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This essay puts on the table the following question: how has architecture helped catalyze legal change? I use as a specific illustration a debate regarding the codification of English common law that took place between Jeremy Bentham and William Blackstone in the late eighteenth century. Bentham and Blackstone’s competing architectural metaphors provided vivid illustrations of perceived dangers that they saw underlying proposed changes in law. The debate shows not only how powerful architectural metaphors were in constructing legal reform. It also demonstrates how novel architectural ideas can mask the lack of substantive changes in legal practice.

This thesis investigates related organizations perceptions and coordination in response to legal changes governing packaging waste collection (PWC) in Gotland, Sweden, utilizing Sensemaking theory, Interorganizational Coordination (IOC) theory, and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) theory. Through qualitative research methods, including interviews with key participants from public and private sectors involved in waste management, this study explores how individuals from different organizations make sense of and adapt to the new regulatory framework. The research identifies diverse organization views towards the legal changes, highlighting challenges related to ambiguity and clarity in regulatory details. Sensemaking processes influence organizational interpretations of the regulations, shaping their actions and collaborative efforts. IOC dynamics play a crucial role in waste management coordination, with task breakdown and coordination among multiple organizations proving more effective than centralized approaches. CSR illustrates the dilemma of private sectors’ contribution to broader sustainability goals due to competition concern in a market-driven business context. The study underscores the significance of public sector entities in waste management governance compared to private organizations. This research contributes to advancing understanding of waste management policy implementation and coordination dynamics within a regional context, leveraging sensemaking, IOC and CSR theories.

This thesis investigates related organizations perceptions and coordination in response to legal changes governing packaging waste collection (PWC) in Gotland, Sweden, utilizing Sensemaking theory, Interorganizational Coordination (IOC) theory, and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) theory. Through qualitative research methods, including interviews with key participants from public and private sectors involved in waste management, this study explores how individuals from different organizations make sense of and adapt to the new regulatory framework. The research identifies diverse organization views towards the legal changes, highlighting challenges related to ambiguity and clarity in regulatory details. Sensemaking processes influence organizational interpretations of the regulations, shaping their actions and collaborative efforts. IOC dynamics play a crucial role in waste management coordination, with task breakdown and coordination among multiple organizations proving more effective than centralized approaches. CSR illustrates the dilemma of private sectors’ contribution to broader sustainability goals due to competition concern in a market-driven business context. The study underscores the significance of public sector entities in waste management governance compared to private organizations. This research contributes to advancing understanding of waste management policy implementation and coordination dynamics within a regional context, leveraging sensemaking, IOC and CSR theories.

El artículo explora los principales atributos del pensamiento jurídico colombiano acerca del derecho, a partir de un análisis de las élites jurídicas. Con ese objetivo, además, son analizadas las condiciones y contextos de la producción contemporánea del conocimiento jurídico nacional. El criterio para definir las élites consistió en establecer cuáles eran los autores y las investigaciones con mayor reconocimiento e influencia entre los lectores (de modo primordial, estudiantes de derecho, juristas y expertos investigadores). Estas élites son identificadas utilizando como fuente el AD Scientific Index - Colombia Scientist Law, esto es, el ranking 2023 de científicos del derecho en el país, lo que se combinó con información extraída de la base de datos de Scopus, que permitió construir un segundo ranking. Los resultados, obtenidos con aplicación de un método analítico, permitieron establecer que la sociología jurídica domina el saber sobre el derecho, combinada con la dogmática, al igual que varias teorías críticas innovadoras, hace algunos pocos años del todo ajenas a las escuelas de derecho. También se comprobó que esas élites tienen rasgos étnicos, de género, geolocalización, formación académica de grado y posgrado, estratificación social y situación laboral análogas., The article examines the main characteristics of Colombian legal thought, analysing the so-called legal elites. With this goal, the conditions and contexts of the contemporary production of national legal knowledge are also analysed. The elites were detected by using criteria to determine the authors and researchers with greater recognition and influence among readers (primarily law students, jurists and specialized researchers. These elites were then identified using the AD Scientific Index - Colombia Scientist Law, that is, the 2023 ranking of legal scholars in the country, combined with information extracted from the Scopus database, which allowed the construction of a second ranking. The results, obtained by applying an analytical method, made it possible to establish that legal sociology dominates the knowledge of law, combined with dogmatics, as well as some innovative critical theories, which were completely foreign to law schools a few years ago. It was also found that these elites have similar ethnicity, gender, geolocation, undergraduate and graduate education, social stratification, and employment status.

