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The article aims to analyse issues relating to the application and validity of the law of neutrality currently raised by the recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In particular, it analyses arguments presented by the doctrine questioning the compatibility of the law of neutrality with other rules of international law, its obsolescence due to changes in the legal basis for the application of its rules and its desuetude due to the non-application by States during recent armed conflicts. The article concludes that despite the significant reduction in its application due to some incompatibilities with other norms of international law and its usefulness in regulating relations between States in conflict and third States, it is not possible to assert that the law of neutrality has been extinguished or that is no longer in force.

The scope of protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict has continued to expand since the issue was first introduced on the international agenda in the 1970s. Today, it is recognized that the environment is a prima facie civilian object and as such it is entitled to the same layers of protection during an armed conflict as any civilian person or object. Thus, there is a legal obligation to prevent environmental harm in armed conflict, before the event. Given the magnitude of environmental damage that can be anticipated in relation to armed conflict, the obligation to prevent such damage in the first place is critical. In this regard, it is important to note that the legal obligation to prevent environmental harm originates from international environmental law. Furthermore, the obligation to prevent harm is an ongoing obligation. This article illustrates that the general preventive obligations found in international environmental law can shed much-needed light on the general preventive obligations already established under the law of armed conflict, in furtherance of environmental protection.

The scope of protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict has continued to expand since the issue was first introduced on the international agenda in the 1970s. Today, it is recognized that the environment is a prima facie civilian object and as such it is entitled to the same layers of protection during an armed conflict as any civilian person or object. Thus, there is a legal obligation to prevent environmental harm in armed conflict, before the event. Given the magnitude of environmental damage that can be anticipated in relation to armed conflict, the obligation to prevent such damage in the first place is critical. In this regard, it is important to note that the legal obligation to prevent environmental harm originates from international environmental law. Furthermore, the obligation to prevent harm is an ongoing obligation. This article illustrates that the general preventive obligations found in international environmental law can shed much-needed light on the general preventive obligations already established under the law of armed conflict, in furtherance of environmental protection.

The scope of protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict has continued to expand since the issue was first introduced on the international agenda in the 1970s. Today, it is recognized that the environment is a prima facie civilian object and as such it is entitled to the same layers of protection during an armed conflict as any civilian person or object. Thus, there is a legal obligation to prevent environmental harm in armed conflict, before the event. Given the magnitude of environmental damage that can be anticipated in relation to armed conflict, the obligation to prevent such damage in the first place is critical. In this regard, it is important to note that the legal obligation to prevent environmental harm originates from international environmental law. Furthermore, the obligation to prevent harm is an ongoing obligation. This article illustrates that the general preventive obligations found in international environmental law can shed much-needed light on the general preventive obligations already established under the law of armed conflict, in furtherance of environmental protection.

The scope of protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict has continued to expand since the issue was first introduced on the international agenda in the 1970s. Today, it is recognized that the environment is a prima facie civilian object and as such it is entitled to the same layers of protection during an armed conflict as any civilian person or object. Thus, there is a legal obligation to prevent environmental harm in armed conflict, before the event. Given the magnitude of environmental damage that can be anticipated in relation to armed conflict, the obligation to prevent such damage in the first place is critical. In this regard, it is important to note that the legal obligation to prevent environmental harm originates from international environmental law. Furthermore, the obligation to prevent harm is an ongoing obligation. This article illustrates that the general preventive obligations found in international environmental law can shed much-needed light on the general preventive obligations already established under the law of armed conflict, in furtherance of environmental protection.

The scope of protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict has continued to expand since the issue was first introduced on the international agenda in the 1970s. Today, it is recognized that the environment is a prima facie civilian object and as such it is entitled to the same layers of protection during an armed conflict as any civilian person or object. Thus, there is a legal obligation to prevent environmental harm in armed conflict, before the event. Given the magnitude of environmental damage that can be anticipated in relation to armed conflict, the obligation to prevent such damage in the first place is critical. In this regard, it is important to note that the legal obligation to prevent environmental harm originates from international environmental law. Furthermore, the obligation to prevent harm is an ongoing obligation. This article illustrates that the general preventive obligations found in international environmental law can shed much-needed light on the general preventive obligations already established under the law of armed conflict, in furtherance of environmental protection.

