Search

The purpose of this monograph is to explore the applicability of the model used by the Canadian Strategic Advisory Team to Afghanistan (SAT) as a potential model of a whole of government approach (WGA) applied in a multinational setting in order to defeat an insurgency. In order to do so, a review of counterinsurgency theory points to the commonality of the need for the political process to be fully engaged and that a better understanding of the insurgency will lead one to better identify the relevant tools from within the WGA that can be applied. While the SAT was a onetime effort, the evidence derived from personal interviews with the architects of the SAT, as well as, journal articles and reports from within the three active Canadian government departments with influence over the SAT begins to demonstrate just how the team functioned as a WGA. Specifically, interviews were conducted to gather the intent and purpose of the SAT, how it interacted with the Afghan government, how it assisted in COIN, if it achieved the assigned goals, how it was to transition over time, and whether the model was felt to be sufficiently robust enough to be adapted into a multinational effort., The original document contains color images.

The purpose of this monograph is to explore the applicability of the model used by the Canadian Strategic Advisory Team to Afghanistan (SAT) as a potential model of a whole of government approach (WGA) applied in a multinational setting in order to defeat an insurgency. In order to do so, a review of counterinsurgency theory points to the commonality of the need for the political process to be fully engaged and that a better understanding of the insurgency will lead one to better identify the relevant tools from within the WGA that can be applied. While the SAT was a onetime effort, the evidence derived from personal interviews with the architects of the SAT, as well as, journal articles and reports from within the three active Canadian government departments with influence over the SAT begins to demonstrate just how the team functioned as a WGA. Specifically, interviews were conducted to gather the intent and purpose of the SAT, how it interacted with the Afghan government, how it assisted in COIN, if it achieved the assigned goals, how it was to transition over time, and whether the model was felt to be sufficiently robust enough to be adapted into a multinational effort. Recent experience by many of the world's modern armies has re- taught us that an insurgent cannot be defeated by the bullet alone. In fact, whether an insurgency is involved or not in today's contemporary operating environment, there is an increasing need to harness the power of the entire government, often referred to as a WGA. It is leveraging capabilities of each sector of government that will become a true multiplier in today's conflicts. This is true in Afghanistan today. Many Force Commanders have been heard to say that more must come from the interagency. In order to get the most out of the WGA is must focus its efforts on building a cohesive approach to developing the capacities of the host government from the tactical through to the strategic levels in order to gain and maintain an advan