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This chapter discusses the foundations of a future-oriented rights-based approach. It sketches some questions regarding the political dimension of the topic. The chapter also discusses the ethical significance of risk and uncertainty, and outlines how those questions are related to issues of more general cultural and philosophical significance. Respect for the basic rights of people requires likewise that we ensure that future people are able to live an autonomous life and that current people are able to decide themselves about basic aspects of their life. Hence, there is a duty to implement democratic institutions worldwide for future generations to inherit. The chapter concludes with some methodological issues regarding the appropriate form of an ethical debate, and attempts to outline what an appropriate attitude towards an 'ethics of the future' might be. It is impossible to do justice to the problem without discussing quite fundamental questions of our understanding of politics, history and the place of human beings in the world.

Dit stuk bespreekt de ‘vluchtelingencrisis’ in het licht van het concept ‘menselijke waardigheid’ – het basisprincipe van het mensenrechtenregime. Mensen ‘verkrijgen’ waardigheid niet pas als ze op Europese grond zijn. Maar als dat zo is, hebben wij ook verdergaande verplichtingen jegens mensen buiten Europa die ons politieke handelen zouden moeten leiden.

This bibliography, which is intended as a resource for public action as well as for further work in the NOVAMIGRA project, collects important references from philosophy as well as, to an extent, from other disciplines such as anthropology and law. These references concern (1) articulations of central normative concepts such as values, norms and (human) rights; (2) important approaches for conceiving of the relations between these concepts. We call these approaches the rights-/norms-based approach and the value-based approach and they also offer two distinct ways to reconstruct the EU’s normative commitments. (3) The bibliography concludes with a section with references that specifically concern refugees.

This chapter investigates how human dignity might be understood as a normative concept for the regulation of technologies. First, various distinctions that are relevant for the way human dignity can be understood are discussed. It is argued that it is particularly important that we should see human dignity as a concept that ascribes a specific status that forms the basis of the human rights regimes. Second, the author’s own approach, inspired by Kant and Gewirth, is presented, it being proposed that we should see the concrete content of human dignity as the protection of the authority of human beings to govern their own lives. Third, various consequences for the evaluation of technologies are discussed. In a context of major global and ecological challenges, together with the replacement of human action by automation, the role of human dignity becomes one of guiding the development of a technology-responsive human rights regime.

Radboud University, 23 mei 2017, Promotores : Slors, M.V.P., Bransen, J.A.M., Cassam, Q. Co-promotores : Geurts, B., Schwitzgebel, E., Düwell, M., Contains fulltext : 172884.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access), 1. Introduction 1. The Gist of the Thesis: Atomism versus Holism Do you have self-knowledge of your intention to be at work on time tomorrow if you’ve had a few drinks too many? Do you know that you want a divorce if you express your desire during a fit of anger? Do you know your own desires, hopes and beliefs if you’re depressed, insecure, or got out of bed on the wrong side of the bed? Do you have self-knowledge of your desire to buy a healthy quinoa salad rather than fish-and-chips for lunch, if it’s evident that you’ve been ‘nudged’? Do you have self-knowledge of your belief that having a baby boy is better than having a baby girl, if you’ve been manipulated by state propaganda? These are fundamental and difficult questions about self-knowledge; about what it means to know your own beliefs, desires, hopes, intentions and other attitudes. The answers to these questions are by no means obvious. The aim of this thesis is not to provide a concrete answer to such questions, but rather to ask what is required in order to answer them. More specifically, the aim is to explore whether contemporary philosophical theories of self-knowledge have the materials to handle such questions in a satisfactory manner, i.e. in a way that respects their subtleties and intricacies. The current philosophical debate on self-knowledge is mostly concerned with the question of whether self-knowledge is a matter of looking into our minds (introspectionism), interpreting our minds (interpretivism), speaking our minds (expressivism) or making up our minds (rationalism). Hence, when working on self-knowledge, one of the first questions one is confronted with is whether one is an ‘introspectionist’, ‘interpretationist’, ‘expressivist’, ‘rationalist’, or perhaps a ‘pluralist’ of some sort. In other words, much of the current self-knowledge debate focuses on the methods or procedures of self-knowledge, their differences, similarities and (in)compatibilities. The focus of this thesis will instead b

