysis of the ratio in terms of legal rules of thumb, or supervenience likeness, can solve these problems. I also argue, however, (5) that the shared view can nevertheless be defended, because the theory of reasons holism is actually rather problematic, and because even if this were not so, legal positivists could still defend the shared view, on the grounds that legal reasons are merely conventional reasons.

Argumentation of uniformity with respect to the Supreme Court has a long tradition and appears in the procedural law context in a variety of ways. It is widely used as a motive for introducing or arguing against changes in the process order, as well as an argument to justify that the Supreme Court must and should act in a certain way. Argumentation of uniformity is further used to legitimize as well as evaluate and criticize the Supreme Court’s role as precedent body. In this doctoral thesis the use and significance of uniformity argumentation regarding the Supreme Court, hereafter the uniformity argument, is examined, analysed and nuanced. A preliminary point of departure for the study is that the uniformity argument may not be as uniform as it appears at first glance. What appears to be the same argument, may in fact hide nuances, different layers or even contradictions, which can be brought to light by studying the uniformity argument more closely in the different contexts in which it is raised. In conclusion, I have highlighted some possible distinctions in the uniformity argument. Among other things, I have pointed to a broader uniformity argument and a narrower one. The broader uniformity argument is described as including both questions of law and questions of fact, in contrast to the narrower uniformity argument which only aims at the position with questions of law. I have highlighted a forward-looking and proactive uniformity argument and a backward-looking and reactive one. I have highlighted that the uniformity argument is used in virtually all contexts where the Supreme Court is discussed or shaped. Furthermore, I have shown how the uniformity argument is used with a variety of uses. I have put my finger on the continuity of the uniformity argument in precedent procedural contexts despite clear changes in the procedural landscape. I have identified that the vagueness of the uniformity argument is important for its resilience, but that this same vagueness

The jurisprudential precedent in Ecuadorian law must be analyzed from its scope of application in the judgments of the Constitutional Cost. Therefore, the objective will be to analyze the illegitimate distances between the precedents issued by this high Court. The right to legal security is also analyzed from a jurisprudential and normative perspective, since it can be violated by the unjustified deviation that the Court has sometimes made of its own rulings; without this action being duly motivated, and without manifestly substantiating its change of argument. This unjustified distance causes that there is no certainty of the criteria that the constitutional forum will apply in its decisions, which generates distrust in the constitutional justice system., El precedente jurisprudencial en el derecho ecuatoriano debe ser analizado desde su ámbito de aplicación en las sentencias de la Corte Constitucional. Por ello el objetivo será analizar los alejamientos ilegítimos entre los fallos emitidos por esta alta Corte. Se considera además desde una perspectiva jurisprudencial y normativa el derecho a la seguridad jurídica, mismo puede ser vulnerado por el desviamiento injustificado que en ocasiones ha realizado la Corte de sus propios precedentes; sin que esta actuación se encuentre debidamente motivada y fundamentada. Lo anterior ocasiona que no exista certeza de los criterios que aplicará el foro constitucional en sus decisiones, lo que genera desconfianza en el sistema de justicia constitucional.

Although the Common Law model of precedent and the Civil Law model of precedent differ in certain respects, they are also similar in important respects. In this chapter, I discuss the question of whether the common core of these models, which I call the shared view, can be squared with a theory called reasons holism. I argue (1) that if the usual reasons for following precedent are genuine, then any of these reasons may favor following precedent in some situations, but not in others, and that this threatens the shared view. I also argue, however, (2) that we may coherently conceive of these reasons as conventional reasons, and that therefore the shared view will not be threatened. Moreover, I argue (3) that if ordinary legal reasons are genuine, the ratio decidendi of a precedent cannot be a genuine general norm, that following precedent can therefore not be understood as action in keeping with such a norm, and (4) that no alternative analysis of the ratio in terms of legal rules of thumb, or supervenience likeness, can solve these problems. I also argue, however, (5) that the shared view can nevertheless be defended, because the theory of reasons holism is actually rather problematic, and because even if this were not so, legal positivists could still defend the shared view, on the grounds that legal reasons are merely conventional reasons.

Allemansrätten finns idag inskriven i Grundlagen och nämns även i Miljöbalken utan att definieras. Lagtexten ger inte någon förklaring till vad allemansrätten konkret betyder och vad den omfattar utöver att alla måste visa hänsyn och varsamhet. Lagen kan bara ge någon form av avgränsning om andra lagar tolkas motsatsvis men att så ska ske är i sådana fall ett antagande. Det vore dessutom märkligt om en grundlag alltid är relativ till alla andra lagar som förment ska vara underställda denna. Allemansrättsliga konflikter är ovanliga, förmodligen för att den baseras på sedvänja och samförstånd men med ett ökat kommersiellt nyttjande av naturen i form av t.ex. bärplockning och turistindustri på andras mark samt förändring av folks attityd så är det inte långsökt att tänka sig att dessa konflikter kan bli alltmer vanliga i framtiden. Det är därför viktigt att veta vilka rättigheter och skyldigheter som allemansrätten egentligen ger, utöver diffusa riktlinjer som personer i allmänhet antas respektera. Då det inte går att finna dessa i lagen så vänder sig det här arbetet till nästa steg i rättsordningen; domstolarna som ska utgå ifrån lagen för att lösa juridiska konflikter. Sju rättsfall har analyserats med syfte att utröna de resonemang som rättstolkaren för och hur de bedömer allemansrättens omfattning i respektive fall. Detta för att kunna jämföra konflikternas utfall och se om domstolarnas hantering av tidigare fall kan tydliggöra någonting avseende allemansrättens utsträckning och begränsningar. Resultatet visar att det finns stora skillnader mellan hur olika domstolar bedömer saken, både inom samma rättsfall men också mellan dessa. Det förekommer rena motsägelser och det kan inte sägas att domstolarna är konsekventa i sin tillämpning av allemansrätten. Några principer förekommer i flera av domsluten såsom en icke-specificerad toleransgräns för skada och olägenhet, att ett kommersiellt nyttjande av allemansrätten är tillåten samt att det finns en möjlighet för fast, The Right of Public Access is today a part of the Swedish constitutional law and is also mentioned in the Environmental Code without being defined. The law does not give any clear explanation as to what the Right of Public Access really means and what it encompasses apart from the general obligation to show consideration and caution. The law can only provide some form of demarcation if other laws are interpreted to the contrary, but that this should be done is in any case an assumption. It would also be strange if a Constitutional law is always relative to all other laws that are supposed to be subordinate to it. Conflicts regarding the Right of Public Access are unusual, probably because it is based on custom and consensus, but with an increased commercial use of nature in the form of for example berry picking and the arranging of tourist activities on other peoples land as well as a change in general attitudes, it is not far-fetched to imagine that these conflict can become increasingly common in the future. It is important to know what rights and obligations the Right of Public Access actually provides, in addition to vague guidelines that people are assumed to follow. Since it is not possible to find this in the law, this thesis turns to the next step in the legal system; the courts, which would usually proceed from the law to resolve legal conflicts. Seven legal cases have been analysed with the aim of finding out the reasoning used by the courts and how they assess the extent of the Right of Public Access in each case. The purpose is to be able to compare the outcomes of the conflicts to see if the courts´ handling of previous cases can clarify anything regarding the extent and limitations of the Right of Public Access. The results show that there are large differences between how different courts assess the matter, both within the same legal case but also between them. There are sheer contradictions and it cannot be said that the courts are consistent in the

