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Why do rebel groups undergo fragmentation? While extensive research about the consequences of rebel fragmentation exists, research on the process of fragmentation remains relatively nascent. This dissertation collects three papers on the causes of rebel group fragmentation. In the first paper, I develop a junior cadres-based explanation of fragmentation. I argue that in a centralized rebel group, factions will emerge when leaders block junior cadres’ access to senior decision-making bodies. Junior cadres who want to influence the organization’s politics therefore face a choice between remaining within the rebel group and exiting it. Factionalizing is a way to redress grievances by aggrieved junior cadres who deem peaceful mechanisms for upward mobility ineffective. Using original datasets and personal interviews, I find strong evidence supporting my argument in the case of Palestinian Fatah. In the second paper, I argue that the solution to the question of fragmentation lies in rebel socialization—specifically, military training (MT). MT increases group cohesion by strengthening horizontal bonds among combatants; vertical bonds between combatants and commanders; and members’ institutional bonds to the organization’s overall mission and esprit de corps. Members become mutually dependent, thus making splintering more costly and fragmentation less likely. I test this argument on a global sample of 83 rebel groups active between 1989 and 2010. I find that rebel groups that have recently conducted MT are less likely to fragment by about 75 percent. In the third paper, I explore the effect of foreign fighters (FFs) on rebel fragmentation, examining a number of mechanisms derived from previous research. First, I explore how reduced group dependency on local fighters, preference divergence, strategic disagreements, and member segregation increase the likelihood of fragmentation for rebel groups that recruit FFs. Second, I posit that if the foreignness of FFs in relation to

В произведениях русских писателей, затрагивающих важную и ныне тему Кавказкой войны, для обозначения сопротивления мусульман используется слово «газават», но не используется слово «джихад». В статье на обширном материале рассматривается возникновение и соотношение понятий «джихад» и «газават». А также доказывается с использованием текстов Корана и хадисов, что под джихадом Пророк понимал не террористические акты, не зверскую казнь людей, а возвышенные и благородные поступки. Авторы, полемизируя с известной концепцией Дж. Фридмана, предсказывают, но по другим основаниям, потрясения в Азии., In the works of Russian writers, touching upon the important and now the theme of the Caucasian war, the word “Gazavat” is used to denote the resistance of Muslims, but the word “Jihad” is not used. The article deals with the emergence and correlation of the concepts of “Jihad” and “Gazavat” on the extensive material. And it is also proved, using the texts of the Koran and hadith, that under Jihad the Prophet understood not terrorist acts, not brutal execution of people, but sublime and noble deeds. The authors, arguing with the well-known concept of J. Friedman, predict, but on other grounds, the turmoil in Asia., Вырăс писателĕсем хальхи вăхăтра пысăк пĕлтерĕшлĕ Кавказ вăрçи темине тапратакан хайлавĕсенче мăсăльмансен хирĕç тăрăвне палăртма джихад сăмахпа мар, газават сăмахпа усă кураççĕ. Пысăк материал çине таянса статья авторĕсем «джахад», «газават» ăнлавсем мĕнрен тухнине, вĕсен шайлашăвне пăхса тухаççĕ. Кунсăр пуçне Коран тексчĕсемпе тата хадиссемпе уса курса, статьяра, джихад тени шутне Пророк террор акчĕсене мар, çынсене тискерле вĕлернине мар, пархатарлă та тава тивĕслĕ ĕçе кĕртнине кăтартнă. Дж. Фридманăн паллă концепцине сивлесе авторсем Азие малашне пачах урăх пăтăрмах тавраш кĕтнине сăлтавласа пĕлтереççĕ.

Статья посвящена анализу влияния «арабской весны» на развитие ситуации в Палестине. Автор приходит к выводу о том, что «палестинская весна» не привела к существенным изменениям в автономии. Власть ФАТХ на Западном берегу и ХАМАС в секторе Газа не пошатнулась, стороны не преодолели раскол, а оккупация Израилем палестинских территорий продолжилась. Вместе с тем автор отмечает, что говорить о провале «палестинской весны» было бы некорректно, так как изначально выступления палестинских активистов имели ограниченный и спорадический характер., The article analyzes the “Arab spring’”s impact on the state affairs in Palestine. The author comes to the conclusion that the “Palestinian spring” did not lead to significant changes in the autonomy. The Fatah authorities in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip have not been shaken, the parties have not overcome the split between them, and Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories has continued. At the same time, the author points out that it would be wrong to speak about the failure of the “Palestinian spring”, since initially the protests of Palestinian activists were limited and sporadic.

