Search

States (principals) frequently employ pro-government militias (agents) in low intensity conflicts with mixed results. In some cases, principal and agent interests diverge or the principal loses control over its agent, which devolves into an autonomous terrorist, warlord, or criminal organization. Looking at historical cases of Latin American pro-government militias from Colombia (Self-Defense groups, Convivirs, and Hometown Soldiers) and Peru (Rondas Campesinas), I examined the principal-agent problem in the context of state-sponsored, pro-government militias and answered the following question: How do sponsor states succeed or fail in maintaining positive control and influence over pro-government militias? States fail when they grant too much autonomy and firepower to militias and succeed when they limit militias’ autonomy by subjecting them to a tailored combination of control mechanisms: monitoring, screening, sanctions, and rewards. Cases from Colombia and Peru demonstrate that the best way to control militias and employ them in counterinsurgency is by incorporating them as legitimate auxiliaries of the armed forces. Incorporation of a militia into the armed forces greatly reduces the principal-agent problem, the associated risk of diverging interests and objectives, and the future pain of demobilization. Arming militias with restricted use weapons, outsourcing their financing to private benefactors, and granting them too much autonomy is a recipe for disaster., http://archive.org/details/theprincipalagen1094559551, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

How should political and military institutions and their leaders think about interventions in intrastate conflicts and civil wars? Moreover, what intervention variables are used to evaluate and implement a different intervention approach during a civil war? Comprehensive studies on third-party intervention and civil wars have focused on if, when, and why to intervene; type of intervention; and intervention effects on civil war processes. Additional scholarship has focused on the role of foreign powers, foreign fighters, and violent extremist organizations and their effects on conflict management and resolution efforts. However, there has not been an intervention framework that accounts for conflict theories in relation to each other over a period of time. I propose a theoretic framework that provides an intervention analyst evaluative variables to assess the effectiveness of an intervention approach over the course of a civil war.

The July 2013 issue of ACLED's monthly conflict trends report focuses on the escalation of unrest in Egypt, ongoing violence in DR-Congo's Katanga Province, continuing communal violence in Kenya, and escalating conflict in Somalia's cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo. What to expect in the upcoming elections in Mali and Zimbabwe is also discussed., The original document contains color images.

The human domain and culture have always been a consideration in military operations. Throughout the Army's history, commanders have learned this aspect of war, adapting and integrating their operational plans to address various disparities in cultural norms. Yet during the period after Vietnam, the United States Army as an institution neither recognized nor prepared itself to address these considerations. Instead it focused on preparing for state-on-state, high intensity warfare. After the Cold War, however, the Army found itself unprepared for the human domain in conflicts such as military operations other than war (MOOTW) and low intensity conflicts (LIC). The chasm between the need to understand the human domain and capability was exacerbated at the dawn of the 21st century as the Army found itself entrenched in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. By this point, the U.S. Congress demanded that the military take action to become more culturally astute. The Army began to adapt by augmenting its force structure with cultural experts to address its immediate needs to understand the cultures of Afghanistan and Iraq. The publication of FM 3-24 changed the attitude of the Army towards cultural understanding. The U.S. Congress continued its push for cultural understanding in the military, and this time the Army was ready to comply., The original document contains color images.

There are approximately 500,000 individuals in a variety of nonstate militias, national armies, and paramilitary groups slated to undergo DDR programs across Africa. This is consistent with the estimated average annual DDR caseload for most of the last decade. As previous large-scale efforts in Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have wound down, new challenges in South Sudan, C te d Ivoire, and the Great Lakes region have emerged. Organized DDR initiatives were underway in 10 African states in 2012, and the need for disarmament was apparent in many others. In Libya, scores of militias emerged during and after the 2011 anti-Qadhafi revolution, and subsequent clashes between them have resulted in hundreds of deaths. Such incidents have focused attention on DDR, but the prevailing volatility has compounded the reluctance among militias to disarm. Libyan authorities estimate that 150,000 combatants need to be disarmed and many judge this issue to be among the most difficult challenges of the post-Qadhafi transition., Africa Security Brief, no. 24, Jan 2013.

This thesis examines the ability of the United Nations to use military forces to aid in the resolution of intrastate conflicts. The new spirit of multilateral activism has nurtured the belief that intervention in the internal conflicts of a state is legitimate and necessary to the peace and security of the world community at large. The purpose of this thesis is not to examine the validity of this claim. The purpose is to examine the ability of the United Nations to carry out this task. This thesis is structured around four chapters. Chapter II surveys the 'evolution' of the concept of peacekeeping and new roles assigned to U.N. forces. This chapter also examines an emerging trend in conflict in the late twentieth century - state disintegration. Chapter III investigates the ability of the United Nations to execute these new missions given its inherent limitations as a system of highly diverse political actors. Chapter IV evaluates the problems intrinsic in this new class of mission, such as the efficacy of the use of force and the requirements for the control of large tracts of territory. Chapter V is a case study of the political process as it emerged in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). In the final analysis, this thesis contends that the United Nations security apparatus, as it presently exists, is ill-suited to deal with situations as intractable as Cambodia or Somalia. Cambodia, Coalitions, Low Intensity Conflict, Peacekeeping, Somalia, United Nations, http://archive.org/details/unitednationsdiv1094526822, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The U.S. Army faces the challenge of long, repeated deployments against enemy formations that do not lend themselves to straightforward doctrinal definitions and constructs. Army doctrine has evolved to meet the challenges. Doctrine writers have struggled to use clear, concise language that accurately depicts operating concepts. A significant part of this struggle arose after the conflation of doctrinal terms and operational priorities that occurred when the Army made stability operations of equal importance with offensive and defensive operations within full-spectrum operations. Despite the Army's long history of fighting small wars against irregular forces, the ascendance of stability operations in the late 1990s and early 2000s ran counter to existing Army beliefs about the appropriate roles and missions of the U.S. Army. The central idea of Army doctrine is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of advantage in sustained land operations. A new operating concept, Unified Land Operations, returns this central idea to its proper place, applicable to all Army operations. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain and maintain a position of advantage provides a battlefield framework and logic that nests Unified Land Operations within the joint operational construct of unified action and provides a structure that allows commanders to effectively and accurately describe their intent in time, space, purpose, and priority. This article introduces the logic behind the new operating concept by presenting a short history of the evolution of Army doctrine from the advent of AirLand Battle in 1982 to the introduction of Unified Land Operations in 2011. The central idea of Unified Land Operations is rooted in AirLand Battle doctrine and retains many of the key full-spectrum operations ideas within an overarching concept that emphasizes lethal capabilities as fundamental to successful Army operations., Republished in Military Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army, p47-57, June 2012 (Mission Command Symposium -- Special Edition). This article was originally published in the March-April 2012 issue of Military Review.