[EN] This research paper examines the significant impact of the Dobbs v. Jackson Supreme Court decision on abortion rights in the United States. By closely analysing the arguments presented to the Court and the underlying reasoning, this study sheds light on the profound implications and future trajectory of abortion rights. Furthermore, it explores the global reverberations of this decision, highlighting its influence on discussions surrounding reproductive rights in other nations. The research underscores the societal implications of the right to abortion, recognising it as a historic form of discrimination based on sex, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. Through this comprehensive exploration of reproductive rights discourse, this research aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted issues within the abortion rights debate., [ES]Este trabajo de investigación examina el impacto de la decisión de la Corte Suprema en el caso Dobbs v. Jacksons Womans Helath Organisation, sobre los derechos al aborto en Estados Unidos. Mediante un análisis minucioso de los argumentos presentados ante la Corte y el razonamiento subyacente, este estudio destaca las profundas implicaciones y la trayectoria futura de los derechos al aborto. Además, explora las repercusiones globales de esta decisión, mediante su influencia en las discusiones sobre los derechos reproductivos en otras naciones. La investigación vislumbra las implicaciones sociales del derecho al aborto, reconociéndolo como una forma histórica de discriminación basada en el sexo, la etnia y el estatus socioeconómico en Estados Unidos. A través de esta exploración integral del discurso sobre los derechos reproductivos, este análisis tiene como objetivo contribuir a una comprensión matizada de los problemas multifacéticos dentro del debate sobre los derechos al aborto., [EU]Ikerketa lan honek Dobbbs-ek Jacksonen aurka Estatu Batuetan abortatzeko eskubideei buruz hartutako erabakiak izan zuen eragina aztertzen du. Auzitegiari aurkeztutako argudioak eta sakoneko arrazoibideak hurbiletik aztertuz, azterlan honek argi uzten du abortatzeko eskubideen etorkizuneko inplikazio sakonak eta ibilbidea. Gainera, erabaki horren erreberentzia globalak aztertzen ditu, beste nazioetako ugalketa-eskubideen inguruko eztabaidetan duen eragina nabarmenduz. Ikerketak abortatzeko eskubidearen gizarte-inplikazioak azpimarratzen ditu, eta sexuagatiko, etniagatiko eta estatus sozioekonomikoagatiko diskriminazio-modu historikotzat hartzen du. Ugalketa-eskubideen diskurtsoaren azterketa zabal horren bidez, ikerketa honen helburua da abortuaren eskubideen inguruko eztabaidaren barruan dauden alderdi anitzeko gaiak modu ñabarrean ulertzen laguntzea.

Although the Common Law model of precedent and the Civil Law model of precedent differ in certain respects, they are also similar in important respects. In this chapter, I discuss the question of whether the common core of these models, which I call the shared view, can be squared with a theory called reasons holism. I argue (1) that if the usual reasons for following precedent are genuine, then any of these reasons may favor following precedent in some situations, but not in others, and that this threatens the shared view. I also argue, however, (2) that we may coherently conceive of these reasons as conventional reasons, and that therefore the shared view will not be threatened. Moreover, I argue (3) that if ordinary legal reasons are genuine, the ratio decidendi of a precedent cannot be a genuine general norm, that following precedent can therefore not be understood as action in keeping with such a norm, and (4) that no alternative analysis of the ratio in terms of legal rules of thumb, or supervenience likeness, can solve these problems. I also argue, however, (5) that the shared view can nevertheless be defended, because the theory of reasons holism is actually rather problematic, and because even if this were not so, legal positivists could still defend the shared view, on the grounds that legal reasons are merely conventional reasons.

Argumentation of uniformity with respect to the Supreme Court has a long tradition and appears in the procedural law context in a variety of ways. It is widely used as a motive for introducing or arguing against changes in the process order, as well as an argument to justify that the Supreme Court must and should act in a certain way. Argumentation of uniformity is further used to legitimize as well as evaluate and criticize the Supreme Court’s role as precedent body. In this doctoral thesis the use and significance of uniformity argumentation regarding the Supreme Court, hereafter the uniformity argument, is examined, analysed and nuanced. A preliminary point of departure for the study is that the uniformity argument may not be as uniform as it appears at first glance. What appears to be the same argument, may in fact hide nuances, different layers or even contradictions, which can be brought to light by studying the uniformity argument more closely in the different contexts in which it is raised. In conclusion, I have highlighted some possible distinctions in the uniformity argument. Among other things, I have pointed to a broader uniformity argument and a narrower one. The broader uniformity argument is described as including both questions of law and questions of fact, in contrast to the narrower uniformity argument which only aims at the position with questions of law. I have highlighted a forward-looking and proactive uniformity argument and a backward-looking and reactive one. I have highlighted that the uniformity argument is used in virtually all contexts where the Supreme Court is discussed or shaped. Furthermore, I have shown how the uniformity argument is used with a variety of uses. I have put my finger on the continuity of the uniformity argument in precedent procedural contexts despite clear changes in the procedural landscape. I have identified that the vagueness of the uniformity argument is important for its resilience, but that this same vagueness

Although the Common Law model of precedent and the Civil Law model of precedent differ in certain respects, they are also similar in important respects. In this chapter, I discuss the question of whether the common core of these models, which I call the shared view, can be squared with a theory called reasons holism. I argue (1) that if the usual reasons for following precedent are genuine, then any of these reasons may favor following precedent in some situations, but not in others, and that this threatens the shared view. I also argue, however, (2) that we may coherently conceive of these reasons as conventional reasons, and that therefore the shared view will not be threatened. Moreover, I argue (3) that if ordinary legal reasons are genuine, the ratio decidendi of a precedent cannot be a genuine general norm, that following precedent can therefore not be understood as action in keeping with such a norm, and (4) that no alternative analysis of the ratio in terms of legal rules of thumb, or supervenience likeness, can solve these problems. I also argue, however, (5) that the shared view can nevertheless be defended, because the theory of reasons holism is actually rather problematic, and because even if this were not so, legal positivists could still defend the shared view, on the grounds that legal reasons are merely conventional reasons.

Although the Common Law model of precedent and the Civil Law model of precedent differ in certain respects, they are also similar in important respects. In this chapter, I discuss the question of whether the common core of these models, which I call the shared view, can be squared with a theory called reasons holism. I argue (1) that if the usual reasons for following precedent are genuine, then any of these reasons may favor following precedent in some situations, but not in others, and that this threatens the shared view. I also argue, however, (2) that we may coherently conceive of these reasons as conventional reasons, and that therefore the shared view will not be threatened. Moreover, I argue (3) that if ordinary legal reasons are genuine, the ratio decidendi of a precedent cannot be a genuine general norm, that following precedent can therefore not be understood as action in keeping with such a norm, and (4) that no alternative analysis of the ratio in terms of legal rules of thumb, or supervenience likeness, can solve these problems. I also argue, however, (5) that the shared view can nevertheless be defended, because the theory of reasons holism is actually rather problematic, and because even if this were not so, legal positivists could still defend the shared view, on the grounds that legal reasons are merely conventional reasons.

