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Creativity is part and parcel of human history and enables (groups of) individuals to adapt to and shape their natural and social surroundings. Here we identify (1) core functions of creativity (“what is it for?”) in terms of its ability to solve ill-defined problems of survival and prosperity and, (2) the neurocognitive mechanisms (“how does it work?”) underlying creative production in terms of cognitive persistence and flexibility. We summarize experimental support for this Dual Pathway to Creativity Model (DPCM) from our own laboratory and that of others, and review work implicating the dopamine-innervated fronto-striatal circuitry in achieving a balance between cognitive flexibility on the one hand, and persistence on the other. We use DPCM to analyze how creativity emerges and develops across the lifespan. We show (3) how personalities and psychopathologies marked by approach (avoidance) motivation link to creativity because of enhanced capacity for flexibility (persistence), and (4) how socio-cultural factors, including psychological safety, diversity, and leadership, condition individual and group creativity. We conclude with open questions for future research, including how (5) individuals and groups move from generating to implementing creative ideas, insights, and problem solutions.

According to one highly influential approach to moral responsibility, human beings are responsible (eligible to be praised or blamed) for what they do because they are responsive to reasons (Fischer & Ravizza 1998). However, this amounts to a descriptive assumption about human beings that may not be borne out by the empirical research. According to a recent trend in moral psychology (Haidt 2001), most human judgment is caused by fast, nonconscious, and intuitive processes, rather than explicit, conscious deliberation about one’s reasons. And when humans do engage in explicit deliberation, it primarily serves to provide post hoc rationalization of their intuitive judgments (confabulation). If this is correct, it is tempting to conclude that most of our judgments—and the actions we perform on their basis—are not genuine responses to reasons. The reasons-responsiveness approach would thus appear to be committed to the implausible conclusion that we are not responsible for very much after all, including, most problematically, our implicit biases. I argue that the reasons-responsiveness approach can avoid this conclusion by showing three things: (1) that affective and intuitive processes can be reasons-responsive; (2) that the responsiveness of those processes can be bolstered by the agent’s environment; and (3) that practices like blame are one of the key ways in which human beings are attuned to reasons over time. I argue that the first and second of these items, despite their initial plausibility, are insufficient on their own to explain why humans can be held accountable for things like implicit biases, and that the way forward is to appreciate what holding each other accountable does—i.e., its effects., Según una teoría influyente de la responsabilidad moral, los seres humanos son responsables (pueden ser disculpados o culpabilizados) cuando tienen la capacidad de responder a razones (Fischer & Ravizza 1998). Pero esta teoría hace una suposición descriptiva sobre los seres humanos que posiblemente no es consistente con investigaciones empíricas. De acuerdo con una tendencia reciente en la psicología moral (Haidt 2001), la mayor parte del juicio humano es resultado de un proceso inconsciente, rápido, e intuitivo en vez de un proceso consciente, deliberado, y racional. Y cuando el ser humano participa en la deliberación consciente, generalmente esta sirve para dar una justificación post hoc de sus intuiciones (“confabulación”). Si este modelo es correcto, uno puede concluir que la mayoría de nuestros juicios no están basados en una respuesta genuina basada en razones. Así, esta influyente teoría de la responsabilidad moral parece llevarnos a la conclusión de que no somos responsables por muchos de nuestros pensamientos y comportamientos, incluyendo los prejuicios implícitos. En este trabajo discuto que esta conclusión puede ser evitada mostrando: (1) que nuestras inclinaciones y procesos intuitivos pueden responder a razones; (2) que estos procesos pueden ser fortalecidos por el ambiente del individuo; y (3) que las prácticas sociales, como la culpa, son una forma clave en que los humanos se ajustan a las razones. Argumento que los puntos primero y segundo, a pesar de su plausibilidad inicial, son insuficientes para explicar por qué los humanos somos responsables de cosas tales como nuestros prejuicios implícitos, y que el modo de progresar en relación con este problema radica en apreciar los efectos de las prácticas sociales tales como la culpa.