The purpose of this report is to present a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designated by the Secretary of State that poses as a threat to U.S. national interests. This report contains an analysis of current research on the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade's past, present, and foreseeable status. An investigation into AAMB's past attacks is imminent to thwarting future attacks. This report will provide a method of analysis to identify gaps and trends in Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade's past attacks. The findings from the analysis will pave the way for further research to benefit national security.

The purpose of this report is to present a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designated by the Secretary of State that poses as a threat to U.S. national interests. This report contains an analysis of current research on the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade's past, present, and foreseeable status. An investigation into AAMB's past attacks is imminent to thwarting future attacks. This report will provide a method of analysis to identify gaps and trends in Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade's past attacks. The findings from the analysis will pave the way for further research to benefit national security.

This thesis first and foremost analyzes and compares Hamas and Fatah's political documents from 2005 and 2009 respectively, and how Israel is portrayed as the enemy in these documents. The theoretical framework focuses on enemy images, but also includes concepts such as national identity, intractable conflicts, intergroup relations and the Other. These concepts are necessary to broaden my analysis and capture the complexity of the situation I am analyzing. Enemy images emerges through psychological processes, specific social and political contexts and intergroup relations and are related to phenomenons such as negative stereotypes, predjudice and discrimination which can have devastating consequences. Both Fatah and Hamas have developed since there inception and are now, politically, not that far apart. The image of Israel as the enemy is clear in both the organizations documents and similar language is used when it comes to the palestinian people and the conflict. The comparison is interesting since the media image of Hamas as a terrorist organization and Fatah (as part of the PLO) as a legitimate represantative for the Palestinian people is clearly simplified. It might not be incorrect but when their more modern documents are compared, the difference between them are not very striking.

This thesis first and foremost analyzes and compares Hamas and Fatah's political documents from 2005 and 2009 respectively, and how Israel is portrayed as the enemy in these documents. The theoretical framework focuses on enemy images, but also includes concepts such as national identity, intractable conflicts, intergroup relations and the Other. These concepts are necessary to broaden my analysis and capture the complexity of the situation I am analyzing. Enemy images emerges through psychological processes, specific social and political contexts and intergroup relations and are related to phenomenons such as negative stereotypes, predjudice and discrimination which can have devastating consequences. Both Fatah and Hamas have developed since there inception and are now, politically, not that far apart. The image of Israel as the enemy is clear in both the organizations documents and similar language is used when it comes to the palestinian people and the conflict. The comparison is interesting since the media image of Hamas as a terrorist organization and Fatah (as part of the PLO) as a legitimate represantative for the Palestinian people is clearly simplified. It might not be incorrect but when their more modern documents are compared, the difference between them are not very striking.

U.S.-Israel defense, diplomatic, and economic cooperation has been close for decades. U.S. policymakers often consider Israel's security as they make policy choices in the region. Israel has relied on U.S. support for its defense posture. Congress provides active oversight of the executive branch's dealings with Israel. Some Members of Congress oppose what they perceive as insufficiently critical U.S. support of Israel. Other Members of Congress have criticized actions by the Obama Administration and previous U.S. administrations for being insufficiently supportive of Israel, and occasionally have authorized and appropriated funding for programs benefitting Israel at a level exceeding that requested by the executive branch. During 2011, Israel did not face any conventional military attacks, but its security perceptions changed as several surrounding Arab countries experienced political upheavals. Israel has few means of influencing political outcomes in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, or Jordan, but developments in those states may significantly affect Israeli security. Israelis have expressed concern that Islamist governments hostile to Israel and the West could gain power in countries undergoing transitions. Political change in the Arab world and continuing stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process have partly driven the PLO's pursuit of greater international recognition of Palestinian statehood. Those factors may also be increasing the prospect of Hamas's integration into Palestinian organs of governance, despite ongoing tensions between Hamas and rival faction Fatah. These developments and Israeli reactions to them have reinforced and perhaps deepened the political impasse on core issues of Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- security parameters, borders, Jewish settlements, water rights, Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Israeli leaders have renewed their calls for urgent international action against Iran's nuclear program., CRS Report for Congress.

