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This thesis addresses the European Union (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) by analysing whether recourse to Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is a sufficient legal basis for the instrument, as well as how the mechanism relates to Articles I, II, III, and XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in terms of possibilities for compliance. The purpose is to position the CBAM in the context of EU and World Trade Organization (WTO) law and to examine the nature of the CBAM in the light of criticisms of discrimination and protectionism that has been levelled against the EU in the context of the implementation of the instrument. The analysis is carried out by reviewing the Treaty and Agreement Articles, discussing relevant rulings and reports by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the WTO Appellate Body, as well as referencing doctrine. Based on an initial discussion, it appears that, in addition to 192(1), Articles 114 and 207 of the TFEU might be relevant for the CBAM in terms of the appropriate legal basis. The analysis indicates that while recourse to Article 207 would be difficult to justify, it is less clear that it would not be appropriate to use Article 114 in addition to 192(1). In terms of the GATT Articles, the analysis shows that there are several ambiguities and unclarities resulting from a lack of definition within a WTO context as well as the fact that the relation of the CBAM to the GATT largely depends on how the instrument will be implemented. If nothing else, the findings demonstrate that the relationship between trade and environmental measures is perhaps more relevant than ever.

This paper explores the reasons embedded in the original architecture of both the international trade and monetary regimes that determined different outcomes for both. It proposes that the original version of the Bretton Woods monetary regime showed faster its essential failures and basically had to be replaced as early as 1971, while the trade regime embodied in the GATT and later in the WTO managed to at least survive until present day. It posits that correspondence (or the lack of it) of the basic characteristics of the said regimes with the underlying political reality where the regimes would apply (in line with Ruggie´s depiction of «embedded liberalism») accounts for the differentiated outcomes. It explains that the international trade regime showed more flexible traits that allowed it to adjust to the underlying political and led to its survival. The lack of that adaptability element would likewise explain the early demise of the original Bretton woods scheme., Este trabajo explora las razones incorporadas en la arquitectura original de los regímenes internacionales de comercio y monetario que determinaron los distintos desenlaces para ambos. Propone que la versión original del régimen monetario de Bretton Woods mostró más rápidamente sus fallas esenciales y tuvo que ser remplazado tempranamente en 1971, mientras que el régimen internacional de comercio logró al menos sobrevivir hasta ahora. Postula que el alineamiento (o la ausencia de este) de las características básicas de dichos regímenes con la realidad política subyacente sobre la cual deberían aplicarse esos regímenes (en la línea de la descripción de Ruggie del concepto de embedded liberalism) explica la diferenciación en los resultados. Explica que el régimen internacional de comercio reveló caracteres de mayor flexibilidad que le permitieron ajustarse a la realidad política subyacente lo que llevó a su sobrevivencia. La falta de ese elemento de adaptabilidad explicaría igualmente el temprano deceso del esquema original de Bretton Woods.

PurposeTo report a case of gonioscopy-assisted transluminal trabeculotomy (GATT) in a patient with primary congenital glaucoma.ObservationsA three-year-old boy who presented with buphthalmos and elevated intraocular pressure. Despite the presence of iris and iris processes extending to Schwalbe's line, GATT was performed successfully.ConclusionsGATT may be successful with primary congenital glaucoma even when angle structures are not initially visible.

The global semiconductor industry has benefited from a period of intense geographic specialization, yet faces the growing prospect of a new era of turbulence in international trade relations. Severely disrupted by exogenous shocks in global supply chains, the ability of the industry to cater to ceaseless demand growth is jeopardized by an increasing number of initiatives proposed for most industrialized economies to subsidize domestic development and production of semiconductors. The purpose of the study is to identify the array of measures currently being considered to stimulate the European semiconductor industry, along with their corresponding risk of being involved in international trade disputes based on earlier invocations of the WTO SCM Agreement. The study draws lessons from previous disputes citing the SCM Agreement to mitigate the risk of a complainant’s success in disputing the proposed EU measures. At the same time, the study considers whether the proposed legislation is coherent in addressing what is likely one of the most complex industries and sophisticated supply chains in the world.

PurposeTo report a case of gonioscopy-assisted transluminal trabeculotomy (GATT) in a patient with primary congenital glaucoma.ObservationsA three-year-old boy who presented with buphthalmos and elevated intraocular pressure. Despite the presence of iris and iris processes extending to Schwalbe's line, GATT was performed successfully.ConclusionsGATT may be successful with primary congenital glaucoma even when angle structures are not initially visible.

Purpose: The paper aims, from an African perspective, to investigate the practice of inconsistent custom duty valuations experienced by related MNEs and to explore the impact this may have on MNEs. Design/Methodology/Approach: Perceptions from industry experts from various African countries were sought by means of a questionnaire and supplemental literature was reviewed with a view to address the stated objectives. Findings: The main findings point to custom officials’ lack of knowledge of transfer pricing principles, possible corruption by custom officials and custom authorities keeping reference prices. The impact on MNEs appear to mainly relate to additional costs in the form of storage, consignment seizure, and lengthy court battles. Implications/Originality/Value: Strategies to address challenges arising in custom valuations suggest training of customs officials, coordination and exchange of information between relevant departments within the revenue authority and making use of advanced pricing agreements.

