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When and how do party politics matter in junior allies’ decisions to engage in multinational military operations? Developing a new role theory model of party politics and multinational military operations, we put forward a two-level argument. First, we argue that the rationale for military action is defined in a contest between political parties with expectations of what constitutes the proper purpose (constitutive roles) and functions (functional roles) of the state. Second, we hold that material and ontological insecurities reduce political space for contestation and debate, but that junior allies tend to focus on role demands for ‘good states’ and ‘good allies’ rather than the nature and aim of the military operation. To unpack our argument, we analyse the debate among political parties in Romania and Denmark leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Concluding our analysis, we outline the implications for the changing security order and current debates in NATO member states on how to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

When and how do party politics matter in junior allies’ decisions to engage in multinational military operations? Developing a new role theory model of party politics and multinational military operations, we put forward a two-level argument. First, we argue that the rationale for military action is defined in a contest between political parties with expectations of what constitutes the proper purpose (constitutive roles) and functions (functional roles) of the state. Second, we hold that material and ontological insecurities reduce political space for contestation and debate, but that junior allies tend to focus on role demands for ‘good states’ and ‘good allies’ rather than the nature and aim of the military operation. To unpack our argument, we analyse the debate among political parties in Romania and Denmark leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Concluding our analysis, we outline the implications for the changing security order and current debates in NATO member states on how to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Enhanced institutional structures do not always entail increased efficiency in diplomatic interlocution. Both exogenous and endogenous factors may hinder smooth interaction between international actors, notwithstanding reinforced diplomatic frameworks. An analysis of waning political dialogue, between the US and the EU, from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty to the Trump administration, supports empirically this consideration. In spite of the EU having in place, during that period, the most extensive array of foreign policy institutions in its history, a decline in transatlantic political relations was not averted. What is more, the decline accelerated after the creation of such institutions by the Lisbon Treaty. Over thirteen years after the entry into force of the treaty, an assessment of its effectiveness within transatlantic dialogue is timely and necessary. What did the Lisbon Treaty, from its entry into force to the Trump administration, mean for EU-US political dialogue? Why was the Lisbon Treaty ineffective in strengthening EU-US political relations, and avoiding ever-increasing transatlantic rifts throughout the different crises of that period?, El desarrollo de estructuras institucionales no conlleva necesariamente una mayor efectividad en la interlocución diplomática. Tanto factores exógenos como endógenos pueden restar fluidez a la interacción entre actores internacionales, a pesar de aparatos diplomáticos reforzados. Un análisis del declive en el diálogo político entre EEUU y la UE, desde la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa hasta la administración Trump, apoya empíricamente esta consideración. A pesar de que la UE contaba en ese periodo con la panoplia más extensa de instituciones de política exterior de su historia, no se evitó un declive en las relaciones políticas transatlánticas. Es más, el declive aceleró tras la creación de tales instituciones por el Tratado de Lisboa. Más de trece años después de la entrada en vigor del Tratado, una evaluación de su efectividad para el diálogo transatlántico es oportuna y necesaria. ¿Qué supuso el Tratado de Lisboa, desde su entrada en vigor hasta la administración Trump, para el diálogo político entre la UE y EEUU? ¿Por qué el Tratado de Lisboa fue ineficaz para fortalecer las relaciones políticas entre la UE y EEUU y evitar crecientes desavenencias transatlánticas a lo largo de las diferentes crisis de ese periodo?

Germany is at risk of sustaining collateral damage in the face of intensifying US-Chinese competition and conflict. China’s ascendance and America's desire to preserve the status quo lock Beijing and Washington into a classic security dilemma. The United States sees China as a potential regional hegemon in Asia and as an emerging global systemic challenger. China sees the United States as impeding its rise. Security competition is already well underway. So are geo-economic and geo-technological competition and conflict. For Germany, a position of relative neutrality or equidistance is not an option, it should consider pursuing a multi-track approach.

Enhanced institutional structures do not always entail increased efficiency in diplomatic interlocution. Both exogenous and endogenous factors may hinder smooth interaction between international actors, notwithstanding reinforced diplomatic frameworks. An analysis of waning political dialogue, between the US and the EU, from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty to the Trump administration, supports empirically this consideration. In spite of the EU having in place, during that period, the most extensive array of foreign policy institutions in its history, a decline in transatlantic political relations was not averted. What is more, the decline accelerated after the creation of such institutions by the Lisbon Treaty. Over thirteen years after the entry into force of the treaty, an assessment of its effectiveness within transatlantic dialogue is timely and necessary. What did the Lisbon Treaty, from its entry into force to the Trump administration, mean for EU-US political dialogue? Why was the Lisbon Treaty ineffective in strengthening EU-US political relations, and avoiding ever-increasing transatlantic rifts throughout the different crises of that period?, El desarrollo de estructuras institucionales no conlleva necesariamente una mayor efectividad en la interlocución diplomática. Tanto factores exógenos como endógenos pueden restar fluidez a la interacción entre actores internacionales, a pesar de aparatos diplomáticos reforzados. Un análisis del declive en el diálogo político entre EEUU y la UE, desde la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa hasta la administración Trump, apoya empíricamente esta consideración. A pesar de que la UE contaba en ese periodo con la panoplia más extensa de instituciones de política exterior de su historia, no se evitó un declive en las relaciones políticas transatlánticas. Es más, el declive aceleró tras la creación de tales instituciones por el Tratado de Lisboa. Más de trece años después de la entrada en vigor del Tratado, una evaluación de su efectividad para el diálogo transatlántico es oportuna y necesaria. ¿Qué supuso el Tratado de Lisboa, desde su entrada en vigor hasta la administración Trump, para el diálogo político entre la UE y EEUU? ¿Por qué el Tratado de Lisboa fue ineficaz para fortalecer las relaciones políticas entre la UE y EEUU y evitar crecientes desavenencias transatlánticas a lo largo de las diferentes crisis de ese periodo?