Radboud University, 23 mei 2017, Promotores : Slors, M.V.P., Bransen, J.A.M., Cassam, Q. Co-promotores : Geurts, B., Schwitzgebel, E., Düwell, M., Contains fulltext : 172884.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access), 1. Introduction 1. The Gist of the Thesis: Atomism versus Holism Do you have self-knowledge of your intention to be at work on time tomorrow if you’ve had a few drinks too many? Do you know that you want a divorce if you express your desire during a fit of anger? Do you know your own desires, hopes and beliefs if you’re depressed, insecure, or got out of bed on the wrong side of the bed? Do you have self-knowledge of your desire to buy a healthy quinoa salad rather than fish-and-chips for lunch, if it’s evident that you’ve been ‘nudged’? Do you have self-knowledge of your belief that having a baby boy is better than having a baby girl, if you’ve been manipulated by state propaganda? These are fundamental and difficult questions about self-knowledge; about what it means to know your own beliefs, desires, hopes, intentions and other attitudes. The answers to these questions are by no means obvious. The aim of this thesis is not to provide a concrete answer to such questions, but rather to ask what is required in order to answer them. More specifically, the aim is to explore whether contemporary philosophical theories of self-knowledge have the materials to handle such questions in a satisfactory manner, i.e. in a way that respects their subtleties and intricacies. The current philosophical debate on self-knowledge is mostly concerned with the question of whether self-knowledge is a matter of looking into our minds (introspectionism), interpreting our minds (interpretivism), speaking our minds (expressivism) or making up our minds (rationalism). Hence, when working on self-knowledge, one of the first questions one is confronted with is whether one is an ‘introspectionist’, ‘interpretationist’, ‘expressivist’, ‘rationalist’, or perhaps a ‘pluralist’ of some sort. In other words, much of the current self-knowledge debate focuses on the methods or procedures of self-knowledge, their differences, similarities and (in)compatibilities. The focus of this thesis will instead b

Radboud University, 23 mei 2017, Promotores : Slors, M.V.P., Bransen, J.A.M., Cassam, Q. Co-promotores : Geurts, B., Schwitzgebel, E., Düwell, M., Contains fulltext : 172884.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access), 1. Introduction 1. The Gist of the Thesis: Atomism versus Holism Do you have self-knowledge of your intention to be at work on time tomorrow if you’ve had a few drinks too many? Do you know that you want a divorce if you express your desire during a fit of anger? Do you know your own desires, hopes and beliefs if you’re depressed, insecure, or got out of bed on the wrong side of the bed? Do you have self-knowledge of your desire to buy a healthy quinoa salad rather than fish-and-chips for lunch, if it’s evident that you’ve been ‘nudged’? Do you have self-knowledge of your belief that having a baby boy is better than having a baby girl, if you’ve been manipulated by state propaganda? These are fundamental and difficult questions about self-knowledge; about what it means to know your own beliefs, desires, hopes, intentions and other attitudes. The answers to these questions are by no means obvious. The aim of this thesis is not to provide a concrete answer to such questions, but rather to ask what is required in order to answer them. More specifically, the aim is to explore whether contemporary philosophical theories of self-knowledge have the materials to handle such questions in a satisfactory manner, i.e. in a way that respects their subtleties and intricacies. The current philosophical debate on self-knowledge is mostly concerned with the question of whether self-knowledge is a matter of looking into our minds (introspectionism), interpreting our minds (interpretivism), speaking our minds (expressivism) or making up our minds (rationalism). Hence, when working on self-knowledge, one of the first questions one is confronted with is whether one is an ‘introspectionist’, ‘interpretationist’, ‘expressivist’, ‘rationalist’, or perhaps a ‘pluralist’ of some sort. In other words, much of the current self-knowledge debate focuses on the methods or procedures of self-knowledge, their differences, similarities and (in)compatibilities. The focus of this thesis will instead b

Questions of sustainability will be of crucial importance for the twenty-first century. But do we have to think about questions of responsibilities regarding future people in terms of human rights? And if duties regarding sustainability fall outside the scope of human rights, what would this imply for the moral and political importance of human rights in general? This article investigates conceptually how we should see the relationship between human rights and long-term global ecological challenges. We will discuss how a human rights approach to questions of sustainability would be different from other approaches and what would be required to see those ecological challenges as human rights questions. We will discuss the possibilities for conceptualizing the relationship between human rights and sustainability. And we will briefly draw some conclusions in terms of topics for further debate.

Human beings orient themselves in the world via judgments; factual, moral, prudential, aesthetic, and all kinds of mixed judgments. Particularly for normative orientation in complex and contested contexts of action, it can be challenging to form judgments. This paper explores what one can reasonably expect from a theory of the power of judgment from a Kantian approach to ethics. We reconstruct practical (prudential and moral) judgments on basis of the self-reflexive capacities of human beings, and argue that for the subject to see himself as committed to prudential goods it is necessarily implied that he understands himself as committed to moral judgment. However, to understand the normativity of understanding oneself as a being with practical commitments at all, the aesthetic judgment is introduced: the power of judgment in its pure form of selfreflexivity. We claim that aesthetic reflection and judgment is conditional on the possibility for human beings to enter the space of reasons, and therewith for practical self-understanding as such. The paper concludes with a preliminary sketch of different conceptual possibilities in fleshing out the role of the power of judgment in its aesthetic employment in developing mixed judgments.

The recent student and staff protests in Amsterdam and at other Dutch universities have brought to light fundamental disagreements about the future of the Dutch university. Many students and staff members of Dutch universities have argued that the level of democratic decisionmaking about central policy issues in universities should be increased. But what can democracy mean in the context of the contemporary university system? In this contribution we will first briefly sketch the public role of the university. Then we will put forward our main claim, that the Dutch university currently suffers from a triple democratic deficit: in the relation between society and the university, in the relation between university administration and the academic community, and in the relation between the academic community and society. We can only make progress by considering these three problems of democratic legitimation in their mutual relations.