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Offshore energy development activities, including offshore wind, have the potential to uncover UXO and other military MEC, which can pose a serious threat to human safety and the environment. The guidelines established by this guidance provide a framework for lessees to contact the federal government, identify potential risks, and develop response and operation plans in the event of discovering MEC. While this framework does not eliminate the risks involved in dealing with MEC or encapsulate the full range of regulatory requirements, it is intended to serve as a baseline for maximizing consistent safe and responsible MEC responses and create uniform channels of communication between industry and all relevant federal stakeholders.

The objectives of this study were to update the FDOT vessel past point database that characterizes modern vessel traffic throughout navigable waterways in Florida and to develop updated models of future traffic projection.

Maritime piracy is not a new phenomenon in the history of mankind... there is extensive documentation that explains how and under what circumstances Julius Caesar was kidnapped by pirates in the Mediterranean Sea. It has always been a phenomenon feared by coastal population and settlements and, with the passing of time and the improvement of ships navigability conditions, by the crews of vessels sailing the seas. Besides, it has always been a real threat to commercial transactions and to the economic safety of those who have been involved, in one way or another, in the marine routes and of the countries that have bordered the waters. Modern history has added other problems to the phenomenon: the political destructuring of seaside countries, globalization and problems derived from political and economic issues. To provide solutions to the piracy phenomenon, global responses have been sought, including those of the European Union with very specific actions, such as the EU PROJECT Critical Maritime Routes Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) or the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Guinea action plan 2015-2020., La piratería marítima no es un fenómeno nuevo en la historia de la humanidad, hay documentación sobrada que explica cómo y en qué circunstancias Julio Cesar fue secuestrado por piratas en el Mediterráneo. Ha constituido un fenómeno temido por las poblaciones y asentamientos costeros y, con el paso del tiempo y la mejora de las condiciones de navegabilidad las naves, por las tripulaciones de las embarcaciones que habían de surcar los mares. Y siempre ha supuesto una amenaza real para las transacciones comerciales y para la seguridad económica de cuantos se han visto involucrados, de una u otra forma, en las rutas marinas y los países que han bordeado las aguas. La historia moderna ha añadido otros problemas al fenómeno: la desestructuración política de países ribereños, la globalización y los problemas derivados de otros políticos y económicos. Para dar soluciones al fenómeno piratería se han buscado respuestas globales, entre ellas las de la Unión Europea con acciones muy específicas, como el Proyecto para la defensa de Rutas Marítimas Críticas (CRIMGO) o la Estrategia de la Unión Europea para el Golfo de Guinea y el Plan de Acción sobre el Golfo de Guinea 2015-2020.

The Coast Guard R&D Center (RDC) conducted four phases of a marine safety risk assessment for the waters of the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal (CSSC) in the vicinity of the Aquatic Invasive Species Electrified Dispersal Barrier (MM 296.5), Romeoville, IL. An overarching goal of this work is to determine the adequacy of present risk mitigation strategies, and if necessary, recommend alternatives to the present strategies. The work covered by this report includes: (1) a data-driven, event-tree based quantitative risk analysis, (2) review and analysis of three-months of canal transits through the barrier zone, (3) shore measurements to categorize electrical currents at the Oxbow Midwest Calcining barge loading facility and (4) a summary of regulatory development and rule changes since the initial operation of the barrier through the present., Prepared in collaboration with ABSG Consulting, Science Applications International Corporation, and Shearwater Systems, LLC. Sponsored in part by DHS Contract nos. HSCG32-12-J-300033 and HSCG32-13-J-000010. The original document contains color images.

This pioneering work has main goal of observing and determining the dynamics of controlling circulation in the Sunda Strait - a strategic passage for marine safety and international shipping.