The EDC was a failed attempt at European integration in military and defense. This thesis intends to examine how and why the EDC failed and what it means for today. This thesis aims to understand what are the implications for the EDC's failure in the EU's efforts to gain strategic autonomy. This issue is important to many with interests in the European region. The failure of the EDC will be analyzed as a case study utilizing the theoretical framework of Neoclassical Realism. Constraints include language, lack of government transparency, and inherent limitations of case study research. This thesis will outline different theories and why Neoclassical Realism is chosen to evaluate the EDC; then it will examine the EDC during its negotiation and writing; then it will analyze the case from the perspective of each of the EDC participants, and then it will describe the implications of the EDC for the present situation. This thesis will examine the EDC from a theoretical standpoint. Because the EDC is a unique case of failed European integration, a broader International Relations theory will be used in this thesis. There are a number of theories regarding European integration and broader theories on International Relations. This thesis will examine the EDC from the Neoclassical Realist perspective. The Pleven Plan was to allow for the rearmament of Germany under conditions acceptable to France. The Plan was to solve the German rearmament dilemma. Proponents had to deal with nationalists who resisted relinquishing control of armed forces while also nurturing the European idea that called for more integration. The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1952; the US and UK both called for its quick ratification. There were concerns among the treaty's signatories. Germany worried about a return of its army, its defense, and its acceptance in the West. Italy was concerned about integration, maintaining internal stability, and helping its economy. The smaller countries of the Benelux were

This article focuses on the links between transatlantic relations - a structured array of markets, hierarchies, networks, ideas, and institutions - and broader elements of international structure and world order. It argues that the changing state of transatlantic relations reflects changes in the structure of the relations themselves, but also structural change in the global and domestic arenas and how such change shapes or reflects the actions of a wide variety of agents. The first part of the article briefly explores the importance of international structure in order to identify the global forces that shape the context for transatlantic relations. The article then examines the key mechanisms in transatlantic relations which interact to create forms of transatlantic order; these create spaces for a wide variety of agents, operating within broader elements of international and domestic structure, and the article illustrates this through the ways in which the EU's "new agenda for EU-US relations" sought to shape transatlantic interactions during the first year of the Biden presidency. The article examines the implications of transatlantic responses to the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, and concludes that despite the move to enhanced EU-US cooperation in the short term, the interaction of structures, mechanisms, and actors will contribute to continuing differentiation of transatlantic relations, at least in the medium term, whatever the preferences of US and EU policy-makers.

In light of the larger contextual picture of increased geostrategic rivalry with China, this article focuses on the question whether transatlantic cooperation responses towards the geostrategic challenge of China can possibly be coherent at all. How can we explain coherent actions (or lack thereof) between actors across the Atlantic in their foreign policy towards China? The central idea then is to explain transatlantic cooperation responses to the geostrategic challenge of China from a coherence angle, providing us with a perspective by which we can understand why actors on both sides of the Atlantic invest in policy coherence, or rather not. We argue that this coherence angle on transatlantic relations is particularly promising as it combines a focus on actors and structural dimensions that is able to offer explanations by whom, where, and why policy coherence is achieved. By looking into two different cases, the so-called concerted sanctions case and the AUKUS case, we find both, transatlantic coherence and incoherence, respectively, in response to the strategic challenge of China. Overall, this article has important policy implications, as it can point to the underlying factors in transatlantic policy-making that push or obstruct coherence.

When the 2007 global financial crisis hit financial markets, European leaders were quick to point the finger at US markets, excessive risk-taking, and insufficient regulation. However, it soon became apparent that European banks were more exposed than their Wall Street counterparts. With massive dollar liabilities, European banks were dependent on the US to act as a global lender of last resort. The crisis revealed a level of transatlantic interdependence that had been unknown to most observers and policymakers prior to the crisis. We argue that this represents a paradox, given that the project of the European Monetary Union was partly motivated by a desire to make Europe more independent from the US dollar. The euro was a response to the challenge of "it’s our dollar, but it's your problem". In this article, we examine how the European vulnerability to the US dollar that began post-Bretton Woods did not, in fact, disappear with the creation of a European currency. Instead, through financialization and deregulation, European financial markets developed new, complex interactions with US financial markets. This financialization of transatlantic banking flows created a new type of interdependence. As European banks were so heavily invested in US markets, this gave the US authorities a direct interest in bailing them out. While cross-border banking flows have decreased since the crisis, the interdependencies remain, and currency swaps were used once again to handle the economic fallout from Covid-19. In the area of financial and monetary policy, the transatlantic relationship remains strong and stable within a dollar hegemony.

Since the end of World War II, outer space has been an arena in which both high and low politics have played out, and both the US and Europe have been heavily invested. This article examines the case study of space exploration as a window into the evolving nature of the transatlantic relationship. With the US government regularly deprioritizing Europe in its foreign policy and at times taking the transatlantic relationship for granted, the author argues that transnational and non-state actors have played an important role in maintaining the stability of the alliance. In terms of space, this means that the space community - space agencies, private actors, space enthusiasts, engineers, and scientists, among others - often enable transatlantic cooperation despite initial conflictual rhetoric stemming from political leaders. Importantly, while these transnational or non-state actors tend to view space as a peaceful domain for all of humankind, governments and militaries often treat space as the next battlefield. To support this argument, the article considers two major transatlantic space developments: the US's Space Force, which reflects a US desire to be dominant in space, and Europe's Galileo satellite system, which reflects a European goal to have strategic autonomy from the US. The author argues that the idea that space should be a peaceful domain for all of humankind is more strongly reflected in outcomes, despite the presence of conflictual, militaristic rhetoric.