Under the hopeful atmosphere of Turkey's accession to full membership to European Union, Turkey became oriented towards realizing extensive legal and constitutional amendments, as well as juridical reforms in restructuring the contemporary body of law and judicial institutions based on the promise of strengthening access to justice mechanisms and improving human rights laws and practices in Turkey that was shaped by the discourses of democratic governance, rule of law, and economic progress. At the beginning of the second decade of 2000, the affective atmosphere in Turkey abruptly changed by a series of national and international crises, leading into an impasse in the ordinary life in Turkey. This dissertation aims to examine the promise of legal change as the history of the present of law and legal practice in Turkey. Focusing on everyday personal and professional practices of avukats (attorneys) in addressing the legal issues of gender and sexuality, I explore how the narratives of legal change historically inform the aesthetic formation of the contemporary body of law, as well as the differences between ordinary and professional bodies. Building on theories of affect and queer theories, I argue that the law constitutes both a historical site of socio-cultural belonging and an everyday social space within and through which professional bodies become oriented towards generating the possibilities of socio-legal change, depending how their personal and professional experiences and encounters shape their everyday legal practices and how they reside within judicial and professional positionalities in practicing the law.

Under the hopeful atmosphere of Turkey's accession to full membership to European Union, Turkey became oriented towards realizing extensive legal and constitutional amendments, as well as juridical reforms in restructuring the contemporary body of law and judicial institutions based on the promise of strengthening access to justice mechanisms and improving human rights laws and practices in Turkey that was shaped by the discourses of democratic governance, rule of law, and economic progress. At the beginning of the second decade of 2000, the affective atmosphere in Turkey abruptly changed by a series of national and international crises, leading into an impasse in the ordinary life in Turkey. This dissertation aims to examine the promise of legal change as the history of the present of law and legal practice in Turkey. Focusing on everyday personal and professional practices of avukats (attorneys) in addressing the legal issues of gender and sexuality, I explore how the narratives of legal change historically inform the aesthetic formation of the contemporary body of law, as well as the differences between ordinary and professional bodies. Building on theories of affect and queer theories, I argue that the law constitutes both a historical site of socio-cultural belonging and an everyday social space within and through which professional bodies become oriented towards generating the possibilities of socio-legal change, depending how their personal and professional experiences and encounters shape their everyday legal practices and how they reside within judicial and professional positionalities in practicing the law.

This article discusses the role of courts and legislators in the development of Chilean private law in the context a recent bill that seeks to enact the French théorie de l’imprévision in the Chilean Civil Code as a reaction to the economic effects of the COVID-19 crisis. On the one hand, it holds that the public discussion triggered by this bill has led to the emergence of a certain consensus regarding the convenience of accepting this theory, but that the most adequate path for this remains an open question. In this context and relying on elements of Comparative Law, Legal Theory and Law and Economics it argues that, in the Chilean case, the best route to bring this doctrine into the legal system is a legislative reform, but that the proposed bill does not have the technical depth required for it. On the other hand, it argues that general and unforeseen crisis, as that of the COVID-19, should be dealt by special emergency legislation, not by judicial or statutory general reforms aiming to introduce new legal paradigms., Este artículo analiza el rol del juez y el legislador en el desarrollo del derecho privado chileno, a propósito del reciente proyecto de ley que busca recoger la teoría de la imprevisión en el Código Civil como reacción a los efectos de económicos de la crisis del COVID-19. Por un lado, sostiene que la discusión en torno a este proyecto ha hecho emerger un cierto consenso respecto de la conveniencia de acoger esta teoría, pero que la forma adecuada para ello sigue siendo una pregunta abierta. En ese contexto y con base en elementos de derecho comparado, teoría del derecho y análisis económico del derecho argumenta que, en el caso chileno, la mejor ruta para acoger dicha teoría es una reforma legislativa, pero que el proyecto de ley propuesto no tiene la profundidad técnica requerida para ello. Por el otro lado, argumenta que crisis generales e imprevistas, como la del COVID-19, deben ser abordadas mediante legislación especial, no por reformas legales generales o cambios jurisprudenciales que impliquen cambios de paradigma.

Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle’s Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato’s Politicus and Laws., La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle’s Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato’s Politicus and Laws., La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle’s Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato’s Politicus and Laws., La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle’s Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato’s Politicus and Laws., La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle’s Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato’s Politicus and Laws., La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle’s Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato’s Politicus and Laws., La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle’s Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato’s Politicus and Laws., La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle’s Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato’s Politicus and Laws., La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle’s Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato’s Politicus and Laws., La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

The last quarter of a century has featured a surge in interest and studies on the commons, spearheaded, of course, by the efforts of Elinor Ostrom. These efforts have problematized the once well-established paradigm of the tragedy of the commons most clearly described by Garrett Hardin in 1968. One could say that the commons, thus, have become a fundamental field of study in most social sciences. This is not the case in the field of legal scholarship (with one noticeable exception that I will discuss later), which leads me to the overarching issue of this essay, namely the difficult relationship between jurists and the commons. The phrase “difficult relationship” does not refer to an explicit antagonism, but to something even worse: complete indifference and a scandalous lack of knowledge. While my main purpose is to try to explain this sorry state of affairs, I also hope to make a more general point on the nature of law and legal change. In this sense, the commons can be considered a case-study in legal theory. The main issue of this paper is to tackle following subquestions. What is the status of commons in the Western European legal discourse? Why do most legal scholars pay such a poor attention to the growing literature on the commons in other disciplines? What factors contribute to this peculiar case of cultural deafness? What promise of improvement does the future hold?, U poslednjih četvrt veka bili smo svedoci rasta interesovanja i istraživanja zajedničkih dobara koje je predvodila Elinor Ostrom. Ovi napori su doveli u pitanje prethodno ustanovljenu paradigmu tragedije zajedničkih dobara koja je najbolje izražena u radu Gareta Hardina iz 1968. godine. Moglo bi se reći da su u međuvremenu zajednička dobra postala sfera istraživanja od fundamentalne važnosti u društvenim naukama. To nije bio slučaj kada je reč o pravnoj misli (uzimajući u obzir da postoji jedan izuzetak koji će biti analiziran kasnije) i to je tema ovog eseja, naime, složeni odnos između zajedničkih dobara i pravnika. Izraz „složeni odnos“ ne treba da upućuje na otvoren antagonizam, već na nešto još gore: potpunu ravnodušnost i skandalozan nedostatak znanja. Iako je moj glavni cilj da ovde objasnim dato stanje stvari, namera mi je da takođe iznesem opštiju tvrdnju o prirodi prava i pravne promene. U tom smislu zajednička dobra se mogu uzeti kao studija slučaja u pravnoj teoriji. Ovaj članak će razmotriti sledeća potpitanja. Koji status zajednička dobra imaju u zapadno-evropskom pravnom diskursu? Zbog čega većina pravnih mislilaca obraća tako malo pažnje na rastuću literaturu o zajedničkim dobrima? Koji faktori su na delu u ovom čudnom slučaju kulturnog slepila? Da li postoje razlozi da u budućnosti dođe do promene u tom pogledu?