As U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan begins to wind down, political and military leaders are already beginning to make uncomfortable choices about the military's future force structure, missions, and procurement programs. These decisions are being shaped by the ongoing economic down-turn, domestic issues, public opinion, transnational threats, and increasing competition with China. The recently issued Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense indicates that the United States will only deploy large military forces for long-duration combat operations when vital America interests are clearly at stake. It also indicates policy-maker reluctance to intercede in the small wars that have been prevalent throughout much of the world over the last decade. This paper will examine the small wars in West Africa in the period since the end of the Cold War. Its purpose is to ascertain the tendencies and characteristics of these conflicts and identify implications for future U.S. regional strategy in light of recent defense strategic guidance. Additionally, it is intended to provide policy practitioners a better understanding of the challenges they will face when attempting to frame the strategic environment and problems in a region like Africa., Strategy Research Project.

Since the end of the Second World War most modern armies have been conventionally structured and equipped to fight high-intensity conflicts against like-armed nations. There also have been many low-intensity conflicts in which similarly equipped nations found themselves engaged. In response to these low-intensity conflicts, nations employed the forces available to them, which were generally armored and mechanized in nature. The result of these conflicts have made the relevance of heavy armor, specifically the tank on the asymmetric battlefield, a point of contention for the last half century. This prompts the following question: How were conventionally equipped, heavy tank forces employed in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and why were they successful or unsuccessful? Specific examples are French COIN operations in Indochina; the United States' involvement in Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq; Canadian operations in Afghanistan; and the Russian Federation's combat in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Each case study will discuss the situation and threat faced, the tactics used by the COIN force, modifications to either vehicles or doctrine to better respond to the threat, and the ultimate determination of either success or failure of the tank in the conflict. The results of this study are that the combined arms team provides the commander with a lethal and capable force. The initiative is gained by commanders who seek the nonconventional employment of armor despite the situation or terrain. Task organized units or units that train with different branches enjoy greater success with less friction than units task organized under fire. Lastly, units possessing a more deployable package have a greater initial effect on the battlefield.

This paper annotates that the demonstrated offensive capability of Marine Tanks integrated into the Marine, Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept, combined with recent tactical and technical developments in training and equipment, has ensured the Marine Corps Tank Community possesses superior ability to be the hard punch of the United States Marine Corps a,s America's middle-weight fighting force. Though the world is in a constant state of change and today's environment might suggest a conventional conflict is not strongly probable. The stance of this paper is that our Nation and Corps must always be prepared to operate in the conventional arena. The Marine Corps might not be a fully mechanized armor tank force, and fiscal constraints threaten to continue whittling away at the conventional strength within the Corps ranks. It still should to continue to maintain a dedicated tank capability it can always have at its disposal to integrate into the MAGTF to ensure future battlefield success in any non-permissive future environment.

Since 1994, the two Russian-Chechen wars have revealed the importance of combining enemy and population-centric tactics to resolve conflicts. The first war, based on enemy-centric tactics, ended in Russian failure and Chechen autonomy. Economically devastated by war, the Chechnya population splintered as the separatists continued the war to liberate neighboring countries. Although the Russians' second invasion secured Chechnya, the Russian forces were unable to destroy the population's support for the separatists. In 2002, identifying the split between radical and moderate separatist elements, the Russian government added population-centric tactics focused on local moderate Chechens. The moderate local Chechens subsequently began administering Chechnya. War weary and disillusioned by separatist terrorism, the Chechen populace chose the stability and economic opportunities the Russian-orchestrated and Russian-funded Chechen government provided. Relentlessly targeted and having lost Chechen support, the remaining separatists lived in exile or joined terrorist organizations. In the end, the combination of tactics ended Chechnya's bid for autonomy.

There has been a very active debate over how to describe the violence occurring in Mexico. Is it narcoinsurgency, narcoterrorism, or a crime wave that is gripping Mexico? This is more than a mere academic debate. Such distinctions may not seem important as all insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and organized crime syndicates share a number of organizational and operational characteristics. Defining the particular type of organized violence has deep and far-reaching implications for policy makers responsible for designing the strategies that need to be implemented by those who face this ongoing violence on a daily basis. Terms such as insurgency and terrorism create policy options and strategic choices distinct from those that would be in responses to criminality. High-intensity law enforcement is an imperfect approach to counter high-intensity crime, but it avoids the concept and policy traps presented by the various strategies associated with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The struggle against Mexico's violent entrepreneurs will be long and uncertain. As entrepreneurs of illegal businesses, the Mexican cartels will continue to innovate in their efforts to survive and generate profits. If such criminal innovation is to be countered, there needs to be mutually reinforcing cooperation from governments on both sides of the border. Hopefully, the result will be a more peaceful Mexico ensconced in a thriving and mutually beneficial relationship with the United States., Published in Parameters, v41 n2 p37-48, Summer 2011.

