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Until 1984, the amount appearing in the DoD budget under "military retirement" was the annual payment to retired military personnel or their survivors--equaling approximately $16 billion that year. That amount reflected the number of retirees and the retirement system that resulted from force-management decisions made 20 or more years earlier. Those managing the personnel force in 1984 essentially had no control over these retirement-budget payments. Similarly, force managers in 1984 could make decisions influencing future retirement expenditures without answering for them in their own budgets. Policymakers were concerned that this system could result in increasingly expensive retirement plans, a more senior force, more retirees than justified by force-readiness considerations, and poor decisions involving substitution of civilian and military personnel and between capital and labor investments.

In their landmark volume, Jencks and Phillips (1998) suggested that reducing the gap in scores between black and white students would do more to move America toward racial equality than any other alternative. They argue that eliminating the gap might eventually solve many of the others issues that separate the races: the need for affirmative action policies in colleges and jobs, the gap in wages, and perhaps even segregated communities. When recommending policies that could help achieve gap reduction, they suggest that the strongest empirical evidence exists for class size reductions and raising the quality of teachers by obtaining teachers with higher test scores as two "expensive" options. They also believe that policies prior to kindergarten such as pre-kindergarten and Heads tart programs that are oriented toward teaching cognitive skills are necessary. They also emphasize the difficulty of finding politically viable solutions. Decisive political support for programs that only benefit blacks is unlikely, and so benefits for some whites seems necessary to build a viable political coalition. Jencks and Phillips (1998) also were pessimistic that expanding federal programs could play a significant role in solving the problem because of the distrust of federal initiatives in education. In this paper we will suggest that a federal resource role is critical to addressing the problem, and that specific programs that are appropriately targeted could be effective and efficient. While significant political issues of federal involvement are still present, the recent election and the federal surplus has probably made a broader federal role in education more likely- although still difficult.

Great efforts have been made to improve the nation's public K-12 educational system since the early 1980s. States have been the primarily initiators of this educational reform. States have leverage to reform education because they provide approximately one-half of educational funding to typical school districts in the nation and set policies that influence who teaches and what is taught. Furthermore, state courts also play a key role in deciding whether educational funds are adequate and equitably distributed. Even before 1980, the states had diverse educational systems that varied widely in terms of per-pupil spending, resource allocation, and educational policies. Reforms that have been initiated since then have varied widely by state in terms of the pace and types of reform, ensuring a continuing widely diverse set of educational systems across states.

This report from the RAND organization analyzes results from the NAEP (National Assessment of Educational Progress) state test scores of 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996. The report is unique in offering comparative data on similar student demographics across states, allowing the authors to examine the impact of state educational reforms on comparable populations. The results show that some states are doing much better than others with similar populations. For instance, states such as Texas and North Carolina showed remarkable gains in scores of minority and disadvantaged students, while states such as California and Louisiana did not. The authors conclude that "the most efficient and effective use of education dollars is to target states with higher proportions of minority and disadvantaged students with funding for lower pupil-teacher ratios, more widespread prekindergarten efforts, and more adequate teaching resources." Teacher salaries did not seem to be a key factor in test score improvements, though the authors suggest this may be a result of the fact that current salary structures do not differentiate between high- and low-quality teachers.

This report from the RAND organization analyzes results from the NAEP (National Assessment of Educational Progress) state test scores of 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996. The report is unique in offering comparative data on similar student demographics across states, allowing the authors to examine the impact of state educational reforms on comparable populations. The results show that some states are doing much better than others with similar populations. For instance, states such as Texas and North Carolina showed remarkable gains in scores of minority and disadvantaged students, while states such as California and Louisiana did not. The authors conclude that "the most efficient and effective use of education dollars is to target states with higher proportions of minority and disadvantaged students with funding for lower pupil-teacher ratios, more widespread prekindergarten efforts, and more adequate teaching resources." Teacher salaries did not seem to be a key factor in test score improvements, though the authors suggest this may be a result of the fact that current salary structures do not differentiate between high- and low-quality teachers.

Before Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S), the last major mobilization of reservists occurred almost 50 years ago during the Korean conflict. Thus, reservists serving in the Selected Reserve Components before 1990 had largely no experience with a large-scale reserve mobilization. In fact, the likelihood of a reserve mobilization was probably viewed as so remote that it played almost no role in decisions to join or remain in the reserve forces. The ODS/S mobilization, and the subsequent involvement of reservists in various other operations, ranging from the Army Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Initiative to the current effort in Bosnia, have changed this perception in important ways. It is clear that the Reserve Components are expected to play an important role in responding to regional crises, as well as in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations. For instance, since 1991, Reserve Component members were activated or volunteered to support Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti), Provide Promise and Deny Flight (Bosnia), Restore Hope (Somalia), Southern Watch (Southern Iraq), and Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq). Mobilizations are likely to be more frequent in the future and are likely to have important effects on reservists' attitudes and the degree of support they receive from their families and civilian employers.