This report provides an overview of current issues in U.S.-Palestinian relations and it also contains an overview of Palestinian society and politics and descriptions of key Palestinian individuals and groups--chiefly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Authority (PA), Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian refugee population. For more information, see the following: CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report R40664, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by Carol Migdalovitz. The "Palestinian question" is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state neighbors, but to many countries and non-state actors in the region and around the world-- including the United States--for a variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. U.S. policy toward the Palestinians since the advent of the Oslo process in the early-1990s has been marked by efforts to establish a Palestinian state through a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and establish norms of democracy, accountability, and good governance within the PA. Congressional views of the issue have reflected concern that U.S. bilateral assistance not detrimentally affect Israel's security by falling into the hands of Palestinian rejectionists who advocate terrorism and violence against Israelis., CRS Report for Congress.

Far from being solely a terrorist organization, Hamas is a heterogeneous movement that uses both violence and political participation to achieve its main objective, which is to stay in power and preserve its identity. Two opinions about Hamas are prevalent. According to the first opinion, Hamas is a radical, terrorist organization. The policy implication of this opinion is simple: Hamas cannot be reformed and will continue to use violence until it is neutralized. According to the second opinion, Hamas is a social movement that does not necessarily need to use violence. This school of thought sees Hamas as a movement that can learn to refrain from violence. The policy implication of this opinion is that Hamas' participation in politics will help it transition into a nonviolent organization. Both perspectives emphasize only a particular part of Hamas, either its use of violence or its political development. But Hamas must be analyzed and understood by the complexity of its organization and the interdependency of its actions to internal and external influences. Therefore, it is important to pose the following questions: (1) What are the domestic, international, and internal organizational factors that shape Hamas' behavior and lead to either pragmatic nonviolent action or the use of violence?; and (2) Is Hamas' ideological movement driven by absolute religious principles that cannot be compromised, or is it a pragmatic organization capable of justifying compromise even on a seemingly immutable doctrine? This thesis asserts a middle position: Hamas' decision to act depends on two factors, its internal situation and the political and situational circumstances on the ground in Palestine. The middle position implies that the situation on the ground can be influenced in a way that gives Hamas little or no incentive to use violence.

La ofensiva contra Gaza buscaba, en palabras del presidente israelí Simón Peres, “dar una lección” a Hamás que, a pesar del boicot internacional y del bloqueo económico israelí, ha logrado conservar el gobierno en la franja. Tras 10 días de encarnizados bombardeos, el Consejo de Seguridad aprobó la resolución 1860 que llamaba a un alto el fuego inmediato. Israel declaró un alto el fuego unilateral el 17 de enero de 2009, tras firmar un memorando con EEUU que intensificaba la cooperación en la lucha contra el contrabando de armas hacia Gaza. Poco después, Hamás proclamó su “victoria” y también anunció la interrupción de las hostilidades. La posibilidad de que, a pesar de su elevado número de víctimas, el enfrentamiento termine sin vencedores ni perdedores es altamente probable. Pese a haber sufrido un elevado número de bajas, Hamás podría conservar el control de Gaza y, además, forzar la apertura de los pasos fronterizos para poner fin a la crisis humanitaria. Por su parte, Israel podría frenar el contrabando de armas a Hamás y conseguir una presencia internacional en la frontera con Egipto, pero deberá pagar un elevado precio por ello ya que la desproporcionalidad de su ofensiva ha socavado su imagen a nivel internacional. La viabilidad de este frágil alto el fuego dependerá del grado de implicación de la comunidad internacional no sólo en la resolución de esta crisis, sino también en la reactivación de las negociaciones de paz.