Pseudo-profound bullshit pertains to grammatically and syntactically correct but meaningless sentences, that, due to syntactical correctness appear as made to communicate something and research shows that people deem them profound. However, the effect of differing source credibility on bullshit profoundness evaluations has, to our knowledge, not yet been tested. We presented participants with pseudo-profound bullshit alone and with authors of different credibility. In order to partly replicate and extend on the findings regarding mechanisms of receptivity and sensitivity to bullshit we collected profoundness evaluations for mundane statements and proverbs, and different measures of analytic thinking. Ascribing credible authors leads to an increase while ascribing uncredible authors leads to a decrease in profoundness evaluations. Cognitive reflection protects against the tendency to evaluate any type of statement as profound and drives better differentiation between pseudo- and conventionally truly profound, while positive views about actively open-minded thinking enable stronger effects of credible authorship.

Pseudo-profound bullshit pertains to grammatically and syntactically correct but meaningless sentences, that, due to syntactical correctness appear as made to communicate something and research shows that people deem them profound. However, the effect of differing source credibility on bullshit profoundness evaluations has, to our knowledge, not yet been tested. We presented participants with pseudo-profound bullshit alone and with authors of different credibility. In order to partly replicate and extend on the findings regarding mechanisms of receptivity and sensitivity to bullshit we collected profoundness evaluations for mundane statements and proverbs, and different measures of analytic thinking. Ascribing credible authors leads to an increase while ascribing uncredible authors leads to a decrease in profoundness evaluations. Cognitive reflection protects against the tendency to evaluate any type of statement as profound and drives better differentiation between pseudo- and conventionally truly profound, while positive views about actively open-minded thinking enable stronger effects of credible authorship.

En stor del i vårt beslutsfattande handlar om hur vi processar det vi tar del av och sen tar beslut om. Det kan handla om det är mer djupt eller ytligt processande inför vi ska ta våra beslut. Det kan även påverka vårt beslutfattande beroende på hur informationen presenteras för oss, till exempel om det är via ord eller siffror.Detta är vad den här studien har undersökt, hur kvalitativ och kvantitativ information kan påverka vårt beslutsfattande, samt även hur vi tenderar att vara mer intuitiva eller analytiska i vårt beslutsfattande och om det finns en koppling däremellan. Studien undersökte även på om matematikångest påverkar vår upplevelse av siffror när vi ska bedöma människor.En enkät skapades där deltagarna skulle bedöma olika individer baserat på både siffror och ord. Även ett matematikångest test samt ett test för att se deltagarnas analytiska respektive intuitiva sida genomfördes på samma enkät.Resultaten analyserades där det bland annat kom fram att deltagarna har större benägenhet att anse att någon är mer sympatisk om den beskrivs med ord samt att den är mer kompetent om den beskrivs med siffror.En diskussion gjordes där det diskuterades bland annat varför de andra hypoteserna inte fick ett signifikant resultat där valet att ha enkäten online kan ha spelat in, samt de många olika momenten kan ha påverkat utgångarna av varandra.

Excess intake of 'free sugars' is a key predictor of chronic disease, obesity, and dental ill health. Given the importance of determining modifiable predictors of free sugar-related dietary behaviors, we applied the integrated behavior change model to predict free sugar limiting behaviors. The model includes constructs representing 'reasoned' or deliberative processes that lead to action (e.g., social cognition constructs, intentions), and constructs representing 'non-conscious' or implicit processes (e.g., implicit attitudes, behavioral automaticity) as predictors of behavior. Undergraduate students (N = 205) completed measures of autonomous and controlled motivation, the theory of planned behavior (TPB) measures of explicit attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control (PBC), and intentions, past behavior, implicit attitude, and behavioral automaticity at an initial point in time, and free sugar limiting behavior and behavioral automaticity two weeks later. A Bayesian structural equation model indicated that explicit attitude, subjective norms, and PBC predicted behavior via intention. Autonomous motivation predicted behavior indirectly through all TPB variables, while controlled motivation predicted behavior only via subjective norms. Implicit attitudes and behavioral automaticity predicted behavior directly and independently. Past behavior predicted behavior directly and indirectly through behavioral automaticity and intentions, but not implicit attitudes. Current findings suggest pervasive effects of constructs representing both reasoned and non-conscious processes and signpost potential targets for behavioral interventions aimed at minimizing free sugar consumption.