The U.S. military was largely designed for major combat operations against state actors, but over the past several years it has made significant changes to its training, organizing, and equipping paradigms to adapt to nonstate, irregular threats in Afghanistan and Iraq. The adversaries in both of these wars have yet to employ sophisticated weaponry (such as manportable air defense systems or anti-tank guided missiles) in any significant numbers. The introduction of such weapons could radically escalate the challenges faced by U.S. forces. All that is needed for the Taliban to make the transition to a more lethal adversary is a state supplier of advanced weapons and training in their use. Under these conditions, the U.S. Army might be approaching a situation similar to that of the Israelis in 2006 before the Second Lebanon War, when it faced a hybrid threat, defined as an adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain [its] political objectives. To better understand the breadth of challenges that could affect U.S. decisions about future military capabilities, RAND Arroyo Center researchers examined the recent experiences of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Lebanon and Gaza. Key Points: The basics of joint combined arms fire and maneuver are necessary for successful operations against hybrid opponents; The ability of an adversary to transition from irregular to hybrid is relatively simple, requiring only the sponsorship of a state actor able to provide sophisticated weapons and training; Precision, standoff fires are critical, but not sufficient, to cope with hybrid opponents; and Heavy forces -- based on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles -- are key elements of any force that will fight hybrid opponents., This research brief describes work done by the RAND Arroyo Center and documented in Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza, by David E. Johnson, OP-285-A, 2010.

Many contemporary military operations are launched in conflict environments which necessitate the application of instruments additional to the military to establish peace and security. So-called "multifunctional" or "multidimensional" operations require new approaches to Command and Control (C2). C2 of all the participants in such operations by one organisation is not possible. Rather, focus and convergence will need to arise from a mere willingness to collaborate, based on a perception of mutual benefit and interdependencies. This understanding has led to the idea of the Comprehensive Approach (CA). This paper maps and explores various definitions of CA and ideas of how it could and should be implemented. In particular, this paper outlines the contrast between interpreting CA as a mindset or as a structure or process. This paper also describes the differences in approaches seeking out "comprehensiveness" at a national, inter-agency or intra-agency level. How CA is interpreted has an effect on how tools to perform and measure it can be developed, as well as for how educating and training on the approach should be conducted. As CA is regarded as an essential tool for achieving collective focus and convergence in modern, multifunctional operations, exploring these differences is necessary., Presented at the International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (16th) held in Quebec City, Canada on 21-23 June 2011. Published in the Proceedings of the International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (16th), June 2011. Briefing charts begin p19.

The concept of an African standby force (ASF) responds to the logic of a greater involvement of African States in the resolution of African problems. A protocol adopted on 9 July 2002 envisioned such a force established by the African Union (AU) and designed to provide timely and efficient responses to a full spectrum of operations focused on the particular security challenges of the African continent. As currently structured and trained, the ASF will be able to conduct peace support missions and low intensity operations. Yet, there is a misalignment between the mandated requirements and expected capabilities. Shortcomings are operational and logistical in nature and will hamper responsiveness, effectiveness, and sustainability. To cope adequately with threats not initially taken into account, the AU should focus mainly on sustainability and operational flexibility. This translates into structural changes for increased firepower at brigade level, the integration of enablers, and a better leverage of partnerships and international cooperation., Strategy Research Project.

Since its establishment as a state Israel's geo-political circumstance demands that the small nation state adapt to an ever changing threat environment. Israeli defense policy traditionally consisted of deterrence through a dominant military capable of quickly defeating conventional threats. The emergence of Hezbollah, a non-state actor operating in Lebanon and receiving support from Iran, and its capability to conduct hybrid war changed the way the Israeli Defense Force balanced its capabilities in preparation for future conflicts. This monograph examines the IDF following its 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon when it prepared to fight a counterinsurgency but instead fought a 'hybrid war' of mixed major combat operations and counterinsurgency in Lebanon in 2006. It uses the lenses of Israeli Defense Policy, Israeli Defense Force doctrine, training, and officer educational system to determine why the IDF was defeated during its 2006 war with Hezbollah despite of its recent counterinsurgency and counterterrorism experiences in the occupied territories od the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As the IDF prepares for its next war, a balanced approach between low intensity conflict and high intensity conflict provides the greatest flexibility to hedge against an uncertain future. While a general purpose Army may not solve any one problem specifically, it will get close enough which will enable necessary adaptation. The force is required to effectively apply combined arms formations and work jointly with government agencies. The Israeli experience in its 2006 was in Lebanon is a reminder that it is better to prepare for a conventional conflict and fight an unconventional conflict if required. This prescription accounts for the following two assumptions: unconventional conflict generally is longer in duration and allows more time for leaders to make the required adaptations, The original document contains color images.

The "Warrior Ethos" is the written manifestation of what individual Soldiers ascribe to be. It is a covenant which embodies how Soldiers serve the nation and expresses their dedication to accomplish their mission and their responsibilities to each other and the Army. It informs how they train and what expert knowledge they must master. As the Army seeks to define required future capabilities, what cultural changes if any will be needed to adapt and ensure success? This paper maintains that the "Warrior Ethos", a subset of the Soldier's Creed, reflects a Cold War mindset focused on application of kinetic force and is out of alignment with the changing character of warfare as experienced over the last ten years of persistent conflict. Future conflicts are likely to be dominated by low intensity conflict and stability operations where leaders at lower levels will routinely face difficult and ambiguous circumstances which will require a high degree of moral judgment in the reasoned application of force. Adapting Army culture to meet these challenges will require an Army that values and builds trust relationships and places high priority on the development of moral character., Strategy Research Project

This paper provides statistical data to prove that the 10 to 1 ratio is an invalid ratio; and thereby, the 10 to 1 ratio an invalid tool for analyzing and prescribing manpower for counterinsurgency operations. The data reveals a new ratio and draws conclusions on the relevance of prescribed force ratios for counterinsurgency., Published in the Small Wars Journal, p1-26, 2010.

The concept of peacebuilding holds enormous importance for international relations, particularly in regions facing impending violent conflict and those recovering from such conflict. However, in order for peacebuilding to be a viable alternative to traditional peace operations, scholars and practitioners need to have a shared understanding of what peacebuilding is and what goals it hopes to achieve, in addition to fluid strategies for implementation. This dissertation seeks to identify strategies for building sustainable peace through sustainable community development and democratization. Using a qualitative metasynthesis of five ethnographies conducted in Chiapas Mexico, this dissertation develops mid-range theories, or strategies, for building peace in Chiapas and in regions experiencing low-intensity conflict more generally. These strategies are based upon the development of Pluriethnic collective governance at the local level in regions that are experiencing low-intensity conflict related to indigenous communities.