The last quarter of a century has featured a surge in interest and studies on the commons, spearheaded, of course, by the efforts of Elinor Ostrom. These efforts have problematized the once well-established paradigm of the tragedy of the commons most clearly described by Garrett Hardin in 1968. One could say that the commons, thus, have become a fundamental field of study in most social sciences. This is not the case in the field of legal scholarship (with one noticeable exception that I will discuss later), which leads me to the overarching issue of this essay, namely the difficult relationship between jurists and the commons. The phrase “difficult relationship” does not refer to an explicit antagonism, but to something even worse: complete indifference and a scandalous lack of knowledge. While my main purpose is to try to explain this sorry state of affairs, I also hope to make a more general point on the nature of law and legal change. In this sense, the commons can be considered a case-study in legal theory. The main issue of this paper is to tackle following subquestions. What is the status of commons in the Western European legal discourse? Why do most legal scholars pay such a poor attention to the growing literature on the commons in other disciplines? What factors contribute to this peculiar case of cultural deafness? What promise of improvement does the future hold?, U poslednjih četvrt veka bili smo svedoci rasta interesovanja i istraživanja zajedničkih dobara koje je predvodila Elinor Ostrom. Ovi napori su doveli u pitanje prethodno ustanovljenu paradigmu tragedije zajedničkih dobara koja je najbolje izražena u radu Gareta Hardina iz 1968. godine. Moglo bi se reći da su u međuvremenu zajednička dobra postala sfera istraživanja od fundamentalne važnosti u društvenim naukama. To nije bio slučaj kada je reč o pravnoj misli (uzimajući u obzir da postoji jedan izuzetak koji će biti analiziran kasnije) i to je tema ovog eseja, naime, složeni odnos između zajedničkih dobara i pravnika. Izraz „složeni odnos“ ne treba da upućuje na otvoren antagonizam, već na nešto još gore: potpunu ravnodušnost i skandalozan nedostatak znanja. Iako je moj glavni cilj da ovde objasnim dato stanje stvari, namera mi je da takođe iznesem opštiju tvrdnju o prirodi prava i pravne promene. U tom smislu zajednička dobra se mogu uzeti kao studija slučaja u pravnoj teoriji. Ovaj članak će razmotriti sledeća potpitanja. Koji status zajednička dobra imaju u zapadno-evropskom pravnom diskursu? Zbog čega većina pravnih mislilaca obraća tako malo pažnje na rastuću literaturu o zajedničkim dobrima? Koji faktori su na delu u ovom čudnom slučaju kulturnog slepila? Da li postoje razlozi da u budućnosti dođe do promene u tom pogledu?

The last quarter of a century has featured a surge in interest and studies on the commons, spearheaded, of course, by the efforts of Elinor Ostrom. These efforts have problematized the once well-established paradigm of the tragedy of the commons most clearly described by Garrett Hardin in 1968. One could say that the commons, thus, have become a fundamental field of study in most social sciences. This is not the case in the field of legal scholarship (with one noticeable exception that I will discuss later), which leads me to the overarching issue of this essay, namely the difficult relationship between jurists and the commons. The phrase “difficult relationship” does not refer to an explicit antagonism, but to something even worse: complete indifference and a scandalous lack of knowledge. While my main purpose is to try to explain this sorry state of affairs, I also hope to make a more general point on the nature of law and legal change. In this sense, the commons can be considered a case-study in legal theory. The main issue of this paper is to tackle following subquestions. What is the status of commons in the Western European legal discourse? Why do most legal scholars pay such a poor attention to the growing literature on the commons in other disciplines? What factors contribute to this peculiar case of cultural deafness? What promise of improvement does the future hold?, U poslednjih četvrt veka bili smo svedoci rasta interesovanja i istraživanja zajedničkih dobara koje je predvodila Elinor Ostrom. Ovi napori su doveli u pitanje prethodno ustanovljenu paradigmu tragedije zajedničkih dobara koja je najbolje izražena u radu Gareta Hardina iz 1968. godine. Moglo bi se reći da su u međuvremenu zajednička dobra postala sfera istraživanja od fundamentalne važnosti u društvenim naukama. To nije bio slučaj kada je reč o pravnoj misli (uzimajući u obzir da postoji jedan izuzetak koji će biti analiziran kasnije) i to je tema ovog eseja, naime, složeni odnos između zajedničkih dobara i pravnika. Izraz „složeni odnos“ ne treba da upućuje na otvoren antagonizam, već na nešto još gore: potpunu ravnodušnost i skandalozan nedostatak znanja. Iako je moj glavni cilj da ovde objasnim dato stanje stvari, namera mi je da takođe iznesem opštiju tvrdnju o prirodi prava i pravne promene. U tom smislu zajednička dobra se mogu uzeti kao studija slučaja u pravnoj teoriji. Ovaj članak će razmotriti sledeća potpitanja. Koji status zajednička dobra imaju u zapadno-evropskom pravnom diskursu? Zbog čega većina pravnih mislilaca obraća tako malo pažnje na rastuću literaturu o zajedničkim dobrima? Koji faktori su na delu u ovom čudnom slučaju kulturnog slepila? Da li postoje razlozi da u budućnosti dođe do promene u tom pogledu?