Purpose: The paper aims, from an African perspective, to investigate the practice of inconsistent custom duty valuations experienced by related MNEs and to explore the impact this may have on MNEs. Design/Methodology/Approach: Perceptions from industry experts from various African countries were sought by means of a questionnaire and supplemental literature was reviewed with a view to address the stated objectives. Findings: The main findings point to custom officials’ lack of knowledge of transfer pricing principles, possible corruption by custom officials and custom authorities keeping reference prices. The impact on MNEs appear to mainly relate to additional costs in the form of storage, consignment seizure, and lengthy court battles. Implications/Originality/Value: Strategies to address challenges arising in custom valuations suggest training of customs officials, coordination and exchange of information between relevant departments within the revenue authority and making use of advanced pricing agreements.

This article seeks to find a balance between a classic multilateralism and a modern minilateralism in the context of international economic relations by adopting a phenomenological and hermeneutic methodology. This text argues that such a balance allows to achieve justice, order, and generally, global well-being. In this vein, a working hypothesis is put forward as long as international trade agreements include provisions protecting human rights in the shape of erga omnes obligations and considering human dignity as supreme source of law and juridical value, the chance of eroding the system by public choice typical maneuvers is mitigated. Likewise, the cold goal of trade liberalization set forth in Article II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is provided with a sense of justice. This approach to international trade agreements suggests that fair trade and free trade can be synonyms., Com uma metodologia fenomenológico-hermenêutica e com o objetivo de encontrar um meio termo entre multilateralismo clássico e um minilateralismo moderno no contexto das relações econômicas internacionais no interesse de alcançar situações de justiça, ordem e, em geral, de bem-estar global, é proposta uma hipótese de trabalho segundo a qual, sempre que nos acordos internacionais sejam incluídas disposições de proteção dos direitos humanos como obrigações erga omnes e considerando a dignidade humana como fonte e valor supremos do direito, por um lado, diminui-se a possibilidade de corroer o sistema através de dispositivos próprios da teoria da eleição pública e, por outro lado, é possível descobrir que dá-se um sentido de justiça a uma meta fria de liberalização comercial nos termos do artigo II do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas Aduaneiras e Comércio (GATT 1994). Com esta aproximação aos acordos internacionais de comércio pode-se chegar a uma sinonímia entre comércio justo e comércio livre., Con una metodología fenomenológico-hermenéutica y con el objetivo de encontrar un término medio entre un multilateralismo clásico y un minilateralismo moderno en el contexto de las relaciones económicas internacionales en aras del logro de situaciones de justicia, orden y, en general, de bienestar global, se propone una hipótesis de trabajo según la cual, siempre que en los acuerdos internacionales se incluyan disposiciones de protección de los derechos humanos a manera de obligaciones erga omnes y considerando la dignidad humana como fuente y valor supremos del derecho, por un lado, se mitiga la posibilidad de erosionar el sistema mediante artilugios propios de la teoría de la elección pública y, por otro lado, se descubre que se le da un sentido de justicia a una fría meta de liberalización comercial en los términos del artículo II del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio. Con esta aproximación a los acuerdos internacionales de comercio puede llegarse a una sinonimia entre comercio justo y comercio libre.

The global semiconductor industry has benefited from a period of intense geographic specialization, yet faces the growing prospect of a new era of turbulence in international trade relations. Severely disrupted by exogenous shocks in global supply chains, the ability of the industry to cater to ceaseless demand growth is jeopardized by an increasing number of initiatives proposed for most industrialized economies to subsidize domestic development and production of semiconductors. The purpose of the study is to identify the array of measures currently being considered to stimulate the European semiconductor industry, along with their corresponding risk of being involved in international trade disputes based on earlier invocations of the WTO SCM Agreement. The study draws lessons from previous disputes citing the SCM Agreement to mitigate the risk of a complainant’s success in disputing the proposed EU measures. At the same time, the study considers whether the proposed legislation is coherent in addressing what is likely one of the most complex industries and sophisticated supply chains in the world.

The 2030 UN Sustainable Development Agenda defines its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in terms of human rights, rule of law and multilevel governance of related public goods. Global governance failures challenge the ‘embedded liberalism’ and rule-of-law principles underlying UN and WTO law. WTO rules promoting non-discriminatory ‘regulatory competition’ among neo-liberal Anglo-Saxon countries, China’s totalitarian state capitalism, Europe’s multilevel constitutionalism and ‘third world conceptions’ of international law are disrupted by geopolitical rivalries. This contribution explains why the SDGs cannot be realized without multilevel legal and judicial restraints on ‘market failures’ (like environmental pollution) and ‘governance failures’ (like hegemonic trade wars, US disruption of the WTO dispute settlement system). As long as international law is conceived as power politics privileging domestic interest groups, the cosmopolitan SDGs risk being undermined. Protecting human rights and de-carbonizing economies require democratic struggles for holding governments more accountable, as illustrated by citizen-driven environmental litigation in Europe and by disregard for SDGs by authoritarian and populist governments.