The concept of peacebuilding holds enormous importance for international relations, particularly in regions facing impending violent conflict and those recovering from such conflict. However, in order for peacebuilding to be a viable alternative to traditional peace operations, scholars and practitioners need to have a shared understanding of what peacebuilding is and what goals it hopes to achieve, in addition to fluid strategies for implementation. This dissertation seeks to identify strategies for building sustainable peace through sustainable community development and democratization. Using a qualitative metasynthesis of five ethnographies conducted in Chiapas Mexico, this dissertation develops mid-range theories, or strategies, for building peace in Chiapas and in regions experiencing low-intensity conflict more generally. These strategies are based upon the development of Pluriethnic collective governance at the local level in regions that are experiencing low-intensity conflict related to indigenous communities.

The U.S. Army focus on conventional warfare during the period 1980-2003 resulted in a lack of counterinsurgency' doctrinal development during that period, leaving the regular Army forces without a basis to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations in Iraq after the initial invasion in 2003. Further, because of the lack of doctrinal, educational, and training focus on counterinsurgency during the previous two decades, the majority of senior military leaders such as General Sanchez, the V Corps commander in Iraq in 2003, were not adequately prepared to address the strategic and operational level concerns related to a counterinsurgency. This left military leaders and troops throughout Iraq in a situation where disparate operational and tactical approaches were taken against the insurgency, with mixed results. The Army simply had no adequate doctrinal basis that prepared its general-purpose forces to deal with the insurgency that emerged during the summer of 2003.

After eight years of conventional U.S. Army involvement in Afghanistan, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) have remained organized and trained to defeat a peer or near-peer enemy in a direct, symmetrical conflict. The complex socio-ethnical structure of Afghanistan requires something new, but an analysis of international forces involved in a century of Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) operations indicates a variety of metrics of successful organization and training. Something new can be found in something old. Through the analysis of historical COIN conflicts and combatants in Algeria, Philippines, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, the modern military analyst can determine effective metrics for the assessment, selection, organization and training of contemporary COIN forces. Counterinsurgency Operations are not merely a less-intense form of conflict within the Range of Military Operations, but an entirely different arc of the warfare continuum and require specialized units, operations, tactics and skills that are beyond capabilities of an organic IBCT. In the current fight, IBCTs receive a number of these enablers upon arrival into theater, and enjoy a margin of success during their tour. This thesis finds a correlation between training and organizing COIN-specific forces prior to their engagement in the conflict, and the eventual success or failure of that force in a COIN struggle. Though success in COIN comes with higher risk and is more manpower intensive, the lower technological and logistical demands warrant additional research from a force design perspective. Based on the preponderance of low-intensity conflicts over the incidents of highintensity conflict during the post-WWII era, America may be wise in establishing designated "COIN" battalions and brigades within the standing force package., The original document contains color images.

This thesis traces Pakistan's strategy of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) against India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and analyzes the gains and losses to Pakistan arising from its implementation. LIC was primarily intended to wrest control of the state of J&K from India, to weaken India and its army, and to mobilize international support for Pakistan's position on Kashmir. While this strategy had some initial success, it slowly began to damage key political, economic and social structures within Pakistan. The thesis looks at both the gains and the pitfalls of LIC, and its impact on Pakistan's "well being," as measured by its prosperity, stability and international stature from the periods 1971 to 1989 and 1990 to 2009. The analysis shows that on balance, LIC is doing Pakistan more harm than any good. The thesis concludes by suggesting policy options open to Pakistan, the United States and India., The original document contains color images.

Current trends in defense thinking show signs of being influenced by the notion that preparing for one form of war has brought about another. It is captured in the almost routine claim that America's superiority in conventional warfare is so great that it is driving our adversaries toward irregular methods. All of these examples share the basic assumption that we are now fighting (and will likely continue to fight) conflicts for which we have not prepared -- precisely because we have not prepared for them. Thus, the modern complement -- a preparation paradox -- to the old Latin adage "If you want peace, prepare for war," might well be "If you want one kind of war, prepare for another." Paradoxical propositions of this sort have a certain intellectual appeal: they are keen and pithy, and thus are frequently used in debates. Edward Luttwak's classic work, "Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace," attempted to argue that the realm of strategy is full of paradoxical propositions. However, embracing any paradox is rarely a good idea. This one rests on at least two questionable premises. The first of these is the assumption that America's broad range of foes or potential foes can be grouped together. They cannot. Second, the preparation paradox assumes that substantive change is easier for our foes than it is for us, but the evidence actually points in the opposite direction. While the U.S. military remains eloquent in the vernacular of battle, it is still developing fluency in the language of war. Embracing the preparation paradox would only harm this effort. As we have seen, the premises of the paradox are invalid; however, they have contributed to shaping many of the debates within defense circles today. For that reason, it is important to examine them, and to understand why they are faulty. The problem is that some propositions remain persuasive long after they have been stripped of any semblance of logic., Advancing Strategic Thought Series.

Since the advent of aviation, aircraft have migrated from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to weapons platforms. Balloons, airplanes, and UAVs all began as a means to observe the battlefield, but were later armed in order to attack the observed enemy. The DOD currently seeks stratospheric airships that could serve as persistent ISR platforms. However, the warfighter's desire to quickly attack observed targets make this concept a candidate for similar weaponization. Like their forerunners in other wars, stratospheric airships could become weaponized stratospheric airship (WSA). This paper argues the Air Force should pursue WSAs because they provide a persistent, survivable, and cost effective means of employing long-range munitions over a battlefield. This paper begins by conducting an environmental scan of stratospheric airships to determine likely qualities of persistence, cost effectiveness, survivability, and payload capacity based upon current and projected technology. It will also examine the status of small precision munitions as well as the potential WSA missions of close air support (CAS) and time-sensitive-targets (TST). The paper will then develop two WSA variants, the MZ-1 operating at 75,000 feet and the MZ-2 operating at 125,000 feet. As a thought experiment aimed at examining the strengths and weaknesses of the concept, the paper then applies these variants against two wartime scenarios: the low-intensity conflict of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the near-peer conventional conflict of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The paper will show that even though limited numbers of munitions, significant munitions replenishment time, and low CAS mission situational awareness hamper the WSA concept, it should still be pursued., The original document contains color images.