Allemansrätten finns idag inskriven i Grundlagen och nämns även i Miljöbalken utan att definieras. Lagtexten ger inte någon förklaring till vad allemansrätten konkret betyder och vad den omfattar utöver att alla måste visa hänsyn och varsamhet. Lagen kan bara ge någon form av avgränsning om andra lagar tolkas motsatsvis men att så ska ske är i sådana fall ett antagande. Det vore dessutom märkligt om en grundlag alltid är relativ till alla andra lagar som förment ska vara underställda denna. Allemansrättsliga konflikter är ovanliga, förmodligen för att den baseras på sedvänja och samförstånd men med ett ökat kommersiellt nyttjande av naturen i form av t.ex. bärplockning och turistindustri på andras mark samt förändring av folks attityd så är det inte långsökt att tänka sig att dessa konflikter kan bli alltmer vanliga i framtiden. Det är därför viktigt att veta vilka rättigheter och skyldigheter som allemansrätten egentligen ger, utöver diffusa riktlinjer som personer i allmänhet antas respektera. Då det inte går att finna dessa i lagen så vänder sig det här arbetet till nästa steg i rättsordningen; domstolarna som ska utgå ifrån lagen för att lösa juridiska konflikter. Sju rättsfall har analyserats med syfte att utröna de resonemang som rättstolkaren för och hur de bedömer allemansrättens omfattning i respektive fall. Detta för att kunna jämföra konflikternas utfall och se om domstolarnas hantering av tidigare fall kan tydliggöra någonting avseende allemansrättens utsträckning och begränsningar. Resultatet visar att det finns stora skillnader mellan hur olika domstolar bedömer saken, både inom samma rättsfall men också mellan dessa. Det förekommer rena motsägelser och det kan inte sägas att domstolarna är konsekventa i sin tillämpning av allemansrätten. Några principer förekommer i flera av domsluten såsom en icke-specificerad toleransgräns för skada och olägenhet, att ett kommersiellt nyttjande av allemansrätten är tillåten samt att det finns en möjlighet för fast, The Right of Public Access is today a part of the Swedish constitutional law and is also mentioned in the Environmental Code without being defined. The law does not give any clear explanation as to what the Right of Public Access really means and what it encompasses apart from the general obligation to show consideration and caution. The law can only provide some form of demarcation if other laws are interpreted to the contrary, but that this should be done is in any case an assumption. It would also be strange if a Constitutional law is always relative to all other laws that are supposed to be subordinate to it. Conflicts regarding the Right of Public Access are unusual, probably because it is based on custom and consensus, but with an increased commercial use of nature in the form of for example berry picking and the arranging of tourist activities on other peoples land as well as a change in general attitudes, it is not far-fetched to imagine that these conflict can become increasingly common in the future. It is important to know what rights and obligations the Right of Public Access actually provides, in addition to vague guidelines that people are assumed to follow. Since it is not possible to find this in the law, this thesis turns to the next step in the legal system; the courts, which would usually proceed from the law to resolve legal conflicts. Seven legal cases have been analysed with the aim of finding out the reasoning used by the courts and how they assess the extent of the Right of Public Access in each case. The purpose is to be able to compare the outcomes of the conflicts to see if the courts´ handling of previous cases can clarify anything regarding the extent and limitations of the Right of Public Access. The results show that there are large differences between how different courts assess the matter, both within the same legal case but also between them. There are sheer contradictions and it cannot be said that the courts are consistent in the

This paper contributes to an ongoing debate concerning the perceived judicial activism of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It argues that the output of the Court should be better viewed as the phenomenon of judicial law-making, not unlike in domestic jurisdictions. However, unlike many domestic legal systems, the European Convention on Human Rights framework promotes large quantities of judge-made law. This outcome results from a combination of objective factors that, taken together, enhance the process of judicial law-making by the ECtHR. Those factors include the applied mode of interpretation of the Convention, the approach to its construction, the weak textual basis, the existence of positive obligations, the lack of the doctrine of precedent, the extremely high case law and judicial turnovers, the concurrent legislative inactivity, the existence of the inter-state jurisdiction and the doctrine of autonomous meaning. At the same time, the judicial law-making is only hindered by the doctrine of subsidiarity, the principle of margin of appreciation and the Fourth Instance doctrine. As a consequence of this overwhelming dominance of the factors enhancing the process of judicial law-making over those that hinder it, the ECtHR produces large quantities of judge-made law.

The study analyses the ‘developed concept of sources of law’ created by Zygmunt Ziembiński in the second half of the 1960s, which was extremely important in Polish legal theory. Its main feature is a departure from the exclusivity of treating legal regulations as a source of law. While legislative competence plays a primary role in the conception, the inclusion of a norm in the system of law is also determined by other factors. The most characteristic in this context is the presence, in addition to the rules of exegesis (interpretative, inferential and conflict-solving), of three other factors discussed in this paper: political justification (legitimizing the legal system as a whole), customs (social norms introduced into the legal system by judicial decisions) and precedent (confirming an extra-legal norm or creating a legal norm after the acceptance of such an act by legal doctrine). This is why the concept not only breaks the positivist theoretical-legal paradigm, but also creates a realistic picture of the sources used in the decision-making processes of applying the law., The study analyses the ‘developed concept of sources of law’ created by Zygmunt Ziembiński in the second half of the 1960s, which was extremely important in Polish legal theory. Its main feature is a departure from the exclusivity of treating legal regulations as a source of law. While legislative competence plays a primary role in the conception, the inclusion of a norm in the system of law is also determined by other factors. The most characteristic in this context is the presence, in addition to the rules of exegesis (interpretative, inferential and conflict-solving), of three other factors discussed in this paper: political justification (legitimizing the legal system as a whole), customs (social norms introduced into the legal system by judicial decisions) and precedent (confirming an extra-legal norm or creating a legal norm after the acceptance of such an act by legal doctrine). This is why the concept not only breaks the positivist theoretical-legal paradigm, but also creates a realistic picture of the sources used in the decision-making processes of applying the law.

This paper aims to interpret, critically, the published written work of the architect Lucio Costa and investigate, as main focus, the crucial role that the precedent assumes in its conception. In this context, the article intends to demonstrate that Lucio Costa's projectual process is atemporal, and can be better investigated and applied to contemporaneity. To complement the findings, it was necessary to analyze one of the projects of his authorship that contained a descriptive memorial, which was chosen for Parque Guinle, aiming to recognize the inseparability between thought and projectual practice in Lucio Costa. His published written work is recognized by several authors as being of great importance in the context of the insertion of modern architecture in Brazil. His texts became a landmark of theoretical foundation for design practice and influenced many architects who worked in the period between approximately the 1930s and 1960s in Brazil., O presente artigo tem como finalidade interpretar, criticamente, a obra escrita publicada do arquiteto Lucio Costa e investigar, como foco principal, o papel crucial que o precedente assume em sua concepção. Neste contexto, o artigo pretende demonstrar que o processo projetual de Lucio Costa é atemporal, podendo ser melhor investigado e aplicado na contemporaneidade. Para complementar as constatações, fez-se necessário analisar um dos projetos de sua autoria que continha memorial descritivo, cujo escolhido foi o Parque Guinle, objetivando reconhecer a indissociabilidade entre pensamento e prática projetual em Lucio Costa. Seu trabalho escrito publicado é reconhecido por vários autores como de grande importância no contexto da inserção da arquitetura moderna no Brasil. Dessa maneira, seus textos tornaram-se um marco de fundamentação teórica para a prática projetual e influenciaram diversos arquitetos que atuaram no período compreendido, aproximadamente, entre as décadas de 30 e 60, no país.

The Supreme Court has wide discretion to choose the cases it will decide. But how does the Court exercise this discretion? The Supreme Court’s rules explain that it may hear any case “important” enough for it to decide. Unsurprisingly, commentators have criticized this standard as “hopelessly indeterminate” and “intentionally vague.” The Court, however, has said more about how it decides whether to grant review. We need simply to look to its merits opinions. These decisions sometimes offer a brief, informative description of the decision to grant review. These oft-overlooked statements may, in aggregate, be suggestive of trends in the Court’s agenda-setting discretion. This Article presents a text and data analysis of thousands of Supreme Court opinions describing the reason for granting review, collectively illuminating which cases are important enough to merit certiorari. This view into certiorari helps reveal which cases earn the Court’s attention and how the Court’s priorities change over time. This analysis finds, for example, that the Court’s docket shifts in response to large events (e.g., depressions and wars) and to significant political developments (e.g., landmark legislation). And, perhaps more concerning, individual appointments also shape the Court’s docket. The Court should thus better explain its decisions to grant review in the mode of a common law of certiorari. Doing so can improve the interbranch dialogue over judicial reform, offer better information to litigants, and instill greater confidence in our Supreme Court.