The aim of this dissertation is to illuminate the interplay between female agency and legal regulation in Sweden during the period 1760-1860. The material chosen for the study relates to matters concerning women that were brought before the Judiciary Inspection, the highest legal authority in Sweden. From its central position in the state hierarchy, this court was an arena in which the central power could identify and find solutions to problems important for the stability and development of society. The study identifies issues that encouraged women to bring proceedings before the court, or prompted other parties to bring women to court. The dissertation has analysed the actions taken and arguments made in these cases by women, their counterparts, and court representatives, in relation to the regulations or the absence of regulations in each particular situation. This has shown the room for manoeuvre that could be achieved, and how the women could achieve it – in terms of right to manage property, economic agency and debt responsibility, finding ways to support themselves and their families, or affirming their positions as mothers and mistresses of households. In this way, the dissertation illuminates the freedom of agency in practice that has often been seen as contradictory in a strictly patriarchal society like early modern Sweden. The dissertation also traces some important changes over time, including the increasingly diverse class background of litigants over the period in question, shifts in understandings of property, work, family, and the meaning of legal majority. The central diachronic claims are firstly that the legal system shifted over time from one primarily based upon status, circumstance, and local opinion to one based on formalized understanding of the law founded upon contract and clear legal definitions, and that this had important implications for women’s room for manoeuvre in the courts and in society. Secondly, that the negotiation process cont

The aim of this dissertation is to illuminate the interplay between female agency and legal regulation in Sweden during the period 1760-1860. The material chosen for the study relates to matters concerning women that were brought before the Judiciary Inspection, the highest legal authority in Sweden. From its central position in the state hierarchy, this court was an arena in which the central power could identify and find solutions to problems important for the stability and development of society. The study identifies issues that encouraged women to bring proceedings before the court, or prompted other parties to bring women to court. The dissertation has analysed the actions taken and arguments made in these cases by women, their counterparts, and court representatives, in relation to the regulations or the absence of regulations in each particular situation. This has shown the room for manoeuvre that could be achieved, and how the women could achieve it – in terms of right to manage property, economic agency and debt responsibility, finding ways to support themselves and their families, or affirming their positions as mothers and mistresses of households. In this way, the dissertation illuminates the freedom of agency in practice that has often been seen as contradictory in a strictly patriarchal society like early modern Sweden. The dissertation also traces some important changes over time, including the increasingly diverse class background of litigants over the period in question, shifts in understandings of property, work, family, and the meaning of legal majority. The central diachronic claims are firstly that the legal system shifted over time from one primarily based upon status, circumstance, and local opinion to one based on formalized understanding of the law founded upon contract and clear legal definitions, and that this had important implications for women’s room for manoeuvre in the courts and in society. Secondly, that the negotiation process cont