The presidency of Donald Trump represented an unprecedented low point in transatlantic relations. When Joe Biden took power in early 2021, his administration launched several policy initiatives suggesting that the new administration would continue to allow the seemingly long-term weakening of the transatlantic relationship to continue. A significant part of the literature on recent developments in transatlantic relations points in the same direction, namely that a weakening of the cooperation across the Atlantic has taken place. This article proposes an alternative view, arguing that the relationship has strengthened in recent years despite Donald Trump and his erratic policy. The article applies a theoretical framework combining international as well as domestic variables. Based on an analysis of four cases - NATO, the US pivot to Asia, the sanctions policy towards Russia, and the Afghanistan debacle - it is concluded that the transatlantic relationship is strong.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Europe and the US quickly joined in a strong and coordinated response. But how significant is the Ukraine crisis response for longer-term trends in transatlantic relations? This thematic issue addresses this question by focusing on the factors that affect the strength of the transatlantic relationship. Only by exploring the impact of various structural, strategic, economic, institutional, and domestic factors can we better understand the current and future state of EU-US relations - both in normal times and in times of crisis. Two questions are explored across cases: First, is the EU - US relationship changing in various fields? Second, how can the putative changes (or stability) in EU - US relations be explained? For this purpose, the articles also operationalize and apply a common explanatory framework. This Introduction sets out and justifies the overall research questions, develops the analytical framework, and briefly explains the empirical focus of the articles that follow.

The aim of this article is to discuss how a weakening transatlantic relationship influences European defence cooperation and integration. It also asks how these observed patterns of weakening EU-US relations can be explained and what the consequences might be for the EU’s efforts to build a stronger and more coherent security and defence policy. Building upon a "comprehensive neo-functionalist" approach first coined by the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter, European security and defence policy should be seen as part of an externalisation of EU integration as a response to weakening transatlantic relations. The debate on European "strategic autonomy", the Strategic Compass, and the European "defence package" should therefore be considered as part of such an externalisation process of actively influencing and reshaping the transatlantic relationship. When analysing European security and defence, the article also shows that it is misleading to regard European integration as something to be subordinated to NATO. Nevertheless, a European security deficit does exist due to differing perspectives among member states on how the EU process should relate to NATO. The article, therefore, concludes that strategic autonomy can only be developed with close EU-NATO cooperation. Furthermore, a more multipolar world order where the EU no longer can rely upon a transatlantic security community to the same extent as before challenges the EU's role as a defender of multilateralism and poses new challenges to the EU's common foreign and security policy.

This article summarizes the thematic issue findings, focusing on the factors that contribute to stabilize or weaken EU-US relations. Seen together, the articles have systematically documented that there is a growing pressure on transatlantic relations both in multilateral institutional settings as well as in foreign and security policy. On the one hand, transatlantic relations within NATO are strengthening in the context of Russia's new war in Ukraine, pushing Europe closer to the US and papering over disputes among European nations about the course of intra-European security cooperation. Shared norms and institutions as well as non-state actors with an interest in keeping the relationship strong for economic, strategic, or more normative reasons also serve to stabilize the relationship. On the other hand, longer-term geopolitical and economical structural changes together with domestic factors, particularly in the US, and in some cases diverging interests, suggest a parallel longer-term weakening of the relationship.

This article aims to investigate the character of transatlantic security relations in Africa: How can it be characterized? Have they become weaker or stronger over the past decade? How can this development be explained? As NATO has not yet been heavily engaged on the African continent, it is prudent to study the relations between the EU and the US. Africa has been of concern to the EU (and its member states) for decades due to its geographical closeness and historic bonds. Since 2001, for both Europe and the US, Africa has become a region of increasing security concern due to the threat of international terrorism - for Europe, we can also add the migration concern. The European side of this relationship has also been largely dominated by France, making the transatlantic security cooperation in Africa essentially about French-American relations. As France has taken the lead regarding Europe's security and defense engagement in Africa, increasingly with the support of other EU member states and associated non-members, this bilateral relationship is more than simply cooperation between two states. By applying a framework that understands EU security and defense policy as a process increasingly characterized as a differentiated and flexible integration under French leadership, the development of the Franco-US security relations in Africa must be understood as an expression of the transatlantic security relations in this region.

In 2019, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement System (WTO-DSS) lost its quorum. Instead of the required minimum number of three members, the AB’s membership fell to one member only as the US under Donald Trump blocked the appointment of new members upon the expiry of the terms of two incumbent ones. The AB's paralysis produced a high level of shock in the EU. In this article, we take a closer look at the US's decision to paralyze the WTO's AB and the EU's reaction to it. Its point is that it will not be easy to get the US back on board as the factors that drove its decision predate the Trump era. Long before Trump, the tradeoff upon which the US based its acceptance of the WTO-DSS unraveled. For US policy makers, the EU is partly to blame for this as it undermined the system's prompt compliance assumption. More important even is the claim that the system's AB created new obligations for the WTO members to the point where the acceptance of some WTO rules - notably regarding trade remedies - became politically unsustainable in the US itself.

Emotions have been found to underpin the moral hierarchy of values and beliefs within and among groups by restraining undesirable attitudes and behavior. As such, emotions serve as potential indicators for analyzing whether or not certain norms are still deemed relevant. As Jon Mercer puts it: "One way to test for the presence of norms is to look for emotion". While the literature in International Relations (IR) generally accepts the emotional underpinnings of norms, there has been strikingly little elaboration of appropriate methods and criteria for studying the link between emotion and norms in IR. In this contribution, I suggest that socialization processes in a security community involve the internalization of appropriate rules of emotional expression or, in short, emotion norms. I propose that emotion norms can be historically traced via the emotional vocabulary and expressive rules derived from the production of texts. To do this, I searched for documents and treaties that serve as canonical texts for the collective self-conception and self-image of the transatlantic security community. As I hope to show, in these texts one can find substantial evidence of emotion norms, which designates these documents as 'emotional landmarks' that embody the emotional construction of the transatlantic emotional (security) community.