The article deals with the question of the legal nature and essence of the judicial acts of the Ukrainian courts as a source of law. It also analyzes the notion and characteristics of the sources of law according to academics. Particular attention is paid to the investigation into whether the decisions of the Ukrainian courts can be defined as a precedent and whether they have, in turn, binding force for all people. Therefore, the analysis of the legal nature of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the Supreme Court, and the administrative courts was of interest. The study used general and special scientific methods, the basis of which is the application of the results of theoretical research and other generalized information on the sources of law in Ukraine. The authors conclude that these decisions have a different nature than the judgments of the common law system. Although some judicial decisions of Ukrainian courts tend to possess some elements of precedent and are binding, not only for the parties to the case but for all people. This makes it possible to characterize these judicial decisions as complementary sources of law., El artículo trata la cuestión de la naturaleza jurídica y la esencia de los actos judiciales de los tribunales ucranianos como fuente de derecho. Analiza también la noción y las características de las fuentes del derecho según los académicos. Se presta especial atención a la investigación sobre si las decisiones de los tribunales ucranianos pueden definirse como un precedente y si tienen, a su vez, una fuerza vinculante para todas las personas. Por lo tanto, interesó el análisis de la naturaleza jurídica de las decisiones del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el Tribunal Constitucional de Ucrania, el Tribunal Supremo y los tribunales administrativos. El estudio utilizó métodos científicos generales y especiales, cuya base es la aplicación de los resultados de la investigación teórica y otra información generalizada sobre las fuentes del derecho en Ucrania. Los autores concluyen que estas decisiones tienen una naturaleza diferente a las sentencias del sistema de derecho común. Aunque algunas decisiones judiciales de los tribunales ucranianos tienden a poseer algunos elementos del precedente y son vinculantes, no solo para las partes del caso sino para todas las personas. Esto permite caracterizar estas decisiones judiciales como fuentes complementarias del derecho.

This article examines the institutions introduced in the Colombian legal system by Law 1437/2011 on the binding force of the precedent. It also verifies whether the comprehensive reform of these institutions under Law 2080/2021 addresses or solves the main problems arising from using the precedent because of regulatory gaps on the subject. Through a case study manifesting the issues produced by these regulatory gaps, we conclude that due to the procedural narrative under which this reform was conceived, Law 2080/2021 did not address the substantive interpretive problems related to the unification judgments and other instruments created by administrative authorities to positivize precedents in Colombia. Finally, the article clarifies that the reform did not address any substantive discussions about controls on judges’ role in law-making, even though it continued the path traced since 2011 to strengthen judges’ competence., Este artigo examina as instituições introduzidas no sistema legal colombiano com a Lei 1.437 de 2011 sobre a força vinculatória do precedente judicial para analisar se a reforma integral dessas instituições, produzida na Lei 2.080 de 2021, abordou ou solucionou de alguma forma algumas das principais problemáticas que surgiram no uso do precedente administrativo. Isso à consequência de lacunas regulamentares sobre o tema originadas na decisão de positivação da Lei 1.437 de 2011. Por meio de um estudo de caso no qual foram manifestos os problemas produzidos por essas lacunas, este texto conclui que, devido ao teor processualista com o qual a reforma foi concebida, a Lei 2.080 de 2021 não enfrentou os problemas interpretativos de natureza teórico-substantiva que foram originados quanto às sentenças de unificação e aos demais instrumentos que foram criados na Lei 1.437 para tornar exigíveis como precedentes judiciais as sentenças de unificação. Por último, o artigo evidencia que a reforma também não abordou discussões de fundo com relação aos controles do papel de criação dos juízes em nosso contexto, ainda apesar de continuar pelo caminho que tinha sido estabelecido desde 2011 para fortalecer essas competências dos juízes., El artículo examina las instituciones introducidas en el sistema legal colombiano con la Ley 1437 de 2011 en torno a la fuerza vinculante del precedente judicial, para analizar si la reforma integral a estas instituciones, producida en la Ley 2080 de 2021, abordó o solucionó de alguna forma algunas de las principales problemáticas que surgieron en el uso del precedente administrativo. Esto a consecuencia de vacíos regulatorios sobre el tema originados en la decisión de positivización de la Ley 1437 de 2011. A través de un estudio de caso en el que se manifiestan los problemas producidos por estos vacíos regulatorios, el escrito concluye que debido al tinte procesalista con el que se concibió la reforma, la Ley 2080 de 2021 no afrontó los problemas interpretativos de naturaleza teórica-sustantiva que se han originado en relación con las sentencias de unificación y los demás instrumentos que se crearon en la Ley 1437 para hacer exigibles como precedentes judiciales las sentencias de unificación. Por último, el artículo pone de presente que la reforma tampoco abordó discusiones de fondo en relación con los controles al papel de creación de los jueces en nuestro contexto, aun a pesar de que continuó por la senda que se había trazado desde el año de 2011 para fortalecer estas competencias de los jueces.

The scarcity of craftsmanship in our society is the result of modernist philosophies that celebrate mass production, mechanized industry, exponential economic gain and a corporate/developer-led economy. This relatively recent rupture in thousands of years of human history has led to the loss of generations of valuable knowledge and of an understanding of life stretching beyond material face value. A reconciliation between the traditional values of craftsmanship and contemporary technological advances has been at the core of my practice for over three decades. Here, the need for the “Architect Craftsman” is presented as an alternative approach to the egocentric modernist figure of the “Architect Artist” that has in recent times so widely informed our ways of building., A escassez de artesanato na nossa sociedade contemporânea é o resultado de filosofias modernistas que celebram a produção em massa, indústrias mecanizadas, ganhos económicos exponenciais e economias mundiais lideradas por corporações e promotores. Esta ruptura relativamente recente nos milhares de anos da história humana tradicional levou à perda de gerações de conhecimentos valiosos, e de uma compreensão da vida que vai para além do valor facial e material. Uma reconciliação entre os valores tradicionais do artesanato e os avanços tecnológicos contemporâneos tem estado no centro da minha prática há mais de três décadas. Aqui, a necessidade do “A rquitecto A rtesão" é apresentada como uma abordagem alternativa à emergência modernista e egocêntrica do “A rquitecto A rtista" que, recentemente, foi tão amplamente atribuída às formas de construção., La escasez de artesanos en la sociedad actual es resultado de las filosofías modernas que celebran la producción en serie, las industrias mecanizadas, el beneficio económico exponencial y las economías mundiales dirigidas por empresas y promotores. Esta ruptura relativamente reciente con los miles de años de historia tradicional de la humanidad ha llevado a la pérdida de valiosos conocimientos de generaciones y de una forma de entender la vida que va más allá de su valor material nominal. La reconciliación entre los valores de la artesanía tradicional y los avances tecnológicos ha sido la base de mi práctica profesional durante más de tres décadas. Aquí, la necesidad del “Arquitecto artesano” se presenta como planteamiento alternativo a la aparición de la figura egocéntrica y vanguardista del “Arquitecto artista”, que últimamente ha dado forma ampliamente a nuestros modos de construir.