Exploring the insight of the butterfly effect from chaos theory, this article shows how technological transformation influences legal change. The argument is developed from a sociological and a historical perspective, comparing and contrasting social customs since the seventeenth century until today and showing the transformation of criminal offenses. In societies with a strict moral code, adultery, fornication, and sodomy were sexual crimes, even if victimless. After the sexual revolution, these conducts are no longer criminal. Explaining this phenomenon, the article identifies the change of attitude towards human nudity as an important factor and considers this change of legal culture to be a consequence of technological innovations related to personal hygiene, public health, and cleanliness. The taboo against nudity persisted because bathing was not considered healthy and there were no separate bathrooms in residences until the end of the nineteenth century. Examining nudism, the possibility of divorce and human rights protection, the article emphasizes the role of technology for the cultural revolution, and of culture for legal change. Another interesting example of the relationship between law and technology comes from the development of the automobile industry and the emergence of a series of laws to regulate exhaustively individual transportation. Moreover, the invention of antibiotics altered the expectation of the sick individuals who expect to be cured and, as a consequence, affected also the practice of torts and civil liability. The flap of wings of various butterflies led to the current setting.

The aim of this dissertation is to illuminate the interplay between female agency and legal regulation in Sweden during the period 1760-1860. The material chosen for the study relates to matters concerning women that were brought before the Judiciary Inspection, the highest legal authority in Sweden. From its central position in the state hierarchy, this court was an arena in which the central power could identify and find solutions to problems important for the stability and development of society. The study identifies issues that encouraged women to bring proceedings before the court, or prompted other parties to bring women to court. The dissertation has analysed the actions taken and arguments made in these cases by women, their counterparts, and court representatives, in relation to the regulations or the absence of regulations in each particular situation. This has shown the room for manoeuvre that could be achieved, and how the women could achieve it – in terms of right to manage property, economic agency and debt responsibility, finding ways to support themselves and their families, or affirming their positions as mothers and mistresses of households. In this way, the dissertation illuminates the freedom of agency in practice that has often been seen as contradictory in a strictly patriarchal society like early modern Sweden. The dissertation also traces some important changes over time, including the increasingly diverse class background of litigants over the period in question, shifts in understandings of property, work, family, and the meaning of legal majority. The central diachronic claims are firstly that the legal system shifted over time from one primarily based upon status, circumstance, and local opinion to one based on formalized understanding of the law founded upon contract and clear legal definitions, and that this had important implications for women’s room for manoeuvre in the courts and in society. Secondly, that the negotiation process cont

Exploring the insight of the butterfly effect from chaos theory, this article shows how technological transformation influences legal change. The argument is developed from a sociological and a historical perspective, comparing and contrasting social customs since the seventeenth century until today and showing the transformation of criminal offenses. In societies with a strict moral code, adultery, fornication, and sodomy were sexual crimes, even if victimless. After the sexual revolution, these conducts are no longer criminal. Explaining this phenomenon, the article identifies the change of attitude towards human nudity as an important factor and considers this change of legal culture to be a consequence of technological innovations related to personal hygiene, public health, and cleanliness. The taboo against nudity persisted because bathing was not considered healthy and there were no separate bathrooms in residences until the end of the nineteenth century. Examining nudism, the possibility of divorce and human rights protection, the article emphasizes the role of technology for the cultural revolution, and of culture for legal change. Another interesting example of the relationship between law and technology comes from the development of the automobile industry and the emergence of a series of laws to regulate exhaustively individual transportation. Moreover, the invention of antibiotics altered the expectation of the sick individuals who expect to be cured and, as a consequence, affected also the practice of torts and civil liability. The flap of wings of various butterflies led to the current setting.

Exploring the insight of the butterfly effect from chaos theory, this article shows how technological transformation influences legal change. The argument is developed from a sociological and a historical perspective, comparing and contrasting social customs since the seventeenth century until today and showing the transformation of criminal offenses. In societies with a strict moral code, adultery, fornication, and sodomy were sexual crimes, even if victimless. After the sexual revolution, these conducts are no longer criminal. Explaining this phenomenon, the article identifies the change of attitude towards human nudity as an important factor and considers this change of legal culture to be a consequence of technological innovations related to personal hygiene, public health, and cleanliness. The taboo against nudity persisted because bathing was not considered healthy and there were no separate bathrooms in residences until the end of the nineteenth century. Examining nudism, the possibility of divorce and human rights protection, the article emphasizes the role of technology for the cultural revolution, and of culture for legal change. Another interesting example of the relationship between law and technology comes from the development of the automobile industry and the emergence of a series of laws to regulate exhaustively individual transportation. Moreover, the invention of antibiotics altered the expectation of the sick individuals who expect to be cured and, as a consequence, affected also the practice of torts and civil liability. The flap of wings of various butterflies led to the current setting.

