Search

In the last two decades, individual-differences research has put forward 3 cognitive psychometric constructs: executive control (i.e., the ability to monitor and control ongoing thoughts and actions), working memory capacity (WMC, i.e., the ability to retain access to a limited amount of information in the service of complex tasks), and fluid intelligence (gF, i.e., the ability to reason with novel information). These constructs have been proposed to be closely related, but previous research failed to substantiate a strong correlation between executive control and the other two constructs. This might arise from the difficulty in establishing executive control as a latent variable and from differences in the way the 3 constructs are measured (i.e., executive control is typically measured through reaction times, whereas WMC and gF are measured through accuracy). The purpose of the present study was to overcome these difficulties by measuring executive control through accuracy. Despite good reliabilities of all measures, structural equation modeling identified no coherent factor of executive control. Furthermore, WMC and gF-modeled as distinct but correlated factors-were unrelated to the individual measures of executive control. Hence, measuring executive control through accuracy did not overcome the difficulties of establishing executive control as a latent variable. These findings call into question the existence of executive control as a psychometric construct and the assumption that WMC and gF are closely related to the ability to control ongoing thoughts and actions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

When bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two different tasks) occur occasionally among univalent stimuli, performance is slowed on subsequent univalent stimuli even if they have no overlapping stimulus features. This finding has been labeled the bivalency effect. It indexes an adjustment of cognitive control, but the underlying mechanism is not well understood yet. The purpose of the present study was to shed light on this question, using event-related potentials. We used a paradigm requiring predictable alternations between three tasks, with bivalent stimuli occasionally occurring on one task. The results revealed that the bivalency effect elicited a sustained parietal positivity and a frontal negativity, a neural signature that is typical for control processes implemented to resolve interference. We suggest that the bivalency effect reflects interference, which may be caused by episodic context binding

The occasional occurrence of bivalent stimuli, that is, stimuli with features relevant to two tasks, slows performance on subsequent tasks with univalent stimuli, including those which have no common features with bivalent stimuli (i.e., the "bivalency effect”). We have suggested that the bivalency effect might stem from an episodic context binding arising from the occasional occurrence of bivalent stimuli. However, as the same response set is used usually for univalent and bivalent stimuli, bivalent stimulus features may be negatively primed via response features. We investigated this possibility in two experiments, in which one group of participants used the same response keys for all tasks and another group used separate response keys. The results showed a comparable bivalency effect in both groups. Thus, it rather results from episodic context binding than from response set priming

When switching tasks, occasionally responding to bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two different tasks) slows performance on subsequent univalent stimuli, even when they do not share relevant features with bivalent stimuli. This performance slowing is labelled the bivalency effect. Here, we investigated whether the bivalency effect results from an orienting response to the infrequent stimuli (i.e., the bivalent stimuli). To this end, we compared the impact of responding to infrequent univalent stimuli to the impact of responding to infrequent bivalent stimuli. For the latter, the results showed a performance slowing for all trials following bivalent stimuli. This indicates a long-lasting bivalency effect, replicating previous findings. For infrequent univalent stimuli, however, the results showed a smaller and shorter-lived performance slowing. These results demonstrate that the bivalency effect does not simply reflect an orienting response to infrequent stimuli. Rather it results from the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli, probably by episodic binding with the more demanding context created by them.

The goal of this study was to investigate recognition memory performance across the lifespan and to determine how estimates of recollection and familiarity contribute to performance. In each of three experiments, participants from five groups from 14 up to 85 years of age (children, young adults, middle-aged adults, young-old adults, and old-old adults) were presented with high- and low-frequency words in a study phase and were tested immediately afterwards and/or after a one day retention interval. The results showed that word frequency and retention interval affected recognition memory performance as well as estimates of recollection and familiarity. Across the lifespan, the trajectory of recognition memory followed an inverse u-shape function that was neither affected by word frequency nor by retention interval. The trajectory of estimates of recollection also followed an inverse u-shape function, and was especially pronounced for low-frequency words. In contrast, estimates of familiarity did not differ across the lifespan. The results indicate that age differences in recognition memory are mainly due to differences in processes related to recollection while the contribution of familiarity-based processes seems to be age-invariant.

When switching between different tasks and bivalent stimuli occur only occasionally on one of them, performance is slowed on subsequent univalent trials even if they have no overlapping features with the bivalent stimulus. This phenomenon has been labeled the "bivalency effect." Recent evidence has revealed that this effect is robust, general, and enduring. Moreover, it challenges current theories of task-switching and cognitive control. Here, we review these theories and propose a new, episodic context binding account. According to this account, binding does not only occur between stimuli, responses, and tasks, but also for the more general context in which the stimuli occur. The result of this binding process is a complex representation that includes each of these components. When bivalent stimuli occur, the resulting conflict is associated with the general context, creating a new conflict-loaded representation. The reactivation of this representation causes interference on subsequent trials, that is, the bivalency effect. We evaluate this account in light of the empirical evidence.

When bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two different tasks) occur occasionally among univalent stimuli, performance is slowed on subsequent univalent stimuli even if they have no overlapping stimulus features. This finding has been labeled the bivalency effect. It indexes an adjustment of cognitive control, but the underlying mechanism is not well understood yet. The purpose of the present study was to shed light on this question, using event-related potentials. We used a paradigm requiring predictable alternations between three tasks, with bivalent stimuli occasionally occurring on one task. The results revealed that the bivalency effect elicited a sustained parietal positivity and a frontal negativity, a neural signature that is typical for control processes implemented to resolve interference. We suggest that the bivalency effect reflects interference, which may be caused by episodic context binding

The occasional occurrence of bivalent stimuli, that is, stimuli with features relevant to two tasks, slows performance on subsequent tasks with univalent stimuli, including those which have no common features with bivalent stimuli (i.e., the "bivalency effect”). We have suggested that the bivalency effect might stem from an episodic context binding arising from the occasional occurrence of bivalent stimuli. However, as the same response set is used usually for univalent and bivalent stimuli, bivalent stimulus features may be negatively primed via response features. We investigated this possibility in two experiments, in which one group of participants used the same response keys for all tasks and another group used separate response keys. The results showed a comparable bivalency effect in both groups. Thus, it rather results from episodic context binding than from response set priming