Since 2002, $39 billion and $46.7 billion have been appropriated to Afghanistan and Iraq for reconstruction spending. The dollar amounts suggest that reconstruction is important in post-conflict environments, but how important is it really? Some military commanders have interestingly noticed a relationship between the insurgency and reconstruction spending, specifically with the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). In post-conflict environments, CERP reconstruction efforts can be applied in such a manner that they contribute to the diffusion of the incubation and growth of insurgencies. This research is focused on determining how the CERP program can be used to influence insurgency through a Social Movement Theoretical framework. There are two primary purposes: to determine if CERP has historically influenced the security environment in any measurable way and to develop a model comprised of those components (needs, deserve and message resonance) that could plausibly be argued to have an effect on violence and determine which components most significantly influence insurgency. The model is tested on the At Tameem province of Iraq. The results depict that commanders have not used CERP to influence the insurgency in Iraq, but there does exist a weak positive correlation. Further, when compared to historical data, the deserve and message resonance factors contribute more to the influence of popular support than do the needs of the people. Several prescriptive implications are drawn with regard to the future use of CERP., The original document contains color images.

Since the inception of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Federal Government has spent nearly 85 billion dollars to fund civilian contracts geared towards supporting military personnel and operations in theater. Such a figure underscores a recent unprecedented reliance upon the civilian sector to enable the United States to wage war more effectively when engaged in counterinsurgency. As the United States continues to find itself embroiled in regional, low intensity conflicts, civilian contracting will provide military planners with a viable alternative to expanded military force which will ultimately yield positive dividends on the counterinsurgent battlefields of the twenty first century.

"Conduct a presence patrol in order to maintain stability in the area" may say a great many things to your average squad leader, but it does not tell him his mission. Maneuver warfare requires decentralized command, and hence mission tactics are central from the practical perspective of considering how to apply doctrine to action. While certainly this means commanders should avoid specifying some details of "how the mission must be accomplished" and requires "a subordinate's exercise of initiative framed by proper guidance and understanding," in a sense of real-world execution it also means the subordinate must be tasked with a mission. Difficulties in effectively assigning tasks in less than high-intensity environments arise from ineffective application of doctrinal language, not a lack of applicable doctrine.

Much has changed since the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) was formed in the aftermath of the 1983 Beirut bombing, which killed 241 service members. In a world where the greatest threat to liberty was a ground war in Eastern Europe, terrorism was an afterthought. In 1999, the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) was assigned program management functions for the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). As a program office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SO/LIC & IC), CTTSO is uniquely positioned to contribute to the success of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). With overall supervision of the SO/LIC & IC activities of DoD, including oversight of policy and resources, the ASD acts as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on SO/LIC & IC matters. This allows CTTSO to take operational requirements from warfighters, incorporate policy objectives that flow down from the Department, and marshal technical expertise resident in its program managers, subject matter experts, and developers to provide capabilities that are fieldable and sustainable over the "Long War." Fighting the scourge of terrorism is a multi-pronged effort, ranging from the sharing of intelligence to cooperative operations to collaborative development. CTTSO specifically works with other countries to cooperatively share requirements and develop capabilities to leverage U.S. taxpayer dollars into projects that work better and are developed faster., The original document contains color images. All DTIC reproductions will be in black and white.

America's ongoing battles in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted limitations in our understanding of the complexity of modern warfare. Furthermore, our cultural prism has retarded the institutionalization of capabilities needed to prevail in stabilization and counterinsurgency missions. An ongoing debate about future threats is often framed as a dichotomous choice between counterinsurgency and conventional war. This oversimplifies defense planning and resource allocation decisions. Instead of fundamentally different approaches, we should expect competitors who will employ all forms of war, perhaps simultaneously. Such multimodal threats are often called hybrid threats. Hybrid adversaries employ combinations of capabilities to gain an asymmetric advantage. Thus, the choice is not simply one of preparing for long-term stability operations or high-intensity conflict. We must be able to do both simultaneously against enemies far more ruthless than today's. This essay widens the aperture of the current debate to account for this threat. It compares and contrasts four competing perspectives and evaluates them for readiness and risk implications. This risk assessment argues that the hybrid threat presents the most operational risk in the near- to midterm. Accordingly, it concludes that hybrid threats are a better focal point for considering alternative joint force postures., The original document contains color images. All DTIC reproductions will be in black and white.

This manual gives the US Army a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve success in a counterinsurgency. COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. To do this, the manual merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current operational environment. The US Army thinking and doctrine on COIN tactics since the end of World War II have focused on the conduct of counterguerrilla operations in the later stages of insurgency. The Army has seen itself as defeating guerrilla forces-usually communist forces-rather than defeating an entire insurgency. It saw success as something it could achieve by using the force of arms directly against guerrilla forces. This doctrine of COIN began to take shape shortly after World War II in manuals such as FM 31-20, Operations against Guerrilla Forces (1951) and later in FM 31-15, Operations against Irregular Forces (1961). The Army refined its counterinsurgency doctrine during Vietnam in FM 31-22, US Counterinsurgency Force, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (both published in 1963) and in FM 31-23, Stability and Support Operations (1972). After Vietnam, the Army split COIN doctrine off from conventional "high intensity" operations in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (1990) in which the "light" forces owned counterinsurgency, and FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations (1986), where the focus remained on defeating the guerrilla force. This manual is the historical successor to FM 90-8. In addition, parts of FM 100-20 have been integrated into this FM, As have the Army's concept of full-spectrum operations and all elements of COIN operations. At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population., The publication supersedes FM 90-8, 29 August 1986 and FM 7-98, 19 October 1992. FMI 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98)

Over 200 years ago, a group of men gathered to create an enduring document that would usher a new era into the world: The Constitution of the United States of America. The document created a free and democratic country that stands as an example for freedom, equality, and democracy. Being a world leader has invited a full spectrum of threats against the United States in its promotion of these ideals. Unfortunately, in its zeal to defend the United States against its current enemies, the military has turned its attention away from conventional warfighting. Now, the United States military has become unwisely fixated on low-intensity conflict, almost ignoring the threat posed by the high-intensity conflicts of conventional warfare. Because focusing training on low-intensity conflict limits the U.S. military's ability to hone conventional warfighting skills, ignores the most dangerous threat to the country, and delays procurement for future threats, the U.S. military's priority should be training and equipping a force for high-intensity conflict. The United States must focus first on the most dangerous threat to the nation, a conventional threat. Focusing on a conventional threat means training and procurement should be focused around conventional tasks and equipment, while irregular capabilities are developed as a secondary issue.