The aim of this dissertation is to illuminate the interplay between female agency and legal regulation in Sweden during the period 1760-1860. The material chosen for the study relates to matters concerning women that were brought before the Judiciary Inspection, the highest legal authority in Sweden. From its central position in the state hierarchy, this court was an arena in which the central power could identify and find solutions to problems important for the stability and development of society. The study identifies issues that encouraged women to bring proceedings before the court, or prompted other parties to bring women to court. The dissertation has analysed the actions taken and arguments made in these cases by women, their counterparts, and court representatives, in relation to the regulations or the absence of regulations in each particular situation. This has shown the room for manoeuvre that could be achieved, and how the women could achieve it – in terms of right to manage property, economic agency and debt responsibility, finding ways to support themselves and their families, or affirming their positions as mothers and mistresses of households. In this way, the dissertation illuminates the freedom of agency in practice that has often been seen as contradictory in a strictly patriarchal society like early modern Sweden. The dissertation also traces some important changes over time, including the increasingly diverse class background of litigants over the period in question, shifts in understandings of property, work, family, and the meaning of legal majority. The central diachronic claims are firstly that the legal system shifted over time from one primarily based upon status, circumstance, and local opinion to one based on formalized understanding of the law founded upon contract and clear legal definitions, and that this had important implications for women’s room for manoeuvre in the courts and in society. Secondly, that the negotiation process cont

The aim of this dissertation is to illuminate the interplay between female agency and legal regulation in Sweden during the period 1760-1860. The material chosen for the study relates to matters concerning women that were brought before the Judiciary Inspection, the highest legal authority in Sweden. From its central position in the state hierarchy, this court was an arena in which the central power could identify and find solutions to problems important for the stability and development of society. The study identifies issues that encouraged women to bring proceedings before the court, or prompted other parties to bring women to court. The dissertation has analysed the actions taken and arguments made in these cases by women, their counterparts, and court representatives, in relation to the regulations or the absence of regulations in each particular situation. This has shown the room for manoeuvre that could be achieved, and how the women could achieve it – in terms of right to manage property, economic agency and debt responsibility, finding ways to support themselves and their families, or affirming their positions as mothers and mistresses of households. In this way, the dissertation illuminates the freedom of agency in practice that has often been seen as contradictory in a strictly patriarchal society like early modern Sweden. The dissertation also traces some important changes over time, including the increasingly diverse class background of litigants over the period in question, shifts in understandings of property, work, family, and the meaning of legal majority. The central diachronic claims are firstly that the legal system shifted over time from one primarily based upon status, circumstance, and local opinion to one based on formalized understanding of the law founded upon contract and clear legal definitions, and that this had important implications for women’s room for manoeuvre in the courts and in society. Secondly, that the negotiation process cont

Network, organizational, and policy learning literatures indicate that when interest groups face failure they will seek out alternative ideas and strategies that will enhance their potential for future success. Research with regard to interest groups and legal change has found that interest groups, using arguments that were once accepted as the legal standard for Supreme Court decisions, were unwilling or unable to alter their arguments when the Court reversed its position on these legal standards. This research project examined the conflicting findings of these literatures. Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework as a guide, this project studied the separationist advocacy coalition in cases regarding state aid to elementary and secondary sectarian schools from 1971 to 2002. The legal briefs filed by members of the separationist advocacy coalition with the Court were examined using content analysis to track changes in their legal arguments. Elite interviews were then conducted to gain an understanding of the rationale for results found in the content analysis. The research expectation was that the separationist advocacy coalition would seek out and incorporate into their briefs new and innovative legal arguments to promote their policy goals. The research results demonstrated that prior to legal change interest groups did seek out and incorporate new legal arguments borrowed from other fora and sought to expand or reinterpret established legal arguments to better aid their policy goals. The changes that seemed to have the potential for adoption by the Court were quickly incorporated into the briefs of the other members of the coalition. Following legal change interest groups continued to analyze the decisions of the Court in order to seek out the best possible legal arguments to use in their briefs; however, the main focus of legal arguments examined and used by the coalition narrowed to those cited by the swing justice in the funding cases. Two innovative arguments