This book marks the 75th anniversary of the 1948 Hostage Case in which a US military tribunal in Nuremberg acquitted General Lothar Rendulic of devastating Northern Norway on account of his honest factual error. The volume critically reappraises the law and facts underlying his trial, the no second-guessing rule in customary international humanitarian law (IHL) that is named after the general himself, and the assessment of modern battlefield decisions. Using recently discovered documents, this volume casts major doubts on Rendulic’s claim that he considered the region’s total devastation and the forcible evacuation of all of its inhabitants imperatively demanded by military necessity at the time. This book’s analysis of archival and court records reveals how the tribunal failed to examine relevant facts or explain the Rendulic Rule’s legal origin. This anthology shows that, despite the Hostage Case’s ambiguity and occasional suggestions to the contrary, objective reasonableness forms part of the reasonable commander test under IHL and the mistake of fact defence under international criminal law (ICL) to which the rule has given rise. This collection also identifies modern warfare’s characteristics—human judgment, de-empathetic battlespace, and institutional bias—that may make it problematic to deem some errors both honest and reasonable. The Rendulic Rule embodies an otherwise firmly established admonition against judging contentious battlefield decisions with hindsight. Nevertheless, it was born of a factually ill-suited case and continues to raise significant legal as well as ethical challenges today. The most comprehensive study of the Rendulic Rule ever to appear in English, this multi-disciplinary anthology will appeal to researchers and practitioners of IHL and ICL, as well as military historians and military ethicists and offers ground-breaking new research.

The Law of Armed Conflict is an inherently male-normative branch under international law. Taking effect in situations of armed conflict, a context traditionally associated with masculinity, the law serves the purpose to: (a) set rules for conduct of warfare, and (b) ensure legal protection for those who are not taking actively part in the conflict. There are several distinct legal provisions that require States to take measures beforehand, that is, preventive measures, where the aim is to prevent future violations (including grave breaches) of the Law of Armed Conflict, should armed conflict erupt. The purpose of this paper is to explore what insights a feminist reading of the obligation to prevent war crimes might bring to the table. The analysis applies thoughts from feminist legal theory to the Law of Armed Conflict as a preventive legal regime. Furthermore, with regards to the preventive features, it is discussed how gender perspectives can purposefully be included in training and education for the civilian population and for members of the armed forces. In this paper, it is argued that a gender-sensitive reading of the law is required to ensure that war crimes are duly prevented. This would have to include war crimes other than acts of sexual violence, as arguably, the impact of certain war crimes, such as indiscriminate destruction of homes and the destruction of livelihoods may have an unduly heavy impact on women, obscured by hegemonic masculine perceptions. Therefore, particular mechanisms that enable gender-sensitivity should be established beforehand, in order for a State to fully fulfill its obligation to prevent all war crimes.

In the performance of law enforcement tasks, military forces frequently use expanding bullets. Such bullets are prohibited in international armed conflicts (IAC:s) by treaty, but in non-international armed conflicts (NIAC:s), the matter is regulated by the principle prohibiting means and methods of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (SIrUS), and possibly by an independent rule of customary international humanitarian law. This essay looks first to a proposed solution in which the law enforcement legal paradigm takes precedence, and finds such a solution incomplete and its application limited. It proceeds to look at the prohibition of expanding bullets in NIAC:s as an independent rule,exploring the formation of customary law, the evidence value of military manuals, expanding bullets as a war crime, and the ICTY Tadíc ruling. It finds the evidence of the existence of such a rule unconvincing. It then looks to principle of SIrUS and explores the best approaches for its interpretation and application. Ultimately, it argues that the military utility, in the form of stopping power and decreased risk of collateral injury, provided by expanding bullets is of such a scale and nature that the use of such bullets could reasonably be argued to pass the assessment as required by the principle. In light of this, the essay emphasises the need for treaty-based rules in order create effective weapons prohibitions, and that armed forces are still obliged to properly assess which set of rules govern the use of force.