La ofensiva contra Gaza buscaba, en palabras del presidente israelí Simón Peres, “dar una lección” a Hamás que, a pesar del boicot internacional y del bloqueo económico israelí, ha logrado conservar el gobierno en la franja. Tras 10 días de encarnizados bombardeos, el Consejo de Seguridad aprobó la resolución 1860 que llamaba a un alto el fuego inmediato. Israel declaró un alto el fuego unilateral el 17 de enero de 2009, tras firmar un memorando con EEUU que intensificaba la cooperación en la lucha contra el contrabando de armas hacia Gaza. Poco después, Hamás proclamó su “victoria” y también anunció la interrupción de las hostilidades. La posibilidad de que, a pesar de su elevado número de víctimas, el enfrentamiento termine sin vencedores ni perdedores es altamente probable. Pese a haber sufrido un elevado número de bajas, Hamás podría conservar el control de Gaza y, además, forzar la apertura de los pasos fronterizos para poner fin a la crisis humanitaria. Por su parte, Israel podría frenar el contrabando de armas a Hamás y conseguir una presencia internacional en la frontera con Egipto, pero deberá pagar un elevado precio por ello ya que la desproporcionalidad de su ofensiva ha socavado su imagen a nivel internacional. La viabilidad de este frágil alto el fuego dependerá del grado de implicación de la comunidad internacional no sólo en la resolución de esta crisis, sino también en la reactivación de las negociaciones de paz.

The United States and Jordan have maintained a valuable and mutually supportive relationship for decades as a result of shared interests in a moderate, prosperous, and stable Middle East. This monograph highlights Jordan's ongoing value as a U.S. ally and considers ways the U.S.-Jordanian alliance might be used to contain and minimize problems of concern to both countries. Although Jordan is not a large country, it is an important geographical crossroads within the Middle East and has been deeply involved in many of the most important events in the region's recent history. Now, the importance of this relationship has increased, and Jordan has emerged as a vital U.S. ally in efforts to stabilize Iraq and resist violent extremism and terrorism throughout the region. Dr. Terrill notes the importance of Jordanian political reform, but also recommends patience, opposing the idea of coercing Jordan on democratization issues while Amman is currently struggling to cope with severe refugee and terrorism problems resulting from the war in Iraq. He devotes considerable attention to threats against Jordan emanating from the ongoing terrorist activity and sectarian warfare in Iraq. Dr. Terrill takes an especially close look at the Jordanian programs to train 50,000 Iraqi police officers as well as Special Operations forces of a variety of friendly Arab countries. The monograph also considers the broader implications for the United States and the region if the Jordanian government is crippled in its ability to function by spillover problems from Iraq. Jordanian differences with Iran, which go back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, also are considered. While such differences are serious and have worsened since 2003, Jordan remains interested in improving its relations with Tehran. On the Israeli-Palestinian front, Amman is seeking ways to calm the West Bank and Gaza Strip and serve as an advocate of Palestinian rights while maintaining normal relations with Israel., ISBN 1-58487-335-3

L'article analyse les mutations du leadership palestinien depuis Oslo, mutations qu'il faut placer dans une double perspective historique (querelles intestines à l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine depuis sa fondation en 1964) et sociologique (qui gouverne quoi, par quels biais et au nom de qui?). L'article suggère que, pour pouvoir apprécier la nature du conflit qui oppose actuellement le Fatah au Hamas, il faut remonter à 1994-et comprendre comment une ancienne garde de l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) de retour d'exil (les «returneesD>>) a alors noué une alliance avec certains leaders des Territoires, faisant de l'Autorité palestinienne le véhicule privilégié pour le maintien d'un réseau néopatrimonial autour d'Arafat. En se basant sur plusieurs interviews et une analyse sociologique de quelques institutions clés palestiniennes (Parlement, Forces de sécurité, Ministère de l'intérieur, etc.), l'article offre de nouvelles pistes pour comprendre l'émergence d'une nouvelle génération de militants, aussi bien au sein du Fatah que du Hamas, qui a au final débouché sur une impasse après le coup militaire du Hamas à Gaza en juin 2007., This paper analyzes the evolution of the Palestinian leadership since Oslo against the backdrop of long-term institutional changes within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since 1964. It argues that the current clashes between Hamas and Fatah can be in part understood as a continuation of the tension that arose after Oslo between the so-called 'PLO-returness' and the 'insider' leadership. In this respect, the second Intifada needs to be considered as an internal Palestinian revolt against part of its leadership. To understand the current stalemates around key institutions (Prime Minister, Palestinian Legislative Council, Ministry of the Interior, Security Forces, etc.), this paper proposes a sociological analysis of these key ruling institutions and offers insights into the rise of a new generation of politicians, both within Hamas and Fatah.