The 2030 UN Sustainable Development Agenda defines its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in terms of human rights, rule of law and multilevel governance of related public goods. Global governance failures challenge the ‘embedded liberalism’ and rule-of-law principles underlying UN and WTO law. WTO rules promoting non-discriminatory ‘regulatory competition’ among neo-liberal Anglo-Saxon countries, China’s totalitarian state capitalism, Europe’s multilevel constitutionalism and ‘third world conceptions’ of international law are disrupted by geopolitical rivalries. This contribution explains why the SDGs cannot be realized without multilevel legal and judicial restraints on ‘market failures’ (like environmental pollution) and ‘governance failures’ (like hegemonic trade wars, US disruption of the WTO dispute settlement system). As long as international law is conceived as power politics privileging domestic interest groups, the cosmopolitan SDGs risk being undermined. Protecting human rights and de-carbonizing economies require democratic struggles for holding governments more accountable, as illustrated by citizen-driven environmental litigation in Europe and by disregard for SDGs by authoritarian and populist governments.

The 2030 UN Sustainable Development Agenda defines its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in terms of human rights, rule of law and multilevel governance of related public goods. Global governance failures challenge the ‘embedded liberalism’ and rule-of-law principles underlying UN and WTO law. WTO rules promoting non-discriminatory ‘regulatory competition’ among neo-liberal Anglo-Saxon countries, China’s totalitarian state capitalism, Europe’s multilevel constitutionalism and ‘third world conceptions’ of international law are disrupted by geopolitical rivalries. This contribution explains why the SDGs cannot be realized without multilevel legal and judicial restraints on ‘market failures’ (like environmental pollution) and ‘governance failures’ (like hegemonic trade wars, US disruption of the WTO dispute settlement system). As long as international law is conceived as power politics privileging domestic interest groups, the cosmopolitan SDGs risk being undermined. Protecting human rights and de-carbonizing economies require democratic struggles for holding governments more accountable, as illustrated by citizen-driven environmental litigation in Europe and by disregard for SDGs by authoritarian and populist governments.

Denna uppsats har undersökt det folkrättsliga ramverket bakom EU’s autonoma sanktioner mot Ryssland. Efter Rysslands folkrättsstridiga handlingar mot våldsförbudet och non-interventionsprincipen i Ukraina 2014, antog EU ett paket av olika åtgärder mot de som ansetts ansvariga och mot viktiga sektorer av den ryska ekonomin. Sanktionerna är autonoma eftersom de har antagits oberoende av någon resolution från FN:s säkerhetsråd i enlighet med Artiklarna 39 och 41 i FN-stadgan. Autonoma sanktioner är beryktat svåra att definiera och att rättsligt kategorisera. Om åtgärderna inte strider mot någon av EU-medlemsstaternas internationella förpliktelser, kan de fritt utövas som rättsenliga retorsionshandlingar. Om de däremot är i strid med en förpliktelse, kan de bara rättfärdigas som tredjestatskontraåtgärder i statsansvarsrätten. Huvudfrågan för uppsatsen har därför varit i vilken mån EU’s autonoma sanktioner mot Ryssland kan rättfärdigas som tredjestatskontraåtgärder. Först behövde dock frågan om de strider mot EU-medlemsstaternas förpliktelser enligt WTO-rätten i traktaten GATT och GATS undersökas. Reseförbuden, frysningarna av tillgångar och vapenembargot som införts av EU kan kvalificeras som retorsionshandlingar, men de finansiella restriktionerna och handelsrestriktionerna strider mot EU-medlemsstaternas förpliktelser till icke-diskriminering under WTO-rätten. För att kvalificeras som folkrättsenliga kontraåtgärder, måste de uppfylla vissa kriterier kodifierade av ILC i Artiklarna 49-53 ARSIWA. Dilemmat/problemet är att EU-medlemsstaterna inte kan anses som direkt skadade stater utifrån Artiklarna 42 och 49 ARSIWA. Eftersom förpliktelserna som brutits av Ryssland är förpliktelser erga omnes, gentemot hela det internationella samfundet, kan EU-medlemsstaterna göra Rysslands ansvar gällande enligt Artikel 48. Rätten för icke-skadade stater att vidta kontraåtgärder är dock en av de mest splittrande och kvarvarande frågorna i statsansvarsrätten. ILC undvek frågan genom at, This thesis has examined the international legal framework for the EU’s autonomous sanctions against Russia. Following Russia’s breaches of the obligations of non-use of force and non-intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the EU adopted a package of different measures against those deemed responsible and against key sectors of the Russian economy. The sanctions are autonomous since they are imposed independently of any resolution by the UNSC under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter. Autonomous sanctions are notoriously difficult to define and legally categorise. If the measures do not violate any of the EU Member States’ international obligations, they can be freely exercised as legal acts of retorsion. If they are in breach of an obligation however, they can only be justified as third-party countermeasures under the law of State responsibility. The main question of the thesis has therefore been to what extent the EU’s autonomous sanctions against Russia could be justified as third-party countermeasures. First, the question regarding whether they are in violation of the EU Member States’ obligations under WTO law, in the treaties of GATT and GATS, had to be examined. The travel bans, the asset freezes and the arms embargo imposed by the EU can be qualified as retorsion, but the financial and trade restrictions against the Russian financial and energy sectors are in violation of the EU Member State’s obligations of non-discrimination under WTO law. To qualify as lawful countermeasures, they would have to meet certain criteria codified by the ILC in Articles 49-53 ARSIWA. The dilemma is that the EU Member States cannot be considered directly injured States within the meaning of Articles 42 and 49 ARSIWA. As the obligations breached by Russia are obligations erga omnes, owed to the international community as a whole, the EU Member States can invoke the responsibility of Russia under Article 48. The right of non-injured States to take third-party countermeasures however, i