NGA contributes enormously to the safety of navigation worldwide -- military and civilian. The agency's maritime and aeronautical roles encompass all facets of charting and related tradecrafts. Its international responsibilities place it among global leaders in these fields. No one travels by ship or plane who isn't served by the navigational efforts of this agency. The agency's aeronautical and maritime missions range widely, as topics in this issue make clear. Operation Deep Freeze, which supplies Antarctic bases, receives its lifeblood from airlifts aided by NGA in an ongoing relationship with the scientific community. Likewise, NGA's partnership with the U.S. Air Force demonstrates its constant refinement of the Global Positioning System (GPS). The omnipresent GPS testifies to the reach of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). Always looking forward, the agency continues to improve the face of its aeronautical services, expanding its digital offerings in the wake of September 11th. Paralleling these advances, digital improvements in maritime navigation enable safer sailing. This issue includes the following articles/topics: "NGA Director Addresses National Defense Intelligence College Graduates"; "Empire Challenge 2009 Promotes Joint Military Operations"; "NGA Historian Addresses Piracy at Maritime Conference"; "GPS Reliability Depends on Air Force and NGA"; "Agency Aids Operation Deep Freeze Antarctic Airlifts"; "After Sept. 11: The Changing Face of Aeronautical Services"; "Aeronautical Analysts Soar to New Heights"; "Office of Global Navigation Enables Historic Visit"; "Red Dots Identify Submarine Hazards"; "Digital Navigation Keeps Navy on Course"; "Maritime Heritage Creates Modern Tradecrafts"; "21st Century: Innovation Promises to Moderate Vertical Obstruction Risk"; "Our Heritage: Oceanographer Mary Sears Advanced Marine Science"; and "New Campus East: NGA Takes Charge of First Two Buildings."

This report evaluates the adequacy of current maritime policy in meeting the commercial, economic, security and environmental needs of the United States in the next three decades. The report assesses ability of the maritime transportation system and maritime policy to cope with increasing trade volumes. The evaluation is conducted in the context of a long-term forecast of the foreign trade of the United States through the year 2038. The forecast and the participation of the United States in global trade are presented in sections I-III. Section IV describes current federal role, and especially the role of the Maritime Administration, in the areas of port development, shipbuilding, national security, taxation, labor and safety laws, the environment, vessel operations, maritime education, technological improvements and the Marine Highway Initiative. Where appropriate, the policies are assessed for meeting the current and future commercial, security and environmental needs of the nation. The section describes which policies are contributing to sustaining the competitiveness of the United States in the global maritime industry and which are hindering or failing to support such competitiveness. Section V then describes the obstacles to reform in maritime policies. Section VI explores options for reforms to maritime policies that are not meeting the commercial or other needs of the nation as well as the possible consequences of these reforms. The findings of this report lead to the overall conclusion that the current body of policies is only supportive of domestic maritime trades. Policy is not supportive of U.S. participation in international trades. The U.S.-flag oceangoing fleet has been in decline relative to the fleets of other maritime nations. Building ships in the U.S. and operating U.S.-flag ships is more costly than building or operating ships in other nations. Possible reforms can lend more support to the U.S. maritime industry.

El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en el estudio del Port State Control, que se está convirtiendo en uno de los instrumentos más eficaces en la prevención de los accidentes marítimos, y el estudio de los diferentes esquemas regionales establecidos. Básicamente el trabajo se divide en dos partes diferenciadas: la exposición de las diferentes resoluciones elaboradas por la Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI) en materia de Port State Control y la descripción de los esquemas regionales establecidos.

A diferencia de las regulaciones que se aplican a los buques mercantes, donde cada clase de buque debe cumplir obligatoriamente con unas normas y códigos de seguridad muy estrictos, regulados éstos a nivel internacional, la legislación referente a los pesqueros representa un conjunto de normas y recomendaciones fragmentarias y poco específicas, reguladas de manera no uniforme y de difícil seguimiento y verificación.

La Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI) ha impulsado el Convenio Internacional para la Seguridad de la Vida Humana en el Mar (Safety of Live at the Sea, SOLAS). Para la comprensión del mismo, Ricard Marí ha desarrollado un tratado en cuatro volúmenes y 934 páginas, en que desarrolla, de forma clara y pormenorizada, todos los puntos del mismo. Asimismo, el tratado pretende cubrir las lagunas que aún subsisten. El primer volumen, titulado Operatividad en la interfaz buque-puerto, trata " El buque como objeto de amenaza " El puerto como filtro de la amenaza al buque " Las personas implicadas y responsables en la respuesta " Nuevas tecnologías a aplicar El segundo volumen, titulado Desarrollo de las ordenanzas portuarias, trata " Análisis de los preceptos normativos " Análisis de la normativa relacionada con el PBIP " Vinculación y coherencia con los procedimientos El tercer volumen, titulado Resolución de emergencias en los buques, trata " Exigencias procedentes de la normativa SOLAS, códigos ISM (IGS) " Exigencias procedentes del código PBIP " Interacciones preponderantes y condicionantes El cuarto volumen, titulado Intervención de las fuerzas del orden en los buques, trata " Análisis de las legislaciones relacionadas " Situación pasada, presente y futura " Procedimientos de intervención de las fuerzas de seguridad externas " Procedimientos internos de los buques y sus tripulaciones

Descripció del recurs: 2 de maig de 2012, "Dos suicidas hicieron explotar sus bombas el 15 de marzo de 2004, uno dentro del puerto junto a la cerca (del perímetro exterior) y otro fuera. Las detonaciones que se produjeron, atribuidas en primer lugar a la explosión de algún depósito de combustible, causaron quince heridos." La aplicación de las normas de obligado cumplimiento, capítulo XI-2 del Convenio SOLAS, conocido como el código PBIP, en vigor desde el 1 de julio de 2004, así como del Reglamento del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, en vigor desde el 20 de mayo del mismo año, para la protección del entorno marítimo, constituye un reto difícil de afrontar por parte de los responsables de seguridad. La preocupación principal es la protección de la interfaz buque-puerto, y todos los procedimientos deben orientarse a generar una barrera impermeable a todas las amenazas pasadas, presentes y futuras. El libro presenta un nivel de conocimientos especializados en los temas incluidos en la security, tanto en la metodología de los procedimientos detectores de los riesgos relacionados con la intervención delictiva de humanos (identificación de indicios, señales, acciones, pautas de conducta, respuesta a ciertos estímulos de control, etc.), como desde el punto de vista del buque como unidad independiente y autónoma, para controlar su seguridad integral. Los contenidos se plantean teniendo en cuenta los tres grandes bloques que intervienen en el proceso de la seguridad (security): el buque, sus tipos, el diseño estructural y los tráficos; el puerto como filtro de las amenazas que intentan acceder al buque, y las personas involucradas en unos y otros, además de los elementos delictivos que provocan la crisis.

Crisis es cualquier situación creada por una amenaza de la que pueden derivar graves daños o la pérdida de vidas, bienes, intereses o imagen. Cualquier ruptura de la actividad rutinaria en el buque puede desencadenar una situación de crisis, con independencia de la naturaleza real o la gravedad de la situación inicial. Vulnerabilidad significa el grado de invalidez que tienen realmente las acciones preventivas y de protección establecidas en el esquema de seguridad del buque, tanto en el propio sistema como en los aspectos de la organización que todavía presente, frente a las amenazas y a los riesgos. En gran medida, las situaciones de crisis relacionadas con los accidentes marítimos (incendio a bordo, varada, vías de agua, etc.) son bien conocidas por la gente de mar, mientras que los aspectos que se incluyen dentro de lo que en inglés se denomina security no han sido tratados en la medida en que determinados acontecimientos ocurridos recientes lo requieren. Esta publicación trata de la influencia del factor humano, la negociación entre posturas enfrentadas, los procedimientos para hacer frente a una situación de crisis y los métodos para el control de masas afectadas por el shock y el pánico.

