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Abstract This article explores the consequences of extremely low real interest rates in a world with integrated but heterogeneous capital markets, nominal rigidities, and an effective lower bound [a zero lower bound (ZLB) for simplicity]. We establish four main results: (1) At the ZLB, creditor countries export their recession abroad, which we illustrate with a new Metzler diagram in quantities; (2) Beggar-thy-neighbour currency and trade wars provide stimulus to the undertaking country at the expense of other countries; (3) (Safe) public debt issuances and increases in government spending anywhere are expansionary everywhere; and (4) When there is a scarcity of safe assets, net issuers of these assets import the recession from abroad.

The secular decline in safe interest rates since the early 1980s has been the subject of considerable attention. In this short paper, we argue that it is important to consider the evolution of safe real rates in conjunction with three other first-order macroeconomic stylized facts: the relative constancy of the real return to productive capital, the decline in the labor share, and the decline and subsequent stabilization of the earnings yield. Through the lens of a simple accounting framework, these four facts offer suggestive insights into the economic forces that might be at work.

A safe asset is a simple debt instrument that is expected to preserve its value during adverse systemic events. The supply of safe assets, private and public, has historically been concentrated in a small number of advanced economies, most prominently the United States. Over the last few decades, with minor cyclical interruptions, the supply of safe assets has not kept up with global demand. The reason is straightforward: the collective growth rate of the advanced economies that produce safe assets has been lower than the world's growth rate, which has been driven disproportionately by the high growth rate of high-saving emerging economies such as China. The signature of this growing shortage is a steady increase in the price of safe assets; equivalently, global safe interest rates must decline, as has been the case since the 1980s. The early literature, brought to light by Ben Bernanke's famous "savings glut" speech of 2005, focused on a general shortage of assets without isolating its safe asset component. The distinction, however, has become increasingly important over time, particularly in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis and its sequels. We begin by describing the main facts and macroeconomic implications of safe asset shortages. Faced with such a structural conundrum, what are the likely short- to medium-term escape valves? We analyze four of them, each with its own macroeconomic and financial trade-offs.

We explore the consequences of safe asset scarcity on aggregate demand in a stylized IS-LM/Mundell Fleming style environment. Acute safe asset scarcity forces the economy into a "safety trap" recession. In the open economy, safe asset scarcity spreads from one country to the other via capital flows, equalizing interest rates. Acute global safe asset scarcity forces the economy into a global safety trap. The exchange rate becomes indeterminate but plays a crucial role in both the distribution and the magnitude of output adjustment across countries. Policies that increase the net supply of safe assets somewhere are output enhancing everywhere.

A key precursor of twentieth-century financial crises in emerging and advanced economies alike was the rapid buildup of leverage. Those emerging economies that avoided leverage booms during the 2000s also were most likely to avoid the worst effects of the twenty-first century's first global crisis. A discrete-choice panel analysis using 1973-2010 data suggests that domestic credit expansion and real currency appreciation have been the most robust and signicant predictors of financial crises, regardless of whether a country is emerging or advanced. For emerging economies, however, higher foreign exchange reserves predict a sharply reduced probability of a subsequent crisis.

A key precursor of twentieth-century financial crises in emerging and advanced economies alike was the rapid buildup of leverage. Those emerging economies that avoided leverage booms during the 2000s also were most likely to avoid the worst effects of the twenty-first century's first global crisis. A discrete-choice panel analysis using 1973-2010 data suggests that domestic credit expansion and real currency appreciation have been the most robust and signicant predictors of financial crises, regardless of whether a country is emerging or advanced. For emerging economies, however, higher foreign exchange reserves predict a sharply reduced probability of a subsequent crisis.

The paper proposes a unified framework to study the dynamics of net foreign assets and exchange rate movements. We show that deteriorations in a country's net exports or net foreign asset position have to be matched either by future net export growth (trade adjustment channel) or by future increases in the returns of the net foreign asset portfolio (hitherto unexplored financial adjustment channel). Using a newly constructed data set on US gross foreign positions, we find that stabilizing valuation effects contribute as much as 31% of the external adjustment. Our theory also has asset pricing implications. Deviations from trend of the ratio of net exports to net foreign assets predict net foreign asset portfolio returns one quarter to two years ahead and net exports at longer horizons. The exchange rate affects the trade balance and the valuation of net foreign assets. It is forecastable in and out of sample at one quarter and beyond. A one standard deviation decrease of the ratio of net exports to net foreign assets predicts an annualized 4% depreciation of the exchange rate over the next quarter.

The paper proposes a unified framework to study the dynamics of net foreign assets and exchange rate movements. We show that deteriorations in a country's net exports or net foreign asset position have to be matched either by future net export growth (trade adjustment channel) or by future increases in the returns of the net foreign asset portfolio (hitherto unexplored financial adjustment channel). Using a newly constructed data set on US gross foreign positions, we find that stabilizing valuation effects contribute as much as 31% of the external adjustment. Our theory also has asset pricing implications. Deviations from trend of the ratio of net exports to net foreign assets predict net foreign asset portfolio returns one quarter to two years ahead and net exports at longer horizons. The exchange rate affects the trade balance and the valuation of net foreign assets. It is forecastable in and out of sample at one quarter and beyond. A one standard deviation decrease of the ratio of net exports to net foreign assets predicts an annualized 4% depreciation of the exchange rate over the next quarter.