In its over 25 years' history, the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been touted as one of the most active and successful international adjudicatory systems in relation to other international dispute settlement fora. The process in the engagement of the system presents a tripartite structure consisting of consultation, panel and appellate stages, and the enforcement proceedings. The functions of these processes help to promote the trust and confidence of the member states in the WTO trade dispute settlement system. Now the Appellate Body (AB) is paralysed following the incapacitation and consequential suspension of the appellate function of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), because of the insufficient membership caused by the United States blockade on the appointment process of AB members. The paper discusses the trajectory of the WTO dispute settlement reform from the GATT regime, the root cause of the suspension of the Appellate Body, and the options available for the disputants in and outside the WTO system. It concludes that the system possesses policy defects if the attitude of a single state can render the AB non-functional and should be transformed when the appellate system is resuscitated.

In its over 25 years' history, the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been touted as one of the most active and successful international adjudicatory systems in relation to other international dispute settlement fora. The process in the engagement of the system presents a tripartite structure consisting of consultation, panel and appellate stages, and the enforcement proceedings. The functions of these processes help to promote the trust and confidence of the member states in the WTO trade dispute settlement system. Now the Appellate Body (AB) is paralysed following the incapacitation and consequential suspension of the appellate function of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), because of the insufficient membership caused by the United States blockade on the appointment process of AB members. The paper discusses the trajectory of the WTO dispute settlement reform from the GATT regime, the root cause of the suspension of the Appellate Body, and the options available for the disputants in and outside the WTO system. It concludes that the system possesses policy defects if the attitude of a single state can render the AB non-functional and should be transformed when the appellate system is resuscitated.

Denna uppsats har undersökt det folkrättsliga ramverket bakom EU’s autonoma sanktioner mot Ryssland. Efter Rysslands folkrättsstridiga handlingar mot våldsförbudet och non-interventionsprincipen i Ukraina 2014, antog EU ett paket av olika åtgärder mot de som ansetts ansvariga och mot viktiga sektorer av den ryska ekonomin. Sanktionerna är autonoma eftersom de har antagits oberoende av någon resolution från FN:s säkerhetsråd i enlighet med Artiklarna 39 och 41 i FN-stadgan. Autonoma sanktioner är beryktat svåra att definiera och att rättsligt kategorisera. Om åtgärderna inte strider mot någon av EU-medlemsstaternas internationella förpliktelser, kan de fritt utövas som rättsenliga retorsionshandlingar. Om de däremot är i strid med en förpliktelse, kan de bara rättfärdigas som tredjestatskontraåtgärder i statsansvarsrätten. Huvudfrågan för uppsatsen har därför varit i vilken mån EU’s autonoma sanktioner mot Ryssland kan rättfärdigas som tredjestatskontraåtgärder. Först behövde dock frågan om de strider mot EU-medlemsstaternas förpliktelser enligt WTO-rätten i traktaten GATT och GATS undersökas. Reseförbuden, frysningarna av tillgångar och vapenembargot som införts av EU kan kvalificeras som retorsionshandlingar, men de finansiella restriktionerna och handelsrestriktionerna strider mot EU-medlemsstaternas förpliktelser till icke-diskriminering under WTO-rätten. För att kvalificeras som folkrättsenliga kontraåtgärder, måste de uppfylla vissa kriterier kodifierade av ILC i Artiklarna 49-53 ARSIWA. Dilemmat/problemet är att EU-medlemsstaterna inte kan anses som direkt skadade stater utifrån Artiklarna 42 och 49 ARSIWA. Eftersom förpliktelserna som brutits av Ryssland är förpliktelser erga omnes, gentemot hela det internationella samfundet, kan EU-medlemsstaterna göra Rysslands ansvar gällande enligt Artikel 48. Rätten för icke-skadade stater att vidta kontraåtgärder är dock en av de mest splittrande och kvarvarande frågorna i statsansvarsrätten. ILC undvek frågan genom at, This thesis has examined the international legal framework for the EU’s autonomous sanctions against Russia. Following Russia’s breaches of the obligations of non-use of force and non-intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the EU adopted a package of different measures against those deemed responsible and against key sectors of the Russian economy. The sanctions are autonomous since they are imposed independently of any resolution by the UNSC under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter. Autonomous sanctions are notoriously difficult to define and legally categorise. If the measures do not violate any of the EU Member States’ international obligations, they can be freely exercised as legal acts of retorsion. If they are in breach of an obligation however, they can only be justified as third-party countermeasures under the law of State responsibility. The main question of the thesis has therefore been to what extent the EU’s autonomous sanctions against Russia could be justified as third-party countermeasures. First, the question regarding whether they are in violation of the EU Member States’ obligations under WTO law, in the treaties of GATT and GATS, had to be examined. The travel bans, the asset freezes and the arms embargo imposed by the EU can be qualified as retorsion, but the financial and trade restrictions against the Russian financial and energy sectors are in violation of the EU Member State’s obligations of non-discrimination under WTO law. To qualify as lawful countermeasures, they would have to meet certain criteria codified by the ILC in Articles 49-53 ARSIWA. The dilemma is that the EU Member States cannot be considered directly injured States within the meaning of Articles 42 and 49 ARSIWA. As the obligations breached by Russia are obligations erga omnes, owed to the international community as a whole, the EU Member States can invoke the responsibility of Russia under Article 48. The right of non-injured States to take third-party countermeasures however, i