Pure legal learning: cognitive functions in a normative system Norms are the obvious foundation for most of legal sociology and jurisprudence. Norms can be defined as counterfactual expectations, expectations that do not change even when counter-evidence of reality is presented. Thus learning is counter to our intuition of law. However, law does change, and some of the changes can be described as learning. Law changes by political decisions when the legislator acts, it can change incrementally when the judge makes a decision, it changes when new practices become binding, and it changes when doctrine is developed in legal science. If we differentiate between learning within a worldview and a learning that changes world-views, most cases of legal change can be interpreted as decision-making within a world-view, not the development of one. In this article, the author develops a conceptual frame of reference, in terms of pure legal learning, for a specific type of legal change. Pure legal learning denotes a learning process, which is not merely a change within a world-view, but a change in the legal world-views themselves. This is therefore the process where degrees of freedom for legal change are defined., Sociologisk Forsknings digitala arkiv

Pure legal learning: cognitive functions in a normative system Norms are the obvious foundation for most of legal sociology and jurisprudence. Norms can be defined as counterfactual expectations, expectations that do not change even when counter-evidence of reality is presented. Thus learning is counter to our intuition of law. However, law does change, and some of the changes can be described as learning. Law changes by political decisions when the legislator acts, it can change incrementally when the judge makes a decision, it changes when new practices become binding, and it changes when doctrine is developed in legal science. If we differentiate between learning within a worldview and a learning that changes world-views, most cases of legal change can be interpreted as decision-making within a world-view, not the development of one. In this article, the author develops a conceptual frame of reference, in terms of pure legal learning, for a specific type of legal change. Pure legal learning denotes a learning process, which is not merely a change within a world-view, but a change in the legal world-views themselves. This is therefore the process where degrees of freedom for legal change are defined., Sociologisk Forsknings digitala arkiv

Pure legal learning: cognitive functions in a normative system Norms are the obvious foundation for most of legal sociology and jurisprudence. Norms can be defined as counterfactual expectations, expectations that do not change even when counter-evidence of reality is presented. Thus learning is counter to our intuition of law. However, law does change, and some of the changes can be described as learning. Law changes by political decisions when the legislator acts, it can change incrementally when the judge makes a decision, it changes when new practices become binding, and it changes when doctrine is developed in legal science. If we differentiate between learning within a worldview and a learning that changes world-views, most cases of legal change can be interpreted as decision-making within a world-view, not the development of one. In this article, the author develops a conceptual frame of reference, in terms of pure legal learning, for a specific type of legal change. Pure legal learning denotes a learning process, which is not merely a change within a world-view, but a change in the legal world-views themselves. This is therefore the process where degrees of freedom for legal change are defined., Sociologisk Forsknings digitala arkiv

Pure legal learning: cognitive functions in a normative system Norms are the obvious foundation for most of legal sociology and jurisprudence. Norms can be defined as counterfactual expectations, expectations that do not change even when counter-evidence of reality is presented. Thus learning is counter to our intuition of law. However, law does change, and some of the changes can be described as learning. Law changes by political decisions when the legislator acts, it can change incrementally when the judge makes a decision, it changes when new practices become binding, and it changes when doctrine is developed in legal science. If we differentiate between learning within a worldview and a learning that changes world-views, most cases of legal change can be interpreted as decision-making within a world-view, not the development of one. In this article, the author develops a conceptual frame of reference, in terms of pure legal learning, for a specific type of legal change. Pure legal learning denotes a learning process, which is not merely a change within a world-view, but a change in the legal world-views themselves. This is therefore the process where degrees of freedom for legal change are defined., Sociologisk Forsknings digitala arkiv

27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 743 (2006)