The scarcity of craftsmanship in our society is the result of modernist philosophies that celebrate mass production, mechanized industry, exponential economic gain and a corporate/developer-led economy. This relatively recent rupture in thousands of years of human history has led to the loss of generations of valuable knowledge and of an understanding of life stretching beyond material face value. A reconciliation between the traditional values of craftsmanship and contemporary technological advances has been at the core of my practice for over three decades. Here, the need for the “Architect Craftsman” is presented as an alternative approach to the egocentric modernist figure of the “Architect Artist” that has in recent times so widely informed our ways of building., A escassez de artesanato na nossa sociedade contemporânea é o resultado de filosofias modernistas que celebram a produção em massa, indústrias mecanizadas, ganhos económicos exponenciais e economias mundiais lideradas por corporações e promotores. Esta ruptura relativamente recente nos milhares de anos da história humana tradicional levou à perda de gerações de conhecimentos valiosos, e de uma compreensão da vida que vai para além do valor facial e material. Uma reconciliação entre os valores tradicionais do artesanato e os avanços tecnológicos contemporâneos tem estado no centro da minha prática há mais de três décadas. Aqui, a necessidade do “A rquitecto A rtesão" é apresentada como uma abordagem alternativa à emergência modernista e egocêntrica do “A rquitecto A rtista" que, recentemente, foi tão amplamente atribuída às formas de construção., La escasez de artesanos en la sociedad actual es resultado de las filosofías modernas que celebran la producción en serie, las industrias mecanizadas, el beneficio económico exponencial y las economías mundiales dirigidas por empresas y promotores. Esta ruptura relativamente reciente con los miles de años de historia tradicional de la humanidad ha llevado a la pérdida de valiosos conocimientos de generaciones y de una forma de entender la vida que va más allá de su valor material nominal. La reconciliación entre los valores de la artesanía tradicional y los avances tecnológicos ha sido la base de mi práctica profesional durante más de tres décadas. Aquí, la necesidad del “Arquitecto artesano” se presenta como planteamiento alternativo a la aparición de la figura egocéntrica y vanguardista del “Arquitecto artista”, que últimamente ha dado forma ampliamente a nuestros modos de construir.

This essay succinctly addresses an analysis of the constituent call made in May 2017, establishing as purpose to make a dissertation on its limits from the constituent acts’ jurisprudence set in the years 1999 and 2000. The study was done through a qualitative approach, using an hermeneutical research methodology. The conclusion was the inapplicability of the judicial precedents previously established for all the acts carried out by the 2017 Constituent Assembly, El presente ensayo abordó de manera sucinta un análisis de la convocatoria constituyente realizada en mayo de 2017, estableciéndose como propósito realizar una disertación sobre los límites de ella desde la jurisprudencia de los actos constituyentes establecida en los años 1999 y 2000. Lo anterior se realizó a través de una investigación enmarcada en un enfoque cualitativo, utilizando la metodología hermenéutica. Se concluyó en la inaplicabilidad de los precedentes judiciales previamente establecidos para todos los actos llevados adelantes por la actual Asamblea Constituyente de 2017, Este ensaio abordou de forma sucinta uma análise da convocatória constituinte realizada em maio de 2017, estabelecendo a finalidade de realizar uma dissertação de mestrado sobre seus limites a partir da jurisprudência dos atos constitutivos instituídos nos anos de 1999 e 2000. O anterior foi realizado por meio de pesquisa enquadrada em abordagem qualitativa, utilizando a metodologia de pesquisa hermenêutica. Concluiu-se na inaplicabilidade da jurisprudência anteriormente estabelecida para todos os atos praticados pela atual Assembleia Constituinte de 2017

Formalizing case-based reasoning is an important topic in AI and Law, which has been discussed using various approaches, such as formal dialogue games, abstract dialectical frameworks. In this paper we model case-based reasoning by using the formal argument semantics of case models. With the precedent models we present, the validity of legal arguments in the case-based reasoning process can be shown formally. We also present a case study of precedent models in a real legal domain and evaluate the validity of arguments in case-based reasoning.

Formalizing case-based reasoning is an important topic in AI and Law, which has been discussed using various approaches, such as formal dialogue games, abstract dialectical frameworks. In this paper we model case-based reasoning by using the formal argument semantics of case models. With the precedent models we present, the validity of legal arguments in the case-based reasoning process can be shown formally. We also present a case study of precedent models in a real legal domain and evaluate the validity of arguments in case-based reasoning.

The general assessment of the problem of the use of previous decisions in international adjudication usually starts from the many statements to the effect that ‘there is no rule of precedent in international law’. Reliance is mainly placed on specific statutory rules, starting from Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is understood to authoritatively reflect the sources of international law and states that the Court ‘shall apply... judicial decisions’ as ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’ subject to the operation of Article 59, which appears to rule out any endorsement of a rigid rule (or practice) of stare decisis. These approaches have a common thread: they address the question of the use and authority of previous decisions in international adjudication as one regulated by rules. Yet, they are never found to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem. This chapter offers an alternative to the traditional outlook, challenging the oft-repeated truism that ‘there is no rule of precedent in international adjudication’ by arguing that it is desirable to shift the analysis from an almost mythological rule of precedent—or an equally esoteric belief of a lack thereof—to more tangible rules on precedent. These may include—and do include—rules in which a specific understanding of the question is endorsed by the statutory provisions of a specific international adjudicator, but are not exhausted by them, as other rules of different nature and origin (including, but not limited to, organisational directives, rules on submissions, on evidence and on law- ascertainment, as well as those concerning systems of challenge, appeal, and control) also have an impact—with various degree of directness—on the role, possible uses, and authority of the past. This study is based on the identification of such rules and their treatment. Its overall purpose is to show how, in the absence of one rule of precedent, the many rul

Several factors triggered the legitimacy crisis which paralysed the WTO Appellate Body in December 2019. This article focuses on one of them: the criticism expressed by the United States that the 'Appellate Body claims its reports are entitled to be treated as precedent'. This work describes the origins of the problem and examines the issue of the precedential value of adopted reports within the WTO dispute settlement. It argues that the problem cannot be addressed through textual attempts to better define the value of precedent, as some have suggested, but can be alleviated through the practice of adjudicators. Moreover, it argues that the criticisms regarding the precedential value of past reports is due to the inherent hierarchy ensuing from the existence of an appeals organ. Therefore, the demise of the Appellate Body may weaken the precedential value of past adopted reports.

This essay succinctly addresses an analysis of the constituent call made in May 2017, establishing as purpose to make a dissertation on its limits from the constituent acts’ jurisprudence set in the years 1999 and 2000. The study was done through a qualitative approach, using an hermeneutical research methodology. The conclusion was the inapplicability of the judicial precedents previously established for all the acts carried out by the 2017 Constituent Assembly, El presente ensayo abordó de manera sucinta un análisis de la convocatoria constituyente realizada en mayo de 2017, estableciéndose como propósito realizar una disertación sobre los límites de ella desde la jurisprudencia de los actos constituyentes establecida en los años 1999 y 2000. Lo anterior se realizó a través de una investigación enmarcada en un enfoque cualitativo, utilizando la metodología hermenéutica. Se concluyó en la inaplicabilidad de los precedentes judiciales previamente establecidos para todos los actos llevados adelantes por la actual Asamblea Constituyente de 2017, Este ensaio abordou de forma sucinta uma análise da convocatória constituinte realizada em maio de 2017, estabelecendo a finalidade de realizar uma dissertação de mestrado sobre seus limites a partir da jurisprudência dos atos constitutivos instituídos nos anos de 1999 e 2000. O anterior foi realizado por meio de pesquisa enquadrada em abordagem qualitativa, utilizando a metodologia de pesquisa hermenêutica. Concluiu-se na inaplicabilidade da jurisprudência anteriormente estabelecida para todos os atos praticados pela atual Assembleia Constituinte de 2017

Betydelsen av HD:s avgöranden som prejudikat har rönt allt större uppmärksamhet, främst med fokus på hur HD själv ser på sin rättspraxis. Denna artikel kompletterar diskussionen genom att undersöka tingsrätternas bruk av prejudikat. Artikeln visar att endast en relativt liten andel av HD:s avgöranden används aktivt i tingsrätterna och att överlappningen mellan de avgöranden som används av tingsrätterna och de som används av HD själv är ytterst begränsad. En möjlig förklaring är att HD i hög grad prövar frågor som mycket sällan uppkommer i tingsrätterna. Detta är inte nödvändigtvis problematiskt, men motiverar en diskussion om hur HD bäst kan leda rättstillämpningen.