The collapse of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 led to the challenges of creating and then maintaining a stable, safe, and secure environment for the people of that nation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) failure to organize and establish the unity of command and unity of purpose needed to implement under an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has resulted in the ISAFs inability to gain and maintain security, prevent a resurgence of the Taliban, and develop an effective infrastructure development plan. This strategy research paper (SRP) examines how poor administration and organization of the political and military effort in Afghanistan has resulted in a lack of unity of command and unity of purpose, which has created an unstable political and military environment and an ineffective Afghan government. This SRP concludes with eleven recommendations to better organize NATOs political and military effort in order for the NATO mission to succeed in Afghanistan.

In the jumbled terrain of modern urban combat, the preferred theater of operations for today's terrorists, the need to distinguish combatant from noncombatant is paramount. In a war with no fixed fronts, with no clearly identifiable foe, where the very definition of the word "enemy" is maddeningly fluid, Soldiers require better, smarter, and more innovative ways to defend themselves without jeopardizing their overall mission. Instead of "shoot first and ask questions later," Nonlethal munitions (NLM) allow Soldiers to "ask questions by shooting." The judicious application of nonlethal effects allows the Soldier to interrogate the intent of the target by giving it ample warning and incentive to cease any questionable or objectionable behavior prior to resorting to more extreme measures. NLM are analogous to precision guided weapons in that they are designed to deliver a measured effect against a specific target while minimizing the likelihood of collateral damage. Many of the current NLM were type classified from specifications drawn up in a bygone era. The Cold War had ended, the military was downsizing, the so called "Peace Dividend" was on every politician's lips and the Berlin Wall was being broken up into souvenirs for tourists. The Army's NLM were based on civilian law enforcement models -- short-range, low-velocity rounds intended for use only as a last resort. After all, the greatest foreseeable threat to law enforcement at that time was from "peaceniks" and antiglobalization protestors. But times changed quickly and the Army's deployment with NATO to Kosovo identified a real and urgent need for NLM in a military role. In April 2000, the Office of the Project Manager Close Combat Systems (PM CCS), part of Program Executive Office Ammunition (PEO Ammo), deployed the Army's first ever Nonlethal Capabilities Set. The Army seemed well on the way to acquiring a nonlethal capability that would protect the troops while avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties., Published in Army AL&T, p46-49, Jan-Mar 2008.

The U.S. Army's operational tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan is creating a generation of leaders untrained to meet the full spectrum threats that it must be prepared to confront on the battlefield of tomorrow. The U.S. Army has been fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since with great success, especially given the challenges of the contemporary operating environment its junior leaders face every day. This success, however, has come with a cost. While soldiers, leaders, and units have adapted over the past 6 years to fight an adaptive and innovative counterinsurgency, they have lost many of the full spectrum core-competency warfighting skills that make the U.S. Army the most formidable in the world. This paper will focus on mechanized maneuver battalion and brigade-level organizations. Unless the U.S. Army's leadership begins a mental shift toward a more balanced approach to training, the Army will no longer have the institutional knowledge of how to fight and win to maintain dominance on the conventional battlefield. The basic core high-intensity warfighting skills are absolutely necessary to support U.S. military dominance and promote the achievement of U.S. interests around the world for the future.

In order to effectively plan and execute military operations in today's security environment, Regional Combatant Commanders require forces capable or planning and conducting missions across the range of military operations. Recent experience has shown that while U.S. forces are highly effective in high-intensity conflict against conventional enemies, they are somewhat less capable in low-intensity conflict against unconventional threats. By using the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, this paper identifies the dangers associated with a force unable to properly plan and execute operations against an unconventional opponent. The paper examines current U.S. military forces and defines three non-existing characteristics and resources needed for success in today's global security environment. It uses the United States Marine Corps as a model to identify changes currently underway, as well as areas for improvement. Finally, the paper makes recommendations that can be applied to all U.S. military forces, enabling successful operations in low-intensity conflict against unconventional threats while maintaining high intensity war fighting capabilities.

This thesis examines the decision-making processes used by company grade officers operating in combat roles in Iraq and seeks to determine if innovation largely originates among lower ranking officers. The author analyzes the incentives structure and the command climate of the U.S. Army in Iraq and how officers operate within this environment. Interviews with officers who served in Iraq illuminate the motivations for innovation. The thesis identifies the many obstacles that officers encounter in attempting to "innovate from below.", The original document contains color images.

Buddy treatment, first responder combat casualty care, and patient evacuation under hostile fire have compounded combat losses throughout history. Force protection of military first responders is complicated by current troop deployments for peacekeeping operations, counter terrorism, and humanitarian assistance missions that involve highly visible, politically sensitive low intensity combat in urban terrain. Research progress has been made in the areas of robotics; artificial intelligence; sensors; computer vision; mechanical, electrical and biological engineering; noninvasive diagnostics; and wireless digital communications. Academic institutions have demonstrated intelligent robots that execute functions ranging from performing mechanical repairs to playing soccer. The military has significantly invested in autonomous vehicles, and other robots to support its Objective Force. By leveraging several Department of Defense funding sources the Army Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center has established a growing portfolio of projects aimed at adapting, integrating, or developing new robotic technologies to locate, identify, assess, treat, and rescue battlefield casualties under hostile conditions.