Non-PR, IFPRI4; CRP2; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry, PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Export barriers (or controls) can take a variety of forms -such as prohibitions, taxes, quotas or licenses, among others- and have been applied to industrial and agricultural products, both by developed and developing countries, while pursuing economic and non-economic goals. When both the Havana Charter - legal instrument intended to establish the International Trade Organization37- and the General Agreement on Customs Tariffs and Trade - GATT - were negotiated, measures of this type were not a major issue of concern.

Analysing disputes between the US and the EU under GATT and the WTO respectively, the paper demonstrates that the judicialization (or legalization) of international dispute settlement procedures can contribute to states’ compliance with these dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper compares four sets of pairwise similar disputes with US had with the EU: the so-called Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC) case (which arose under GATT) and the Foreign Sales Corporations case (which was settled through WTO procedures), the Steel case (GATT) and the Patents case (WTO), the two Hormones cases under GATT and the WTO respectively, and the Citrus case (GATT) and the Bananas case (WTO). In each of the four comparisons the US acted more in accordance with the judicial WTO dispute settlement procedures than with the diplomatic GATT procedures. We can therefore say that contrary to realist assumptions, the judicialization of dispute settlement procedures can contribute to their effectiveness. However, contrary to idealist assumptions the effectiveness of international dispute settlement procedures does not automatically follow from their judicialization. Yet, as assumed by institutionalists, judicialized dispute settlement procedures are better than diplomatic dispute settlement mechanisms in sustaining states’ compliance with these procedures precisely because of their normative and strategic effects.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing the biggest crisis since its inception in 1995. From 11 December, the committee that deals with WTO members’ appeals, the Appellate Body, will be left with only one judge. New appointments have been blocked by the United States. This will incapacitate the Body because the minimum require­ment for any decision is three judges. What seems to be a mere procedural issue will result in major disruptions for international trade relations and might ultimately lead to the unravelling of the existing global trade order. The EU and like-minded part­ners have three options to cope with the situation and to safeguard the WTO’s role in trade dispute settlement. The EU and its partners could either endure the stale­mate while aiming for a broader WTO reform. Or the EU could strive for an alter­native appeals mechanism within the WTO, as an interim solution. The third option would be to seek dispute settlements outside of the WTO. None of the options comes without risk of failure since there is uncertainty about the US endgame, and each move could deliver proof for the US that the WTO no longer serves its interests.

Die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) befindet sich in der größten Krise seit ihrer Gründung im Jahr 1995. Seit dem 10. Dezember 2019 ist die Berufungskammer der WTO nur noch mit einem Richter besetzt. Um Streitfälle zu schlichten, sind mindestens drei Richter nötig. Die Vereinigten Staaten blockieren jedoch die Ernennung neuer Juristinnen und Juristen für die Kammer; zudem verwehrt die US-Regierung der WTO sämtliche Zahlungen für die Finanzierung des Berufungs­gremiums. Damit ist es faktisch lahmgelegt. Was auf den ersten Blick wie eine reine Verfahrens­frage aussieht, könnte die inter­nationalen Handelsbeziehungen erheblich stören und letztlich zur Auflösung der bestehenden Welthandelsordnung führen. Die EU und gleichgesinnte Partner haben drei Optionen, die Blockade der WTO-Streitschlichtung aufzulösen: Erstens könnten sie abwarten und versuchen, mit der Trump-Regierung weiter über eine von Washington geforderte umfassende WTO-Reform zu verhandeln. Zweitens könnte die EU als Zwischenlösung einen alter­nativen Mechanismus zur Schlichtung von Streitfällen innerhalb der WTO anstreben, im besten Fall über eine plurilaterale Vereinbarung zwischen möglichst vielen WTO-Mitgliedstaaten. Drittens ist die Suche nach einer Streitbeilegung außerhalb der WTO denkbar. Jede dieser Optionen könnte scheitern, vor allem weil unklar ist, welche Verhandlungsziele die Trump-Regierung verfolgt. (Autorenreferat)

