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Network-centric warfare is a no-way-back trend in modern military operations. The application of this concept ranges from upper-level decision making echelons to troop guidance on the battlefield, and many studies have been carried out in this area. However, most of these are concerned with either the higher-level strategic networks, that is, the networks linking the higher echelons with abundant resources, satellite communications, or even a whole network infrastructure, or high-end TEN, representing resource-rich troops in the field, with military aircraft, battleships, or ground vehicles equipped with powerful wireless communication devices and (almost) unrestricted energy resources for communication. However, these studies fail to take into account the "last-mile TEN," which comprises resource constrained communication devices carried by troopers, equipping sensor nodes deployed in the field or small unmanned aerial vehicles. In an attempt to fill this gap in the studies on battlefield networking, this article seeks to combine software-defined and delay-tolerant approaches to support the diverse range of strict requirements for applications in the last-mile TEN. © 2017 IEEE., Funding Agency:Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (FAPERGS) Grant number: 2240-2551/14-2SIAFEM

This work represents the realization of Network-Centric goals of interoperability, information management, systems integration and cohesive battlespace visualization using networked computer technology. The application of structured data methodologies using the E xtensible Markup Language (XML) allows organizations and systems to exchange and process battlespace information cooperatively. The practical application of this technology is demonstrated. Governance of information systems using structured data and the rejection of proprietary, application specific solutions is a leadership responsibility that is defined as Data Control. XML is presented as a leadership control measure that can be used to achieve Network-Centricity on the battlefield. The fundamental principles of XML application development are presented in the context of warfighting. Exemplars address a cross-section of battlespace applications. The visualization of the physical battlefield is demonstrated with network delivered 3D terrain views. Geodesy and position reporting is addressed using an XML defined data structure to enforce interoperability. An XML expression of the Battlespace Generic Hub is applied to joint and multilateral interoperability and information exchange. An approach to the effective employment of multiple different, but cooperative, autonomous systems in the battlespace uses XML to define parameters that determine artificial intelligence multi-agent behavior and environmental factors. This thesis combines a critical analysis of the priorities of Network- Centricity and interoperability with practical and functional exemplars that demonstrate the efficacy of extensible architectures. The pragmatic approach is directed at the warfighter, and leadership challenges are identified., http://archive.org/details/interoperability109456290, Captain, United States Marine Corps, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Our nation's ability to respond to natural or man-made disasters has remained relatively unchanged since the attacks of 9/11. Current response operations are characterized by the inability to efficiently produce a collaborative and effective response to incidents of national significance and address the challenges of the Information Age. The military has adapted network-centric tenants and principles from business applications to effectively operate in the Information Age and increase mission effectiveness. These tenants and principles can be adapted by responders to address current deficiencies and increase mission effectiveness. Implementation of network centric response is both technologically and organizationally feasible. Network-centric response operations would allow responders to meet the challenges and leverage the opportunities of the Information Age, resulting in increased mission effectiveness.

This thesis examines joint publications and the emerging concept of Network-Centric Operations (NCO) as a basis for identifying recommended changes to doctrine in order to implement NCO in joint task forces (JTFs). Technology is allowing the United States military to evolve from the industrial age to the information age. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has termed this evolution 'Force Transformation' and identified Network-Centric Operations as the primary concept encompassing the future capabilities of the joint force. The Department of Defense calls for co-evolution of the doctrine, organization, and technology of NCO. The technology required to achieve NCO continues to rapidly expand, and individual military services have started procuring and implementing the technology as it becomes available. Subsequently, US military JTFs have already attempted to realize the benefits of NCO in operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, yet the military continues to organize JTFs according to Department of Defense planning guidance and doctrine that date to July of 2001. The conclusions reached in this thesis are that size, structure, interdependence, and synchronization are key NCO organizational attributes dictating shifts in basic joint doctrine and JTF organizational architecture., The original document contains color images.

Western military organizations are increasingly paying attention to the concepts of Network Centric Warfare (NCW), Network Centric Operations (NCO), Network Enabler Capabilities (NEC), and Network-Based Defense (NBD) to increase competitive advantage, innovation, and mission effectiveness. Network-based effectiveness occurs due to the influence of various factors such as people, procedures, technology, and organizations (extended from Leavitt, 1965). This text identifies aspects of network-based effectiveness that can benefit from a better understanding of leadership and management development of people, procedures, technology, and organizations. A brief discussion is presented on how leadership and management development can support network-based effectiveness. Aspects of network-based effectiveness that involve further research by scientists are identified. Thirteen briefing charts summarize the presentation., Presented at the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (CCRTS) (11th) held in San Diego, CA, on 20-22 Jun 2006. The original document contains color images.

The transformation into a world based on communication and information leads to Information Operations (IO) becoming more important than ever. Thus, there is a need to develop new methodologies for successful IO that take into account the change towards network-enabling warfare capabilities. In a network-centric warfare approach it is important to understand the opponents' network structure and communication system and how they use these resources. Equally important is to understand one's own network structure in terms of strengths and weaknesses. Every type of network has it own vulnerabilities in the form of vital nodes, links, and platforms, regardless of whether it is a communications, organizational, or biological network. If one understand one's own structure as well as that of one's opponents, the chances of effective IO increase greatly. A fruitful way forward is to use theories based on center of gravity (CoG) and critical vulnerabilities (CV). This paper first discusses the logic of networks in general terms and then considers different types of networks and their respective abilities to resist attacks of different kinds due to center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Twenty briefing charts summarize the presentation., Presented at the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (CCRTS) held in San Diego, CA, on 20-22 Jun 2006. The original document contains color images.

