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This report documents results of the Mobile Underwater Debris Survey System (MUDSS) Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) project that was conducted in two phases over the period of 1995 through 1998. MUDSS Phase I included a set of two successful feasibility demonstrations. The feasibility demonstrations included an at-sea demonstration of a multi-sensor MUDSS prototype against unexploded ordnance (UXO) targets in the late summer of 1995, and a demonstration of trace explosive detection in sediment samples taken near underwater UXO in October 1996. MUDSS Phase II included development and demonstration of an advanced and refined MUDSS survey system using the experience with the MUDSS prototype of Phase I. MUDSS Phase II technology demonstration was held at a former practice-bombing site in November 1998. The MUDSS technology demonstration resulted in a successful mapping of suspected UXO in an environmentally difficult, muddy UXO site.

Ozone profiles obtained by near‐daily ozonesonde observations during campaigns at several sites in the North Atlantic are used to construct time‐height cross sections of ozone concentration through the troposphere. Strong day‐to‐day ozone variability on the scale of synoptic meteorological disturbances is found both in the spring and in the summer throughout much of the troposphere. Layers of high ozone concentration (∼100 ppb) are frequently seen in the middle and upper troposphere and are invariably associated with transport characteristics that strongly support a stratospheric source for these layers. Regions of low ozone (<40 >ppb) are seen in the middle and upper troposphere associated with higher relative humidity. The connection of these events with low surface mixing ratios suggests that convective processes mix air low in ozone up through the troposphere. Vertical layering of ozone mixing ratio, which is seen at all of the observing locations, is a result of differing sources of air in the different layers.

Debow's review, Agricultural, commercial, industrial progress and resources. / Volume 14, Issue 3, Page(s) 230-238, (dlps) volume: acg1336.1-14.003, (dlps) article: acg1336.1-14.003:6, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/t/text/accesspolicy.html

The siting of facilities for large-scale, novel technologies presents a formidable challenge to politcal risk management. This paper develops a model for describing the decision process for this type of problem at the level of societal systems. It explicitly considers the role of the relevant interested parties, each of whom brings to the siting debate its own set of objetives and attributes. We have labeled the approach a multiattribute multiparty model (MAMP to distinguish it from prescriptive techniques such as multiattribute utility analysis or decision analysis). The MAMP model is a natural extension of the burgeoning literature on the key role that limited time, attention, and information processing capabilities play in political decision making when there are uncertain outcomes and likely conflicts among interested parties. The model also highlights the importance of decentralized and sequential decision making and indicates the role that formal risk assessments have played at each stage of the process. We illustrate its application in the context of the decision proess associated with a proposed liquiefied natural gas terminal in California. The concluding portion of this paper suggests future rsearch needs for improving the credibility of analysis and facilitating collective action with respect to facility siting problems.

One of the most challenging problems in decisions concerning the deployment of novel, large-scale technologies is the assessment of the risk to the surrounding population. In particular cases, such as nuclear reactors or liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities, the political process involved may tend to focus on one particular form of that risk, i.e., the risk to life from catastrophic accidents. This paper examines several different assessments of that type of risk with two main goals in mind: (i) To present and compare the various procedures of risk assessment as applied to liquefied energy gas (LEG) terminal siting, and in doing so to clarify the limits of knowledge and understanding of LEG risks (ii) To quantify and compare the risks at four LEG terminal sites: Eemshaven (Netherlands), Mossmorran (UK), Point Conception (USA), and Wilhelmshaven (West Germany)

This chapter, deals with the siting and approval process for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) import facility at Wilhelmshaven in the Federal Republic of Germany. The major aspects of the political decision-making process are summarized, focusing on the role of technical analyses of public safety risk in this decision. The most remarkable feature of this process was that despite the novelty of the LNG technology in the FRG, it deviated very little from established industrial siting and approval procedures. Public interest in the project and concerns about its acceptability did not rise above a relatively low level. At some point, however, unexpected difficulties related to the question of safety risk seemed to threaten the approval of the terminal, but these were eventually overcome by the federal government in a rather elegant way, leaving little more than ripples on the surface.

The Gasworks company has filed an application to locate a liquefied energy gas (LEG) terminal in the vicinity of Pietersdorf. Gasworks feels that this proposed project is economically justifiable from an investment point of view. It has also been encouraged to undertake such a project by the National Energy Board, because LEG promises to meet some of the country’s future energy needs. The community of Pietersdorf stands to benefit from the plant insofar as it will provide additional tax revenues and future employment opportunities. However, some residents from the town are concerned about the impact of the facility on their future safety given the risk, even though relatively small, of a serious accident that might damage property as well as threaten lives. In addition, this group is concerned with the potential negative effect of large-scale technological facilities on the future quality of the environment and the lifestyle of their children and grandchildren. Environmentalist groups have voiced similar concerns and are opposed to the project.