In the performance of law enforcement tasks, military forces frequently use expanding bullets. Such bullets are prohibited in international armed conflicts (IAC:s) by treaty, but in non-international armed conflicts (NIAC:s), the matter is regulated by the principle prohibiting means and methods of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (SIrUS), and possibly by an independent rule of customary international humanitarian law. This essay looks first to a proposed solution in which the law enforcement legal paradigm takes precedence, and finds such a solution incomplete and its application limited. It proceeds to look at the prohibition of expanding bullets in NIAC:s as an independent rule,exploring the formation of customary law, the evidence value of military manuals, expanding bullets as a war crime, and the ICTY Tadíc ruling. It finds the evidence of the existence of such a rule unconvincing. It then looks to principle of SIrUS and explores the best approaches for its interpretation and application. Ultimately, it argues that the military utility, in the form of stopping power and decreased risk of collateral injury, provided by expanding bullets is of such a scale and nature that the use of such bullets could reasonably be argued to pass the assessment as required by the principle. In light of this, the essay emphasises the need for treaty-based rules in order create effective weapons prohibitions, and that armed forces are still obliged to properly assess which set of rules govern the use of force.

Legal rules on the attribution of conduct determine whether conduct is considered an act of the State for the purpose of holding it responsible under international law. This thesis analyses the standard and function of attribution rules in the case law of human rights courts, quasi-judicial human rights bodies, and international criminal courts with jurisdiction over violations of humanitarian law. More specifically, this thesis analyses whether human rights courts on the one hand, and international criminal tribunals when dealing with humanitarian law on the other, have followed the standards of attribution as laid down in customary international law or, rather, whether these courts and tribunals have adopted or recognized special rules to determine whether certain conduct constitutes an act of the State. Additionally, this thesis examines whether these courts, tribunals and bodies apply attribution rules from the law of State responsibility to determine the applicable law and consequently enable the exercise of their judicial function. The latter is a question of the function of attribution rules.

From Afghanistan to Syria, from Mali to Yemen, cross-border armed conflicts involving one or more organized armed groups are breaking news headlines and ever increasing in frequency. Although pre-dating this millennium, this recent form of armed conflict is unprecedented in both scale and impact. Consequently, this new type of hostilities challenges existing International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which originates from a period when cross-border armed conflicts were a rarity and not in the forefront of the international community’s consciousness. Principally, this study determines whether cross-border armed conflicts require continuity, change, or transformation to existing IHL. Answering this research question, the study focuses on rules relating to IHL scope of application, more specifically, rules defining its scope ratione materiae (i.e. the rules relating to the classification of armed conflicts – « the what? ») and ratione personae (i.e. the rules guiding the identification of actors being belligerent parties to armed conflicts – « the who? »). The study has two parts. The first part concerns the classification of cross-border armed conflicts. It examines whether the current taxonomy of armed conflicts sufficiently captures this new type of hostilities. In particular, it analyzes whether cross-border armed conflicts can be classified as non-international armed conflicts, even in cases of non-consented interventions by a State or an international organization. The second part addresses the issue of foreign participation in a pre-existing internal armed conflict, which is one aspect of IHL personal applicability to cross-border armed conflicts. By scrutinizing the Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts, the study finds a gap: this Law does not offer a legal framework to regulate foreign participation in a pre-existing internal armed conflict. In a constructive approach, the study follows an analogical reasoning and suggests a solution de lege ferenda to fill thi, De l’Afghanistan à la Syrie, du Mali au Yémen, les conflits armés transfrontières impliquant un ou plusieurs groupes armés organisés se sont multipliés ces dernières années et ont fait l’actualité de ce début de troisième millénaire. Bien que cette forme récente de conflits armés ait été observée avant ce millénaire, les conflits armés transfrontières contemporains se caractérisent par une ampleur et une incidence sans précédent. Ainsi, ce nouveau modèle d’hostilités met à l’épreuve le droit international humanitaire, développé à une époque où cette réalité conflictuelle était à peine connue et ne figurait en tout cas pas au rang des préoccupations de la communauté internationale. Par conséquent, cette étude se donne pour objectif principal de déterminer si ces conflits armés transfrontières s’accommodent d’une continuité ou, au contraire, nécessitent un changement voire une mutation du droit international humanitaire. Afin de répondre à cette question centrale de recherche, elle s’intéresse spécifiquement aux règles relatives au champ d’application de ce droit, en particulier aux règles définissant son champ d’application ratione materiae (soit les règles portant sur la qualification des conflits armés – « le quoi ? ») et ratione personae (soit les règles guidant l’identification des acteurs parties aux conflits armés – « le qui ? »). Cette étude s’articule logiquement en deux parties traitant respectivement de la qualification des conflits armés transfrontières et de la participation d’un acteur étranger à un conflit armé interne préexistant. Cette dernière représente un aspect distinctif de l’applicabilité personnelle du droit international humanitaire à ces conflits. En premier lieu, cette étude vérifie donc si la taxinomie actuelle des conflits armés suffit à appréhender ce nouveau modèle d’hostilités. Elle examine notamment si les conflits armés transfrontières se satisfont d’une qualification existante de conflit armé non international, même en cas d’interven, (DROI - Sciences juridiques) -- UCL, 2021