Network-centric warfare (NCW), as a theory of war, relies on the premise that ubiquitously networked forces and capabilities will outperform forces that are not. Put another way, all things being equal, the side with the ability to network will generally win. Fundamentally, then, the key enabler of NCW is represented by the functioning of the network that connects sensors, shooters, and decision makers in a system exploiting the synergy of its dispersed parts. While the ubiquity and health of the network is therefore paramount, weapons designed to attack the electronic components of that network can, in an instant, vaporize U.S. technological and operational superiority and render future, NCW-based combatant commanders and military forces impotent. This paper explores the relationships between NCW, systems and chaos theories, Col. John R. Boyd's decision-making model, and their impact on a potential operational center of gravity and its subsequent vulnerabilities; identification of likely threats posed by potential adversaries to hold U.S. networked forces at risk; and recommended solutions to defend against those threats.

The network-centric warfare philosophy is becoming more firmly entrenched in US military doctrine and operations. As a result, the state and trustworthiness of the network and its computational resources are becoming even more important for commanders, particularly as the network itself is becoming an ever more lucrative target for cyber attack. In cyberspace, however, given human limitations and the fact that intelligent agents (computer viruses, worms, etc.) execute most cyber attacks, we argue that the netcentric environment will require computerized agents to detect, assess, and respond to cyber attacks. A significant portion of day-to-day network operations will have to be allocated to intelligent agents (or computer-generated forces (CGFs)). These CGFs will have to determine the types of attacks that are underway, the targets of the attacks, the appropriate responses to the attacks, the prioritization of the responses, the erection of defenses against secondary attacks, the response to the primary attack(s), and for the overall management of the response., The original document contains color images.

The trend in U.S. operations suggests an increased level of operations with a greater variety of nations as coalition partners in the future than during the Cold War. The trend also suggests that the identity and mix of those partners will continue to be defined shortly before activity commences and be defined substantially by the nature of the situation. Because of our history of involvement with a small number of traditional partners and allies, we tend to approach operations with new partners on a case-by-case, unique basis. We argue that DOD would be well-served if it adopted a modular approach to defining the how-to of coalition operations. Such an approach would necessitate the systematic exploration of each key issue that can critically influence operational results. Such a research approach would necessarily be far-reaching, evolutionary, collaborative, and require a long-term commitment. The thesis for our research is that assessment of the combined U.S.-coalition partner force performance at forward echelons can be used to gauge the overall effectiveness of individual programs and initiatives that address culture, technology standards, organization and doctrine, and policy and law issues pursued to improve network-centric operations with coalition partners. Because operational performance is the final judge of military effectiveness, we advocate protracted, objective experimentation that will serve as the catalyst for progress in addressing culture, technology standards, organization and doctrine, and policy and law issues., The original document contains color images. Presented at the 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS 2005) held in McLean, VA on 13-16 Jun 2005. Published in the Proceedings of the 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS 2005) Jun 2005.

Network-centric operations (NCO) concepts and capabilities are central to Department of Defense (DOD) transformation efforts and are predicted by advocates to have wide-ranging impacts on the conduct of warfare and military forces. NCO concepts cover the entire military response to the Information Age, including ways of thinking, human and organizational behavior, and the networks the military uses across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare. In a broad sense, NCO is about harnessing networks and networked forces to create military advantages and capabilities. This paper first highlights the centrality of NCO to DoD transformation efforts by using examples from Joint Visions 2010 and 2020, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Office of Force Transformation (OFT), and Service transformation documents to demonstrate the importance of NCO to DoD. Next, it examines NCO concepts to identify core characteristics and underlying capabilities levied on the supporting network. These sources of NCO thought come primarily from DoD authors; however, many other countries and alliances, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and NATO, are also interested in NCO-like concepts. The paper then analyzes several capabilities required of networks to determine some of the attendant requirements and challenges. This analysis includes potential impacts should networks fail to achieve the required performance or collapse under attack. These challenges are illustrated using examples from the author's experience on the CENTCOM/J6 staff during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF). Finally, the analysis provides some recommendations to mitigate associated vulnerabilities introduced by relying upon networks and the promises of NCO., Pub. in "Netted Bugs and Bombs: Implications for 2010," Chapter 2, p47-76, Dec 2005.

Research in the UK is currently being conducted to develop an open architecture solution for Network Enabled Capability (NEC). This paper outlines the current status of that research and discusses some key architectural issues., The original document contains color images. Presented at the International Command and Control Research and technology Sympoisum (9th) Held in Copenhagen, Denmark on 14-16 Sep 2004.

New information technologies introduced into military operations provide the impetus to explore alternative operating procedures and command structures. New concepts such as network-centric operations and distributed, decentralized command and control, have been suggested as technologically enabled replacements for platform centric operations and centralized command and control. As attractive as these innovations may seem, it is important that responsible military planners test these concepts before their adoption. To do this it is necessary to build models and simulations and to conduct experiments and exercises. The authors assess the flow of information within three alternative Command and Control (C2) structures using a series of quantitative measures of performance of command and control effectiveness. In terms of the categorization developed by Alberts, these metrics bridge between the information domain and the cognitive domain. The quantitative assessment of information flows within alternative C2 structures is part of a larger programme of work considering the structure of future headquarters for UK armed forces. Outputs are being compared with high level combat models outputs in order to assess the quantitative linkage between our measures of C2 effectiveness and metrics of benefit at the campaign level, measures of force effectiveness., The original document contains color images. Presented at the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (2004 CCRTS) held in San Diego, Ca on 15-17 Jun 2004. Published in the Proceedings of the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (2004 CCRTS) Jun 2004.