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

This research paper is an evaluation as to how far the anti-dumping laws and rules enabled WTO to resolve relevant trade disputes and to protect the interests of developing countries. The paper primarily examines in a legal and procedural paradigm, whether anti-dumping measures provided in the WTO-DSB forum and incorporated into respective foreign trade laws of countries have been effective or merely costing the importing countries, while countries that keep dumping do so with impunity, because dumping is just condemned, not prohibited.  The Article VI of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) deals with Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties. Interpretation of the Article VI.1 would reveal that:  ‘that dumping is an act by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products’. ‘In connection with the effect of Article VI on the practice of dumping itself, in the Havana Meet in 1954-55, it was agreed that contracting parties should, within the framework of their legislation, refrain from encouraging dumping, as defined in that paragraph, by private commercial enterprises’. This lopsidedness in the GATT regulations was not corrected in the WTO regulations. The cost of anti-dumping investigations and substantiating the same and all the associated consultative processes are time consuming and not evenly poised on the two parties to the dispute concerned. One instance is the unsustainable practice of DSB constituting Panel with members drawn from the country which initiated action. This goes against the very root of natural justice. One of the principles of natural justice and the related legal maxim is that, ‘No person shall sit in judgment of his/her own cause’.  Fairness demands that the members should be drawn from a third country. The structure of the panel should be three; one each from developed and developing countries and the third to be elected by majority of t

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

Previous works considering the history of American trade policy during the Cold War have tended to focus on either the United States’ export control policy in the unilateral and multilateral context or the Cold War’s influence on the formation and evolution on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. While useful, these studies are limited by their narrowness. To date, no single work has emerged accounting for trade’s place in American Cold War strategy or the reciprocal impact that economic globalization and the Cold War had on each other. I argue that American Cold War trade policy was an “economic containment” exercise. The United States’ “Commercial Cold War” was conceptualized by strategists as a struggle between two rival, yet interdependent networks—one liberal and capitalist, and led by the United States; the other communist and led at the outset by the Soviet Union. The United States used trade both positively and negatively to achieve a variety of ends. Its overarching goal was to use trade to develop its network at the expense of the Soviet Union’s. This strategy assumed centralized, flexible control over trade policy in order to capitalize on diplomatic openings. Successive American presidents aspired to such trade policy control. But the diffusion of power throughout the U.S. government and across the Western alliance rendered that impossible. It proved far easier to deny East-West trade than to expand it, and more assertive American initiatives were often stymied. But despite the limits on unilateral action, the multilateral trade architectures that were established during the Cold War proved adequate to their purposes and remain in renovated form in the 21st Century.

This research paper is an evaluation as to how far the anti-dumping laws and rules enabled WTO to resolve relevant trade disputes and to protect the interests of developing countries. The paper primarily examines in a legal and procedural paradigm, whether anti-dumping measures provided in the WTO-DSB forum and incorporated into respective foreign trade laws of countries have been effective or merely costing the importing countries, while countries that keep dumping do so with impunity, because dumping is just condemned, not prohibited.  The Article VI of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) deals with Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties. Interpretation of the Article VI.1 would reveal that:  ‘that dumping is an act by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products’. ‘In connection with the effect of Article VI on the practice of dumping itself, in the Havana Meet in 1954-55, it was agreed that contracting parties should, within the framework of their legislation, refrain from encouraging dumping, as defined in that paragraph, by private commercial enterprises’. This lopsidedness in the GATT regulations was not corrected in the WTO regulations. The cost of anti-dumping investigations and substantiating the same and all the associated consultative processes are time consuming and not evenly poised on the two parties to the dispute concerned. One instance is the unsustainable practice of DSB constituting Panel with members drawn from the country which initiated action. This goes against the very root of natural justice. One of the principles of natural justice and the related legal maxim is that, ‘No person shall sit in judgment of his/her own cause’.  Fairness demands that the members should be drawn from a third country. The structure of the panel should be three; one each from developed and developing countries and the third to be elected by majority of t

This research paper is an evaluation as to how far the anti-dumping laws and rules enabled WTO to resolve relevant trade disputes and to protect the interests of developing countries. The paper primarily examines in a legal and procedural paradigm, whether anti-dumping measures provided in the WTO-DSB forum and incorporated into respective foreign trade laws of countries have been effective or merely costing the importing countries, while countries that keep dumping do so with impunity, because dumping is just condemned, not prohibited.  The Article VI of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) deals with Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties. Interpretation of the Article VI.1 would reveal that:  ‘that dumping is an act by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products’. ‘In connection with the effect of Article VI on the practice of dumping itself, in the Havana Meet in 1954-55, it was agreed that contracting parties should, within the framework of their legislation, refrain from encouraging dumping, as defined in that paragraph, by private commercial enterprises’. This lopsidedness in the GATT regulations was not corrected in the WTO regulations. The cost of anti-dumping investigations and substantiating the same and all the associated consultative processes are time consuming and not evenly poised on the two parties to the dispute concerned. One instance is the unsustainable practice of DSB constituting Panel with members drawn from the country which initiated action. This goes against the very root of natural justice. One of the principles of natural justice and the related legal maxim is that, ‘No person shall sit in judgment of his/her own cause’.  Fairness demands that the members should be drawn from a third country. The structure of the panel should be three; one each from developed and developing countries and the third to be elected by majority of t

Desde la creación de la OMC se han recibido algunas demandas por parte de sus estados miembros todo ello respecto a la adopción de restricciones a las exportaciones. Dicha práctica supone la configuración de un nuevo tipo de proteccionismo denominado “proteccionismo inverso” el cual no parece estar regulado a cabalidad por las disposiciones del GATT. Si bien algunos de sus artículos parecen arrojar cierta luz sobre el tema, por lo que se han invocado en algunas de las diferencias de las existentes hasta la fecha –como el “Articulo VIII Derechos y Formalidades referentes a la importación y a la exportación” y el "Artículo XI Eliminación General de las Restricciones Cuantitativas", entre otros– resulta evidente la incapacidad del GATT y la OMC para remediar esta situación. Por lo tanto, dada esta carencia, es crucial dentro del sistema multilateral de comercio que se conduzca un nuevo proceso de negociación en el que se desarrolle un acuerdo definitivo que regule este tipo de políticas comerciales.