Excess intake of 'free sugars' is a key predictor of chronic disease, obesity, and dental ill health. Given the importance of determining modifiable predictors of free sugar-related dietary behaviors, we applied the integrated behavior change model to predict free sugar limiting behaviors. The model includes constructs representing 'reasoned' or deliberative processes that lead to action (e.g., social cognition constructs, intentions), and constructs representing 'non-conscious' or implicit processes (e.g., implicit attitudes, behavioral automaticity) as predictors of behavior. Undergraduate students (N = 205) completed measures of autonomous and controlled motivation, the theory of planned behavior (TPB) measures of explicit attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control (PBC), and intentions, past behavior, implicit attitude, and behavioral automaticity at an initial point in time, and free sugar limiting behavior and behavioral automaticity two weeks later. A Bayesian structural equation model indicated that explicit attitude, subjective norms, and PBC predicted behavior via intention. Autonomous motivation predicted behavior indirectly through all TPB variables, while controlled motivation predicted behavior only via subjective norms. Implicit attitudes and behavioral automaticity predicted behavior directly and independently. Past behavior predicted behavior directly and indirectly through behavioral automaticity and intentions, but not implicit attitudes. Current findings suggest pervasive effects of constructs representing both reasoned and non-conscious processes and signpost potential targets for behavioral interventions aimed at minimizing free sugar consumption.

The dual‐process model, describing addictive disorders as resulting from an imbalance between increased automatic approach behaviors towards the substance and reduced abilities to control these behaviors, constitutes a sound theoretical framework to understand alcohol‐use disorders. The present study aimed at exploring this imbalance at behavioral and cerebral levels in binge drinking, a pattern of excessive alcohol consumption frequently observed in youth, by assessing both reflective control abilities and automatic processing of alcohol‐related stimuli. For this purpose, 25 binge drinkers and 25 comparison participants performed a Go/No‐Go task during electrophysiological recording. Inhibition abilities were investigated during explicit (ie, distinguishing alcoholic versus nonalcoholic drinks) and implicit (ie, distinguishing sparkling versus nonsparkling drinks, independently of their alcohol content) processing of beverage cues. Binge drinkers presented poorer inhibition for the explicit processing of beverage cues, as well as reduced N200 amplitude for the specific processing of alcohol‐related stimuli. As a whole, these findings indicated inhibition impairments in binge drinkers, particularly for alcohol cues processing and at the attentional stage of the cognitive stream. In line with the dual‐process model, these results support that binge drinking is already characterized by an underactivation of the reflective system combined with an overactivation of the automatic system. Results also underlined the influence of explicit processing compared with implicit ones. At the clinical level, our findings reinforce the need to develop intervention methods focusing on the inhibition of approach behaviors towards alcohol‐related stimuli.

The dual‐process model, describing addictive disorders as resulting from an imbalance between increased automatic approach behaviors towards the substance and reduced abilities to control these behaviors, constitutes a sound theoretical framework to understand alcohol‐use disorders. The present study aimed at exploring this imbalance at behavioral and cerebral levels in binge drinking, a pattern of excessive alcohol consumption frequently observed in youth, by assessing both reflective control abilities and automatic processing of alcohol‐related stimuli. For this purpose, 25 binge drinkers and 25 comparison participants performed a Go/No‐Go task during electrophysiological recording. Inhibition abilities were investigated during explicit (ie, distinguishing alcoholic versus nonalcoholic drinks) and implicit (ie, distinguishing sparkling versus nonsparkling drinks, independently of their alcohol content) processing of beverage cues. Binge drinkers presented poorer inhibition for the explicit processing of beverage cues, as well as reduced N200 amplitude for the specific processing of alcohol‐related stimuli. As a whole, these findings indicated inhibition impairments in binge drinkers, particularly for alcohol cues processing and at the attentional stage of the cognitive stream. In line with the dual‐process model, these results support that binge drinking is already characterized by an underactivation of the reflective system combined with an overactivation of the automatic system. Results also underlined the influence of explicit processing compared with implicit ones. At the clinical level, our findings reinforce the need to develop intervention methods focusing on the inhibition of approach behaviors towards alcohol‐related stimuli.