In today's Command and Control (C2) environment critical information is located in many disparate data sources. C2 decision-making can be adversely affected by insufficient or unavailable access to information located in these disparate data sources. This paper will provide an overview of the problems surrounding this issue, a real-world scenario representing the problem, and how the problem was overcome using a network centric approach. The paper will also demonstrate how the application of current technology can be leveraged to present a unified view of data from disparate data sources, and how our organization is leveraging technology to help the Warfighter eliminate the stove-piping of information to increase network centricity. The objective of this paper is to present the reader with insight on how to utilize today's technology to allow leaders to make well-informed decisions, thus increasing their effectiveness in fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). By understanding our use of technology in support of the Warfighter, the reader will gain key insights on how to improve their own organization's capabilities to support C2 decision-making., The original document contains color images.

Command and Control (C2) communication in a network centric environment such as the Global Information Grid (GIG) is postulated to be data "rich". However, our current situation is that the most critical C2 information, the commander's intent, orders and directives, does not actually flow as data. It is often communicated as "free text". While suitable for interpersonal communication, it is not able to support advanced automation or intelligent decision aids due to its inherent ambiguity. Battle Management Language (BML) was developed as a solution to this problem. BML is defined as the unambiguous language used to: 1) command and control forces and equipment conducting military operations and, 2) provide for situational awareness and a shared, common operational picture. It can be seen as a representation of a digitized commander's intent to be used for real troops, for simulated troops, and for future robotic forces. Based on this concept, a prototype of BML was developed demonstrating an actual National Training Center (NTC) Brigade Operations Order. The United States (U.S.) Defense Modeling and Simulation Office's (DMSO) Extensible Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Framework (XMSF) initiative is extending BML based on open, commercial Internet standards. The XMSF prototype demonstrates a web-enabled Extensible Battle Management Language (XBML)., The original document contains color images.

Over the past 20-years, the military services have evolved from platform-centric to network centric warfare. As they continue to progress in the Information Age, network-centric warfare is envisioned to evolve into information-centric warfare (some evidence suggests this evolution has already taken place.) This paper is meant to be thought provoking, in as much as it proposes the next step in warfare: transitioning from network-centric/information-centric to knowledge-centric warfare. Network-centric warfare is built around human and organizational behavior a new way of thinking in terms of linkages. Its end result is combat power that can be generated from the effective linking or networking of the warfighting enterprise. Its premise is the ability to push "information to the edge." Once this premise becomes institutionalized, warfare will utilize the proven attributes of network-centric/information centric warfare to go to the next, logical, evolutionary step in the conduct of warfare namely pushing knowledge to the edge . This next step is a transformation of network/information- centric-warfare's "Power to the Edge" to knowledge-centric warfare's Power of the Edge . This paper discusses the basic tenants of network/information-centric warfare and how its attributes form the basis for knowledge-centric warfare. Key technologies for the transition from network/information centric to knowledge centric are discussed., The original document contains color images.

The current Department of Defense (DoD) Network consists of separate domains, disparate networks that are geographically dispersed, and resourced by hundreds of diverse funding sources. As we move into a Network Centric DoD Enterprise and as Web and data services become available throughout the DoD Network with applications becoming Enterprise wide, an unreasonable burden will be placed on the service providers to research and gather the appropriate data to determine if users requesting access should be authorized that access. A most challenging problem in managing large distributed systems is the complexity of security administration. Since most applications are not yet available as Web Services but rather still controlled within a certain localized command or enclave, the issue of authorization is manageable albeit error prone and expensive. DoD transformation to a Network Centric environment requires robust authentication of users and Web Services for C2 based on PKI/biometric technology and subsequent authorization/Access to data/services/applications provided by an Enterprise Role Based Access Control (ERBAC) system. This paper is designed to convey information to the audience of the importance, necessity, and urgency associated with the problem, the need to commit resources for a solution and subsequently working within that solution across the DoD enterprise., The original document contains color images. Presented at the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium Held in San Diego, CA on 15-17 Jun 2004.

Objectives of the case study: problem formulation: operations other than war on the Balkans, the Network-Centric Warfare background of the RNLA, the availability of a ISIS. Key questions to ask: to what extent were NCO capabilities applied in Operations Other than war by task force during NATO Operation Amber Fox? What was the nature of the process that enabled the transformation to Network Centric Operations? Can the Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework be employed to effectively describe NCO in OOTW as well as to the transformation processes required to achieve relatively mature NCO?, The original document contains color images.

This paper develops an analytical model that can very simply provide important insights into the consequences (in terms of combat outcomes) generated by different command and control (C2) architectures for information processing. A Lanchester-type model of force-on-force combat that reflects C2 architecture at the platform level is developed through a detailed analysis of the target-engagement cycle for a single typical firer in modern tank combat. The most significant new aspect of this model is the consideration of so-called parallel acquisition of targets (i.e., new targets can be acquired while a previously acquired target is being engaged). Computational results show that being able to effect parallel acquisition of targets will not only significantly increase a tank force's infliction of casualties on an enemy tank force, but also significantly reduce the number of casualties that are suffered. The model presented here is developed using Taylor's new methodology for Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients under conditions of stochastic line of sight. This methodology allows greater micro-combat detail than has ever been possible in Lanchester-type models. Hence, it has opened up new vistas for the mathematical modeling of force-on-force combat. Twenty-one briefing charts summarize the presentation., Presented at the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (CCRTS 2004) (9th) held in San Diego, CA, on 15-17 Jun 2004. Pub. in the Proceedings of the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (CCRTS 2004) (9th), Jun 2004. The original document contains color images.