Desde la creación de la OMC se han recibido algunas demandas por parte de sus estados miembros todo ello respecto a la adopción de restricciones a las exportaciones. Dicha práctica supone la configuración de un nuevo tipo de proteccionismo denominado “proteccionismo inverso” el cual no parece estar regulado a cabalidad por las disposiciones del GATT. Si bien algunos de sus artículos parecen arrojar cierta luz sobre el tema, por lo que se han invocado en algunas de las diferencias de las existentes hasta la fecha –como el “Articulo VIII Derechos y Formalidades referentes a la importación y a la exportación” y el "Artículo XI Eliminación General de las Restricciones Cuantitativas", entre otros– resulta evidente la incapacidad del GATT y la OMC para remediar esta situación. Por lo tanto, dada esta carencia, es crucial dentro del sistema multilateral de comercio que se conduzca un nuevo proceso de negociación en el que se desarrolle un acuerdo definitivo que regule este tipo de políticas comerciales.

Basado en la teoría constructivista de análisis de relaciones internacionales e identificando los factores que operan sobre el comportamiento de los Estados, este artículo compara los momentos cruciales en la evolución del estatus internacional de España en el período de la posguerra. Nos referimos a la entrada española en el régimen internacional de intercambio comercial representado por el Acuerdo General de Tarifas y Comercio (GATT) en 1963, la inclusión de España en el Consejo de Europa en 1977, la participación del país en la OTAN desde 1982 y, por último, la entrada de España en la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE) en 1986. Argumentamos que este último hito en la trayectoria internacional española dejó poco margen a Madrid, no quedándole más remedio que establecer relaciones diplomáticas con el Estado de Israel. Esto demuestra que la presión del sistema internacional, derivada del nuevo status de España en la CEE, fue crucial para la formalización de relaciones bilaterales entre ambos países., Based on the Constructivist theoretical approach for analyzing international relations by identifying the forces which influence states behavior, this article compares major junctions in Spain’s international status and the way systemic changes influenced the course of Spanish-Israeli relations. The article looks at Madrid’s entry into the international trade regime represented by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1963, Spain’s joining the Council of Europe in 1977, Madrid’s inclusion in NATO in 1982, and its entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. We argue that this last milestone left Madrid with little option but to establish relations with Israel. This proved that systemic pressure, derived from Spain’s new status in the EEC, was crucial for the establishment of bilateral diplomatic ties.

There has been a polarised debate on the desirability of import restrictions to increase corporate accountability for child labour that occurs in global supply chains. Some scholars have indicated that states in favour of imposing import restrictions could sidestep this debate relying upon the perceptions that people in the importing market might have. They have based this argument on the case law of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (WTO DSM). The attitude-behaviour gap has, however, been largely overlooked in their analyses. This behavioural phenomenon provides an explanation as to why there is an inconsistency between what people value or believe and what they actually do. This essay revisits the WTO DSM's case law in order to determine whether such values or beliefs might justify import restrictions. On balance, this essay finds that the WTO DSM has not sufficiently taken the attitude-behaviour gap into account in its interpretation of Article III(4) and Article XX(a) 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The transatlantic trade dispute is escalating: After the United States (US) introduced additional tariffs on steel and aluminium, hectic negotiations began with the European Union (EU). First, the EU obtained a temporary derogation before increasing tariffs on a long list of particularly symbolic and politically sensitive products, such as orange juice and Harley-Davidson motorcycles. At the same time, the EU, in concert with other states, made the first move in a possible World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute procedure against the US. The US, in the meantime, has signalled the next round by deciding to examine options for tariffs on cars. Existing multinational rules leave only a limited scope for tariff increases, all of which bear the risk of further escalation. It would therefore be wise for the EU not to exhaust this leeway but to keep cool and stay liberal in its approach to trade. (Autorenreferat)

Basado en la teoría constructivista de análisis de relaciones internacionales e identificando los factores que operan sobre el comportamiento de los Estados, este artículo compara los momentos cruciales en la evolución del estatus internacional de España en el período de la posguerra. Nos referimos a la entrada española en el régimen internacional de intercambio comercial representado por el Acuerdo General de Tarifas y Comercio (GATT) en 1963, la inclusión de España en el Consejo de Europa en 1977, la participación del país en la OTAN desde 1982 y, por último, la entrada de España en la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE) en 1986. Argumentamos que este último hito en la trayectoria internacional española dejó poco margen a Madrid, no quedándole más remedio que establecer relaciones diplomáticas con el Estado de Israel. Esto demuestra que la presión del sistema internacional, derivada del nuevo status de España en la CEE, fue crucial para la formalización de relaciones bilaterales entre ambos países., Based on the Constructivist theoretical approach for analyzing international relations by identifying the forces which influence states behavior, this article compares major junctions in Spain’s international status and the way systemic changes influenced the course of Spanish-Israeli relations. The article looks at Madrid’s entry into the international trade regime represented by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1963, Spain’s joining the Council of Europe in 1977, Madrid’s inclusion in NATO in 1982, and its entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. We argue that this last milestone left Madrid with little option but to establish relations with Israel. This proved that systemic pressure, derived from Spain’s new status in the EEC, was crucial for the establishment of bilateral diplomatic ties.

