Search

We begin with an introduction of superconductivity by giving a brief history of the phenomenon. The phenomenological Ginzburg–Landau theory and the microscopic theory of Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer are outlined. In view of recently available multi-band superconductors, relevant theories of both types are discussed. Unlike the traditional GL theory an extended GL theory is developed relevant to temperatures below the critical temperature. Superconductivity in a nanosystem is the highlight of the remaining part of the paper. Theories and experiments are discussed to give an interested reader an updated account and overview of what is new in this active area of research.

This article will present the case that the benefits of collective defence, deterrence, and efficiencies resulting from the pooling of resources and the sharing of the burdens of operations outweigh the relatively modest costs of NATO membership. Rather than a cumbersome Cold-War relic, NATO has been and remains on the forefront of both diplomatic and military transformation of the Euro-Atlantic security environment. The US is a major beneficiary of this arrangement. Conflict, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. We publish scholarly articles as well as viewpoints that address issues of current interest to the makers and executors of US national security policy. We are particularly interested in articles addressing homeland security, WMD/WME proliferation, regional conflict, and the contemporary role of US security forces. The journal seeks articles that will make our readers think, generate discussion, and gain new insight into the challenges and opportunities confronting US policymakers and military operators. Views that run counter to the conventional wisdom or official US government policy are welcomed. Conflict, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. We publish scholarly articles as well as viewpoints that address issues of current interest to the makers and executors of US national security policy. We are particularly interested in articles addressing homeland security, WMD/WME proliferation, regional conflict, and the contemporary role of US security forces. The journal seeks articles that will make our readers think, generate discussion, and gain new insight into the challenges and opportunities confronting US policymakers and military operators. Views that run counter to the conventional wisdom or official US government policy are welcomed.

World War I saw the end of the empires that had dominated the European political scene for centuries and it cut short the lives of over ten million human beings. The effect of the war and the lessons taken from it remain with us today. What then are the lessons of World War I that have been so resilient? First, excessive militarization of a country, both in terms of its military capabilities to wage war and in terms of the organization of its political and public life, is a prescription for disaster. Second, there is a need for crisis management institutions and procedures to prevent hazardous situations escaping the control of governments. As events in 1914 spun out of control, officials seemed unable to halt or even slow the rush toward war, a war most did not seem to want. Finally, there is an understanding that sovereign nations need to be part of an interlocking network of international organizations to provide communication and transparency to defuse or prevent tensions that can lead to war. This Strategic Insight suggests that although these lessons have merit, they often ease only the symptoms of a developing crisis, while doing little to address the underlying sources of international tension. It explores the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) recent efforts to foster stability, and suggests how these initiatives might be improved by deemphasizing crisis management in favor of long-term efforts to address more fundamental sources of international discord.

An intellectual equivalent of a raid is how a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) staffer described US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's proposal for a rapidly deployable response force during the September 2002 meeting of NATO Defense Ministers. With relatively little warning to Alliance colleagues, Mr. Rumsfeld proposed the establishment of a robust, NATO force capable of more than just flag-waving. This force, often referred to as the NATO Response Force or NRF, is intended not only to have fairly sharp teeth but also to be the vehicle that brings other Alliance forces and concepts into the 21st century. Many observers believe that this US proposal, timed as it was just a few months before the Prague Summit, was offered to downplay the Summit's enlargement policies (thereby not offending the Russians) and to give NATO Allies one last clear chance of developing a credible war-fighting capability. A kinder view holds that the NRF is a bit of an olive branch designed to allay fears of increasing US isolationism, particularly based on American exclusion of NATO during major portions of Operation Enduring Freedom, and presents a tangible link between the United States, NATO and even the European Union (EU). Everyone recognizes that NATO's European members need to increase their military capabilities relative to their American counterpart. The NRF may offer a way to refocus national economic resources devoted to the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and to serve as the catalyst for NATO's military transformation efforts. This document explains why NATO must properly organize, train, and equip their joint combined force for significant crisis response capability, especially in the area where European Union efforts fall short: warfighting capability.