In the coming legislative period, the Federal Government and the Bundes­tag will need to redefine the scope of Germany’s responsibility in world politics. The potential for action of German foreign policy cannot be prop­erly assessed without taking into consideration the new international constellations and the required changes. Shifts in international power, the loss of influence of Western positions, growing authoritarianism, the weakening of multilateral institutions, urgent global problems such as climate change - all of these challenges call for a realignment of German foreign policy. In doing so, it is impor­tant to adequately assess the limits of its capabilities but also the existing room for manoeuvre. This should guide its goals and priorities. German foreign policy is faced with increasingly intense competition for international influence and the authority to interpret norms and values. This competition takes different forms in the individual fields of foreign affairs. For this reason, Germany’s presence in international politics can only be influential if the ministries involved pool their efforts and resources. More room needs to be made available for forward-looking and medium-term approaches in foreign policy decision-making. In this way, it may be possible to overcome the tendency towards ad hoc decisions and to avoid predominantly reactive patterns of behaviour. Germany’s foreign relations must be guided by reliable partnerships and new forms of responsibility-sharing in various policy areas. How conflicting objectives are to be negotiated can only be determined through open and transparent dialogue. (author's abstract)

In the end of November, the US Department of Defense presented key findings of its Global Posture Review (GPR). Addressing current and future developments across the US's global military presence, the Posture is highly relevant for America's allies. With the GPR, the Biden administration reaffirms its commitment to strengthening NATO; however, the elements of the Review that have so far been published leave important questions unanswered - in particular, how the priorities between Europe and Asia will be set in the long-term and whether new land-based weapons systems will be sta­tioned in European NATO states. (author's abstract)

Ende November hat das US-amerikanische Verteidigungsministerium die Ergebnisse seiner Global Posture Review (GPR) vorgestellt. Die Posture gibt Aufschluss über die geplante Entwicklung der weltweiten Militärpräsenz der USA und hat daher auch eine hohe Relevanz für deren Bündnispartner. Die Biden-Administra­tion bekräftigt mit dieser GPR ihr Bekenntnis zur Stärkung der Nato. Zugleich lassen die bislang veröffentlichten Eckpunkte wichtige Fragen offen - insbesondere dazu, wie die Prio­ritäten zwischen Europa und Asien längerfristig gesetzt werden und ob neue land­gestützte Waffensysteme in europäischen Nato-Staaten stationiert werden sollen. (Autorenreferat)

The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens ofthousands of additional US troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, aswas the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts. While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Once key issues of financial equity and militarydeterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out forthemselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and atthe same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large.

The EDC was a failed attempt at European integration in military and defense. This thesis intends to examine how and why the EDC failed and what it means for today. This thesis aims to understand what are the implications for the EDC's failure in the EU's efforts to gain strategic autonomy. This issue is important to many with interests in the European region. The failure of the EDC will be analyzed as a case study utilizing the theoretical framework of Neoclassical Realism. Constraints include language, lack of government transparency, and inherent limitations of case study research. This thesis will outline different theories and why Neoclassical Realism is chosen to evaluate the EDC; then it will examine the EDC during its negotiation and writing; then it will analyze the case from the perspective of each of the EDC participants, and then it will describe the implications of the EDC for the present situation. This thesis will examine the EDC from a theoretical standpoint. Because the EDC is a unique case of failed European integration, a broader International Relations theory will be used in this thesis. There are a number of theories regarding European integration and broader theories on International Relations. This thesis will examine the EDC from the Neoclassical Realist perspective. The Pleven Plan was to allow for the rearmament of Germany under conditions acceptable to France. The Plan was to solve the German rearmament dilemma. Proponents had to deal with nationalists who resisted relinquishing control of armed forces while also nurturing the European idea that called for more integration. The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1952; the US and UK both called for its quick ratification. There were concerns among the treaty's signatories. Germany worried about a return of its army, its defense, and its acceptance in the West. Italy was concerned about integration, maintaining internal stability, and helping its economy. The smaller countries of the Benelux were

The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens ofthousands of additional US troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, aswas the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts. While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Once key issues of financial equity and militarydeterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out forthemselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and atthe same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large.

These pages deal with the different reasons that led the Peruvian writer Zoila Aurora Cáceres Moreno (Lima, 1877-Madrid, 1958) to travel to Spain on numerous occasions. Moreover, this article attempts to approach her journalistic work in the Spanish newspaper El Liberal of Barcelona, under the pseudonym Evangelina, and the relationships, both personal and professional, that she had with some Spanish intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries., En estas páginas abordamos los distintos motivos que llevaron a la escritora peruana Zoila Aurora Cáceres Moreno (Lima, 1877-Madrid, 1958) a viajar en numerosas ocasiones a España. Asimismo, mostramos un acercamiento a su labor periodística en el diario español El Liberal, de Barcelona, bajo el seudónimo de Evangelina, y las relaciones, tanto personales como profesionales, que mantuvo con algunos intelectuales españoles de finales del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XX.

These pages deal with the different reasons that led the Peruvian writer Zoila Aurora Cáceres Moreno (Lima, 1877-Madrid, 1958) to travel to Spain on numerous occasions. Moreover, this article attempts to approach her journalistic work in the Spanish newspaper El Liberal of Barcelona, under the pseudonym Evangelina, and the relationships, both personal and professional, that she had with some Spanish intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries., En estas páginas abordamos los distintos motivos que llevaron a la escritora peruana Zoila Aurora Cáceres Moreno (Lima, 1877-Madrid, 1958) a viajar en numerosas ocasiones a España. Asimismo, mostramos un acercamiento a su labor periodística en el diario español El Liberal, de Barcelona, bajo el seudónimo de Evangelina, y las relaciones, tanto personales como profesionales, que mantuvo con algunos intelectuales españoles de finales del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XX.