The dual-process model, describing addictive disorders as resulting from an imbalance between increased automatic approach behaviors towards the substance and reduced abilities to control these behaviors, constitutes a sound theoretical framework to understand alcohol-use disorders. The present study aimed at exploring this imbalance at behavioral and cerebral levels in binge drinking, a pattern of excessive alcohol consumption frequently observed in youth, by assessing both reflective control abilities and automatic processing of alcohol-related stimuli. For this purpose, 25 binge drinkers and 25 comparison participants performed a Go/No-Go task during electrophysiological recording. Inhibition abilities were investigated during explicit (ie, distinguishing alcoholic versus nonalcoholic drinks) and implicit (ie, distinguishing sparkling versus nonsparkling drinks, independently of their alcohol content) processing of beverage cues. Binge drinkers presented poorer inhibition for the explicit processing of beverage cues, as well as reduced N200 amplitude for the specific processing of alcohol-related stimuli. As a whole, these findings indicated inhibition impairments in binge drinkers, particularly for alcohol cues processing and at the attentional stage of the cognitive stream. In line with the dual-process model, these results support that binge drinking is already characterized by an underactivation of the reflective system combined with an overactivation of the automatic system. Results also underlined the influence of explicit processing compared with implicit ones. At the clinical level, our findings reinforce the need to develop intervention methods focusing on the inhibition of approach behaviors towards alcohol-related stimuli.

Impulsiveness has been studied as an aspect of personality and psychopathology for generations. There are longstanding disagreements about how to define it and whether it should be viewed as one construct or several. This article begins by briefly reviewing some earlier and some more recent work on impulsiveness. Several approaches have recently converged to focus on a distinction between impulsive reactions to emotion and impulsive properties that are not initiated by emotion. From this review, we turn to psychopathology. It is well known that impulsiveness is related to externalizing psychopathology, but some have concluded that a similar relation does not exist for internalizing psychopathology. A recent literature is described that challenges the latter conclusion, linking impulsive reactivity to emotion to both externalizing and internalizing aspects of psychopathology. Discussion then turns to emotion-related impulsiveness and other constructs to which it is conceptually and empirically related, reexamining whether other conceptual targets should be added to the discussion. The article closes with a consideration of how important it is to continue to remain open to new conceptual perspectives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

When faced with a decision regarding probability or heuristics, people generally show their bias toward a heuristic, even if it might be the wrong decision, such as on the classic base-rate neglect task (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). The crucial question is whether people know that they are focused on this bias. Recent dual process theories (DPTs) have incorporated the crucial role of conflict detection and resolution to better explain why people are biased on classic reasoning and judgment tasks. Two recent models, the Logical Intuition Model (De Neys, 2012) and the Three-stages Model (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) suggest that the source of errors and bias can be explained in two distinct ways. The Logical Intuition Model postulates that people are generally efficient and routine conflict detectors and that errors are due to a failure to inhibit an initial, intuitive response. The Three-stages Model claims that detection is imperfect and that the detection mechanism is the main source of errors because people do not recognize that they are making biased decisions. These claims were investigated in a series of three experiments. In Experiment 1, participants completed a modified base-rate neglect task. In Experiment 2, a conditional reasoning task was added to test whether the claims of the two base-rate neglect models would transfer to a qualitatively different task. In Experiment 3, participants were placed into four different groups where they were given one of two forms of false feedback, true feedback, or no feedback (control) in order to test whether feedback would interact with answer confidence and resultant intuitive or analytic processing correlates (such as response time). Across all three experiments, the Three-stages Model’s claim that monitoring/detection failures is the main source of bias on the base-rate neglect task was supported over the Logical Intuition Model’s claim of inhibition failures as the major source of bias. Experiments

Traditionally, a user would only use one system for a particular task, defining a one-toone user-system relationship. However, the advances in technology are changing this fundamental premise. An emerging trend is the notion of one-to-many, where a user has a choice of multiple systems to complete the same task. This phenomenon purports to alter the current status quo of potentially many of the individual and group level theories, especially those on how users accept a system. The study engages in analytic induction. Therein, it employs the dual process theory to observe the acceptance journey of users, when they are presented with a choice of systems to complete the same task. The study identifies the importance of the emotional and rational facets of the dual process theory, while introducing compliance as a possible third facet. Finally, the study introduces ‘complete agnosticism’ as a novel notion that explains how one-to-many user-system relationships are facilitated. Sedigeh Moghavvemi University of Malaya Jalan Universiti, 50603 KL, Malaysia sedigheh@um.edu.my Shailesh Palekar Queensland University of Technology 2 George Street, Brisbane, Australia s.palekar@qut.edu.au