Comparing four case studies presents an analytic challenge since each country has its own style, decision process, and institutional arrangements. This chapter presents a set of unifying concepts that are sufficiently broad to enable us to structure the siting procedure in each country using a common framework. Building on these concepts we develop a set of reader’s aids that clarify the sequence of key events, the main concerns of the interested parties, and the arguments each stakeholder brings into the policy arena. Most importantly, these aids indicate how each siting problem was initially formulated and how it evolved over time.

Plans to import liquefied natural gas into the Netherlands were first drawn up in the early 1970s and resulted in the initiation of studies and discussions on various aspects of LNG technology. The siting question, however, was not an urgent one until 1977, when a contract was signed with the Algerian company Sonatrach to import 4 billion m3 of LNG per year, for a 20-year period starting in 1983. Following extensive political discussions at various levels, an LNG terminal site at Eemshaven, in the northern province of Groningen, was finally selected and approved by the Dutch cabinet and parliament in 1978 (Tweede Kamer 1978). This decision outcome was significant because Eemshaven only became a serious candidate in late 1977; detailed studies and policy advice to and within the government (including the cabinet) had previously focused on Maasvlakte in the Rotterdam harbor area, as the preferred terminal site (see Figure 4.1).

One of the most challenging problems in decisions concerning the deployment of novel, large-scale technologies is the assessment of the risk to the surrounding populations. In particular cases, such as nuclear reactors or liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities, the political process involved may tend to focus on one particular form of that risk: the risk to life from catastrophic accidents. This chapter examines several assessments of this type with two main goals in mind: (1) to present and compare the various risk assessment procedures as they have been applied to LEG terminal siting, and in so doing to clarify the limits of knowledge and understanding of LEG risks (2) to quantify and compare the risks estimated in analyses prepared for four LEG sites, namely: Wilhelmshaven (Brötz 1978; DGWE 1979; Krappinger 1978a,b,c; WSB 1978) - Eemshaven (TNO 1978) - Mossmorran—Braefoot Bay (Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group 1979, henceforth referred to as Aberdour; Cremer and Warner 1977; HSE 1978a) - Point Conception (ADL 1978; FERC 1978; SAI 1976)

The descriptive material presented on the four case studies illustrates how different interested parties form strategies and present arguments to defend their positions regarding the siting of technological facilities. This chapter has a prescriptive flavor by focusing on ways to improve both the decision process and the resulting outcomes.

The siting of facilities for large-scale, novel technologies presents a formidable challenge to politcal risk management. This paper develops a model for describing the decision process for this type of problem at the level of societal systems. It explicitly considers the role of the relevant interested parties, each of whom brings to the siting debate its own set of objetives and attributes. We have labeled the approach a multiattribute multiparty model (MAMP to distinguish it from prescriptive techniques such as multiattribute utility analysis or decision analysis). The MAMP model is a natural extension of the burgeoning literature on the key role that limited time, attention, and information processing capabilities play in political decision making when there are uncertain outcomes and likely conflicts among interested parties. The model also highlights the importance of decentralized and sequential decision making and indicates the role that formal risk assessments have played at each stage of the process. We illustrate its application in the context of the decision proess associated with a proposed liquiefied natural gas terminal in California. The concluding portion of this paper suggests future rsearch needs for improving the credibility of analysis and facilitating collective action with respect to facility siting problems.

One of the most challenging problems in decisions concerning the deployment of novel, large-scale technologies is the assessment of the risk to the surrounding population. In particular cases, such as nuclear reactors or liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities, the political process involved may tend to focus on one particular form of that risk, i.e., the risk to life from catastrophic accidents. This paper examines several different assessments of that type of risk with two main goals in mind: (i) To present and compare the various procedures of risk assessment as applied to liquefied energy gas (LEG) terminal siting, and in doing so to clarify the limits of knowledge and understanding of LEG risks (ii) To quantify and compare the risks at four LEG terminal sites: Eemshaven (Netherlands), Mossmorran (UK), Point Conception (USA), and Wilhelmshaven (West Germany)

Plans to import liquefied natural gas into the Netherlands were first drawn up in the early 1970s and resulted in the initiation of studies and discussions on various aspects of LNG technology. The siting question, however, was not an urgent one until 1977, when a contract was signed with the Algerian company Sonatrach to import 4 billion m3 of LNG per year, for a 20-year period starting in 1983. Following extensive political discussions at various levels, an LNG terminal site at Eemshaven, in the northern province of Groningen, was finally selected and approved by the Dutch cabinet and parliament in 1978 (Tweede Kamer 1978). This decision outcome was significant because Eemshaven only became a serious candidate in late 1977; detailed studies and policy advice to and within the government (including the cabinet) had previously focused on Maasvlakte in the Rotterdam harbor area, as the preferred terminal site (see Figure 4.1).