The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens ofthousands of additional US troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, aswas the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts. While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Once key issues of financial equity and militarydeterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out forthemselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and atthe same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large.

The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens ofthousands of additional US troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, aswas the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts. While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Once key issues of financial equity and militarydeterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out forthemselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and atthe same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large.

Drawing on a Foucauldian philosophy of thought, this article proposes a novel concept in the study of evolutionary stable global orders:co-relational power. Co-relational power issubstantively understood asa form ofnon-zero sumpower. Non-zero sum or positive power is defined as the situation in whichthe power of one actor is not detrimental to the power of another actor, but it is insteada sum of asymptoticinteractions between actors. We argue that, in a contextof competitive multipolarity, multilateralsecurityorganisations,such as NATO and the EU, seek to adapt and to develop progressive and evolutionary grand strategiesthat canremain stable over time.This becomes a prerequisite for institutional survival.Our analysis shows that both NATO and the EU face geopolitical dilemmas while they seek to adapt to novelinternational ordersand constellationsof threats. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, itproduces new knowledgeabout the conceptual underpinningsand practical implications of theconcept of co-relational power. Second, itgeneratesnew insights on the design and foundationsof progressive strategies and evolutionary stable global environments.

Drawing on a Foucauldian philosophy of thought, this article proposes a novel concept in the study of evolutionary stable global orders:co-relational power. Co-relational power issubstantively understood asa form ofnon-zero sumpower. Non-zero sum or positive power is defined as the situation in whichthe power of one actor is not detrimental to the power of another actor, but it is insteada sum of asymptoticinteractions between actors. We argue that, in a contextof competitive multipolarity, multilateralsecurityorganisations,such as NATO and the EU, seek to adapt and to develop progressive and evolutionary grand strategiesthat canremain stable over time.This becomes a prerequisite for institutional survival.Our analysis shows that both NATO and the EU face geopolitical dilemmas while they seek to adapt to novelinternational ordersand constellationsof threats. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, itproduces new knowledgeabout the conceptual underpinningsand practical implications of theconcept of co-relational power. Second, itgeneratesnew insights on the design and foundationsof progressive strategies and evolutionary stable global environments.

The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens ofthousands of additional US troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, aswas the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts. While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Once key issues of financial equity and militarydeterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out forthemselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and atthe same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large.

The study presents the situation of the United States experienced by the COVID-19 pandemic and the controversial presidency of Donald Trump. Efforts were made to answer the question of how the superpower was coping with an unprecedented challenge and why the US did not work in this clash. Although the internal situation was also analysed, attention was focused on the external aspect. The main conclusion is that the pandemic has exposed the weakness and incompetence of the Trump administration, as evidenced by the rich toll of deaths and sick that the coronavirus has collected in the US. Nor has the Trump team proven itself internationally, abandoning America’s traditional leadership role in such situations, and showing selfishness or pettiness. The Biden administration has attempted to rebuild the U.S. ranks, but faces a difficult task. The new team’s first moves not only brought the US back to the traditional trajectory of US foreign policy, where principles and standards matter, credibility and predictability are important. The process of strengthening the US role has also resulted in the reconstruction of transatlantic relations, which are one of the pillars of America’s strength on the international stage. The article adopts a research strategy based on the tracking of events, their evaluation, qualitative and critical analysis of texts, conducting comparative evaluations., W opracowaniu przedstawiono kondycję Stanów Zjednoczonych doświadczonych pandemią COVID-19 i kontrowersyjną prezydenturą Donalda Trumpa. Starano się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jak supermocarstwo radziło sobie z bezprecedensowym wyzwaniem i dlaczego w tym starciu USA się nie sprawdziły. Choć analizowano też sytuację wewnętrzną, to jednak uwaga była skoncentrowana na aspekcie zewnętrznym. Główna konkluzja brzmi następująco: starcie z pandemią obnażyło słabość i niekompetencję administracji Trumpa, czego potwierdzeniem było bogate żniwo ofiar śmiertelnych i chorych, jakie zbierał koronawirus w USA. Ekipa Trumpa nie sprawdziła się również na arenie międzynarodowej, rezygnując z tradycyjnej w takich sytuacjach przywódczej roli Ameryki, a wykazując się egoizmem czy małostkowością. Administracja Bidena podjęła próbę odbudowy rangi USA, stając jednak przed trudnym zadaniem. Pierwsze posunięcia nowej ekipy spowodowały nie tylko powrót USA na tradycyjną trajektorię amerykańskiej polityki zagranicznej, gdzie liczą się zasady i standardy, ważna jest wiarygodność i przewidywalność. Proces wzmacniania roli USA zaowocował także odbudową relacji transatlantyckich, stanowiących jeden z filarów siły Ameryki na arenie międzynarodowej. W artykule przyjęto strategię badawczą opartą na śledzeniu wydarzeń, ich ocenie, jakościowym i krytycznym analizowaniu tekstów, prowadzeniu ocen porównawczych.

This chapter compares the postures of Iceland and Denmark towards the United States and NATO over time. It explains why both states became strong, unflinching allies of the Unites States after the end of the Cold War despite their contentious relationships with the Unites States during the Cold War. Having hesitatingly joined NATO and signed a military basing agreement with the Unites States, Iceland was a rebellious and extractive ally throughout the Cold War. It threatened repeatedly to leave NATO and/or to expel US forces from Icelandic soil and extracted considerable economic and diplomatic benefits. However, Iceland became highly compliant with US policy after the end of the Cold War. Denmark was a reluctant and transactional ally during the Cold War with the political elite and the public viewing NATO membership as a necessary evil. However, after the end of the Cold War, Denmark became a highly compliant ally, as it expended considerable blood, treasure and political capital to support US priorities and military operations. We show how in both cases the demand for security shelter, coupled with the worldviews and ideas of domestic elites, helped shape the transatlantic relations of the two countries.

