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It is uncontroversial that humans can represent possibilities, but it is debated what this claim amounts to. Under broad views of modal cognition, many representational and reasoning systems represent possibilities at multiple levels of cognitive architecture. Under narrow views of modal cognition, there exists a special kind of higher-level modal thought, that can be measured with purpose built non-verbal modal cognition tasks. Here we ask whether object tracking mechanisms that are assumed to lack the higher-level narrow modal capacity, show behavioral signatures that are assumed to require it. We find signature of modal representation in one task, but not another. The finding suggests that there is no clear difference between tasks that tap broad and narrow modal cognition, and invites a reassessment of the evidence for the latter.

How do children learn to connect expressions (e.g "that red apple") to the real-world objects they refer to? The dominant view in developmental psychology is that children rely on descriptive information (red,apple). In contrast, linguistic theories of adult language attribute primacy to the grammar: words like "that" or "another" first establish the status of potential referents within the discourse context (old, new) before descriptions can factor in. These theories predict that reference can succeed even when the description does not match the referent. We explore this novel prediction in adults and children. Over three experiments, we found that (i) adults relied on the articles to identify the referent, even when the description did not fit, consistent with 'grammar-first' accounts; (ii) consistent with 'description-first' accounts, and unlike adults, 3-5yo children prioritized the descriptions provided by the nouns, despite being sensitive to grammatical information. This suggests that children connect expressions to referents differently from adults.

How do children learn to connect expressions (e.g "that red apple") to the real-world objects they refer to? The dominant view in developmental psychology is that children rely on descriptive information (red,apple). In contrast, linguistic theories of adult language attribute primacy to the grammar: words like "that" or "another" first establish the status of potential referents within the discourse context (old, new) before descriptions can factor in. These theories predict that reference can succeed even when the description does not match the referent. We explore this novel prediction in adults and children. Over three experiments, we found that (i) adults relied on the articles to identify the referent, even when the description did not fit, consistent with 'grammar-first' accounts; (ii) consistent with 'description-first' accounts, and unlike adults, 3-5yo children prioritized the descriptions provided by the nouns, despite being sensitive to grammatical information. This suggests that children connect expressions to referents differently from adults.

The distinctly human ability to both represent number exactly and develop symbolic number systems has raised the question of whether such number concepts are culturally constructed through symbolic systems. Although previous work with innumerate and semi-numerate groups has provided some evidence that understanding exact equality is related to numeracy, it is possible that previous failures were driven by pragmatic factors, rather than the absence of conceptual knowledge. Here, we test whether such factors affect performance on a test of exact equality in 3- to 5-year-old children by modifying previous methods to draw children’s attention to number. We find no effect of highlighting exact equality, either through framing the task as a “Number” game or as a “Sharing” game. Instead, we replicate previous findings showing a link between numeracy and an understanding of exact equality, strengthening the proposal that exact number concepts are facilitated by the acquisition of symbolic number systems.

The distinctly human ability to both represent number exactly and develop symbolic number systems has raised the question of whether such number concepts are culturally constructed through symbolic systems. Although previous work with innumerate and semi-numerate groups has provided some evidence that understanding exact equality is related to numeracy, it is possible that previous failures were driven by pragmatic factors, rather than the absence of conceptual knowledge. Here, we test whether such factors affect performance on a test of exact equality in 3- to 5-year-old children by modifying previous methods to draw children’s attention to number. We find no effect of highlighting exact equality, either through framing the task as a “Number” game or as a “Sharing” game. Instead, we replicate previous findings showing a link between numeracy and an understanding of exact equality, strengthening the proposal that exact number concepts are facilitated by the acquisition of symbolic number systems.