El objeto de estas páginas es examinar si la igualdad en la aplicación de la ley que, grosso modo se traduce en la obligación de seguir los precedentes, es un valor positivo o si, por el contrario, se trata de un principio vacío de contenido o que se diluye o contradice otros principios. Para ello, señalo que la aplicación del principio de igualdad requiere establecer cuáles son los términos de comparación: uno, el caso individual que debe decidir el juez y otro, el precedente. Este último puede manifestarse de dos formas: como la ratio decidendi de uno o varios casos individuales o como uno o varios casos individuales análogos. A continuación analizo cada una de las críticas que, desde una perspectiva iusfilosófica, se ha dirigido contra la igualdad en la aplicación para: a) que igualdad equivale a legalidad; b) que la igualdad en la aplicación es un principio meramente formal; c) el carácter vacío de dicho principio dada la indeterminación de la expresión «semejanza relevante»; d) su irrelevancia, puesto que el juez debe decidir caso por caso, y e) la posible injusticia del precedente, que será reiterada por la decisión posterior., The main subject of these pages is to analyze if equality before the law is a positive value or if it is a devoid, formal and without relevance principle. In order to achieve this purpose, I will start by analyzing the terms of comparison of equality before the law and the problems they set out. I will distinguish two kinds of precedents: the first one lies in the ratio decidendi (model of rules), the second one, in the individual cases (model of analogy). Secondly, I will examine whether the equality before the law is a valuable principle or not. For that purpose, I will explain what the criticisms addressed to the principle are: a) its identification with the principle of legality; b) its’ purely formal character; c) the vacant character (due to the indetermination of the expression «relevant resemblance»; d) its irrelevance because the judge must decide on a case by case, and e) its’ possible injustice. Afterwards, I will make a critical assessment of each of them. My conclusion is that none of the criticism to the equality before the law principle is as important as to play it down.

El objeto de estas páginas es examinar si la igualdad en la aplicación de la ley que, grosso modo se traduce en la obligación de seguir los precedentes, es un valor positivo o si, por el contrario, se trata de un principio vacío de contenido o que se diluye o contradice otros principios. Para ello, señalo que la aplicación del principio de igualdad requiere establecer cuáles son los términos de comparación: uno, el caso individual que debe decidir el juez y otro, el precedente. Este último puede manifestarse de dos formas: como la ratio decidendi de uno o varios casos individuales o como uno o varios casos individuales análogos. A continuación analizo cada una de las críticas que, desde una perspectiva iusfilosófica, se ha dirigido contra la igualdad en la aplicación para: a) que igualdad equivale a legalidad; b) que la igualdad en la aplicación es un principio meramente formal; c) el carácter vacío de dicho principio dada la indeterminación de la expresión «semejanza relevante»; d) su irrelevancia, puesto que el juez debe decidir caso por caso, y e) la posible injusticia del precedente, que será reiterada por la decisión posterior., The main subject of these pages is to analyze if equality before the law is a positive value or if it is a devoid, formal and without relevance principle. In order to achieve this purpose, I will start by analyzing the terms of comparison of equality before the law and the problems they set out. I will distinguish two kinds of precedents: the first one lies in the ratio decidendi (model of rules), the second one, in the individual cases (model of analogy). Secondly, I will examine whether the equality before the law is a valuable principle or not. For that purpose, I will explain what the criticisms addressed to the principle are: a) its identification with the principle of legality; b) its’ purely formal character; c) the vacant character (due to the indetermination of the expression «relevant resemblance»; d) its irrelevance because the judge must decide on a case by case, and e) its’ possible injustice. Afterwards, I will make a critical assessment of each of them. My conclusion is that none of the criticism to the equality before the law principle is as important as to play it down.

This article deals with reflecting on the role of the judicial precedent of the Council of State in relation to the system of sources of Colombian administrative law. Therefore, its main purpose is to provide elements of analysis that contribute to elucidating its role as the main source. To do this, we start by contextualizing, defining and differentiating notions such as jurisprudence and precedent. Then, the evolution of these concepts in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Justice is reviewed in order to evaluate its use in the Council of State’s decisions. Regarding the latter, particular attention is given to the judgements of jurisprudential unification, which have a binding force of legal status. However, for systematic reasons it is argued that, in this “jurisdiction”, they are not the only ones that set a judicial precedent., Este artigo se ocupa de refletir sobre o papel do precedente judicial do Conselho de Estado com respeito ao sistema de fontes do direito administrativo colombiano. Portanto, seu propósito principal é oferecer elementos de análise que contribuam para o esclarecimento de seu papel como fonte principal. Para isso, parte-se de contextualizar, definir e diferenciar noções como as de jurisprudência e precedente. Em seguida, revisa-se a evolução desses conceitos na Corte Constitucional e na Corte Suprema de Justiça para avaliar seu uso nas decisões do Conselho de Estado. Com respeito a este último, enfatiza-se nas sentenças de unificação jurisprudencial, as quais têm uma força vinculante de alcance legal. Não obstante, por razões sistemáticas, defende-se que nessa “jurisdição” não são apenas elas que configuram precedente judicial., Este artículo se ocupa de reflexionar sobre el papel del precedente judicial del Consejo de Estado con respecto al sistema de fuentes del derecho administrativo colombiano. Por tanto, su propósito principal es aportar elementos de análisis que contribuyan al esclarecimiento de su rol como fuente principal. Para ello, se parte de contextualizar, definir y diferenciar nociones como las de jurisprudencia y precedente. Luego, se revisa la evolución de estos conceptos en la Corte Constitucional y en la Corte Suprema de Justicia, para evaluar su uso en las decisiones del Consejo de Estado. Con relación a este último, se enfatiza en las sentencias de unificación jurisprudencial, las cuales poseen una fuerza vinculante de rango legal. No obstante, por razones sistemáticas se sostiene que en esta “jurisdicción”, no solo ellas configuran precedente judicial.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze judicial review in Argentina. The organization of the Judicial Power, in particular the procedure of appointment and removal of the judges of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts will be studied. The characteristics of judicial review sys¬tem in Argentina will be developed, as well as the case or controversy requirement, the declaration of unconstitutionality ex officio by Courts, and the debate on whether precedents of the Supreme Court are man¬datory. Also, the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction will be analyzed. Finally, reference will be made to two mechanisms recently introduced by the Supreme Court that helps legitimize the performance of the Judiciary, Con el objetivo de analizar el control judicial de constitucionalidad en Argentina, se estudiará la organización del Poder Judicial, en particular el modo de designación y remoción de los magistrados de la Corte Suprema y de los tribunales federales inferiores. Además, se desarrollarán las características del sistema de control de constitucionalidad argentino, así como el requisito de “caso”, la posibilidad de declarar la inconstitucionalidad de oficio por parte de los tribunales, y el debate respecto de la obligatoriedad de los precedentes de la Corte Suprema. A su vez, se analizará la jurisdicción originaria y por apelación de dicha Corte. Finalmente, se hará referencia a dos mecanismos introducidos recientemente por el máximo tribunal que ayudan a legitimar la actuación del Poder Judicial