Operations in future crisis and conflict will rely on superior networked information that will enable the warfighter to have decision superiority over the adversary, while shifting power to the edge of warfighting units. The creation of coherent effects on the global battlespace will also be dependent on the full integration and coherent application of all instruments of national power. The Synapse architecture is a visionary concept that will enable this free flow of information across the military forces, inter-agencies, and multi-national partners. The Synapse architecture has two main conceptual components. First, the development and application of quantum computing and mechanics forms the backplane for the operation of the system. This revolution in computing technology gives the system its overwhelming speed, connectivity, and interoperability with all participants. Information will be instantaneously available throughout the network. And second, the concept of polydiscipline construction of the Synapse network joins together in a real-time collaborative architecture, all of the instruments of national power. Human machine interface capabilities such as Visual Focus Directive (VFD) and Full Voice Control (FVC), will give the warfighter in the field unparalleled interface with the Synapse terminal. The result of exploring and prototyping the Synapse could be a wholesale re-innovation of a collaborative information environment ., Presented at the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium: The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies held in San Diego, CA on 15-17 Jun 2004. The original document contains color images.

Future deployments of Objective Force units are required to be not only network-centric with respect to their own assets but also with respect to other Joint, National and Coalition assets. The main issue for any network-centric architecture is how to establish connectivity, federation, collaboration and interoperability in a self organizing way among all elements of the force to include combat, combat support, combat service support and C2 assets. When a combat force element such as a unit of action (UA) combat team or task force is organized it may include assets and resources that are not organic and include cross-attached coalition elements. Its combat support forces, combat service support as well as its C2 resources will most likely also require subordinated coalition elements. This necessitates a well thought out alignment of the different C2 processes employed by each of the coalition partners to enable and assure unity of command, synchronization of the tasks and critical battle space de-confliction. The recommended technical solutions and possible changes to tactic, techniques and procedures essential to achieve that alignment must be subject to a rigorous experimentation program supported by evolving C2 systems stimulated by combat simulations that would ensure outmost flexibility to support the full spectrum of operational needs. In addition, the capabilities of Joint, National and Coalition assets to partner with us must also be taken into account., The original document contains color images.

Partial context: TTCP MAR AG-1 Quantitative modelling of NCW, Outline, TACSITS and hypotheses, Maritime interception a coastline of recent interest, Platform-Centric Case Interceptors have an area of responsibility, Queueing Systems describe demand for service, MIO attributes <=> queueing-theory quantities, Parameters and outputs, Networking Enables Adaptive Redeployment, Effect of adaptive redeployment, Effect of increased classification performance , Summary so far, Two-stage analysis (from Chris Davis), Notional network architecture (from Meredith Hue), Medium Level of Networked Capability, Proposed stage-2 analysis a simulation, Participants in the Auckland Workshop, MIF Commander's flow chart a first attempt, Application to anti-submarine warfare, ASW classification attributes <=> QT quantities, Effect of improved shared situational awareness, Range of service-time distributions explored, Effect on probability of acquiring service, The equations of queueing theory., See also ADM001929. Proceedings, Held in Sydney, Australia on July 8-10, 2003., The original document contains color images.

This paper presents the "C2 Enterprise Reference Architecture" (C2ERA), which is a new technical concept of operations for building information systems better suited to the Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) environment. The C2ERA is the technical architecture mandated by the Designated Acquisition Commander for C4ISR Enterprise Integration in the U.S. Air Force. The C2ERA contains two key ideas. Related activities and functions are gathered into a C2 Node, with a designated node manager responsible for delivering and sustaining an integrated capability to the user community. The development of mission functionality is separated from the system infrastructure. This infrastructure (and the responsibility for it) is divided into one part that must be the same across the enterprise, called the "Common Integrated Infrastructure," and another part that may vary between C2 Nodes, called the "node platforms". Thirty-one briefing charts summarize the presentation., Presented at the International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS 2003) (8th) held in Washington, DC on 17-19 Jun 2003. Published in the Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS 2003), Jun 2003. The original document contains color images.

This paper deals with information availability related to crisis management, an area that has become a prioritized national and international concern. The paper looks into two different scenarios with a view to identify some shortcomings and possibilities inherent in a national information infrastructure. By fairly simple means it is possible to obtain significant improvement of data availability, which in turn will give a substantial contribution to improved emergency preparedness through the availability of a national crisis information grid. A network centric solution is suggested, where the limitations inherent in today's information grid are overcome, and where information is dynamically made available as required., The original document contains color images.

As the United States continues as the sole nation with a vested interest in every region of the world, it is increasingly sensitive to asymmetric threats that neutralize or circumvent its ability to defend against or respond to hostile activity. One of these areas is broadly described as information warfare. One specific aspect of this refers to strategic information warfare (SIW) attack against the information technology base of the nation's critical infrastructures. Defending those infrastructures is problematic for the U.S. government. Although the military relies on the civilian infrastructure, it does not control it. Neither is the civilian government in a position to dictate to the private infrastructure organizations. Any attempts to defend the national information infrastructure may be based largely, therefore, on deterring an attack, rather than detecting and thwarting it. Although deterrence may be most commonly associated with nuclear warfare, the United States still relies to a large extent on deterring aggressive foreign activity to protect its interests worldwide. This paper assesses the threat from SIW attacks and reviews the theories of deterrence, focusing on deterrence in the post-Cold War era. It then describes some strategies the United States can build to deter SIW most effectively., Presented at the 7th Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (CCRTS 2002) held in Monterey, CA on 11-13 Jun 2002.