In response to complaints by Ukraine, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Indonesia, the Government of Australia has defended the introduction of plain packaging of tobacco products in the World Trade Organization. This article focuses upon the legal defence of Australia before the WTO Panel. A key part of its defence has been the strong empirical evidence for the efficacy of plain packaging of tobacco products as a legitimate health measure designed to combat the global tobacco epidemic. Australia has provided a convincing case that plain packaging of tobacco products is compatible with the TRIPS Agreement 1994 – particularly the clauses relating to the aims and objectives of the agreement; the requirements in respect of trade mark law; and the parallel measures in relation to access to essential medicines. Australia has also defended the consistency of plain packaging of tobacco products with the TBT Agreement 1994. Moreover, Australia has provided clear reasons for why the plain packaging of tobacco products is compatible with GATT. The position of Australia has been reinforced by a number of third parties – such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Canada, and others - which have also been pioneers in tobacco control and public health. Australia’s leadership in respect of tobacco control and plain packaging of tobacco products is further supported by larger considerations in respect of international public health law, human rights, and sustainable development. NOTE: Matthew Rimmer was an Editor of this special issue.

Based on the Constructivist theoretical approach for analyzing international relations by identifying the forces which influence states behavior, this article compares major junctions in Spain’s international status and the way systemic changes influenced the course of Spanish-Israeli relations. The article looks at Madrid’s entry into the international trade regime represented by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1963, Spain’s joining the Council of Europe in 1977, Madrid’s inclusion in NATO in 1982, and its entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. We argue that this last milestone left Madrid with little option but to establish relations with Israel. This proved that systemic pressure, derived from Spain’s new status in the EEC, was crucial for the establishment of bilateral diplomatic ties., Basado en la teoría constructivista de análisis de relaciones internacionales e identificando los factores que operan sobre el comportamiento de los Estados, este artículo compara los momentos cruciales en la evolución del estatus internacional de España en el período de la posguerra. Nos referimos a la entrada española en el régimen internacional de intercambio comercial representado por el Acuerdo General de Tarifas y Comercio (GATT) en 1963, la inclusión de España en el Consejo de Europa en 1977, la participación del país en la OTAN desde 1982 y, por último, la entrada de España en la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE) en 1986. Argumentamos que este último hito en la trayectoria internacional española dejó poco margen a Madrid, no quedándole más remedio que establecer relaciones diplomáticas con el Estado de Israel. Esto demuestra que la presión del sistema internacional, derivada del nuevo status de España en la CEE, fue crucial para la formalización de relaciones bilaterales entre ambos países.

Based on the Constructivist theoretical approach for analyzing international relations by identifying the forces which influence states behavior, this article compares major junctions in Spain’s international status and the way systemic changes influenced the course of Spanish-Israeli relations. The article looks at Madrid’s entry into the international trade regime represented by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1963, Spain’s joining the Council of Europe in 1977, Madrid’s inclusion in NATO in 1982, and its entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. We argue that this last milestone left Madrid with little option but to establish relations with Israel. This proved that systemic pressure, derived from Spain’s new status in the EEC, was crucial for the establishment of bilateral diplomatic ties., Basado en la teoría constructivista de análisis de relaciones internacionales e identificando los factores que operan sobre el comportamiento de los Estados, este artículo compara los momentos cruciales en la evolución del estatus internacional de España en el período de la posguerra. Nos referimos a la entrada española en el régimen internacional de intercambio comercial representado por el Acuerdo General de Tarifas y Comercio (GATT) en 1963, la inclusión de España en el Consejo de Europa en 1977, la participación del país en la OTAN desde 1982 y, por último, la entrada de España en la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE) en 1986. Argumentamos que este último hito en la trayectoria internacional española dejó poco margen a Madrid, no quedándole más remedio que establecer relaciones diplomáticas con el Estado de Israel. Esto demuestra que la presión del sistema internacional, derivada del nuevo status de España en la CEE, fue crucial para la formalización de relaciones bilaterales entre ambos países.

Trends of trade disputes show that the developed countries are more active in the dispute settlement process of the World Trade Organization (WTO) than the developing countries. Our analyses show that financial strength is an important factor for countries to participate in the dispute settlement process of the WTO. It also plays significant role in winning trade disputes. Therefore, lack of financial strength could be an explanation for the low rate of participation of the small-developing countries in the dispute settlement process. A close look at the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) reveals that it has considerable inability to provide feasible remedies against unfair trade practices. This also discourages the small-developing countries to participate in the dispute settlement process. To ensure equitable participation of the developing countries in the dispute settlement process, the WTO should increase legal and technical assistance for the small-developing countries. At the same time the WTO needs to ensure quick resolution of the disputes and replace the provision of "retaliation" with other meaningful remedies.