The precedent as a formal source of law, poses a problem to the legal system provided by the Colombian Constitution of 1991, since the constituent faithful to the European Roman or continental legal tradi¬tion, kept as the main source of the law, statuting the jurisprudence as a Secondary source. However, through its judgments the Constitutional Court has cemented the obligatory nature of the precedent for judges, so an analysis of the figure, its concept and value in Colombian law must be carried out, El precedente como fuente formal de derecho, plantea un problema al sistema legal dispuesto por la Constitución colombiana de 1991, puesto que el constituyente fiel a la tradición jurídica romanista o continental europea, mantuvo como fuente principal a la ley, estatuyendo a la jurisprudencia como una fuente secundaria. Sin embargo, la Corte Constitucional a través de sus sentencias ha cimentado la obligatoriedad de dicha fuente para los jueces, por lo cual debe realizarse un análisis de la figura, su concepto y valor en el derecho colombiano

This article provides an outline for jurimetrics and its role in finding most relevant and influential decisions of Supreme Court of India particularly in the topic of sexual harassment covering the period of 5 years (2012 to 2016). It retrieved 35 precedents that cited 662 legal information sources. These precedents are further analyzed with the network measures such as degree centrality, closeness centrality and authoritative scores to find out the influential and relevant decisions in sexual harassment. The precedents of Supreme Court of India (Vn=575) legal citation network is created to map the science of law.

The paper seeks to determine to what extent lower national courts are influenced by higher national courts in their application of CJEU case law. In doing so, we study and compare references to CJEU case law in the jurisprudence of Swedish courts of first instance and courts of precedent. We find that Swedish courts of first instance generally speaking identify and apply relevant CJEU case law independent of whether this has been dealt with by Swedish CoP or not. However, when these courts find and cite a Swedish court of precedent decision concerning an issue relating to EU law, they do not consistely consider relevant CJEU case law.

The paper seeks to determine to what extent lower national courts are influenced by higher national courts in their application of CJEU case law. In doing so, we study and compare references to CJEU case law in the jurisprudence of Swedish courts of first instance and courts of precedent. We find that Swedish courts of first instance generally speaking identify and apply relevant CJEU case law independent of whether this has been dealt with by Swedish CoP or not. However, when these courts find and cite a Swedish court of precedent decision concerning an issue relating to EU law, they do not consistely consider relevant CJEU case law.

Studien syftar till att undersöka erfarenheter som handläggare av personlig assistans har av att arbeta i en kontext som är föränderlig till följd av rättspraxis och Försäkringskassans tolkning och tillämpning av den. Studien syftar även till att undersöka de konsekvenser som detta medför för LSS-handläggarna i deras yrkesutövning och vilka konsekvenser som de anser att det fått för brukarna. För att uppnå syftet har semistrukturerade intervjuer använts som datainsamlingsmetod. Den teoretiska ansatsen har bestått av Michael Lipskys teori om gräsrotsbyråkrater och handlingsutrymme och Andrew Jametons koncept om etisk stress. En bearbetning av empirin har genomförts i enlighet med tematisk analys. Olika krav och svårigheter har uppstått för LSS-handläggarna i deras yrkesutövning, såsom konflikt mellan deras professionella värderingar och den institutionella kontexten och att kunna bemöta brukare i oro och kris. Handläggarna är genomgående kritiska till Försäkringskassans restriktiva och detaljstyrda tolkning och tillämpning av den rättspraxis som ska vara styrande för dem båda. Vissa grupper av brukare har som konsekvens av förändrad rättspraxis och Försäkringskassans tolkning och tillämpning av den i stort sett uteslutits från rätten till personlig assistans. I diskussionen förs resonemang om LSS-handläggarnas yrkeskompetens, deras handlingsutrymme och etisk stress samt detaljstyrningens påverkan och konsekvenser för brukarna., The purpose of the following study is to investigate the experiences that social workers have of working in a context that is changing with precedents and the Swedish social insurance agency's, Försäkringskassan’s, interpretation and application of them. The purpose is further to explore the consequences this has for LSS-administrators in their work and for their clients. In order to achieve this aim semi structured interviews has been used as a data collection method. The theoretical approach consists of Michael Lipsky's theory of grassroots bureaucrats and discretion as well as Andrew Jameton's concept of moral distress. The data has been processed in accordance of thematic analysis. Difficulties has emerged for LSS-administrators in their work, such as conflict between their professional values and the institutional context and meeting most anxious clients in crisis. The LSS-administrators are critical of Försäkringskassan’s restrictive and detailed interpretation and application of precedents. Some groups of clients have as a consequence of changed jurisprudence and Försäkringskassan’s interpretation and application of it more or less been excluded from the right to personal assistance. We discuss the LSS-administrators professional competence, their discretion and ethical stress as well as the consequences detailed interpretation has for the clients.

The article discusses the role of precedents in the German judicial practice. In the European continental tradition, law enactment is within the legislature, whereas the role of the judiciary is to enforce law. In the continental system, precedent does not constitute a source of law sensu stricto , that is, a formal source of law. In order to guarantee the law utility and, ultimately, the legal certainty, courts interpret legal provisions in a unified manner. It is noteworthy that during the recent years the coherent interpretation of legal provisions and, by the same token, the commitment to law development, have increased. That means that a unified interpretation of law performed by courts may be considered a precedent. In this context, precedents and stare decisis have been replacing the logical interpretation of law in German courts.

Constitutional jurisprudence is considered a formal and material source of law in the Colombian legal system, hence its binding force in the decisions of judicial and administrative authorities. This recognition, derived from the judicial function of the Constitutional Court, does not occur in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, since the Council of State has not managed to make a diligent issuance, compilation and publication of decisions with a binding character. This investigation focuses its attention on the contentious-administrative jurisdiction and on the binding nature of jurisprudence originating from the Council of State. Herein are studied new legal figures contemplated in Law 1437 of 2011 such as the duty of uniform application of jurisprudence, the extension of the jurisprudence of the Council of State to third parties by authorities, the extraordinary appeal of unification of jurisprudence and the judgments of unification.The binding nature of the judgments of unification issued by the Council of State is established in accordance to this law. It also shows how, if the application is achieved of the new figures and procedures studied, it will contribute to the recognition of the binding force of jurisprudence from the Council of State, clearing backlogs and protecting important values of the legal system, as well as equality of treatment and legal certainty in contentious-administrative issues., A jurisprudência constitucional é considerada como fonte formal e material do direito no sistema jurídico colombiano, daí procede a sua forca vinculante nas decisões de autoridades judiciais e administrativas. Este reconhecimento derivado da função judicial da Corte Constitucional não ocorre na jurisdição do contencioso administrativo, toda vez que o Conselho de Estado não tem se ocupado de uma diligente expedição, recopilação e publicação de sentenças com caráter vinculante.Esta pesquisa foca sua atenção na jurisdição do contencioso administrativo e no caráter vinculante da jurisprudência emanada do Conselho de Estado. São estudadas novas figuras jurídicas contempladas na Lei 1437 de 2011, como: o dever de aplicação uniforme da jurisprudência, a extensão da jurisprudência do Conselho de Estado a terceiros por parte das autoridades, o recurso extraordinário de unificação de jurisprudência e as sentenças de unificação.Estabelece-se o caráter vinculante que ostentam as sentenças de unificação proferidas pelo Conselho de Estado de acordo com esta lei. Além se mostra como se conseguir a aplicação das novas figuras e os procedimentos estudados se contribuirá ao reconhecimento da força vinculante da jurisprudência emanada do Conselho de Estado o descongestionamento judicial e a proteção de valores importantes do sistema jurídico, assim como à igualdade de trato e segurança jurídica no relacionado com o contencioso administrativo., La jurisprudencia constitucional es considerada como fuente formal y material del derecho en el sistema jurídico colombiano, de ahí procede su fuerza vinculante en las decisiones de las autoridades judiciales y administrativas. Este reconocimiento, derivado de la función judicial de la Corte Constitucional, no se da en la jurisdicción de lo contencioso administrativo, toda vez que el Consejo de Estado no se ha ocupado de una acuciosa expedición, recopilación y publicación de sentencias con carácter vinculante. Esta investigación enfoca su atención en la jurisdicción de lo contencioso administrativo y en el carácter vinculante de la jurisprudencia emanada del Consejo de Estado. Son estudiadas aquí nuevas figuras jurídicas contempladas en la Ley 1437 de 2011, tales como el deber de aplicación uniforme de la jurisprudencia, la extensión de la jurisprudencia del Consejo de Estado a terceros por parte de las autoridades, el recurso extraordinario de unificación de la jurisprudencia y las sentencias de unificación.Se establece el carácter vinculante que ostentan las sentencias de unificación proferidas por el Consejo de Estado de conformidad con esta ley. Además se muestra cómo, si se logra la aplicación de las nuevas figuras y los procedimientos estudiados, se contribuirá al reconocimiento de la fuerza vinculante de la jurisprudencia emanada del Consejo de Estado, a la descongestión judicial y a la protección de valores importantes del sistema jurídico, así como a la igualdad de trato y seguridad jurídica en materia de lo contencioso administrativo.