The paper presents the findings, derived from a structured questionnaire, that cover various aspects of the relation between human factor and maritime safety. In general, human element holds a very important share compared to the ensemble of marine-accident causes.

Recent international conflicts have raised fundamental questions about the relationship between international law and armed conflict. The notion that the rules of general international environmental law continue to apply during armed conflict is now well accepted, but the principles that are usually cited remain at a very high level of abstraction. In this paper, the author, a legal adviser in the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Hague, examines the extent to which international law has developed more detailed rules to protect the environment in international armed conflict. After a discussion of the main legal issues, the author focuses on the marine environment, examining the relationship between naval warfare, on one hand, and multilateral environmental treaties on marine safety and the prevention of marine pollution, on the other. She argues that the majority of these treaties do not apply during armed conflict, either because war damage is expressly excluded or because the treaties do not apply to warships. As for the treaties that are in principle applicable during armed conflict, her analysis shows that, under international law, belligerent and neutral states have the legal right to suspend those treaties, wholly or in part. The author concludes that very few of the treaties considered take the new law of armed conflict into account and that there remains a need for more detailed rules on environmental standards for military operations. The paper concludes with an extensive bibliography of journal articles, books, manuals, monographs, symposia and conference reports, selected special reports, and selected official documents and publications., Newport Paper number 15.

This report is the product of a 4 month study of offshore supply vessel (OSV) operations. The study was performed for the U.S. Coast Guard to provide the basis for establishing experience and training levels, career patterns, manning levels and examinations for personnel employed on OSV's. Functional Job Analysis was used to prepare detailed, standardized descriptions of the tasks required under routine and emergency conditions, taking into account OSV design and equipment, availability of personnel, and environmental variables. The functional area of onboard supervision and training was also addressed. Industry practices in the selection and training of personnel were reviewed for comparison with the experience and training needs indicated by the analysis. The information and data developed during the study will also be of value to operating company personnel, training and safety managers in developing training programs, operating instructions and policies, and selection criteria. (Author)

The study used a ship's bridge simulator to investigate safety of navigation, the effect of navigation displays, and the effect of bridge personnel organization during low visibility approaches of a VLCC to a deepwater port complex. Experienced VLCC masters and mates, some team trained and team organized, performed over 90 simulated approaches to the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) using either radar, radar with added racons in the area an automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA), or an ARPA displaying fairway boundary lines. Three scenarios were examined: a landfall approach, coastwise approach, approach to pick up the mooring master, and a dead reckoning approach with degraded position information. Strategies which were chosen by the masters in their approaches are described in light of their effect on deepwater port safety. Conclusions derived from descriptive and statistical evidence of performance led to recommendations for relocating the mooring master pickup point, providing an anchorage for use by masters, and the placement and implementation of racons within the deepwater port area. Other recommendations advocate the use of special bridge procedures and navigation systems during port approaches, and further research into the effect of traffic separation or advisory schemes on deepwater port safety. Findings suggest that while approaches of VLCCs to an offshore deepwater port under conditions similar to those simulated are not deceptively difficult or inherently unsafe, there are opportunities to mitigate the potential for hazardous navigation and shiphandling problems. (Author)

The U.S. Coast Guard annually presents a statistical summary of commercial vessel casualties that were investigated by Coast Guard marine inspectors during the previous fical year. The public, industry, and the Coast Guard have used the findings of these investigations to establish standards and determine the need for legislation to improve the protection of safety of life and property at sea. This compilation includes statistical tables for 1963, 1965-71, and 1973-79., Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council.