L'article analyse les mutations du leadership palestinien depuis Oslo, mutations qu'il faut placer dans une double perspective historique (querelles intestines à l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine depuis sa fondation en 1964) et sociologique (qui gouverne quoi, par quels biais et au nom de qui?). L'article suggère que, pour pouvoir apprécier la nature du conflit qui oppose actuellement le Fatah au Hamas, il faut remonter à 1994-et comprendre comment une ancienne garde de l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) de retour d'exil (les «returneesD>>) a alors noué une alliance avec certains leaders des Territoires, faisant de l'Autorité palestinienne le véhicule privilégié pour le maintien d'un réseau néopatrimonial autour d'Arafat. En se basant sur plusieurs interviews et une analyse sociologique de quelques institutions clés palestiniennes (Parlement, Forces de sécurité, Ministère de l'intérieur, etc.), l'article offre de nouvelles pistes pour comprendre l'émergence d'une nouvelle génération de militants, aussi bien au sein du Fatah que du Hamas, qui a au final débouché sur une impasse après le coup militaire du Hamas à Gaza en juin 2007., This paper analyzes the evolution of the Palestinian leadership since Oslo against the backdrop of long-term institutional changes within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since 1964. It argues that the current clashes between Hamas and Fatah can be in part understood as a continuation of the tension that arose after Oslo between the so-called 'PLO-returness' and the 'insider' leadership. In this respect, the second Intifada needs to be considered as an internal Palestinian revolt against part of its leadership. To understand the current stalemates around key institutions (Prime Minister, Palestinian Legislative Council, Ministry of the Interior, Security Forces, etc.), this paper proposes a sociological analysis of these key ruling institutions and offers insights into the rise of a new generation of politicians, both within Hamas and Fatah.

At the end of November 2007, the Bush Administration convened an international conference in Annapolis, Maryland, to officially revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas reached a "Joint Understanding," in which they agreed to launch continuous bilateral negotiations in an effort to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008 and to simultaneously implement the moribund 2003 Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Both leaders are operating under significant domestic political constraints and they continue to disagree on many issues. Thus, their negotiations will be challenging. This report will not be updated. For background and future developments, see CRS Report RL33530, "Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy," by Carol Migdalovitz., CRS Report for Congress.

To gain the size and capabilities of an insurgency, a would-be insurgent movement must create a politically relevant identity; it must espouse a cause that is popular beyond the group; it must gain dominance over rival organizations; and it must find a sanctuary that provides respite from police, intelligence, and military services. Violence is instrumental in all the tasks proto-insurgencies seek to accomplish. Support from outside states offers numerous advantages to groups seeking to become insurgencies. It can provide safe haven, money, training, and help with political mobilization. It can also help groups overcome logistical difficulties, hinder intelligence-gathering against them, and legitimize them, making government delegitimization efforts almost impossible. Outside states, however, often deliberately try to control or even weaken the group and at times can reduce its political popularity. The reaction of the state is often the most important factor in a movement's overall success. Perhaps the best and most efficient way to prevent proto-insurgents from gaining ground is through in-group policing. The government can also promote rival identities. Governments must, however, recognize the proto-insurgents' weaknesses and avoid overreaction that may inadvertently strengthen them. The most obvious action for the United States is to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes. Appendix A looks at the experiences of four armed groups -- the Lebanese Hizballah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and the Islamic Group (IG), and the Palestinian organization Fatah until 1993 -- and examines why Hizballah became a successful insurgent movement, while EIJ and Fatah never made this leap despite being enduring terrorist groups. Appendix B examines the possibility of an insurgency in Saudi Arabia today. Finally, Appendix C describes some measures that indicate when proto-insurgencies may grow into full-blown insurgent movements., RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Paper 3. ISBN 978-0-8330-4136-4.

The new Palestinian unity government established in March 2007 complicates U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the peace process. When Hamas took power last year, the Bush Administration, along with its Quartet partners and Israel, responded by cutting off contact with and halting assistance to the PA. The Administration sought to isolate and remove Hamas while supporting moderates in Fatah, led by President Mahmud Abbas. The international sanctions have not driven Hamas from power, and instead, some assert they may have provided an opening for Iran to increase its influence among Palestinians by filling the void. Now that Hamas and Fatah are sharing power, it will be harder to isolate Hamas. The United States and European countries have held meetings with non-Hamas members of the new government, while Israel continues to rule out all contact with PA ministers. Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, are pressing for recognition of the new government and an end to the international boycott. Some observers believe Saudi efforts to gain acceptance of the unity government and restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks may be an effort to set the price for Saudi cooperation on other U.S. policies in the region. In 2006, Congress passed P.L. 109-446, the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, to tighten existing restrictions on aid to the Palestinians. In 2007, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R. 1856, which would amend the original Act to further restrict contact with and assistance to the PA. This report will be updated as events warrant., CRS Report for Congress. The original document contains color images.