The Total Force Policy, adopted as part of the move to an All Volunteer Force, placed greater reliance on Reserve forces to meet military contingencies. Operation Desert Storm (ODS) was the first large-scale test of this policy. Approximately 250,000 reservists were mobilized during ODS; these reservists played a critical role, particularly in logistical and medical support missions. However, one problem that surfaced during ODS was that many reservists suffered economic losses during mobilization. These losses occurred because military pay often did not cover the combined loss of civilian pay and the additional expenses incurred by reservists and their families as a result of mobilization. These losses were substantial in cases where reservists had high civilian incomes or where reservists were self-employed. In the latter case, businesses or partnerships often suffered continuing losses after demobilization because of the loss of client good will. These economic losses may not only create hardships for reserve families during a mobilization but could also make future recruiting and retention more difficult.

Changes in the military threats to the United States have radically altered the assumptions underpinning our defense policy, leading to a reexamination of the required size and mix of military forces. The size of military forces had been predicated on a NATO scenario based on the combined threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. However, the collapse of this threat allows the United States to maintain a smaller military force. Downsizing our military forces began in PY92 and is scheduled to continue through at least FY99. This report presents analysis, conducted at the beginning of this drawdown, evaluating alternative strategies for achieving personnel reductions, including alternative voluntary separation offers and their utility in achieving the required reductions in personnel end- strength. Specifically, it first addresses the question of what part of the reductions should come from lowered accession levels and what part from increased separations of personnel currently in the service. It then addresses the process of how to structure separation offers to get both the number and type of desired departures as cost effectively as possible. It identifies the criteria that any separation plan should meet, evaluates proposed plans in terms of the cost to the government and perceived worth to the individual, and develops an analytic framework that the services could use as a tool to structure separation offers. The framework provides a way to estimate acceptance rates for various plans and to identify specific groups to achieve those rates.

Improving the personnel and training readiness of Selected Reserve units requires, among other things, the identification of problems in meeting readiness goals, the causes of these problems, and likely solutions. This report addresses the issue of individual job training in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. For several reasons, a significant proportion of reservists in units are not even minimally qualified in their assigned jobs. These reasons include the large share of prior-service personnel requiring retraining, the large number of reservists who change units and jobs over their career, and forces retraining required when the force structure changes or is modernized. This research has established a job tracking system for reservists and used that system to measure job qualification levels in different units and jobs. It has also measured the frequency of assigned job changes and provided evidence on the causes of usch changes. Finally, it has measured average retraining times for reservists changing jobs

This study addresses an important issue in determining the future size of active and reserve military forces. Some future force scenarios place greater reliance on reserve forces by large active force reductions and smaller reserve reductions. Such scenar ios assume that reserve readiness can be adequately maintained regardless of the extent of active reductions compared to reserve size. This study explores a potential constraint on reserve force reliance associated with limits on the availability of experienced active veterans for reserve service. The reserve force inventory of part-time personnel in FY89 used active force veterans (prior service) in about 45 percent of enlisted positions and over 55 percent of officer positions. These prior-active-service personnel fill an even greater proportion of higher-ranking reserve positions and certain critical skills, such as pilots. The current availability of active veterans would be expected to fall markedly with large reductions in the size of the active forces. Replacement with personnel without active service could result in a significantly less-experienced reserve force in those skills where prior active service may be important to reserve readiness. This study projects the future prior-active-service content of the reserve components under alternative active and reserve force size scenarios. This will aid policymakers in determining the possible limits to active force reduction in proportion to reserve force size. The study also begins to explore the ramifications of the potentially reduced supply of prior-service accessions for reserve personnel readiness and develops a research agenda for further study of this question.

This report presents findings from research that analyzes the reenlistment behavior of Selected Reservists who are making early to mid-career reenlistment decisions. Low reenlistment rates imply a loss of the training investment made during the first term and higher accession and training costs for reserve forces. Low reenlistment rates also have a direct impact on the experience level of personnel in reserve units, and, therefore, on the readiness of the units, although, of course, te level of training and readiness in the units may well have an impact on reenlistment. Predicted reenlistment rates are also an important input into determining accession requirements and the associated planning of recruiting and training resources. The research will support better predictions of reenlistment by identifying the factors important in reenlistment decisions and the magnitude of their effects. In contrast to the more traditional moonlighting models that emphasize the relationship between economic variables (primary wage rate, hours worked on the primary job, moonlighting wage, etc.) and the decision to moonlight, this analysis highlights the importance of attitudinal variables as well as the unit environment in the reenlistment decision.