This paper suggests reassessing the teachings of the Roman method of creation of law, based on the understanding of the ius as ars boni et aequi, which makes evident that the law has a practical purpose and, consequently, topics is the knowledge itself of the law, in which the centrality of the case is highlighted and the realization of justice in terms of what we would today call «effective protection of rights». The text argues that such an understanding presupposes the understanding of the dynamic nature of law, of its artificial nature as created by human beings and, therefore, perfectible, of the active role of the jurist in the construction of a more equitable right, which makes possible the realization of the balanced equality in the preservation of the values of reasonableness that good faith proposes, by considering the requirements of the case, in harmony with the principles that govern the system, in a permanent reconstruction of the balance between topic and system. In rethinking the application of law according to its nature, to the essential function of serving coexistence, and of making the values of a social State of Law a reality, the paper analyzes the experience of Peruvian jurisprudence in the «precedents» of the Supreme Court of Justice, examining several of its most emblematic judgments, under the perspective of topics and, in general, of the Roman method of creating the law., El texto propone revalorizar las enseñanzas del método romano de creación del derecho, basado en el entendimiento del ius como ars boni et aequi, lo cual pone en evidencia que el derecho posee una finalidad práctica y, en consecuencia, la tópica es el saber propio del derecho, en el que se destaca la centralidad del caso y la realización de la justicia en términos de lo que hoy llamaríamos «tutela efectiva de los derechos». Un entendimiento tal supone la comprensión del carácter dinámico del derecho, de su naturaleza artificial en cuanto creado por el ser humano y, por ende, perfectible, del rol activo del jurista en la construcción de un derecho más equo, que haga posible la realización de la igualdad ponderada en la preservación de los valores de razonabilidad que propone la buena fe, mediante la consideración de las exigencias del caso, en armonía con los principios que rigen el sistema, en una permanente reconstrucción del equilibrio entre tópica y sistema. En este repensar la aplicación del derecho atendiendo a su naturaleza, a la función esencial de servir a la convivencia y de hacer realidad los valores de un Estado social de Derecho, se analiza la experiencia de la jurisprudencia peruana en los «Plenos Casatorios» de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, examinando varios de sus fallos más emblemáticos, bajo la perspectiva de la tópica y, en general, del método romano de creación del derecho.

The paper seeks to determine to what extent lower national courts are influenced by higher national courts in their application of CJEU case law. In doing so, we study and compare references to CJEU case law in the jurisprudence of Swedish courts of first instance and courts of precedent. We find that Swedish courts of first instance generally speaking identify and apply relevant CJEU case law independent of whether this has been dealt with by Swedish CoP or not. However, when these courts find and cite a Swedish court of precedent decision concerning an issue relating to EU law, they do not consistely consider relevant CJEU case law.

The paper seeks to determine to what extent lower national courts are influenced by higher national courts in their application of CJEU case law. In doing so, we study and compare references to CJEU case law in the jurisprudence of Swedish courts of first instance and courts of precedent. We find that Swedish courts of first instance generally speaking identify and apply relevant CJEU case law independent of whether this has been dealt with by Swedish CoP or not. However, when these courts find and cite a Swedish court of precedent decision concerning an issue relating to EU law, they do not consistely consider relevant CJEU case law.

Studien syftar till att undersöka erfarenheter som handläggare av personlig assistans har av att arbeta i en kontext som är föränderlig till följd av rättspraxis och Försäkringskassans tolkning och tillämpning av den. Studien syftar även till att undersöka de konsekvenser som detta medför för LSS-handläggarna i deras yrkesutövning och vilka konsekvenser som de anser att det fått för brukarna. För att uppnå syftet har semistrukturerade intervjuer använts som datainsamlingsmetod. Den teoretiska ansatsen har bestått av Michael Lipskys teori om gräsrotsbyråkrater och handlingsutrymme och Andrew Jametons koncept om etisk stress. En bearbetning av empirin har genomförts i enlighet med tematisk analys. Olika krav och svårigheter har uppstått för LSS-handläggarna i deras yrkesutövning, såsom konflikt mellan deras professionella värderingar och den institutionella kontexten och att kunna bemöta brukare i oro och kris. Handläggarna är genomgående kritiska till Försäkringskassans restriktiva och detaljstyrda tolkning och tillämpning av den rättspraxis som ska vara styrande för dem båda. Vissa grupper av brukare har som konsekvens av förändrad rättspraxis och Försäkringskassans tolkning och tillämpning av den i stort sett uteslutits från rätten till personlig assistans. I diskussionen förs resonemang om LSS-handläggarnas yrkeskompetens, deras handlingsutrymme och etisk stress samt detaljstyrningens påverkan och konsekvenser för brukarna., The purpose of the following study is to investigate the experiences that social workers have of working in a context that is changing with precedents and the Swedish social insurance agency's, Försäkringskassan’s, interpretation and application of them. The purpose is further to explore the consequences this has for LSS-administrators in their work and for their clients. In order to achieve this aim semi structured interviews has been used as a data collection method. The theoretical approach consists of Michael Lipsky's theory of grassroots bureaucrats and discretion as well as Andrew Jameton's concept of moral distress. The data has been processed in accordance of thematic analysis. Difficulties has emerged for LSS-administrators in their work, such as conflict between their professional values and the institutional context and meeting most anxious clients in crisis. The LSS-administrators are critical of Försäkringskassan’s restrictive and detailed interpretation and application of precedents. Some groups of clients have as a consequence of changed jurisprudence and Försäkringskassan’s interpretation and application of it more or less been excluded from the right to personal assistance. We discuss the LSS-administrators professional competence, their discretion and ethical stress as well as the consequences detailed interpretation has for the clients.

The paper seeks to determine to what extent lower national courts are influenced by higher national courts in their application of CJEU case law. In doing so, we study and compare references to CJEU case law in the jurisprudence of Swedish courts of first instance and courts of precedent. We find that Swedish courts of first instance generally speaking identify and apply relevant CJEU case law independent of whether this has been dealt with by Swedish CoP or not. However, when these courts find and cite a Swedish court of precedent decision concerning an issue relating to EU law, they do not consistely consider relevant CJEU case law.