The Maritime Transportation Research Board (MTRB) established a committee to identify the research needed to reduce maritime collisions, rammings, and groundings. This request was in keeping with the continuing responsibility of the Coast Guard to ensure marine safety. The early discussions of the Committee on Maritime Collisions, Rammings, and Groundings, which included shipping, pilot, union, and Coast Guard representatives, highlighted the intensity of the controversy over piloting and vessel traffic service (VTS) systems. To augment the committee's deliberations and provide a neutral forum for the discussion of the issues, the MTRB decided to hold a symposium. Increased public sensitivity to maritime accidents and attendant actual, or assumed, environmental pollution has brought under question, among other things, the roles, responsibilities, and competencies of vessel pilots. With the hope that regulating traffic flow would recude casualties, the Coast Guard was asked to establish VTS systems in several U.S. ports. The changes in traditional maritime roles and practices that have resulted from public questions or directions have proven highly controversial. As a result, some ports have experienced the maritime equivalent of civil disobediance. Although no issues were resolved at the symposium, extensive interest in the proceedings has been shown by individuals throughout the industry and government.

The Ports and Waterways Safety Act was enacted on 10 July 1972. The purpose of the Act is to promote safety of ports, harbors, waterfront areas and navigable waters of the U. S. The report begins with a general description of the efforts taken by the Coast Guard in 1973. The report discusses specific accomplishments under the following topics: Approach used in meeting the charge of Title II; Data Acquisition Improvement; Internat'l Conference on Marine Pollution, 1973; Domestic Vessel Traffic Systems; Maneuvering; Personnel Standards; Hazardous Chemicals in Bulk; Research and Development; Risk Management System Development; Damage Risk Analysis; and Miscellaneous (describes actions taken under the authority of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as amended). (Author), See also Rept. no. USCG-M-3-77 dated Jan 75, AD-A033 107.

This report is structured to (1) respond to the question of describing Rules and Regulations to improve vessel controllability; (2) respond to the question of describing Rules and Regulations to reduce cargo loss in the event of an accident, environmental damage due to vessel groundings, and the progress made on an international level regarding design, etc. standards; and (3) respond to the question of problem areas in developing standards., See also Rept. no. USCG-M-4-77 dated Jan 76, AD-A033 108.

The problem of reducing the risk of collisions, groundings, or other accidents to tank vessels in our ports, waterways, and coastal waters is a more complex problem than either the Coast Guard or the Congress anticipated when the Ports and Waterways safety Act of 1972 was enacted. Like many other complex problems the number of factors involved and their interrelationships make human intuition a poor tool for determining what solutions are appropriate. The Coast Guard is attempting to collect the necessary knowledge as rapidly as our abilities and resources will permit; at the same time we are proceeding with regulations and other corrective measures which are appropriate and justifiable., See also Rept. no. USCG-M-1-77 dated Jan 73, AD-A032 799.

This report is Volume One of a two part study of river towboat collisions with bridges. The study is devoted to a review of accidents during the period Fiscal (FY) 1970 through 1974. During this time there were 811 accidents at bridges resulting in $23,153,000 in damages and 14 fatalities. The purpose of this study is to investigate bridge accidents by studying accident reports, waterway characteristics, bridge configurations, environmental conditions, and any other information which might be helpful in defining the problem. Certain bridges were selected for detailed investigation based on numbers of accidents during the sample period. It was not intended to study all problem bridges. It was intended to concentrate on a selected bridge sample to determine what problems are unique to each bridge and what problems are common between bridges, if any.

Statement of John A. Volpe, Secretary, Department of Transportation, before the Special Subcommittee on Oceanography, Senate Commerce Committee, Regarding the Proposed National Oceanic and Atmospheric Program Act of 1969 (S. 2802, S. 2841, and S. 3118), Wednesday, February 18, 1970.

Remarks by Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe before the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers at the Statler Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, April 2, 1970.