The intelligence cycle (other than actual collection by technical or human means) is discussed in terms of the differences between normal processes and the processes used on the most difficult and important problems. It is argued that a network-centric intelligence process (analogous to network-centric warfare) would be more effective than the best of today's processes. The capabilities that must be developed to enable such network centric intelligence are identified, and experimentation is suggested as an effective path towards the development and fielding of these capabilities.

As the Naval Forces progress toward the network-centric environment envisioned by JV 2010 and JV2020, their dependency upon decision-making aids will grow exponentially as the warfighter's thirst for knowledge from the flood of information rises. As noted from Joint Vision 2020, we "...must be able to take advantage of superior information converted to superior knowledge to achieve "decision superiority" - better decisions arrived at and implemented faster....". Particularly of concern are the shortfalls in the consolidated situational awareness available to the decision makers in the Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCCs) and Combat Direction Center (CDCs) onboard aircraft carriers. The existing CDC and TFCC systems do not provide integrated and fused information which requires more people to glean information out of multiple, stove-piped systems. The current systems are not designed to enhance decision-making and information is not presented in an integrated, graphically based manner that facilitates communications and decision support. This increases response times, resulting in reduced mission effectiveness. 21st Century Systems, Inc. is proposing a unique solution to this issue, the Advanced Battlestation with Decision Support System (ABS/DSS) that utilizes an Agent-based Decision Support System coupled with a 2D/3D Battlespace Visualization Tool. The ABS/DSS utilizes 21CSI's Agent Enhanced Decision Guide Environment (AEDGE(TradeMark)) Architecture which expedites generation of Agent-based systems., The original document contains color images.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has taken about 80 percent of the government cutbacks since the end of the Cold Wan As a means to fashion cost savings and gain efficiencies, DoD is seeking to streamline much of its infrastructure. One popular idea to assist in the streamlining effort is through the outsourcing of Information Technology (IT) functions. There is a sentiment within the Department of the Army (DA) that the entire Information Management/information Systems element of the Army can be outsourced without having an impact to the Army. The purpose of this research paper is to examine this sentiment to determine if it makes sense or where it could create problems as the Army moves towards a network centric warfare environment. It will examine the Army's IT requirements to support network centric warfare, examine potential outsourcing options, and determine the implications of these options to the effectiveness of achieving the requirements.

Network-Centric Operations continues to gain acceptance as a construct for future military operations. Operational Art, on the other hand, stands as a principal construct for past military successes and constitutes current joint doctrine. Some critics suggest implementing Network-Centric Operations presages the death of Operational Art. Each Armed Service has begun training and equipping its force using the tenets of Network-Centric Operations, but those forces come together for the first time under the combatant Commander-in-Chief. The CINC will have to determine how a fully networked force affects existing methods of employment to achieve operational and strategic objectives. This paper reconciles Network-Centric Operations and Operational Art by analyzing the underlying assumptions, assertions, and interrelationships. The analysis results in the conclusion that Network-Centric Operations and Operational Art are not mutually exclusive but mutually supporting constructs. In fact, a synergy appears that accomplishes strategic and operational objectives with extraordinary effectiveness. This conclusion leads to six recommendations for the Commander-in-Chief that harmonizes Network-Centric Operations and Operational Art in the theater of operations to ensure future success.

Over the last few years, experiences in naval coalition force activities have indicated a considerable shortfall in interoperability between participants. This has been detrimental to their overall capability and reduced their effectiveness. The problems are associated not only with the technical differences between the participating platforms but also with the lack of understanding of how to function as a network centric coalition task force. The latter being caused by the limited experience of working in such an environment, due to their limited occurrence, and also the cost of running any large scale exercises to address the basic problems. A collaborative venture has been underway for 18 months between UK and US naval research groups where an encrypted link is being used for the network connectivity to provide a suitable research environment to investigate the problems. The objective is to address such areas as data requirements, management and filtering along with the necessary control strategies essential for effective interoperability in a networked coalition force. As well as gaining experience in areas that can be transferred onto operational systems, the four year program should provide some yardstick for measurement of interoperability and whether there is an improvement in technical capability or, perhaps, show that coalition force activity is primarily a political requirement.

In moving toward an interoperability architecture, the concept of network centric is a step in the right direction - all modules connect to the network, not to each other. And a handful of good network citizenship rules provide a syntactical guide for attachment. From the point of view of the network designer this is sufficient - we have enough to build internetworks for the common good. The continued burgeoning of the Internet constitutes an existence proof. But a common networking base is insufficient to reach a goal of cross-system interoperability - the large information system. Many standardization efforts have attempted to solve this problem, but appear to have lacked the necessary scope. For instance, there have been many efforts aimed at standardizing data elements; these efforts, if followed through, yield some gains, but never seem to quite reach the interoperability goal. If we are to truly erect an interoperability architecture, we need to broaden the scope. This problem of cross-program, cross-service and cross-ally interoperability requires that we agree on the what of modularization, not just the how. This paper is aimed at framing the interoperability architecture problem.

This monograph sought to determine if Army transformation forces could integrate leadership and technology to achieve information superiority during maneuver in the land dimension. Leadership and technology could provide a synergy of application where each dimension supports the other in the friendly force component of information management and protection. Information and knowledge were examined in relation to the concept of Network-Centric Warfare. Analysis examined whether transformation force leadership (battle command) could be expected to integrate technology with operational concepts to achieve information superiority with timely, accurate, and relevant information. Timeliness concerns the rapidity of information transmission and concerns the design of information systems with technology and human components. Accuracy represents the certainty inherent in each element of information based primarily on sources and presentation. Relevance provides a measure of the importance of each element of information based on contributions to knowledge during operations. The monograph determined that neither the technological dimension nor the leadership dimension of information alone provides sufficient timeliness, accuracy, and relevance to ensure information superiority for transformation forces during maneuver. However, the synergy of both have great potential for overcoming the complexity of information support to maneuver.