The following project focuses on the last four years of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, starting with the outbreak of the Palestinian II Intifada in September 2000. Its main purpose is to analyze different interests and perspectives of the parties directly involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as those of the international community. Israelis and Palestinians view their environment through different lenses and the key question that the international community should pose is not whether a party to the conflict is right or wrong about certain issues, but how do the parties perceive the issue at the time, whether their perceptions can be changed and can their perceptions be compatible with those of the other party. The main thesis of this project is: that different perceptions and misunderstood assumptions about the objectives, the central beliefs of the parties involved in the conflict, and their unwillingness to make concessions, were the main reasons for bringing the peace process to a standstill. Proposed solutions to this failure are also offered., ISSN 1863-6039.

While the Global War on Terror rages, another insidious conflict plays out not in traditional battlespace, but in the hearts and minds of the broad spectrum of modern civilization. For thousands of years people have warred over ideas, over fissures and chasms between differing ideologies, over religious and sectarian tensions, over poorly timed political statements, over art and poetry, and even over dates on calendars. Where history proves that the volatility of these issues can unite or shatter fragile unions, mutually inclusive issues that once were the only bonds between different cultures are now the last tenuous ligaments between societies torn internally by radical ideas and subversive threats. These links are the fronts in a culture war that rages daily across the entire spectrum of state-to-state and culture-to-culture relationships. In newspapers and on television around the globe, an emotionally explosive war rages: the underdog status quo of civility, mutual concern, and respect for inclusive facets of civilization versus militant extremism, subversive multiculturalism, and apathetic political agendas. The fronts of this battle lie not in the deserts of the Southwest Asia or the jungles of South America, but in global educational institutions, political and diplomatic forums, religious establishments, informational media outlets, and capitalist marketplaces. This paper will present a brief relevant history of American culture and the multicultural movement in the West, examine global influences in the culture war, and outline the Islamist and Salafist movements and their aggregate effect on the culture war played out in the United States and abroad. Finally, a presentation of possible results and prescriptions for positive outcomes will be presented in the context of the Global War on Terror from a Fourth Generation Warfare perspective.

Varför vann Hamas valet? Valresultatet som blivit så uppmärksammat och ifrågasatt av omvärlden vill vi undersöka. Vårt syfte är att hitta en förklaring till varför det palestinska folket röstade på ett av omvärlden terrorstämplat parti. I vår undersökning utgår vi från fyra olika väljarteorier som kan härledas till den politiska kontexten. Teorierna förklarar valresultat utifrån 1) ideologisk närhet 2) politisk agenda 3) tydlighet i kommunikation av ståndpunkter 4) partiernas kompetens. Med utgångspunkt i teorierna och med hjälp av survey-undersökningar undersöker vi Hamas och Fatah samt folkets uppfattningar om respektive parti. Vår slutsats är att Hamas vann valet för att folket protesterade mot korruptionen inom Fatah och deras oförmåga att upprätthålla lag och ordning. En förutsättning för valutgången var också att Hamas hemmafrågor var högst upp på agendan tiden innan valet.

Varför vann Hamas valet? Valresultatet som blivit så uppmärksammat och ifrågasatt av omvärlden vill vi undersöka. Vårt syfte är att hitta en förklaring till varför det palestinska folket röstade på ett av omvärlden terrorstämplat parti. I vår undersökning utgår vi från fyra olika väljarteorier som kan härledas till den politiska kontexten. Teorierna förklarar valresultat utifrån 1) ideologisk närhet 2) politisk agenda 3) tydlighet i kommunikation av ståndpunkter 4) partiernas kompetens. Med utgångspunkt i teorierna och med hjälp av survey-undersökningar undersöker vi Hamas och Fatah samt folkets uppfattningar om respektive parti. Vår slutsats är att Hamas vann valet för att folket protesterade mot korruptionen inom Fatah och deras oförmåga att upprätthålla lag och ordning. En förutsättning för valutgången var också att Hamas hemmafrågor var högst upp på agendan tiden innan valet.