The articles included in this dossier propose an analysis of transatlantic relations between Latin America, Italy and Spain, specifically in the 20th and 21st centuries. From a transdisciplinary approach, they examine both intertextual and personal links and, therefore, also analyze specific figures, institutions, and cultural mediation groups., Os artigos incluídos neste dossiê propõem um estudo das relações transatlânticas entre a América Latina, a Itália e a Espanha, no período específico dos séculos XX e XXI. Numa abordagem transdisciplinar, propõem ligações intertextuais e pessoais e, por isso, estudam também figuras, instituições e grupos de mediação cultural específicos., Los artículos incluidos en este dossier proponen un estudio de las relaciones transatlánticas entre América Latina, Italia y España, en el marco temporal específico del siglo XX y el XXI. Desde un enfoque transdisciplinar, analizan vínculos tanto intertextuales como personales y estudian, por lo tanto, también a específicas figuras, instituciones y colectivos de mediación cultural.

Louisa May Alcott’s Moods and the sensation tales the author published in the 1860s exceeded narrative, racial, and gender boundaries. References to the Roman Republic came to epitomize the sentimental excess that was beginning to be censored by the literary establishment. Tra eccesso e misura: la Repubblica Romana in Moods di Louisa May AlcottIl romanzo Moods e i racconti a sensazione che Louisa May Alcott pubblicò nel decennio 1860 trasgredivano i confini narrativi, razziali e di genere. I riferimenti alla Repubblica Romana finirono col simboleggiare gli eccessi sentimentalisti censurati dall’establishment letterario.

Tax avoidance by multinational corporations has become a central feature of the world economy. After decades of opposition, the US wants to set a global minimum corporation tax rate and limit tax avoidance, but it will need all of Europe to stand behind it. A historic 130-country OECD tax agreement is giving some hope but both sides of the Atlantic will need to confront deeply rooted interests if they want to implement the deal and build a new cooperative tax reform framework.

Die nächste Generation europäischer Politiker*innen glaubt, dass die Vereinigten Staaten und Europa bei der Bewältigung gemeinsamer Herausforderungen zusammenarbeiten können, etwa in den Themenbereichen China, Technologie, Klimawandel, Wirtschaft und Sicherheit. Während junge europäische Abgeordnete im Allgemeinen eine größere europäische Eigenständigkeit befürworten, sehen sie auch Grenzen für die Autonomie der Europäischen Union. Die transatlantische Zusammenarbeit im Umgang mit China findet allgemeine Unterstützung, während die künftige Kooperation mit den Vereinigten Staaten auf den Gebieten Technologie und Klimawandel mit einiger Skepsis betrachtet wird. Während das Vertrauen in die Vereinigten Staaten in der Ära Trump einen schweren Schlag erlitten hat, sind die führenden europäischen Politiker*innen der nächsten Generation vorsichtig hoffnungsvoll, was die Zuverlässigkeit der USA in der Zukunft angeht. Vieles hängt jedoch davon ab, ob Washington in der Lage ist, Maßnahmen zum Klimawandel zu ergreifen.

Die Bundesregierung wie auch der Bundestag stehen in der kommenden Legislaturperiode vor der Notwendigkeit, die Reichweite deutscher Verantwortung in der Weltpolitik neu zu bestimmen. Ohne eine Bestandsaufnahme, wie sich die internationale Arena verändert hat und welcher Wandel darüber hinaus geboten ist, können die Handlungspotentiale deutscher Außenpolitik nicht sachgerecht beurteilt werden. Internationale Machtverschiebungen, Positionsverluste des Westens, wachsender Autoritarismus, Schwächung multilateraler Institutionen und drängende globale Probleme wie der Klimawandel - all diese Herausforderungen erfordern eine Neuaufstellung deutscher Außenpolitik. Dabei gilt es die Grenzen der eigenen Leistungsfähigkeit, aber auch die gegebenen Handlungsspielräume richtig einzuschätzen. Ziele wie Prioritäten sollten sich daran orientieren. Deutsche Außenpolitik steht in einem sich verschärfenden Wettbewerb um internationalen Einfluss und die Deutungshoheit über Normen und Werte. In den einzelnen Feldern auswärtigen Handelns ist dieser Wettbewerb unterschiedlich ausgeprägt. Daher kann deutsche Präsenz in der internationalen Politik nur wirkungsmächtig sein, wenn die Ressourcen der involvierten Ressorts zusammengeführt werden. Im außenpolitischen Entscheidungsprozess müssen Freiräume für voraus­schauende und mittelfristige Ansätze geschaffen werden. Auf diese Weise kann es gelingen, die Neigung zu Ad-hoc-Entscheidungen auszugleichen und ein vorwiegend reaktives Verhaltensmuster zu vermeiden. Deutschlands Außenbeziehungen müssen an belastbaren Partnerschaften und neuen Formen der Verantwortungsteilung in den verschiedenen Politikfeldern ausgerichtet sein. Wie dabei auftretende Zielkonflikte zu regeln sind, kann nur in einer offenen und transparenten Diskussion aus­gehandelt werden. (Autorenreferat)

Although President Biden has made US foreign policy more predictable, its medium- and long-term direction and concomitant implications for transatlantic relations are less certain. This report presents three scenarios of how US strategy might evolve. They provide insight into how the United States behaves in the spheres of security and international economy under different conditions and why, suggesting ways for the EU and Germany to preemptively mitigate risks and positively influence future policy.

The EU and the United States are expected to launch a Trade and Technology Council (TTC) on the sidelines of the US-EU Summit in mid-June, which could present a rare opportunity to jumpstart the EU-US technology relationship. Against the backdrop of rapid technological change, a transatlantic digital technology community could be a 21st-century answer to the Coal and Steal Community - a big democratic project that reaches across borders, knits like-minded communities together in a manner that reinforces shared values, and codifies standards of market access, increased interdependence, and intensified political dialogue.