Legal rules on the attribution of conduct determine whether conduct is considered an act of the State for the purpose of holding it responsible under international law. This thesis analyses the standard and function of attribution rules in the case law of human rights courts, quasi-judicial human rights bodies, and international criminal courts with jurisdiction over violations of humanitarian law. More specifically, this thesis analyses whether human rights courts on the one hand, and international criminal tribunals when dealing with humanitarian law on the other, have followed the standards of attribution as laid down in customary international law or, rather, whether these courts and tribunals have adopted or recognized special rules to determine whether certain conduct constitutes an act of the State. Additionally, this thesis examines whether these courts, tribunals and bodies apply attribution rules from the law of State responsibility to determine the applicable law and consequently enable the exercise of their judicial function. The latter is a question of the function of attribution rules.

投稿論文, Refereed Article

The advent of aircraft in the early twentieth century brought significant changes to human society, from transportation and infrastructure to surveillance and warfare. This technology provided a new way of seeing the world from above – an aerial perspective – with its assumptions and frames of understanding space, peoples and objects. In armed conflict, airplanes facilitated interventions in foreign places and attacks directed at cities and civilians, leading to significant changes to military strategy and to legal and political discourses on how wars should be pursued. This thesis studies how the rise of aerial bombing transformed the central concepts of international law of armed conflict. The focus is on the concepts of aerial territory, civilian population, military objectives, and the principle of proportionality. I argue that these core concepts of the laws of war emerged from or were substantially transformed by the emergence of aerial warfare. The thesis covers the period of 1899 to 1977. It begins with the first considerations by international lawyers of how international law should respond to the introduction airplanes in war and ends with the conclusion of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, where the concepts and ideas that had emerged in the preceding decades were codified. I argue that the central debates and paradoxes of the contemporary laws of war can be traced back to the ideological, material and institutional transformations that took place as a result of aerial bombing in the period between 1899-1977. This thesis aims to shed light on the early history of aerial bombing and international law, a period often forgotten or ignored in scholarship on the laws of war. It uncovers the politics and assumptions behind international humanitarian law in its relation to aerial bombing. I challenge the universality and assimilation of the core concepts of international humanitarian law, exposing how legal discourse has played a central role i

What does it mean to say that international humanitarian law (IHL) strikes a realistic and meaningful balance between military necessity and humanity, and that the law therefore 'accounts for' military necessity? To what consequences does the law 'accounting for' military necessity give rise? Through real-life examples and careful analysis, this book challenges received wisdom on the subject by devising a new theory that not only reaffirms Kriegsräson's fallacy but also explains why IHL has no reason to restrict or prohibit militarily unnecessary conduct on that ground alone. Additionally, the theory hypothesises greater normative significance for humanitarian and chivalrous imperatives when they conflict with IHL rules. By combining international law, jurisprudence, military history, strategic studies, and moral philosophy, this book reveals how rational fighting relates to ethical fighting, how IHL incorporates contrasting values that shape its rules, and how law and theory adapt themselves to war's evolutions.