At the dawn of the information Age, the commander's concept of operation, for arranging potential combat power into victorious campaigns, major operations, and battles, is still the essence of military operations. It is the commander who translates higher concepts and guidance, from the strategic to tactical levels of war, through his visualization of the operation to accomplish the mission Consequently, his concept of operation directs all battlefield activities to achieve the desired military end-state. Network-Centric Warfare is a technologically based process designed to harness the power of the Information Age by exploiting technological advances to achieve dominance in the information domain. Through a network of new systems (sensors, information, and weapons), warfighters translate this information into dominant warfare-centered Network-Centric Operations (NCO). NCO shifts the operational paradigm from platform-centric to effects-based operations, by linking geographically dispersed warfighters (through a common operational picture) to overwhelm potential adversaries.

The U.S. Navy is undergoing a shift in its focus from platform-centric to network-centric warfare in the coming century. Enabled by the recent advances in information technology, network-centric warfare connects widely dispersed platforms into a robust network capable of massing tremendous effects. Network-centric warfare will challenge the operational commander when planning allied/coalition operations in two major areas. The first is interoperability, which includes issues of technology compatibility, intelligence sharing, classified material security policy, language, and rules of engagement. The second challenge addresses the issue of command and control, specifically as national culture and subordination of forces affect it. The operational commander must determine the ability of coalition partner forces to be part of the network and assign mission tasks accordingly. As history has shown, coalition operations require significant leadership on the part of the commander and network- centric warfare is simply another factor to add to the challenge.

The development of information technology has revolutionized both society and the way it conducts business. Companies that have been able to adapt to and exploit these fundamental changes have prospered; those that have not have often been left behind. The United States Navy's network-centric warfare (NCW) concept is based on the premise that the networking of sensors, weapons, and information systems, if coupled with appropriate operational concepts, tactics, and organizational structures, will likewise revolutionize the capabilities of the military. It will, it is claimed, fundamentally change the nature of war. In theory, a common, comprehensive, and comprehensible near-real-time view of the battlefield will enable a new and faster form of warfare characterized by the concepts of "speed of command" and "self-synchronization." Speed of command enables our forces to act, and react to enemy actions and changing vulnerabilities, so quickly and effectively that we "lock out" all possible alternate enemy strategies, forcing capitulation or stopping enemy actions before they begin. Comprehensive knowledge of the battlefield also allows self-synchronization--the ability of forces to organize from the bottom up. Bottom-up organizations are perceived as being better able to adapt to the dynamic, fast-paced, complex, fluid nature of military operations, and better able to rapidly exploit opportunities and enemy vulnerabilities. The network-centric warfare architecture will consist of three separate, but related, systems of systems--a sensor grid, an engagement grid, and an information backplane.

In the past several years, greater exploitation of information technology to increase leverage of information has become a central focus in the military. This focus is reflected in a number of strategic vision documents. Two significant examples are "Joint Vision 2010" signed in 1996 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Achieving and using information superiority is seen as essential to future military success. This has led to the emergence of a new warfare paradigm: network-centric warfare. Towards this end, the Navy's service-wide IT improvement initiative is Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT- 21). IT-21 establishes a standard for IT capability to be achieved throughout the Navy within which Navy units can shape their IT improvements. This study explores a requirements-approach for planning improvement of IT through IT-21. Specifically, it focuses on a single function of one squadron: flight scheduling in Patrol Squadron 40. This study addresses how to establish information requirements, assess current IT performance, and formulate specifications by which to drive planning for IT improvement. It concludes by mapping IT-2 1 components to requirements to provide VP-40 with a plan for improving its flight scheduling process through IT-21.

Platforms throughout the military and other government agencies (such as FEEMA and police departments) have become more networked; the last link in each network chain, however, has always been the individuals themselves. This structure requires a network that can process large amounts of data in order to provide the individuals with succinct and actionable information. Information, such as individual positions, weapons orientation, and friendly positions, serve to greatly enhance the situational awareness and improve the likelihood of mission success. The goal of this research is to use networking to improve the infantry’s situational awareness. The Robotic Operating System (ROS) is the foundation of a prototype network investigated in this thesis. It enables rapid prototyping of components and functionality through an open-source library with multi-language and multi-platform support. The network was constructed with software and hardware modules consisting of wearable sensors and various computational platforms. Future development will include linking the network to autonomous units and other assets with simplified controls. The deliverable is a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) with hardware designed to be operational for infantry squads and software designed to deliver contextual situational awareness to all of its members. The data distribution is handled through a brokered publish and subscribe network implemented via ROS., http://archive.org/details/scalablemobiledh1094545843, Ensign, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is employed by the United States Navy (USN) to allow combat naval systems to share combat resources, collectively gather and distribute intelligence data and generate superior air pictures for effective and efficient engagement against air threats with high precision, timeliness and accuracy using existing radar or weapon systems. CEC has yet to be employed on any land combat systems. This thesis discusses possible employment of CEC on land combat systems based on a combat operational profile. Simulation analysis on a land-based anti-air defense scenario provides insights on the employment of CEC on land combat systems., http://archive.org/details/studyofcommandnd1094517402, Major, Singapore Army

The Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISR-E) faces ever-increasing complexity in the conduct of expeditionary operations. This research seeks to explore computer-supported collaborative work of the MCISR-E. Properties of networks and complexity are explored through a systems thinking perspective on collective intelligence. Online social networking information technology is examined for demonstration of emergent knowledge creation for sensemaking in the computer-supported collaborative work of MCISR-E. This is provided through use cases of commercial off the shelf online social networking technology and crowdsourcing applications. Crowdsourcing through social networking technology as it benefits both collaborative information seeking and collaborative filters are suggested as possible fit to the MCISR-E. Use cases demonstrate this fit at the technical, organizational and individual levels. The MCISR-E is a complex adaptive system, designed to raise the collective intelligence of Marine Corps units. Collective intelligence is defined as groups of people doing things intelligently. MCISR-E must effectively demonstrate sensemaking through knowledge creation to achieve this goal. MCISR-E processes must predict and react to events by group work capitalizing on current and new technology., http://archive.org/details/crowdsourcingisr1094537638, Major, United States Marine Corps, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The use of inertial-measurement units (IMUs) for personal navigation is investigated in this thesis. IMUs lack a position-finding algorithm that optimally blends sensor data to achieve high accuracy in a GPS-denied environment. In this research, software and a methodology for tracking position using body-mounted IMUs, building on a gait-phase detection algorithm and quaternion-based complementary filter developed at the Naval Postgraduate School, is developed. The performance of a consumer-grade nine-degrees-of-freedom IMU is characterized and alternative sensor placements evaluated to determine optimal mounting location or locations. Measurements were fused from gyroscope, accelerometer, and magnetometer sensors to create a single, virtual IMU. In addition, measurements from a distributed system of IMUs, as well as multiple co-located IMUs, were averaged to find performance enhancements. Software was developed to streamline and integrate position solutions into a larger network of capabilities. Results show that the foot is the optimal mounting location, and other placements degrade performance. Averaging measurements from multiple IMUs at one location improves performance but with diminishing returns as the number of IMUs increase. We recommend that multiple IMUs be printed on the same MEMS circuit board to achieve accuracy by fusing the measurements of co-located sensors., http://archive.org/details/apersonalinertia1094551727, Civilian, Department of the Air Force, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Achieving interoperability in a net-centric environment is fundamental to maximizing the potential of information sharing and effective use of resources in military operations. With the increasing reliance on unmanned platforms worldwide, there is a need to study the limitations of existing Command and Control (C2) Systems in dealing with the increasing number of objects. More processing power would be required to achieve or maintain a certain level of efficiency and effectiveness of the C2 system in managing and processing the tracks detected. Also, with increasing collaborations between services and allies, interoperability between multiple systems is pertinent. An additional challenge is the need to exchange target-rich tactical picture information. A systems engineering approach was used to identify the critical factors necessary in a C2 system to be architected to satisfy the needs for a future C2 system able to achieve and maintain interoperability in a target rich environment. A pilot study was conducted using ExtendSim to model growing networks and injection of increased amounts of data to assess their impact on the timeliness of information received by the system nodes. Potential future work on the pilot study was described., http://archive.org/details/maintaininginter1094517427, Civilian, Defence Science & Technology Agency, Singapore

The Navy has mandated that fielded computer systems be network-centric, service-based, and support open architectures. However, this competency is limited by network resourcesnamely radio frequency bandwidthwhich the Navy has at its disposal. This forces decisions to be made in which some network applications take priority over others. We apply the Capabilities-based Competency Assessment process developed by Suttie and Potter to create a prioritization model for this problem of limited bandwidth. DoD Architectural Framework Version 1.5 products are used to construct an architectural description for a carrier strike-group underway, capturing each of the operational nodes working within an air detect-to-engage scenario. By linking the tasking assigned to each of these nodes and the services required for their completion, resources may be aligned to support warfare commanders intent and develop a prioritization which optimizes network performance for this tasking. Through network simulation, a comparison is made between the proposed prioritization scheme and traditional schemes. Results show our prioritization scheme consistently reduced latency and increased throughput for mission relevant applications. These improvements translate directly to more relevant information getting to decision makers at a quickened pace. Such information richness leads to information dominance, ultimately providing superior warfighting capability., http://archive.org/details/examinationofcap1094517377, Lieutenant, United States Navy

Cloud computing -- remotely hosting network services and data -- is an emerging concept in the business world that enables the use of mobile devices, increases security, and enables more effective information sharing within organizations. Within the last year, the U.S. Department of Defense has mandated that its networks be consolidated in order to achieve the goals of efficiency, effectiveness, and security. Through cloud computing across the network as an entire enterprise, efforts such as the Joint Information Environment and Enterprise Email endeavor to achieve those goals. The view of military networks as an enterprise blurs the existing lines between garrison and tactical. Consolidation efforts are effective in permanent, garrison networks that are connected with high-bandwidth, fiber optic cables. Furthermore, hosting mission-critical services and data in the cloud will save resources and increase cyber security in the long run. However, similar application of consolidation efforts in the temporary, tactical networks which are employed in austere environments presents unique challenges that will be more effectively overcome if mission command systems are developed for use in both environments, remaining issues of physical security are more fully addressed, and if the concepts of cyber are effectively operationalized in a more comprehensive doctrine.