Mit der Präsidentschaft Joseph Bidens sind in Deutschland und anderen EU-Staaten hohe Erwartungen an einen "Neustart" der transatlantischen Beziehungen verbunden. Die Handlungsspielräume auch dieses Präsidenten werden allerdings wesentlich mitbestimmt von langfristigen Trends in der US-amerikanischen Innen- und Außenpolitik. Sieben Trends wirken auf die Innen- und Außenpolitik der USA besonders stark ein: die politische Polarisierung; die Verschärfung der sozioökonomischen Ungleichheit; die Transformation der amerikanischen Medienlandschaft; die steigenden Kosten des Klimawandels; der Niedergang des verarbeitenden Gewerbes; die sich zuspitzende Rivalität mit China und die Zunahme der sicherheitspolitischen Anforderungen an die US-Bünd­nissysteme. Diese Entwicklungen verstärken sich ganz überwiegend gegenseitig. Es gibt kaum Einflüsse, die bewirken würden, dass ein Trend den anderen signifikant abschwächt. Das "System USA" bewegt sich daher stabil in eine Richtung - der Handlungsspielraum des amerikanischen Präsi­denten wird sich verengen. Die Revitalisierung der transatlantischen Partnerschaft unter dem Vor­zeichen einer konfrontativen Chinapolitik birgt das Risiko, die EU und die europäischen Nato-Partner der USA zu spalten, statt sie zu einen. Impulse für Veränderungen und gesellschaftliches Umdenken in den USA könnten vor allem aus dem wachsenden Problemdruck entstehen. Das gilt beispielsweise mit Blick auf die Kosten des Klimawandels und auf die Gefahren für die amerikanische Demokratie, die mit Desinformation einhergehen. Die deutsche und die europäische Amerikapolitik sollten vor diesem Hintergrund realistische Ambitionen formulieren. Chancen für mehr transatlantische Zusammenarbeit eröffnen sich unter anderem bei der Entwicklung gemeinsamer Normen, Regularien und technischer Standards für den ökonomischen Austausch, nicht zuletzt im Bereich der Digitalwirtschaft, sowie bei gemeinsamen Investitionen. (Autorenreferat)

Die multilaterale Rüstungskontrolle steht vor der grundlegenden Herausforderung, dass Russland und die USA sich von solchen Regimen ab- und sogar gegen sie wenden. Auf den Fortgang bilateraler Rüstungskontrolle können Europäer naturgemäß wenig Einfluss nehmen. Bei vielen multilateralen Abkommen aber sitzen Europäer mit am Tisch und sie haben am Erhalt dieser Regime meist ein originäres Eigeninteresse.

The global revival of economic nationalism and protectionism poses a serious threat to the international foreign trade policy orientation towards principles of a market economy. Popular economic nationalism such as Trumpism, Brexit or the isolation of the Eastern European Visegrád states from immigrants violates fundamental principles of the WTO. Economists agree that Brexit will hurt the UK economy significantly in the medium and long term. In addition, its political and economic effects will damage the US and transatlantic relations. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, on the other hand, continues to claim that leaving the EU will enable Britain to "take back control". In addition, the socioeconomic effects of the Corona crisis on the US, UK, EU and transatlantic relations are devastating. It has far-reaching political, social and economic consequences that go well beyond public health. All partners need each other more than ever to cope with the Covid crisis. Increased transatlantic cooperation to strengthen resilience would also be necessary in closely related areas of international relations and security issues., Die weltweite Wiederbelebung des wirtschaftlichen Nationalismus und des Protektionismus stellt eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die international außenwirtschaftspolitische Orientierung an den Prinzipien der Marktwirtschaft dar. Populärer Wirtschaftsnationalismus wie Trumpismus, Brexit oder die Abschottung der osteuropäischen Visegrád-Staaten gegen Einwanderer verstößt gegen grundlegende Prinzipien der WTO. Die Ökonomen sind sich einig, dass der Brexit der britischen Wirtschaft mittel und langfristig erheblich schaden wird. Darüber hinaus werden seine politischen und wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen auch den USA und den transatlantischen Beziehungen schaden. Der britische Premier Boris Johnson behauptet dagegen nach wie vor, dass der Austritt aus der EU Großbritannien in die Lage versetzen wird, "die Kontrolle zurückzugewinnen". Außerdem sind die sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen der Corona-Krise auf die USA, Großbritannien, die EU und die transatlantischen Beziehungen verheerend. Sie hat weitreichende politische, soziale und wirtschaftliche Folgen, die weit über die öffentliche Gesundheit hinausgehen. Alle Partner brauchen einander mehr denn je, um die Covid-Krise zu bewältigen. Auch in eng verwandten Bereichen der internationalen Beziehungen und Sicherheitsfragen wäre eine verstärkte transatlantische Zusammenarbeit zur Stärkung der Resilienz erforderlich., Le renouveau mondial du nationalisme économique et du protectionnisme constitue une menace sérieuse pour l'orientation de la politique internationale du commerce extérieur vers les principes de l'économie de marché de l'OMC. Les économistes s'accordent à dire que le Brexit nuira considérablement à l'économie britannique à moyen et long terme. En outre, ses effets politiques et économiques endommageront également les États-Unis et les relations transatlantiques. Le Premier ministre britannique Boris Johnson, quant à lui, continue d'affirmer que la sortie de l'UE permettra à la Grande-Bretagne de "reprendre le contrôle". De plus, les effets socio-économiques de la COVID-19 pandémie sur les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, l'UE et les relations transatlantiques sont dévastateurs. Elle a des conséquences politiques, sociales et économiques de grande envergure qui vont bien au-delà de la santé publique. Tous les partenaires ont plus que jamais besoin les uns des autres pour faire face à la crise du Covid. Une plus grande coopération transatlantique pour renforcer la résilience serait également nécessaire dans des domaines étroitement liés des relations internationales et des questions de sécurité.

