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This thesis examines the drivers of the rise and fall of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s and 1960s. The Sino-Soviet alliance grew beyond their similar ideologies through China’s need to modernize its economy and military to face geopolitical threats. This relationship was tested throughout the 1950s with the Korean War and economic Stalinization, but military and economic factors drove the relationship forward. However, ideological differences coupled with diverging economic and military interests ultimately split the relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union. This research focuses on the military and economic factors that drove the Sino-Soviet relationship and ultimately led to its downfall., Ahlah Deslegch, Mongolian Armed Forces, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

El debate acerca de las relaciones entre China y Rusia, y en particular, acerca del alcance potencial de su “asociación estratégica”, tiene en la obra de Bobo Lo (2008) y su concepto de “eje de conveniencia” un inevitable punto de anclaje. El escepticismo del autor respecto a la naturaleza y sostenibilidad de la asociación estratégica entre las dos grandes potencias descansa en tres elementos: la existencia de intereses contrapuestos tanto en el estricto ámbito bilateral como entre sus proyectos de integración regional; la divergencia en el diseño del futuro orden internacional llamado a sustituir el “momento unipolar” (Krauthammer, 1990) de supremacía estadounidense; y por último, la creciente asimetría entre China y Rusia en términos económicos, extensible, salvo en el terreno militar, al resto de capacidades estructurales. En este artículo se realiza una revisión del debate sobre las relaciones China-Rusia partiendo de los tres aspectos mencionados. A continuación, operando desde ellos, se analizan las relaciones China - Rusia desde el lanzamiento por China de la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta (IFR), tanto en lo respectivo a los acuerdos bilaterales, como en la coordinación de la IFR con la Unión Económica Euroasiática (UEE) liderada por Rusia. Las principales conclusiones del estudio son, igualmente, tres. Por un lado, la voluntad de hacer progresar la “asociación estratégica” de gobernantes chinos y rusos, y en paralelo, de minimizar las fuentes de conflicto entre ambas potencias, han devenido en el avance sustancial de su cooperación, aplicable tanto a acuerdos bilaterales como regionales. Por otro lado, siendo cierto lo anterior, persiste un fuerte desequilibrio entre el contenido real de estos acuerdos y la retórica con que, especialmente Rusia, proyecta sus relaciones con China. La tercera conclusión pasa por evidenciar que la asimetría entre China y Rusia, a pesar de mantenerse en aumento, no ha imposibilitado profundizar en la “asociación estratégica”., Bobo Lo’s concept of the ‘axe of convenience’ is an unavoidable anchor point in the debate on China-Russia relations and the potential for their ‘strategic association’. The author’s scepticism regarding the nature and sustainability of the strategic association between these two great powers rests on three aspects: the existence of conflicting interests both in bilateral relations and their regional integration projects; the design of the future international order intended to replace the ‘unipolar moment’ under US supremacy; and finally, the growing asymmetry between China and Russia in economic terms and other structural capacities apart from the army. This article reviews the debate on China-Russia relations based on these three factors. I thus analyse China-Russia relations since the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) regarding bilateral relations and the coordination of the BRI and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) led by Russia. This study draws three main conclusions. First, both Chinese and Russian leadership have made efforts to advance the relationship between their countries and to minimise the potential sources of conflict, which has led to real progress in the strategic association reaching not only bilateral but also regional cooperation. Second, there is still a strong imbalance between the actual content of the agreements and the rhetoric employed, particularly in Russia, to project this relationship. Third, a growing asymmetry has not prevented the deepening of the strategic association. There has been a mutual adaptation to an asymmetric relationship. Russia has accepted that China determines the economic and commercial nature of the Eurasian integration, whereas China has adapted to Russian narratives and requirements to keep alive its role of political leadership in Eurasia.

In the past few years, there has been a significant economic and political rapprochement between China and Russia, marked by the announcement of numerous trade agreements and investments in transport infrastructure and the exploitation of Russian natural resources. This cooperation seems to have intensified since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Several European and American media see it as a sign that China and Russia are developing a form of strategic alliance that could harm Western interests. This article analyses the different forms of Sino-Russian rapprochement whilst highlighting the economic and political limits of this cooperation.

This article attempts to advance the neoclassical realist framework by elaborating on the interaction between system-level and unit-level factors in the formation of states’ behavior. With an empirical focus on post-Cold War China–Russia relations, which represent the ambivalent combination of a consistently growing strategic entente and a simultaneous reluctance to form a full-fledged political-military alliance, this study establishes two major unit-level factors – differing economic models and negative historical memories – that create hurdles for alliance formation between the two countries. However, under greater systemic pressure from the US-led unipolarity, China’s and Russia’s state leaders have not only increased bilateral military-to-military cooperation but have begun to actively implement policies to deliberately transform, if not remove, the existing non-systemic hurdles. Therefore, the neoclassical realist framework can be understood and further tested as a dynamic interaction model in which the unit-level circumstances, while moderating the causal impact of the system, are themselves being transformed by the system via state policies, as is their impact on states’ foreign policy.