This chapter, deals with the siting and approval process for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) import facility at Wilhelmshaven in the Federal Republic of Germany. The major aspects of the political decision-making process are summarized, focusing on the role of technical analyses of public safety risk in this decision. The most remarkable feature of this process was that despite the novelty of the LNG technology in the FRG, it deviated very little from established industrial siting and approval procedures. Public interest in the project and concerns about its acceptability did not rise above a relatively low level. At some point, however, unexpected difficulties related to the question of safety risk seemed to threaten the approval of the terminal, but these were eventually overcome by the federal government in a rather elegant way, leaving little more than ripples on the surface.

The descriptive material presented on the four case studies illustrates how different interested parties form strategies and present arguments to defend their positions regarding the siting of technological facilities. This chapter has a prescriptive flavor by focusing on ways to improve both the decision process and the resulting outcomes.

One of the most challenging problems in decisions concerning the deployment of novel, large-scale technologies is the assessment of the risk to the surrounding populations. In particular cases, such as nuclear reactors or liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities, the political process involved may tend to focus on one particular form of that risk: the risk to life from catastrophic accidents. This chapter examines several assessments of this type with two main goals in mind: (1) to present and compare the various risk assessment procedures as they have been applied to LEG terminal siting, and in so doing to clarify the limits of knowledge and understanding of LEG risks (2) to quantify and compare the risks estimated in analyses prepared for four LEG sites, namely: Wilhelmshaven (Brötz 1978; DGWE 1979; Krappinger 1978a,b,c; WSB 1978) - Eemshaven (TNO 1978) - Mossmorran—Braefoot Bay (Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group 1979, henceforth referred to as Aberdour; Cremer and Warner 1977; HSE 1978a) - Point Conception (ADL 1978; FERC 1978; SAI 1976)

Comparing four case studies presents an analytic challenge since each country has its own style, decision process, and institutional arrangements. This chapter presents a set of unifying concepts that are sufficiently broad to enable us to structure the siting procedure in each country using a common framework. Building on these concepts we develop a set of reader’s aids that clarify the sequence of key events, the main concerns of the interested parties, and the arguments each stakeholder brings into the policy arena. Most importantly, these aids indicate how each siting problem was initially formulated and how it evolved over time.

The Gasworks company has filed an application to locate a liquefied energy gas (LEG) terminal in the vicinity of Pietersdorf. Gasworks feels that this proposed project is economically justifiable from an investment point of view. It has also been encouraged to undertake such a project by the National Energy Board, because LEG promises to meet some of the country’s future energy needs. The community of Pietersdorf stands to benefit from the plant insofar as it will provide additional tax revenues and future employment opportunities. However, some residents from the town are concerned about the impact of the facility on their future safety given the risk, even though relatively small, of a serious accident that might damage property as well as threaten lives. In addition, this group is concerned with the potential negative effect of large-scale technological facilities on the future quality of the environment and the lifestyle of their children and grandchildren. Environmentalist groups have voiced similar concerns and are opposed to the project.

Process techniques, manufacturing equipment designs, and assembly techniques for solid circuit semiconductor networks were established. Pilot-line equipment was constructed, evaluated, and improved. Effort was concentrated on developing and refining processes for producing single-chip, planar, oxide-protected devices with evaporated lead interconnections. Emphasis remained on doing as much processing as possible on silicon in slice form. This philosophy necessitated further refinements to ensure isolation of components. Several methods of improving isolation are described. A molecular electronic computer incorporating 587 semiconductor networks was completed and tested.

Process studies were concluded. Techniques have been developed for evaluation of all diffusion parameters. All machines for the pilot line are either completed, being constructed or modified, or in advanced design stage. The philosophy guiding creation of these machines is that all possible operations will be performed on the functional electronic blocks while they are still in slice form. These operations include cleaning, polishing, photoresist applications, etching, diffusion, and application of evaporated leads and contacts. Considerable progress has been made toward perfecting a welded package.