This dissertation analyzes the interaction of firm level heterogeneity and selection. This selection can encompass either the survival of firms in the market, or their participation in international trade. In the first part I concentrate on the question of how large the aggregate productivity losses from the misallocation of resources across firms are. If firm exit is endogenous, micro-frictions can induce extensive margin misallocation: inefficient firms continue to survive (Zombies) and efficient firms are forced to exit (Shadows). I develop and estimate a fully specified model with plant-level micro-data to quantify extensive margin misallocation. This method allows me to identify Zombie firms, estimate the efficiency distribution of Shadow firms and calculate aggregate Total Factor Productivity (TFP) gains when Zombies are replaced by Shadows. Estimates for Indonesia show that extensive margin misallocation can increase aggregate TFP losses from micro-distortions by over 40%. Compared to existing estimates aggregate TFP losses from micro-distortions are 50-100% higher.In the second part of the dissertation I trace out the implications of a simplified version of the framework I developed in the first part to questions of international trade. The cross-country comparisions in measured micro-distortions suggest that differences in firm heterogeneity could be potentially important to explain aggregate TFP and therefore also trade patterns. I consequently develop a tractable multi-country general equilibrium model of such differences in firm level heterogeneity across countries. I show how the model naturally links measured trade frictions to national firm-efficiency distributions and endogenously generates asymmetries in trade flows in the absence of asymmetric trade frictions. The model is able to generate key stylized facts, specifically the absence of a strong negative relationsship of firm-size dispersions and internal trade shares as predicted by the standard h

This dissertation explores the relationship between international financial markets, financial frictions, and the real economy. In particular, the dissertation focuses on the role of the United States of America (US) as the key country in the global financial architecture. The research presented here advances the study of international finance and macroeconomics by analyzing how the combination of two factors, the greater financial development of the US and financing frictions, leads to the special global roles of the US funding markets and the US dollar.In the first Chapter of the dissertation, I develop a model of financial intermediation in a closed economy, which is also the key building block of the open economy analysis in the second Chapter. In an economy with savers and financial intermediaries where financing frictions are present, the state of the financial sector becomes the key state variable. The financing frictions, modeled as the limited enforceability of deposit contracts, prevent capital from flowing freely from savers to the financial intermediaries that ultimately allocate capital to productive real assets. When financial intermediaries are well capitalized, their capital acts as a safety buffer for potential investment losses and, consequently, financing frictions are alleviated. In this state of the world, financial markets closely resemble those of the standard frictionless asset pricing framework. When, on the other hand, intermediaries are poorly capitalized, concerns for potential losses of capital disrupt the financing markets. In this state of the world, capital does not flow smoothly from savers into productive assets via financial intermediaries. In general, risky assets' prices fall and their volatility increases, thus replicating typical features of financial crises. Interestingly, these effects are highly non-linear.In the second Chapter, I provide a framework for understanding the global financial architecture as an equilibrium outco

This dissertation analyzes the interaction of firm level heterogeneity and selection. This selection can encompass either the survival of firms in the market, or their participation in international trade. In the first part I concentrate on the question of how large the aggregate productivity losses from the misallocation of resources across firms are. If firm exit is endogenous, micro-frictions can induce extensive margin misallocation: inefficient firms continue to survive (Zombies) and efficient firms are forced to exit (Shadows). I develop and estimate a fully specified model with plant-level micro-data to quantify extensive margin misallocation. This method allows me to identify Zombie firms, estimate the efficiency distribution of Shadow firms and calculate aggregate Total Factor Productivity (TFP) gains when Zombies are replaced by Shadows. Estimates for Indonesia show that extensive margin misallocation can increase aggregate TFP losses from micro-distortions by over 40%. Compared to existing estimates aggregate TFP losses from micro-distortions are 50-100% higher.In the second part of the dissertation I trace out the implications of a simplified version of the framework I developed in the first part to questions of international trade. The cross-country comparisions in measured micro-distortions suggest that differences in firm heterogeneity could be potentially important to explain aggregate TFP and therefore also trade patterns. I consequently develop a tractable multi-country general equilibrium model of such differences in firm level heterogeneity across countries. I show how the model naturally links measured trade frictions to national firm-efficiency distributions and endogenously generates asymmetries in trade flows in the absence of asymmetric trade frictions. The model is able to generate key stylized facts, specifically the absence of a strong negative relationsship of firm-size dispersions and internal trade shares as predicted by the standard h