A problem for evaluators is that what people ‘say’ is often, but not always, different from what they ‘do.’ Most thinking, knowledge, behaviour, decisions are automatic, quick and have the characteristics of intuition, little or no effort and no voluntary control (Kahneman 2011b). Our everyday behaviours and thinking are largely based on implicit knowledge consisting of mental representations, or ‘schema’; cognitive knowledge about whatever we are thinking about or acting towards. The schemas are triggered by association and are further elaborated by association. As a result active schemas are internally coherent and semantically consistent (Graesser, Gernsbacher, and Goldman 1997). Schemas allow us to act without consciously thinking about what we will do or how: we simply ‘do,’ ‘know’ and ‘understand.’ A consequence of our reliance on implicit knowledge is that what people ‘say about’ phenomena does not always reflect what they ‘do.’ Elicitation techniques are increasingly being used in research and evaluation to get beyond what people say, apparently by tapping into the implicit cognitive understandings. Elicitation techniques are being used in social research, educational research, market research and evaluation. However, users of elicitation techniques need to understand the limits on the validity of such techniques and how to improve their effectiveness. Understanding the cognitive processes that mediate responses such cognitive processes can help improve the way evaluators obtain data. This thesis aims to improve our understanding of how to use projective or elicitation techniques validly in evaluation and research interviews. The majority of the thesis reviews the literature across several domains and disciplines to explore the cognitive processes that underlie people’s responses to elicitation techniques. The domains and disciplines include cognitive psychology, neurophysiology, phenomenological sociology, evaluation and social research (quantitative and qu

When faced with a decision regarding probability or heuristics, people generally show their bias toward a heuristic, even if it might be the wrong decision, such as on the classic base-rate neglect task (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). The crucial question is whether people know that they are focused on this bias. Recent dual process theories (DPTs) have incorporated the crucial role of conflict detection and resolution to better explain why people are biased on classic reasoning and judgment tasks. Two recent models, the Logical Intuition Model (De Neys, 2012) and the Three-stages Model (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) suggest that the source of errors and bias can be explained in two distinct ways. The Logical Intuition Model postulates that people are generally efficient and routine conflict detectors and that errors are due to a failure to inhibit an initial, intuitive response. The Three-stages Model claims that detection is imperfect and that the detection mechanism is the main source of errors because people do not recognize that they are making biased decisions. These claims were investigated in a series of three experiments. In Experiment 1, participants completed a modified base-rate neglect task. In Experiment 2, a conditional reasoning task was added to test whether the claims of the two base-rate neglect models would transfer to a qualitatively different task. In Experiment 3, participants were placed into four different groups where they were given one of two forms of false feedback, true feedback, or no feedback (control) in order to test whether feedback would interact with answer confidence and resultant intuitive or analytic processing correlates (such as response time). Across all three experiments, the Three-stages Model’s claim that monitoring/detection failures is the main source of bias on the base-rate neglect task was supported over the Logical Intuition Model’s claim of inhibition failures as the major source of bias. Experiments

We construct a class of superprocesses by taking the high density limit of a sequence of interacting-branching particle systems. The spatial motion of the superprocess is determined by a system of interacting diffusions, the branching density is given by an arbitrary bounded non-negative Borel function, and the superprocess is characterized by a martingale problem as a diffusion process with state space M(ℝ), improving and extending considerably the construction of Wang (1997, 1998). It is then proved in a special case that a suitable rescaled process of the superprocess converges to the usual super Brownian motion. An extension to measure-valued branching catalysts is also discussed.

The goal of the study is to analyze the average transmission time in multicasting heterogeneous wireless networks, considering user movements within a cell under the condition that the cell can be divided into several areas with different channel quality. This performance measure is analyzed against the volume of transmitted data and number of users in a cell. Three differentmotionmodels describing usermovements within a cell are studied. In order to find out the average transmission time, an approach based onMarkov control processes was implemented.