The Merchant Marine safety study provides an analysis of the efficiency of the U.S. Merchant Marine safety regulatory system. A critical analysis is made of duplication of rules, regulations, inspections and approvals within the multi-agency system. In addition, U.S. safety standards and performance are compared with those of other maritime nations. Conclusions and recommendations are provided. (Author)

The 2023-2028 National Strategy for the Marine Transportation System: Cultivating a Resilient and Sustainable Blue Economy (2023 Strategy) was developed by CMTS members through continued collaboration and multiple reviews. Members established 25 action items under five strategic priority areas: Priority Area 1: Strengthen Unity of Effort in the MTS; Priority Area 2: Advance the Health, Welfare, Diversity and Growth of the MTS Workforce; Priority Area 3: Enhance the Safety and Security of the MTS; Priority Area 4: Strive for a Sustainable Marine Transportation System; and, Priority Area 5: Support Optimal Performance of the MTS Supply Chain. This Strategy is intended to be complementary to other maritime transportation and freight-related documents from Federal agency partners. The 2023-2028 Strategy supersedes the 2017-2022 Strategy.

This Circular provides the current listing of NVICs. NVICs are issued by Coast, Guard Headquarters in the form of duplicated circulars. Their purpose is to inform the public of, Coast Guard guidance, requirements or information regarding marine safety activities.

The U.S. Coast Guard, a component, of the Department of Homeland, Security (DHS), conducts 11, statutory missions that range from, marine safety to defense readiness., To enhance mission performance, the Coast Guard is implementing a, modernization program to update, its command structure, support, systems, and business practices, while continuing the Deepwater, program—the acquisition program, to replace or upgrade its fleet of, vessels and aircraft. This testimony, discusses the Coast Guard’s (1), fiscal year 2010 budget, (2) mission, performance in fiscal year 2008, the, most recent year for which, statistics are available; and (3), challenges in managing its, modernization and acquisition, programs and workforce planning., This testimony is based on GAO, products issued in 2009 (including, GAO-09-530R and GAO-09-620T), and other GAO products issued, over the past 11 years—with, selected updates in June 2009—and, ongoing GAO work regarding the, Coast Guard’s newest vessel, the, National Security Cutter. Also, GAO analyzed budget and missionperformance, documents and, interviewed Coast Guard officials.

The enclosed report provides information regarding the following, (1)documentation requirements as prepared by the U.S. Coast Guard, for use in developing an ITOS, (2) performance requirements for, crew qualifications, tug performance capabilities and response, time, (3) discussion of the geophysical area under consideration, and, identification of current vessel control provisions which, enhance marine safety, (4) a discussion of Canadian involvement, (5) the ITOS plan provided by industry, (6) an evaluation of the, private sector ITOS plan and (7) a discussion of additional, measures available for consideration by subsequent risk, assessment as complementary or necessary to the ITOS proposed in, order to ensure marine environmental safety. 101 p., appendices, figs. and tables.

CG592/BS071, World wide merchant vessel fire and explosion data were analyzed to determine the contribution of these casualties to the marine pollution problem. The source of information is the Lloyd's Casualty Information System Data Base. The major findings of this analysis were presented for: 1) the overall fire/explosion problem for the world's merchant fleet, 2) lives and vessels lost as a result of fires/explosions, 3) all casualty categories contributing to marine pollution, and 4) fires/explosions contributing to marine pollution. General categories of merchant vessel types were identified and the circumstances surrounding the applicable casualty incidents were then categorized and analyzed for trends to the extent possible.

The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Center was established in 1986 as a consolidation of district Merchant Marine Technical Offices. Our offices are located on the sixth floor of the DOT Headquarters, building in Washington, DC. This document provides a brief overview of our unit?s organization, responsibilities, and activities. It is periodically updated so that its contents are an accurate reflection, of our past, present, and future. Additional information on our unit, as well as this document, is available through our web site at, http://www.dot.gov/dotinfo/uscg/hq/msc (16 p.)