To address the potential terrorist threats to America, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism state that the United States will wage a "war of ideas." The war of ideas seeks to change the minds of varying ideological populations. A war fought in the minds and among people -- human terrain -- requires human players to engage and communicate with indigenous populations in the context of the local culture. As the United States and its coalition partners in the global war on terror (GWOT) clear al-Qaeda from one location, terrorists will seek other locations. They target people to turn them against the United States and the coalition of the willing. A foreign or local government can win the war of ideas and defeat global terrorists only if it wins the hearts and minds of the people, which requires influencing their behavior by offering them a better solution than the solution al-Qaeda offers. A war of ideas is not new to the twenty-first century fight. While history cannot provide a panacea for global terrorism, today's military can learn lessons from historical small wars and low intensity conflicts to train and employ forces effectively to wage and win a war of ideas to counter global insurgents and their ability to win popular support. This paper employs a review of two case studies, Malaya (1945-60) and Vietnam (1964-72), to illuminate my thesis., Wright Flyer Paper no. 29.

This paper is a case study of the British military intervention into Sierra Leone in 2000. The successful British intervention led to the defeat of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and final peace accords, restored order to a failed state, and allowed the democratic restoration of the government of Sierra Leone. The paper will explore the following points: What was British foreign policy at the time and what impact did it have in the decision to intervene?; What was British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine at the time and was it useful for the forces in Sierra Leone?; Did the British forces use their own doctrine or was the situation in Sierra Leone unique?; and Why was the intervention successful and what lessons can be drawn from it? The author analyzes the United Kingdom's actions against its own doctrine, rather than against the doctrine of the United States or another country. There is one major assumption for this case study. The author categorizes the intervention into Sierra Leone as successful. The justification for this assumption is current-day Sierra Leone. Instead of a war-torn failed state, Sierra Leone now has lasting peace, has disarmed its insurgent forces, has ended the large-scale human rights abuses of the past, and has democratic elections -- not coups -- determining the leadership of the country., The original document contains color images.

On September 15th, 2001, three days after the 9/11 attacks, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, presented the National Security Council (NSC) with three Department of Defense (DoD) developed Courses of Action (COAs) for a retaliatory strategy against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. All three plans called for direct action against these non-state, irregular forces. Even while presenting the plans, General Shelton admitted their inadequacy. How is it possible that the best strategy the uniformed leaders of the U.S. military could propose was a direct approach strategy against an adversary that employed an indirect approach strategy? This thesis examines this question through a number of lenses. First, it uses game theory to analyze a work of Ivan Arreguin-Toft: "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict." Next, the conclusions drawn from this analysis are compared to the organizational history of the DoD, and to the U.S. War College education received by the senior military leaders responsible for the plan presented at the NSC meeting on 9/15. The key findings are as follows: (1) the U.S. military must develop an equal capacity to conduct a Direct Approach, an Indirect Approach, or a mixed approach strategy against irregular forces; (2) the U.S. military should allow an adversary to make the first strategic move, which should be responded to with the same strategy being employed by the adversary; and (3) the U.S. military must institute a curriculum within the military officer professional education program that equally balances the teaching of Direct and Indirect Approach strategy foci. The appendix presents a chronology of U.S. military deployments and operations beginning with the Cold War in 1945 to New Horizons Operation in 2001. Each entry includes Operation Name, Type of Operation, Location of Operation, Beginning and End Dates of Operation, and Opponent Strategy (Direct or Indirect)., The original document contains color images.

As low intensity conflicts become more prevalent worldwide, nonlethal solutions are often appropriate responses to such circumstances and can help to prevent escalation of the event to a lethal level. The ability to disperse angry crowds often hinges on calming or isolating a few individuals. The following report details the general performance of selected paintball brands with regard to range and accuracy. In addition, simple methods of increasing the performance are considered and examined for potential near-term usage., The original document contains color images.

Case Study 1 -- The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960); Case Study 2 -- Northern Ireland (August 1969-March 1972); Case Study 3 -- Northern Ireland (1972-1976): The Army Takes Control; Case Study 4 -- Northern Ireland (1976-1994): Police Primacy; Case Study 5 -- Bosnia (1992-1996); Case Study 6 -- Sierra Leone (2000); Case Study 7 -- Iraq., Analysis developed by PA Consulting. Sponsored in part by U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation (OFT/DOD).

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a significant feature of the contemporary world and it is a particular challenge to the armed forces of many states which are involved is such conflict, or are likely to become so. This thesis is not concerned with how such difficult conflict situations arise. Rather it is concerned with how, from the point of view of the state, they may be contained and ultimately brought to a satisfactory resolution. The work is thus concerned with the practicalities of ending LIC. More specifically, the purpose of this research is to establish a framework of doctrinal and military principles applicable to the prevention and resolution of LIC. The principles of this thesis are based in numerous historical examples of LIC and six in depth case studies. These distilled principles are analysed in two central chapters, and are then applied in two latter defence force chapters so as to ensure there practicality and resilience. Numerous defence academics and military practitioners have been consulted in the production of this thesis; their contribution has further reinforced the functionality of the principles examined in this research. The research illustrates the criticality of a holistic approach to LIC. The function of this approach is to guarantee the stability of the sovereign state, by unifying civil, police, intelligence and military services. The effectiveness of the military elements must also be ensured, as military force is central to the suppression of LIC. Consequently, the research makes strategic and operational prescriptions, so as to improve the capability of defence forces that are concerned with preventing or resolving LIC.