This study compares attrition in National Guard and Army Reserve units attending National Training Center (NTC), Reforger and Blazing Trails exercises (Central America), with control units not attending NTC. Attrition is identified by following those individuals present 12 months before the exercise to 6 months following the exercise. Longer-term attrition trends are also presented for these individuals through the end of FY86. Statistical attrition models are estimated using the logit functional form to control for effects of different personnel composition among units. The statistical analysis is supplemented by case studies of units to identify causes of attrition. These results show that National Training Center units have higher attrition results, but not Reforger or Blazing Trails units. Attrition rates are approximately 25% higher in National Training Center units than control units. Attrition rates in Reforger and Blazing Trails units are less than 5% higher than control units. The case studies identified four causes of increased attrition lost civilian income, employer conflict, family conflict, and marginal performance. (eg)

This report is a user's manual for the Reserve Force Policy Screening Models (POSM), which consist of 48 separate models. Eight separate models for each of the six reserve components include three officer and three enlisted models covering military technicians, full-time personnel, and part-time personnel; a fourth pair contains an aggregate of all three types of personnel. Each personnel inventory projection model incorporates behavioral and nonbehavioral options for projecting force sizes into the future. The models incorporate personnel flow into and out of the force, among the different personnel groups (full-time, military technician, and part-time), and into different year-of-service groups. They can project 14 years or more into the future, using assumptions about end strength or accession levels. The models were built to support a wide range of decisions concerning reserve pay, bonus budgets, recruiting resources, and issues of reserve force growth. (RRH)

This study considers how aggregate demand for Army family services will change in the future and identifies long-range issues posed by the changes in Army families. The Army will be drawn further into the realm of family concerns that Army personnel themselves face because (1) the 'early' pattern of Army family formation and growth will continue to compress family-related needs into the early years of Army service; (2) the changing division of labor within families will generate competing obligations to the Army and to one's family members; and (3) the growing orientation toward paid employment among younger generations of Army spouses foreshadows a growing demand for day care, Army assistance in lining up jobs, and diminished flexibility in traditional volunteer activities. The number of Army family dependents will likely decline, not increase, between 1985 and 2000, although Army actions and policies could potentially modify that future. Four long-range issues deserve closer study and continued monitoring: (1) employment opportunities for Army spouses, (2) the growing proportion of women among single parents, (3) readiness, and (4) potential 'hidden' effects of Army practices and policies.

The 1979 Reserve Force Studies Surveys were designed to provide the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ODASD-RA) and the Army Reserve Components with data that can support policy formulation and research on reserve force manning problems. Since the end of the draft, concern about the reserve forces has focused on the continuing declines in Selected Reserve personnel strength, particularly in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve where manpower shortfalls are most severe. The increased concern about reserve supply has led to the implementation of a range of different Selected Reserve programs in the past two years and additional programs are under discussion. However, analyses which identify the approach or mix of approaches which may be appropriate for addressing reserve force manning problems are limited. Data collected in the 1979 Reserve Force Studies Surveys will make possible analyses which focus on reserve force unit manning problems and the assessment of strategies for strength improvement. (Author)

This report describes the long-term results of national experiment designed to study factors that influence reenlistment decisions of Army Reserve and national Guard personnel. In the experiment, 15,000 reservists making reenlistment decisions in 1978 served as test participants. An original evaluation estimated the effect of bonus payments given for 3-year terms ($900) or 6-year terms ($1800) on reenlistment rates and length of commitment. This Note estimates the long-term effect of the bonus on reserve participation using longitudinal data collected 3-1/4 years after original reenlistment decisions. While the bonus only raised reenlistment rates from 38.4 to 40.6 percent, it significantly lengthened the average committed term of service from 1.3 to 4.4 years. Longitudinal tracking of test participants indicates a significant strength gain will result from the longer-term service commitments. After 3-1/4 years from the beginning of the test, the bonus group retained 32.0 percent of the original group, while the control group retained only 25.7 percent.

This note describes the 1979 survey administered to 224 Army National Guard and 221 Army Reserve company-sized units. The first four sections summarize the rationale of the surveys, sample and administrative procedures, and data processing procedures, especially those with analytic implications. Information about response rates is also included. The codebook sections reproduce each question used in the four questionnaires, together with every permissible response category and other technical information required for planning tabulations and other analyses. The files for these surveys contain a total of 22,933 records: 10,617 for Form 1 (administered to E1-E4 enlisted personnel), 11,596 for Form 2 (administered to E5-E9 enlisted personnel), 358 for Form 3 (administered to unit commanders) and 362 for Form 4 (completed either by the unit commander or the unit technician).