Of the 273 occurrences involving vessels in Canadian pilotage waters between 1981 and 1992, 200 involved human factors. A high percentage of those 200 occurrences were identified as being associated with pilots. This study examines the operational relationships between pilots and masters/officers of the watch on Canadian and foreign vessels over 5,000 gross registered tons that are under the conduct of pilots in Canadian pilotage waters. The objective of the study is to identify safety deficiencies associated with teamwork on the bridge, including communications between marine pilots and masters. The study methodology included interviews with representatives of pilotage authorities, the shipping industry, and the Coast Guard; a survey of masters, officers of the watch, and pilots; and a literature review. The study ends with recommendations for improvements in hand-over briefings, communication language, vessel movement monitoring, and teamwork. (44 p.)

As part of its more than $$24 billion Deepwater program to replace aging vessels and aircraft with new or upgraded assets, the Coast Guard is preparing the National Security Cutter (NSC) for service. GAO previously reported on Deepwater assets' deployment delays and the Coast Guard's management of the Deepwater program. GAO was legislatively directed to continue its oversight of the Deepwater program. As a result, this report addresses: (1) the operational effects, if any, of delays in the delivery of the NSC and its support assets of unmanned aircraft and small boats; (2) Coast Guard plans for mitigating any operational effects and any associated costs of these plans; and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard has plans, to include cost estimates, for phasing in logistics support of the NSC while phasing out support for the High Endurance Cutter (HEC) it is replacing. GAO's work is based on analyses of the (1) operational capabilities and maintenance plans of the NSC and its support assets and (2) data on the HECs' condition; comparison of an NSC and HEC; and, interviews with Coast Guard officials. GAO recommends that as the Coast Guard finalizes the Integrated Logistics Support Plan, it should ensure that the plan includes the required logistics support documents to be used and the time frames for completing them.

The Coast Guard is developing a web-based information system to replace an aging computer system that it uses to track safety and law-enforcement actions involving commercial and recreational vessels. In 1995 the Coast Guard awarded a contract to develop the new system, called Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE). Due to the Coast Guard's history of systems development problems and information technology weaknesses, the General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to review MISLE's current status and risks. GAO found that the Coast Guard has made progress since taking over MISLE system development. It is now poised to deploy the system with limited capabilities. But much remains to be accomplished in order to deliver the complete system, with only about $11 million of its $61 million estimate remaining. MISLE is facing risks in four key areas - changing system requirements, software testing, transition planning, and risk management. Unless these challenges are successfully addressed, performance shortcomings, cost escalation, and schedule delay are likely.

G 1602.04, Presented in three volumes; 'Boat Boarding Ladder Placement,' which explores safety considerations including potential for human contact with a rotating propeller; 'Boat Handhold Placement,' which explores essential principles and methods of fall control; and 'Bowrider backrest height variables,' which uses actual accelerometer data in various boats to develop a computer prediction model to explore backrest heights as a factor in containing boat occupants during various maneuvers. Results of the studies and experiments provide groudnwork for possible voluntary industry standards development and possible development of Federal regulations.

MA31A100 ¿ LME07, The John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center was asked by the Office of Security of the Maritime Administration to examine the issue of industrial control systems (ICS) security in the Maritime Transportation System (MTS), and to develop a white paper based upon its findings for circulation amongst MTS stakeholders. In evaluating the issue, this paper first discusses the role of the MTS as part of the domestic and international transportation system and global supply chain, and provides examples of the economic impact of past natural and manmade disruptions to the MTS. It next explores the uses and applications of ICS throughout the MTS, identifies potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities of ICS, and provides examples of possible ICS failures and the potential impact on the MTS. Finally, the paper explores the issue in the context of Federal policy governing critical infrastructure, cybersecurity and supply chain resilience, and makes a number of recommendations that government agencies and the private sector might consider in order to mitigate the ICS security risks.