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a significant feature of the contemporary world and it is a particular challenge to the armed forces of many states which are involved is such conflict, or are likely to become so. This thesis is not concerned with how such difficult conflict situations arise. Rather it is concerned with how, from the point of view of the state, they may be contained and ultimately brought to a satisfactory resolution. The work is thus concerned with the practicalities of ending LIC. More specifically, the purpose of this research is to establish a framework of doctrinal and military principles applicable to the prevention and resolution of LIC. The principles of this thesis are based in numerous historical examples of LIC and six in depth case studies. These distilled principles are analysed in two central chapters, and are then applied in two latter defence force chapters so as to ensure there practicality and resilience. Numerous defence academics and military practitioners have been consulted in the production of this thesis; their contribution has further reinforced the functionality of the principles examined in this research. The research illustrates the criticality of a holistic approach to LIC. The function of this approach is to guarantee the stability of the sovereign state, by unifying civil, police, intelligence and military services. The effectiveness of the military elements must also be ensured, as military force is central to the suppression of LIC. Consequently, the research makes strategic and operational prescriptions, so as to improve the capability of defence forces that are concerned with preventing or resolving LIC.

Table of Contents: Foreward, by Michael C. McMahon; "Planning Integrated Operations: An Operational Design Framework for the Long War", by Jose M. Madera; "Military Enthusiasm and Political Reality: USSOCOM's Role in the Joint, Combined, Interagency Global Counterinsurgency", by Charles R.V. O'Quinn; "Putting the G in the Global War on Terrorism", by Edward J. Mason; "Annihilation and Exhaustion: Fighting the Global War on Terrorism", by Wayne Keysor; "Interagency Approach Vital to Securing GWOT Centers of Gravity", by John J. Schaefer, III; "Counterinsurgency Warfare, Dutch Special Forces", by Jan R. Swillens; "Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Why Words Matter", by D. Jones; "Factors to Consider While Countering Insurgencies in the Global War on Terrorism", by James Oldenburg; and "Pseudo Operations: The Answer to the Snowflake", by James Spies.

The Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) has largely become what can be termed Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The use of supporting arms in general, and artillery in specific, is sporadic at best. Arguments have been made that artillery units, being the least engaged division units, are well suited for ancillary missions such as Information Operations (IO) and Civil Military Operations (CMO). CMO has been given to the artillery regiments and battalions as a secondary mission as directed in ALMAR 061- 05. Whether IO becomes a tertiary mission officially or as a result of CMO mission creep, it is undoubtedly on the horizon for the artillery community. For artillery batteries to be used as provisional IO batteries minor changes in structure and major changes in training must take place. The mission creep had already begun, even before the ALMAR outlining CMO as the secondary mission. The majority of IO billets are filled by Marines carrying the 08XX Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) designation. The logic behind the staffing of these billets is largely based on "effects based targeting," the latest term to be over utilized and under defined. This paper will not attempt to analyze the merits of this trend but rather work on the premise that it is a forgone conclusion that artillery will inherit this mission.

The traditional sources of conflict have changed. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 showed the world there were new sources of conflict: fundamentalism, fanaticism, and the globalization of terrorism. Most western armies soon realized that a change in their traditional structures was necessary if they were to successfully face these new threats. Unfortunately, the German Army's new structure lacks key capabilities and does not meet the needs of the current battlefield. In particular, the structure of the German Intervention Forces Division does not meet these needs. With its armored backbone, this division is still designed to face a conventional army in open terrain. Even if tanks play a significant role in modern urban combat, they cannot compare to the lack of Mechanized Infantry in the Intervention Brigades. Their numbers are too low to gain total control over significant urban environments. It could be argued that this shortfall can be rectified by the Airborne Brigade and the Infantry Regiment in the Air Mechanized Brigade that are assigned to the Intervention Forces. But this option fits just one type of current operation: urban combat. Fighting in rough, mountainous terrain can hardly be managed by these troops. To be able to fight successfully in a mountainous environment, troops need more than just light infantry training. They need special skills and training and the ability to operate at high altitudes. These capabilities are currently available in the German Army's Mountain Brigade. The Mountain Brigade is not only able to conduct operations in a mountainous environment, but also in urban areas. Also, it is the only brigade in the German Army that has an organic pack animal company. This would enable the brigade to operate under weather conditions that do not allow troop insertions or supply by helicopters. The Mountain Brigade should be transferred to the Intervention Forces Division to make these capabilities available, if needed., EWS Contemporary Issues Paper.

In the fight against those who would destroy our freedom, the United States Armed Forces, the Federal law enforcement community, and national first responders require new and improved capabilities. Since 2001, numerous departments and agencies have instituted programs to fill these gaps, but the Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office (CTTSO) has maintained its position at the leading edge of innovation. As a program office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), CTTSO is uniquely positioned to contribute to the success of the Global War on Terrorism. With overall supervision of the SO/LIC activities of DoD, including oversight of policy and resources, the ASD acts as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on SO/LIC matters. This allows CTTSO to take operational requirements from warfighters, incorporate policy objectives that flow down from the Department, and marshal technical expertise resident in its program managers, subject matter experts, and developers to provide capabilities that are fieldable and sustainable over the "Long War." This fortuitous balance of political direction, operational relevance, and technical expertise has enabled CTTSO to respond with agility and speed to changing requirements. In 1999, CTTSO was assigned program management functions for the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), the organization named by the Wall Street Journal as "...the nation's talent scouts for antiterrorism" technologies. More recently, CTTSO's responsibilities have grown to include the Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Low-Intensity Conflict (EOD/LIC) program and the Irregular Warfare Support (IWS) program. Numbering close to 100 dedicated managers, subject matter experts, and direct support personnel and over 400 active projects, CTTSO is positioned to sustain the success it has realized over the past seven years far into the future.

This thesis describes how field artillery fires should be planned and executed in a counterinsurgency fight. Based upon historical research, there are numerous missions that the field artillery community can and must be able to execute in a counterinsurgency fight in order to be successful. Field artillery fires are still relevant on the battlefield, and leaders at all levels must understand how to properly employ them in order to apply the appropriate force required to defeat the enemy and at the same time attempt to minimize the collateral damage that a misplaced artillery round can cause. Additionally this thesis addresses some of the transformational issues that the field artillery community must be aware of in the current fight. Artillery is not going to win the hearts and minds of those local nationals who are neither supportive to an insurgency organization nor against it, but it will provide the protection for the Soldiers on the battlefield. Artillery fires are needed in the current counterinsurgency fight in Iraq., The original document contains color images.