The global revival of economic nationalism and protectionism poses a serious threat to the orientation of international foreign trade policy towards the principles of the WTO market economy. Economists agree that Brexit will significantly harm the UK economy in the medium to long term. In addition, its political and economic effects will also damage the United States and transatlantic relations. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, meanwhile, continues to assert that leaving the EU will allow Britain to "regain control". In addition, the socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the US, UK, the EU and transatlantic relations are devastating. It has far-reaching political, social and economic consequences that go far beyond public health. All the partners need each other more than ever to face the Covid crisis. Greater transatlantic cooperation to build resilience would also be needed in closely related areas of international relations and security issues., Le renouveau mondial du nationalisme économique et du protectionnisme constitue une menace sérieuse pour l'orientation de la politique internationale du commerce extérieur vers les principes de l'économie de marché de l'OMC. Les économistes s'accordent à dire que le Brexit nuira considérablement à l'économie britannique à moyen et long terme. En outre, ses effets politiques et économiques endommageront également les États-Unis et les relations transatlantiques. Le Premier ministre britannique Boris Johnson, quant à lui, continue d'affirmer que la sortie de l'UE permettra à la Grande-Bretagne de "reprendre le contrôle". De plus, les effets socio-économiques de la COVID-19 pandémie sur les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, l'UE et les relations transatlantiques sont dévastateurs. Elle a des conséquences politiques, sociales et économiques de grande envergure qui vont bien au-delà de la santé publique. Tous les partenaires ont plus que jamais besoin les uns des autres pour faire face à la crise du Covid. Une plus grande coopération transatlantique pour renforcer la résilience serait également nécessaire dans des domaines étroitement liés des relations internationales et des questions de sécurité., Die weltweite Wiederbelebung des wirtschaftlichen Nationalismus und Protektionismus gefährdet die Ausrichtung der internationalen Außenwirtschaftspolitik an den Prinzipien der WTO-Marktwirtschaft ernsthaft. Ökonomen sind sich einig, dass der Brexit der britischen Wirtschaft mittel- bis langfristig erheblichen Schaden zufügen wird. Darüber hinaus werden seine politischen und wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen auch den Vereinigten Staaten und den transatlantischen Beziehungen schaden. Der britische Premierminister Boris Johnson behauptet unterdessen weiterhin, dass der Austritt Großbritanniens aus der EU es dem Vereinigten Königreich ermöglichen wird "die Kontrolle zurückzugewinnen". Darüber hinaus sind die sozio-ökonomischen Auswirkungen der COVID-19-Pandemie auf die USA, Großbritannien, die EU und die transatlantischen Beziehungen verheerend. Sie hat weitreichende politische, soziale und wirtschaftliche Folgen, die weit über das öffentliche Gesundheitswesen hinausgehen. Alle Partner brauchen einander mehr denn je, um der Covid-Krise zu begegnen. Eine stärkere transatlantische Zusammenarbeit zum Aufbau von Resilienz wäre auch in eng verwandten Bereichen der internationalen Beziehungen und Sicherheitsfragen erforderlich.

Die tschechische Regierung kündigte am 17. April an, sie werde 18 Mitarbeiter der russischen Botschaft in der Tschechischen Republik zur Ausreise auffordern. Prag wirft Moskau vor, russische Agenten seien verantwortlich für zwei Explosionen in einem Munitionslager im osttschechischen Vrbětice, die sich 2014 ereigneten. Russ­land reagierte mit der Ausweisung von 20 Botschaftsmitarbeitern, woraufhin Prag verkündete, das russische Botschaftspersonal weiter zu reduzieren. Auch hat Russ­land wohl kaum noch Chancen, beim geplanten Ausbau des Atomkraftwerks Dukovany zum Zug zu kommen. Angesichts des tiefsten bilateralen Zerwürfnisses mit Russland seit 1989 (bzw. seit der Unabhängigkeit des Landes 1993) wirbt die Tschechische Re­pub­lik nun um die Unterstützung der Verbündeten in Nato und EU. Deutschland sollte den Umgang mit Russland sowie das Thema hybride Bedrohungen zu einem sicht­baren Element des Dialogs mit Prag machen. (Autorenreferat)

In the wake of the Corona pandemic and the storming of the Capitol, threat perceptions with regard to right-wing extremists and conspiracy theories have increased markedly. The attacks in France and Austria last November showed that the threat from jihadist terrorism also remains acute. Against this background, the counter­terrorism agenda of the European Union (EU) was updated at the end of 2020 and covers a broad range of topics. However, it also testifies to the heterogeneity of the Union's competences and the different interests of EU member states. On the one hand, the EU's role remains limited when it comes to the rehabilitation of imprisoned terrorists and to the broad societal prevention of extremism. On the other hand, the EU is pushing forward with a set of regulations to remove illegal online content. This common legislative agenda is also part of a renewed transatlantic partnership. How­ever, pro­active measures against right-wing terrorism will, for the time being, be advanced in flexible coalitions. (author's abstract)

The International System is traversing a challenging stage in its evolution. The United States should carefully consider the risks of an idiosyncratic leadership and closely work with their European partners, securing a world order based on the norms of multilateralism and democracy. Still, the US President Donald Trump unveils an approach based on emotional and synchronous elements. As a matter of consequence, the EU is considering other geopolitical alternatives to accomplish its goals and deliver the best outcome to the people it serves and for global prosperity. The paper investigates the very specific psychological factors influencing Trumpian political thinking and justifying his corresponding foreign policy decision making processes, in the current transatlantic environment. By contextual examples, the analysis reveals the sensitivities and flaws in applying a subjective, belief-based approach of international (bilateral) relations. We put things into a broader perspective, by analysing the implications of such political behaviour patterns for the international liberal order, in the circumstances of the more and more prominent geopolitical triangle: the EU-China-the US.