Depuis quelques années, on observe un rapprochement économique et politique significatif entre la Chine et la Russie, marqué par l’annonce de nombreux grands accords commerciaux et d’investissements dans les infrastructures de transport et pour l’exploitation des ressources naturelles russes. Cette coopération semble plus marquée depuis la crise ukrainienne de 2014, alors que plusieurs médias européens et américains y voient un signe que la Chine et la Russie sont en train de former une forme d’alliance stratégique, qui pourrait nuire aux intérêts occidentaux. Cet article analyse les différentes formes du rapprochement sino-russe tout en soulignant les limites économiques et politiques de cette coopération., In the past few years, there has been a significant economic and political rapprochement between China and Russia, marked by the announcement of numerous trade agreements and investments in transport infrastructure and the exploitation of Russian natural resources. This cooperation seems deeper since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Several European and American media see it as a sign that China and Russia are developing a form of strategic alliance, which could harm Western interests. This article analyzes the different forms of Sino-Russian rapprochement while highlighting the economic and political limits of this cooperation

In the past few years, there has been a significant economic and political rapprochement between China and Russia, marked by the announcement of numerous trade agreements and investments in transport infrastructure and the exploitation of Russian natural resources. This cooperation seems to have intensified since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Several European and American media see it as a sign that China and Russia are developing a form of strategic alliance that could harm Western interests. This article analyses the different forms of Sino-Russian rapprochement whilst highlighting the economic and political limits of this cooperation.

Depuis quelques années, on observe un rapprochement économique et politique significatif entre la Chine et la Russie, marqué par l’annonce de nombreux grands accords commerciaux et d’investissements dans les infrastructures de transport et pour l’exploitation des ressources naturelles russes. Cette coopération semble plus marquée depuis la crise ukrainienne de 2014, alors que plusieurs médias européens et américains y voient un signe que la Chine et la Russie sont en train de former une forme d’alliance stratégique, qui pourrait nuire aux intérêts occidentaux. Cet article analyse les différentes formes du rapprochement sino-russe tout en soulignant les limites économiques et politiques de cette coopération., In the past few years, there has been a significant economic and political rapprochement between China and Russia, marked by the announcement of numerous trade agreements and investments in transport infrastructure and the exploitation of Russian natural resources. This cooperation seems deeper since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Several European and American media see it as a sign that China and Russia are developing a form of strategic alliance, which could harm Western interests. This article analyzes the different forms of Sino-Russian rapprochement while highlighting the economic and political limits of this cooperation

China’s influence on the global stage is constantly expanding. Recently, a considerable amount of attention has been paid by the Chinese officials to the developments in the Arctic region. Majority of scientific works which have focused on the underlying rationale behind Chinese presence in the Arctic used theoretical tools provided by either liberal institutionalism or realism. Consequently, the picture painted by them is rather pale and does not allow for a sufficient understanding of the Chinese grand international strategy. Chinese actions are presented in one dimension only – either as a threat or being in line with international law. This thesis aims to broaden theoretical scope by using the tools of post-structuralism for analyzing and comparing two radically different discourses on the Arctic – Chinese and Russian. This study’s main argument is that China uses its Arctic presence and cooperation with Russia as a tool for building and projecting its amiable, yet assertive international image, which essentially becomes China’s future capital and a basis for even stronger international position in the years to come.

China’s influence on the global stage is constantly expanding. Recently, a considerable amount of attention has been paid by the Chinese officials to the developments in the Arctic region. Majority of scientific works which have focused on the underlying rationale behind Chinese presence in the Arctic used theoretical tools provided by either liberal institutionalism or realism. Consequently, the picture painted by them is rather pale and does not allow for a sufficient understanding of the Chinese grand international strategy. Chinese actions are presented in one dimension only – either as a threat or being in line with international law. This thesis aims to broaden theoretical scope by using the tools of post-structuralism for analyzing and comparing two radically different discourses on the Arctic – Chinese and Russian. This study’s main argument is that China uses its Arctic presence and cooperation with Russia as a tool for building and projecting its amiable, yet assertive international image, which essentially becomes China’s future capital and a basis for even stronger international position in the years to come.

This thesis examines prospects for the development of Chinese Russian strategic relations. It addresses an interpretation that is prevalent, if not predominant, in current literature on the relationship that the two countries appear to be moving toward alignment or alliance, and that the evidence for this movement is in the increasing security related cooperation between the two sides since 1990. This paper addresses two questions that are central to this interpretation: (1) Is cooperation between the two sides in fact deepening over time? and (2) Is this cooperation likely to lead to alignment? The issue of whether various forms of cooperation between the two sides are properly seen as elements of a new, closer security relationship are addressed in three case studies, each of which compares an important facet of bilateral cooperation in the 1990s with cooperation in the same field during the 1950s. Cooperation in defense technology, economic affairs, and territorial relations are examined. These studies find that Chinese Russian cooperation is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, but that it has fallen off since the early 1990s and is unlikely to develop beyond current levels in the near term. They find no causal link between cooperative relations and the emergence of alignment or alliance between these states. The limited scope of current bilateral cooperation between these countries, the absence of mutual favored treatment in their cooperative relations, and persistent historical enmities are central to this judgment, http://archive.org/details/russiandchinnhis109458935, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.