A cyberdomain has been oficially established. It cross sections the other domains, and for real cyberattacks have already been executed within it. The aim of this work is to show, in practical terms and to non-laywers, some of the main legal issues to be taken into account for the planning and execution of cyberattacks within an armed conflict., Se ha creado oficialmente un nuevo ámbito de operación, el ciberespacial, transversal al resto de ámbitos tradicionales, y en el que ya se han producido acciones ofensivas reales. En este trabajo se pretenden exponer, de forma práctica y para los no juristas, algunas de las principales consideraciones jurídicas a tener en cuenta en el planeamiento y ejecución de acciones ofensivas en el ciberespacio en el marco de los conflictos armados.

Chapter 8 continues the exploration of issues raised by human enhancement technologies. Building on the discussion in the previous chapter, this contribution begins by examining the question of whether and under what circumstances we might consider that individuals who enhance their natural abilities might be considered something other than human – and what that might mean for their treatment under the law. Biochemical enhancement, cybernetic technologies such as brain machine interfaces and advances in prosthetic technologies all have the capacity to alter and augment the human experience and raise interesting challenges for the law. This chapter looks specifically at the application of the laws of armed conflict (international humanitarian law) in relation to these techniques and the effects of human rights law in an age of enhanced humans – whether they be civilian or military personnel. Clear synergies also exist with the discussions in Chapter 13 on brain-machine interfaces. Attention is given in the final section to questions as to the adequacy of the current rights frameworks and as to the distinction between national and international systems.

Autonomous machines are moving rapidly from science fiction to science fact. The defining feature of this technology is that it can operate independently of human control. Consequently, society must consider how ‘decisions’ are to be made by autonomous machines. The matter is particularly acute in circumstances where harm is inevitable no matter what course of action is taken. This dilemma has been identified in the context of autonomous vehicles driving under the regulation of domestic law and, there, governments seem to be moving towards a utilitarian solution to inevitable harm. This leads one to question whether utilitarianism should be transposed into the context of autonomous weapons which might soon operate on the battlefield under the gaze of humanitarian law. The argument here is that it should because humanitarian law includes the core principle of ‘proportionality’, which is fundamentally a utilitarian concept – requiring that any gain derived from an attack outweighs the harm caused. However, while human soldiers are always able to come to a view on proportionality, albeit subjective, there is much doubt over how an autonomous weapon might determine what is proportionate. There is a very large gap between our embryonic understanding of utilitarianism in relation to autonomous vehicles manoeuvring around a city on one hand; and what would be required for armed robots patrolling a battlespace on the other. Bridging this gap is fraught with difficulty but perhaps the best starting point is to take Bentham’s expression of utilitarian mechanics and build upon them. With conscious effort and, ideally, collaboration, states could use the process of applying his classic theory to this very modern problem to raise the standard of protection offered to those caught up in conflict.