This thesis is an analysis of articles published in the Palestinian newspaper al-Quds concerning the escalated conflicts within the Fatah movement during the summer in 2004. The study is done on the basis of the assumption that The Palestinian Authority (PA) expects the domestic media institutions to support the official objectives and, in this case most important, the national unity. My investigation reveals that the articles are indeed highly adjusted and purposed to unify and to hinder further growing instability, both in the political sphere and in the streets. The message urging for unification under the PA is constantly, directly and indirectly, repeated throughout the articles by the choice of themes and references as well as by the choice of individuals and organisations delivering statements.

This thesis is an analysis of articles published in the Palestinian newspaper al-Quds concerning the escalated conflicts within the Fatah movement during the summer in 2004. The study is done on the basis of the assumption that The Palestinian Authority (PA) expects the domestic media institutions to support the official objectives and, in this case most important, the national unity. My investigation reveals that the articles are indeed highly adjusted and purposed to unify and to hinder further growing instability, both in the political sphere and in the streets. The message urging for unification under the PA is constantly, directly and indirectly, repeated throughout the articles by the choice of themes and references as well as by the choice of individuals and organisations delivering statements.

This thesis is an analysis of articles published in the Palestinian newspaper al-Quds concerning the escalated conflicts within the Fatah movement during the summer in 2004. The study is done on the basis of the assumption that The Palestinian Authority (PA) expects the domestic media institutions to support the official objectives and, in this case most important, the national unity. My investigation reveals that the articles are indeed highly adjusted and purposed to unify and to hinder further growing instability, both in the political sphere and in the streets. The message urging for unification under the PA is constantly, directly and indirectly, repeated throughout the articles by the choice of themes and references as well as by the choice of individuals and organisations delivering statements.

Israel's assault on West Bank Palestinian towns throughout April 2002 and its even longer siege and then occupation of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat's presidential compound in Ramallah have raised legitimate questions about how long Arafat will remain in power in Palestine. After all, Arafat is already older than King Husayn of Jordan and Hafiz al-Asad of Syria were at the time of their deaths in recent years, and Arafat has suffered from a number of physical ailments, particularly since his near-fatal plane crash in Libya. In addition to the ravages of time, Arafat must also worry about assassination attempts, either from Palestinian dissidents or Israeli commandoes. Even as the siege of Arafat is coming to an end, the questions of his physical longevity and of political succession in Palestine only intensify. The intent of this essay is not to predict which personality will eventually succeed Arafat, but rather to outline some of the major issues that will define the succession process when it occurs., Published in Strategic Insights, v1 n3, May 2002. The original document contains color images.

Since 1964 the Fedayeen organizations have become a major factor in the politics of the Middle East. These groups have not only been the source of disagreements and discussions between Israel, the Arab States, other nations, and the United Nations but also they have been the source of conflict within the separate states. The purpose of this thesis is to give some proposals or conditions by which the United States may recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as a separate entity. In order to provide valid proposals, the emphasis of the study will be on the PLO, the Fedayeen, their organization and positions, and the United States' positions on this subject. Concerning the latter, the position of Israel is included because of the historical ties between the two nations. The thesis is divided into four major areas: the rise of the Fedayeen and its current place in international politics; the organization of the PLO and Fedayeen's major groups; the United States' position; and proposals. (Author)

Since 1964 the Fedayeen organizations have become a major factor in the politics of the Middle East. These groups have not only been the source of disagreements and discussions between Israel, the Arab states, other nations, and the United Nations but also they have been the source of conflict within the separate states. The purpose of this thesis is to give some proposals or conditions by which the United States may recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as a separate entity. In order to provide valid proposals, the emphasis of the study will be on the PLO, the Fedayeen, their organization and positions, and the United States' positions on this subject. Concerning the latter, the position of Israel is included because of the historical ties between the two nations. The thesis is divided into four major areas: the rise of the Fedayeen and its current place in international politics; the organization of the PLO and Fedayeen's major groups; the United States' position; and proposals., http://archive.org/details/conditionsforuni1094517707, Major, United States Air Force, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.