An econometric model of reenlistment decisions for Army National Guardsmen is developed using data collected from 2876 surveys. The surveys were administered to Guardsmen with less than 8 years of service who were making a reenlistment decision during 1978. The results of the model shows that a 10 percent increase in reserve pay would bring only a 2 percent increase in reenlistment rates. Since almost all Guardsmen are moonlighters, high civilian job wage levels and hours worked bring lower reenlistment rates, Demographic composition and education level significantly affect reenlistment rates. Other things equal, women, blacks, and those who do not complete high school have higher reenlistment rates than their counterparts. Overall, the mode predicts that reenlistment rates will more than double after 1978, thanks to a favorable demographic composition and the absence of draft motivated reservists. (Author)

Describes the 1978 survey administered to a worldwide sample of active force personnel in all four services. The survey was conducted between January and June 1979. The survey was one of several interrelated collection efforts of the Rand-DoD Survey Group, a component of the Rand Manpower, Mobilization and Readiness Program. The first four sections of this note describe the rationale of the survey, sample and weighting procedures, and data-processing procedures, especially those with analytic implications. The codebook sections reproduce each question in the four questionnaires, together with every permissible response category. Variable-specific explanatory notes also appear. The files for this survey contain a total of 57,590 records: 21,565 for Form 1 (enlisted personnel), 16,773 for Form 2 (enlisted personnel), 9,632 for Form 3 (officers), and 9,570 for Form 4 (officers). (See also N-1453 and N-1458.) (Author)

Contents are: Sample Design and Response Rates; Contents of the Data Files; Data Processing and Data Limitations; Item-by-Item Specifications for 1979 DoD Survey of Personnel Entering Military Service: Form 3; and Item-by-Item Specifications for 1979 DoD Survey of Personnel Entering Military Service: Form 4., See also AD-A095 850.

This report describes the 1979 survey administered to enlistees at all 67 Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES) immediately after enlistees were sworn in. The survey was one of several interrelated collection efforts of the Rand-DoD Survey Group, a component of the Rand Manpower, Mobilization, and Readiness Program. The first four sections of the note describe the rationale of the survey, sample and administrative procedures, and data-processing procedures, especially those with analytic implications. Preliminary information about response rates is also included. The codebook sections reproduce each question in the two questionnaires used in the spring 1979 survey, together with every permissible response category. Variable-specific explanatory notes also appear.

This study program seeks to develop broad strategies and specific solutions for dealing with present and future defense manpower problems. These goals require new methodologies for examining broad classes of manpower problems as well as specific problem-oriented research. In addition to analyzing current and future manpower issues, it is hoped that this study program will contribute to a better general understanding of the manpower problems confronting the Department of Defense. A key component of the program is the development of DoD-wide data bases that can support the policy research and analysis necessary for dealing with present and future defense manpower problems. Such data should include information about the behavior, experiences, attitudes, preferences, and intentions of military personnel. Particularly if collected on a periodic basis, these data would be helpful in assessing the response of military personnel to past or current policy chanes and could be used to identify future areas for policy action. This note provides an overview of the design together with a description of the field procedures for one of the major data bases created in this program.

This report provides projections of high quality Navy male accessions in an all volunteer environment under various population and economic scenarios through the year 2000. The work was undertaken in order to provide long-range Naval planners with a set of feasible manpower scenarios for a 25-year time frame. The projections are made for a range of youth employment and fertility rate assumptions. The results are based on a model of enlistment behavior developed using data from 1970-1976. It should thus be emphasized that what was produced was not a projection of what will probably happen, but only an estimate of a range of possible manpower scenarios. The results show that declines in high quality enlistments due to population decline and economic conditions could lend to severe manpower shortfalls if present manpower policies were not altered. (Author)

This report provides a summary and analysis of original data from seven major US aircraft engine manufacturers over a time period 1960-75. Analysis of large and small engine production, surge capacity, costs, productivity, and industry structure was made and compared with historical trends and the use of econometric models. Emphasis was placed on the lead times, shortages, and roles of subcontractors, component availability, and materials. (Author)

This report analyzes attrition patterns of Army National Guardsmen during their training and rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). It uses both a case study approach for seven units and statistical analysis of individual attrition to determine if attrition is higher for units attending NTC. It concludes that attrition is significantly higher for NTC units because of the effects of increased training time, which increase family and employer conflict and lost income from civilian jobs, and because of pruning of marginal personnel.

This report describes the results of a national experiment designed to study factors that influence reenlistment decisions of Army Reserve and National Guard personnel. Some 15,300 reservists making reenlistment decisions in 1978 participated in the experiment. The effect of bonuses given for 3-year terms ($900) or 6-year terms ($1800) on reenlistment rates and length of commitment was estimated by comparing the responses of the group offered the bonus with those of a matching control group. While the bonus raised reenlistment rates only from 38.4 to 40.6 percent, it lengthened the average committed term of service from 1.3 to 4.4 years. Longitudinal tracking of test participants indicates that a significant strength gain will result from the longer term of service commitment. Two years after the test began, 37.3 percent of the original bonus group remained in service, while only 30.4 percent of the control group remained., See also AD-A115 774.