Autonomous machines are moving rapidly from science fiction to science fact. The defining feature of this technology is that it can operate independently of human control. Consequently, society must consider how ‘decisions’ are to be made by autonomous machines. The matter is particularly acute in circumstances where harm is inevitable no matter what course of action is taken. This dilemma has been identified in the context of autonomous vehicles driving under the regulation of domestic law and, there, governments seem to be moving towards a utilitarian solution to inevitable harm. This leads one to question whether utilitarianism should be transposed into the context of autonomous weapons which might soon operate on the battlefield under the gaze of humanitarian law. The argument here is that it should because humanitarian law includes the core principle of ‘proportionality’, which is fundamentally a utilitarian concept – requiring that any gain derived from an attack outweighs the harm caused. However, while human soldiers are always able to come to a view on proportionality, albeit subjective, there is much doubt over how an autonomous weapon might determine what is proportionate. There is a very large gap between our embryonic understanding of utilitarianism in relation to autonomous vehicles manoeuvring around a city on one hand; and what would be required for armed robots patrolling a battlespace on the other. Bridging this gap is fraught with difficulty but perhaps the best starting point is to take Bentham’s expression of utilitarian mechanics and build upon them. With conscious effort and, ideally, collaboration, states could use the process of applying his classic theory to this very modern problem to raise the standard of protection offered to those caught up in conflict.

This paper explores the legality technology lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Recent literature has claimed that LAWS should be subject to a pre-emptive ban, as they are incapable of abiding by the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), and they will increase the risk of harm to civilians. This paper disputes that contention, arguing instead that LAWS could be capable of compliance with IHL. However, there are other moral and policy reasons which could justify further regulation, and therefore a form of partial ban, combined with a soft law instrument, could be helpful in international regulation of the more problematic aspects of LAWS. This paper does not seek to explore questions of accountability and liability for the actions of LAWS in any depth.

This paper explores the legality technology lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Recent literature has claimed that LAWS should be subject to a pre-emptive ban, as they are incapable of abiding by the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), and they will increase the risk of harm to civilians. This paper disputes that contention, arguing instead that LAWS could be capable of compliance with IHL. However, there are other moral and policy reasons which could justify further regulation, and therefore a form of partial ban, combined with a soft law instrument, could be helpful in international regulation of the more problematic aspects of LAWS. This paper does not seek to explore questions of accountability and liability for the actions of LAWS in any depth.

Advances in technologies that could endow humans with physical or mental abilities that go beyond the statistically normal level of functioning are occurring at an incredible pace. The use of these human enhancement technologies by the military, for instance in the spheres of biotechnology, cybernetics and prosthetics, raise a number of questions under the international legal frameworks governing military technology, namely the law of armed conflict and human rights law. The article examines these frameworks with a focus on weapons law, the law pertaining to the detention of and by “enhanced individuals,” the human rights of those individuals and their responsibility for the actions they take while under the influence of enhancements.

It is important that normative development regarding autonomous weapon systems head down a path that is coherent and practical. By autonomous weapon systems, we mean systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. We draw this definition from a 2012 U.S. Department of Defense policy directive, which remains the most extensive public pronouncement by any State on how it intends to proceed with regard to research, development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems. This paper addresses several questions that are critical to charting such a path. First, are autonomous weapon systems different from other new weapon systems, and, if so, how? Second, to the extent they are different, can and should autonomous weapon systems be regulated within the framework of the existing law of armed conflict? If yes, how should States go about doing so? If not, what alternative regulatory approach is appropriate? We conclude that autonomous weapon systems have special features that pose risks and that create challenges in applying the existing law of armed conflict. Nevertheless, we conclude it is possible to adapt the existing framework to account for the features of autonomous weapons, and that the suggested alternative of prohibiting these systems outright is misguided. Instead, we propose a three-tiered process for regulating the development, deployment and use of autonomous systems., Published in International Law Studies, v90 p386-411, 2014.

Currently, there is no internationally accepted definition of when hostile actions in cyberspace are recognized as attacks, let alone acts of war. The goal of this monograph is to provide senior policymakers, decisionmakers, military leaders, and their respective staffs with essential background on this topic as well as to introduce an analytical framework for them to utilize according to their needs. The examination canvasses existing decisionmaking policies, structures, and influences to provide a holistic context for the assessment that extends beyond limits of the legal and technical communities. Its approach focuses on the synthesis and integration of material from existing experts, deferring the detailed analysis to the many published studies. Such broad coverage of many complex issues necessarily requires simplification that may negate certain nuances expected by experienced professionals in those fields; but it is hoped that readers understand these limitations. The purpose is not to prescribe or dictate a specific methodology of assessment; rather, it is to introduce decisionmakers and their staffs to a portfolio of options built around the concepts of characterization, assessment criteria, policy considerations, and courses of action consequences.