This monograph sought to determine if Army transformation forces could integrate leadership and technology to achieve information superiority during maneuver in the land dimension. Leadership and technology could provide a synergy of application where each dimension supports the other in the friendly force component of information management and protection. Information and knowledge were examined in relation to the concept of Network-Centric Warfare. Analysis examined whether transformation force leadership (battle command) could be expected to integrate technology with operational concepts to achieve information superiority with timely, accurate, and relevant information. Timeliness concerns the rapidity of information transmission and concerns the design of information systems with technology and human components. Accuracy represents the certainty inherent in each element of information based primarily on sources and presentation. Relevance provides a measure of the importance of each element of information based on contributions to knowledge during operations. The monograph determined that neither the technological dimension nor the leadership dimension of information alone provides sufficient timeliness, accuracy, and relevance to ensure information superiority for transformation forces during maneuver. However, the synergy of both have great potential for overcoming the complexity of information support to maneuver.

Self-synchronization is an idea that comes directly from Network-Centric Warfare but its foundations lie in complexity theory and the ideas of self-organization and emergent behavior. In order to understand self-synchronization the basics of complexity theory, specifically self-organization and emergent behavior, must be explained. Then, by expanding on the accepted definition of self-synchronization as defined by Admiral Cebrowski in his early literature on NCW it is clear that self-synchronization is a combination of complexity theory's ideas of self-organization and emergent behavior and information technology. Next, by comparing the requirements and conditions of self-synchronization against the conditions and requirements of JOW's Adaptive Command and Objective Force Battle Command it can be determined if the conditions and requirements exist in future Joint and Army command and control concepts to allow self-synchronization. From this comparison it is clear that self-synchronization (self-coordination in the 2003 Defense Transformation Guidance) is a feasible concept for future Joint and Army forces. In fact, current doctrine supports the ideas behind self-synchronization and current Objective Force experiments demonstrate self-synchronizing behavior.

The end of the Cold War marked the end of an era in United States national security. The bi-polar global balance of power, which defined our nation’s defensive strategy for more than 30 years, was replaced with the uncertainty of failed nation-states, rogue authoritarian regimes, and international terrorist organizations. A new world was emerging with the rapid increase in computer technology, the internet, satellite communications, and global economic markets. In 1991, the United States conducted its first major conventional war using smart bombs, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), satellite communications, and space-based imagery technology. These systems were further refined during operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Somalia. Joint Forces were being deployed to all parts of the globe in ways that had not been anticipated before, and the concept of employing a large conventional force was largely becoming too cumbersome and obsolete. A lighter and more rapidly deployable force that provided the same lethal capabilities was required to meet the new challenges of the twenty first century. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, provided a vision of force transformation in order to meet the new challenges for the future. One of the main concepts that emerged as an essential component of force transformation was the ability to achieve information dominance through network-centric warfare. The new paradigm of being a Joint Expeditionary Force that is more rapidly deployable, adaptive, lethal, and able to bring all Joint Force capabilities to bear in any given operation requires the technology that will provide commanders the ability to see the enemy first, understand the situation, and take decisive action. Whether it was low-intensity combat, humanitarian relief, counter-insurgency/counter-terrorist operations, or major combat operations, adapting to new policy demands set the stage for the deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq following the attack on

Recent world events in Iraq have highlighted the power of insurgent groups in battling a more powerful opponent like the United States. Some reports have characterized the insurgency in Iraq as a technology-empowered, network-centric organization without a defined command and control structure while others have painted the insurgency as an undefined hierarchical organization. These contradictory reports have prompted the question: Has technology changed the way the Iraq insurgency operates? Three historical examples, the Front for National Liberation in Algeria, the Irish Republication Army in Ireland, and the Vietcong in South Vietnam display examples of insurgent organizations and further illustrate how these groups used technology for command and control. These historical examples were compared with reported trends of insurgent organization and insurgent activity in Iraq. The ultimate conclusion is that, although Iraqi insurgents attempt to utilize technology for command and control, they must revert to the same methods used by past insurgent groups because the US and coalition forces enjoy superiority in the area of technology. Furthermore, the Iraqi insurgency is an immature organization moving toward a hierarchy.

The two-maneuver battalion design of the modular brigade combat team (BCT) was intended to be as lethal as pre-modularity Army of Excellence brigades while creating as many BCTs as possible. The troop density required for conducting stability operations was not a consideration of the design. The Army has had two opportunities to add troops to the modular BCTs, in January 2004 and in December 2007. In both instances, the decision was to add BCTs. This study identifies the costs and benefits of adding a third maneuver battalion to existing modular BCTs instead of adding BCTs. The research did show that through leveraging capabilities built into existing BCTs, the Army would gain 13 additional battalions. Adding maneuver battalions achieves a cost savings of $7.590 billion. With the Army short approximately 3,000 captains and majors, this study found that adding battalions reduces the need to 54.6% of adding BCTs. Finally, this study found that adding battalions does not affect the Army’s Force Generation model. This study recommends that the Army not add six additional IBCTs to the force structure and that it discontinue the conversion of the four remaining heavy brigades in order to add battalions to existing modular BCTs.

This thesis examines joint publications and the emerging concept of Network-Centric Operations (NCO) as a basis for identifying recommended changes to doctrine in order to implement NCO in joint task forces (JTFs). Technology is allowing the United States military to evolve from the industrial age to the information age. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has termed this evolution “Force Transformation” and identified Network-Centric Operations as the primary concept encompassing the future capabilities of the joint force. The Department of Defense calls for co-evolution of the doctrine, organization, and technology of NCO. The technology required to achieve NCO continues to rapidly expand, and individual military services have started procuring and implementing the technology as it becomes available. Subsequently, US military JTFs have already attempted to realize the benefits of NCO in operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, yet the military continues to organize JTFs according to Department of Defense planning guidance and doctrine that date to July of 2001. The conclusions reached in this thesis are that size, structure, interdependence, and synchronization are key NCO organizational attributes dictating shifts in basic joint doctrine and JTF organizational architecture.