This dissertation explores the relationship between international financial markets, financial frictions, and the real economy. In particular, the dissertation focuses on the role of the United States of America (US) as the key country in the global financial architecture. The research presented here advances the study of international finance and macroeconomics by analyzing how the combination of two factors, the greater financial development of the US and financing frictions, leads to the special global roles of the US funding markets and the US dollar.In the first Chapter of the dissertation, I develop a model of financial intermediation in a closed economy, which is also the key building block of the open economy analysis in the second Chapter. In an economy with savers and financial intermediaries where financing frictions are present, the state of the financial sector becomes the key state variable. The financing frictions, modeled as the limited enforceability of deposit contracts, prevent capital from flowing freely from savers to the financial intermediaries that ultimately allocate capital to productive real assets. When financial intermediaries are well capitalized, their capital acts as a safety buffer for potential investment losses and, consequently, financing frictions are alleviated. In this state of the world, financial markets closely resemble those of the standard frictionless asset pricing framework. When, on the other hand, intermediaries are poorly capitalized, concerns for potential losses of capital disrupt the financing markets. In this state of the world, capital does not flow smoothly from savers into productive assets via financial intermediaries. In general, risky assets' prices fall and their volatility increases, thus replicating typical features of financial crises. Interestingly, these effects are highly non-linear.In the second Chapter, I provide a framework for understanding the global financial architecture as an equilibrium outco

Three of the most important recent facts in global macroeconomics — the sustained rise in the US current account deficit, the stubborn decline in long run real rates, and the rise in the share of US assets in global portfolio — appear as anomalies from the perspective of conventional wisdom and models. Instead, in this paper we provide a model that rationalizes these facts as an equilibrium outcome of two observed forces: a) potential growth differentials among different regions of the world and, b) heterogeneity in these regions’ capacity to generate financial assets from real investments. In extensions of the basic model, we also generate exchange rate and FDI excess returns which are broadly consistent with the recent trends in these variables. More generally, the framework is flexible enough to shed light on a range of scenarios in a global equilibrium environment.

Three of the most important recent facts in global macroeconomics — the sustained rise in the US current account deficit, the stubborn decline in long run real rates, and the rise in the share of US assets in global portfolio — appear as anomalies from the perspective of conventional wisdom and models. Instead, in this paper we provide a model that rationalizes these facts as an equilibrium outcome of two observed forces: a) potential growth differentials among different regions of the world and, b) heterogeneity in these regions’ capacity to generate financial assets from real investments. In extensions of the basic model, we also generate exchange rate and FDI excess returns which are broadly consistent with the recent trends in these variables. More generally, the framework is flexible enough to shed light on a range of scenarios in a global equilibrium environment.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1996., Includes bibliographical references (p. 283-292)., by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas., Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1996., Includes bibliographical references (p. 283-292)., by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas., Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1996., Includes bibliographical references (p. 283-292)., by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas., Ph.D.

We provide an empirical and theoretical analysis of the Greek crisis of 2010. We first benchmark the crisis against all episodes of sudden stops, sovereign debt crises, and lending booms / busts in emerging and advanced economies since 1980. The decline in Greece’s output, especially investment, is deeper and more persistent than in almost any crisis on record over that period. We then propose a stylized macrofinance model to understand what happened. We find that a severe macroeconomic adjustment was inevitable given the size of the fiscal imbalance; yet, a sizable share of the crisis was also the consequence of the sudden stop that started in late 2009. Our model suggests that the size of the initial macro / financial imbalances can account for much of the depth of the crisis. When we simulate an emerging-market sudden stop with initial debt levels (government, private, and external) of an advanced economy, we obtain a Greek crisis. Finally, in recent years, the lack of recovery appears driven by elevated levels of nonperforming loans and strong price rigidities in product markets.

The Greek crisis is one of the worst in history, even in the context of recorded ‘trifecta’ crises – the combination of a sudden stop with output collapse, a sovereign debt crisis, and a lending boom/bust. This column quantifies the role of each of these factors to better understand the crisis and formulate appropriate policy responses. While fiscal consolidation was important in driving the drop in output, it accounted for only for half of that drop. Much of the remainder can be explained by the higher funding costs of the government and private sectors due to the sudden stop.

We provide an empirical and theoretical analysis of the Greek Crisis of 2010. We first benchmark the crisis against all episodes of sudden stops, sovereign debt crises, and lending boom/busts in emerging and advanced economies since 1980. The decline in Greece’s output, especially investment, is deeper and more persistent than in almost any crisis on record over that period. We then propose a stylized macro-finance model to understand what happened. We find that a severe macroeconomic adjustment was inevitable given the size of the fiscal imbalance; yet a sizable share of the crisis was also the consequence of the sudden stop that started in late 2009. Our model suggests that the size of the initial macro/financial imbalances can account for much of the depth of the crisis. When we simulate an emerging market sudden stop with initial debt levels (government, private, and external) of an advanced economy, we obtain a Greek crisis. Finally, in recent years, the lack of recovery appears driven by elevated levels of non-performing loans and strong price rigidities in product markets.