The US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters, is a refereed forum for contemporary strategy and landpower issues. It furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers, and members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs.

This paper discusses cyber warfare and its intersection with the law of armed conflict. Cyberspace creates a unique battlefield with many challenges. This paper tackles four of these challenges: distinguishing warfare acts from criminal activities; what amounts to an armed attack in cyberspace that justifies a State’s right to selfdefence; target distinction; and direct participation in cyber hostilities. It is the author’s determination that the law of armed conflict does apply in cyberspace however two additional changes are needed for the traditional laws to have any practical effect. These two variations include the extension of the traditional criteria of armed attack to include severe data loss as tangible property damage; and reexamining the framework of direct participation.

This paper discusses cyber warfare and its intersection with the law of armed conflict. Cyberspace creates a unique battlefield with many challenges. This paper tackles four of these challenges: distinguishing warfare acts from criminal activities; what amounts to an armed attack in cyberspace that justifies a State’s right to selfdefence; target distinction; and direct participation in cyber hostilities. It is the author’s determination that the law of armed conflict does apply in cyberspace however two additional changes are needed for the traditional laws to have any practical effect. These two variations include the extension of the traditional criteria of armed attack to include severe data loss as tangible property damage; and reexamining the framework of direct participation.

From March 2003 to December 2011 The United States was engaged in combat operations in Iraq. Initially, military action was used to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein but quickly evolved into nation building and fighting an unanticipated insurgency. Military service members were given Rules of Engagement (ROE) to guide interaction with the people of Iraq, both combatant and non-combatant. Despite updating, training, and implementation of ROE, multiple violations occurred which had negative and lasting impacts on counterinsurgency operations. This study will examine three ROE violations in Iraq from the perspective of the insurgent, counter-insurgent, and US media. By viewing an ROE violation from these points of view, the commander will have a better assessment of the battlefield. The study will forecast how these violations may shape US policy in future military operations.

National governments, including that of the United States, do not yet have well-formed cyber attack policies and strategies. A proposed framework consisting of four foundational elements -- contextual views, the cyber attack spectrum, balance of focus, and appropriate circumstances -- provides a basis for considering, discussing, developing, and assessing strategic cyber attack guidance. How an actor approaches each of these four elements fundamentally shapes the myriad details of subsequent policy and strategy. In view of this framework, the United States should pursue the development of comprehensive cyber attack theory. Additionally, it should adopt a broader, but more nuanced view of cyber attacks combined with a focus weighted toward strategic attack. Consequently, such a perspective will inform a normative approach for determining the appropriate circumstances in which to conduct cyber attack, which will guide both U.S. action and modernization of international norms., Strategy Research Project.

Viruses, worms and other forms of malware are at the centre of academic and policy-making debates on the current evolution of security, international relations and international law. Indeed, both their nature and action appear to re-load the most traditional debates on the agency of technologies and their relation to (international) law and politics. In this contribution we focus on one of the most famous and well-documented cases of these past years: the implementation, diffusion and execution of Stuxnet, a malware supposedly aiming at yielding Iranian nuclear-related programs throughout 2009-2010. Our goal is twofold: first, we aim at identifying the main lines of discussion triggered by Stuxnet, critically reviewing on four different accounts using two basic concepts of the sociology of translation: generalized symmetry and actant. Then, we attempt to analyze how these two concepts contribute to a better understanding of the operation by which Stuxnet contributes to the making and shifting of international politics and international law.

Viruses, worms and other forms of malware are at the centre of academic and policy-making debates on the current evolution of security, international relations and international law. Indeed, both their nature and action appear to re-load the most traditional debates on the agency of technologies and their relation to (international) law and politics. In this contribution we focus on one of the most famous and well-documented cases of these past years: the implementation, diffusion and execution of Stuxnet, a malware supposedly aiming at yielding Iranian nuclear-related programs throughout 2009-2010. Our goal is twofold: first, we aim at identifying the main lines of discussion triggered by Stuxnet, critically reviewing on four different accounts using two basic concepts of the sociology of translation: generalized symmetry and actant. Then, we attempt to analyze how these two concepts contribute to a better understanding of the operation by which Stuxnet contributes to the making and shifting of international politics and international law.