On October 26-27, 1995, over two hundred transportation leaders and decision-makers from around the nation convened in Cambridge, Massachusetts to participate in a two day symposium on "Challenges and Opportunities for Global Transportation in the 21st Century." The symposium was convened at the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, or Volpe Center, which is part of the Research and Special Programs Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The purpose of this event was to support effective public and private sector policy decisions by focusing on the core issures that underlie several of the most challenging transportation topics now on the national agenda. On July 16, 1996, the Volpe Center conducted the third of six follow-up sessions on Mesoscale Weather Forecasting : Technological and Institutional Challenges.

Transcript of proceedings beginning: I'd like to welcome you-all to day two of the Radio Technical Commission for Maritime Services Annual Assembly. We are glad to have you here. We hope you've had a good night's rest. My name is Harry Strong; I'm a member of the board of RTCM and the planning committee. I work for Myer Tech Systems, a not-for-profit organization that evolved this year, supporting the federal government since 1958.

CG816/R8007, The objectives of the study were: (1) to analyze the causes of tanker and other vessel casualties that could potentially result in oil pollution, and (2) to evaluate various alternative vessel traffic management systems and techniques for the prevention of oil-polluting casualties in the U.S. offshore waters. The geographical areas of interest are the waters from the U.S. coast out to 200 NM around the contiguous 48 states, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Alaska, except the area north of the Aleutian Islands. Three types of casualties are addressed in the study: groundings, collisions, and rammings. Vessels included in the study are tank vessels (tankers and tank-barges) over 1000 gross tons. The analysis of the causes of tank vessel casualties is performed mainly with the Coast Guard Merchant Vessel Casualty Report (MVCR) data base covering the period from July 1971 to October 1977. Other data sources surveyed include: the Lloyd's Weekly Casualty Reports, the Tanker Casualty Library of Marine Management Systems, Inc., and the Coast Guard Pollution Incident Reporting System. The nature and characteristics of tank vessel casualties that occur in the U.S. offshore waters are described. Systems and techniques considered as alternatives for preventing these casualties are identified, evaluated against each casualty and given an overall rating of casualty prevention effectiveness based on criteria which are defined. The promising systems are selected and conceptual descriptions are presented including the operational features, technical description, cost, staffing and training required, and legal implementation considerations.

This document outlines the Test Concept for the Ports and Waterways Safety System (PAWSS) Project. This Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) purpose is to reduce risk and ensure the PAWSS project meets all System Specification and Statement of Work (SOW) requirements.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had an immediate and visible impact on U.S. transportation. While the obvious impacts were temporary, there may have been less obvious yet longer lasting changes in U.S. travel patterns. The Research and Innovative Technology Administration's Bureau of Transportation Statistics analyzed the impacts in three different ways. All three analyses found these post-9/11 travel trends: -Immediate and continuing impact in air travel, -Immediate but temporary decline in highway travel, -No impact on rail travel, and -Travelers switched from air to highway.

The Coast Guard is considering constructing new or improved vessel traffic service (VTS) systems in as many as 17 ports. The proposed expansion, called VTS 2000, will cost an estimated $260 million to $310 million in federal funds to build and about $42 million in federal funds to operate each year if installed at all 17 locations. At present, the Coast Guard plans to pay these costs from its budget and not pass them on to local ports or to users, such as shipping companies. The General Accounting Office (GAO) was requested to provide information about funding the VTS 2000 program, including funding alternatives to build and operate the system. Briefly, GAO found the following: At its current stage of development, VTS 2000 presents uncertainties as to how many ports need such a system and how much it will cost. GAO did not find widespread support for VTS 2000 among the interviewed stakeholders at eight ports where site visits were conducted. Most opposed user fees or other funding approaches that would pass the cost of VTS 2000 from the federal government to those using the system. Support among those interviewed was greater for VTS systems that they perceived to be less expensive than VTS 2000 systems. Key issues could affect the establishment of privately funded or privately operated VTS systems. These include the private sector's ability to fund the initial start-up costs of such a system, the private sector's exposure to liability, and the Coast Guard's role in planning and overseeing a privately funded system. (43 p.)