The current focus on an ever-increasing sophistication of weapons systems usually overlooks efforts of states to enhance the physical and mental capabilities of human soldiers. While such techniques and technologies have a long history (e.g. the use of drugs and alcohol in order to overcome fear and fatigue; the use of night-vision goggles etc.), they have attained a new quality. For instance, certain armed forces are introducing wearable robotics suit (Powered exoskeletons). Furthermore, the development of military applications of brain-computer interfaces continues, which would allow for direct communication between a human brain and a computer – and eventually vice-versa. These technologies raise a number of pertinent international legal issues, such as: What are the potential consequences for compliance with the rules and principles of the law of armed conflict? What implications may such technologies have for the accountability of states and individuals? And what would the use of such technologies mean for the human rights of the human soldier?

Covert action and traditional military activities are two paths for the legitimate use of force by the United States. For the President to employ the full span of capabilities available to him, there must be a clear understanding of the unique nature of each option. The CIA has, for decades, employed covert activities internationally to further U.S. interests, with the goal of avoiding the stigma of U.S. sponsorship. Likewise, the DoD has been employed to further U.S. interests abroad, having refined its precision targeting capability to a level never before available to an American President, both inside and outside of the designated areas of armed conflict. It is, therefore, critical that national security decision-makers properly employ these tools under the appropriate conditions to align with national policy in the defense of the nation. Misapplication of these tools, however, carries with it consequences that may equally degrade U.S. standing in the international community. No change or addition to domestic or international law is necessary or recommended: this is a policy issue. To refine the law would be to further constrain national security decision making in the face of future and unforeseen threats., Civilian Research Project.

Is the targeted killing of United States citizens legal? There are two competing models that address the legality of targeted killings: the Law-Enforcement Model and the Armed-Conflict Model. This paper examines arguments for and against each model. Using the Issue, Rule, Analysis, and Conclusion methodology for legal analysis, it analyzes the facts of the case of Anwar al-Awlaki under each model, and based on judicial balancing tests, concludes that neither serves both the interests of protecting constitutional rights and combating terrorism. The paper will show that while the Law-Enforcement Model offers the greatest protection for the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens, it fails to adequately address the threat of terrorism, and while the Armed-Conflict Model effectively addresses threats, it risks violating constitutional rights. The paper considers proposals for mitigating violations of constitutional rights under the Armed-Conflict Model, and ultimately concludes that a third model, based on a system of national security courts, provides decision makers with the best basis from which to determine the permissibility of conducting targeted killings against U.S. citizens. As proposed, this National Security Model avoids the restrictions of the political question doctrine and allows for adequate protection of due process rights for U.S. citizens., The original document contains color images.

The United States has increasingly relied on unmanned systems to help fight its wars, and these systems have steadily become more sophisticated. Science is now on the verge of many breakthroughs, particularly in artificial intelligence, which might well lead to the creation of fully autonomous unmanned systems. Autonomous systems could potentially attack enemies with lethal force without a human being in the loop. The possible deployment of lethal, autonomous robots (LARs) raises significant legal and ethical concerns. These profound concerns, including whether such systems would even comport with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), have not yet been definitively resolved. The technology, however, continues to race forward, and many nations of the world are actively pursuing autonomous programs. To prevent being surpassed by rivals, the United States will likely exploit the potential of fully autonomous targeting. Therefore, operational commanders should begin examining the legal and the command and control implications of using such lethal, autonomous robots as they help steer the future development and doctrine of unmanned systems. While the use of such systems will arguably be deemed permissible under the Law of Armed Conflict, prudent operational commanders should still implement additional control measures to increase accountability over these new systems.