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Mandana Behbahani,1,2 Nathan Shlobin,1,2 Colleen Rosen,1 Elizabeth Yerkes,3,4 Vineeta Swaroop,5,6 Sandi Lam,1,2 Robin Bowman1,2 1Division of Pediatric Neurosurgery, Ann and Robert H Lurie Children’s Hospital of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA; 2Department of Neurosurgery, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, IL, USA; 3Division of Pediatric Urology, Ann and Robert H Lurie Children’s Hospital of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA; 4Department of Urology, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, IL, USA; 5Division of Pediatric Orthopedic Surgery, Ann and Robert H Lurie Children’s Hospital of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA; 6Department of Orthopedic Surgery, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, IL, USACorrespondence: Robin BowmanDivision of Pediatric Neurosurgery, Director of Spina Bifida Program, Lurie Children’s Hospital, 225 E. Chicago Ave., Chicago, IL 60611, USATel +1 312 227 4220Fax +1 312 227 9679Email rbowman@luriechildrens.orgIntroduction: Multidisciplinary care for patients with tethered spinal cord syndrome (TCS) is valuable in ensuring comprehensive evaluation, timely follow-up, optimal functional outcome, and patient-centered care. The family-centered focus aims to minimize patient and parental burdens associated with care coordination. We present our first-year institutional experience in operationalizing a multidisciplinary, patient-centered, pediatric tethered cord clinic (TCC) to manage routine, long-term surgical follow-up for children with non-myelomeningocele-related tethered spinal cords.Methods: TCC is composed of three surgical services: orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery, urology. A retrospective chart review of patients seen in the TCC from January 2019 to January 2020 was conducted. Patients enrolled in the clinic were intended for long-term follow-up. Demographic and outcome variables were collected.Results: Fifty-nine patients were seen in TCC. Types of t

The Philippines is one of the foremost supporters of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), responding to the call for robust counter-terrorism (CT) measures through policy and legislation, intelligence-sharing, and military and law enforcement cooperation. As a strategic ally, the United States (US) has renewed political and security relations with Manila, strained since the base closures in 1991; Washington has given hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic aid since 9/11. However, instead of improving the country's CT capabilities to eradicate terrorism, the GWOT and related US policy have created a cyclical incentive structure: certain actors within the government, military, and insurgency groups in the Philippines profit politically and financially from US aid and the warlike conditions, and thus sustain, at a minimum, a presence of conflict and terrorism in order to continue drawing future benefits. This paper will investigate how such actors profit from the GWOT and perpetuate conflict, as well as examine the implications of these finding and recommendations on future US policy and Philippine counter-terrorism efforts., http://archive.org/details/isphilippinespro109451601, Captain, United States Air Force, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

In Southeast Asia, three main separatist minorities are often studied: the Moros of the southern Philippines, the Acehenese on the island of Sumatra in Indonesia, and the Thai-Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. Their persisting grievances and pursuits of self-determination include disputes over ancestral land, socio-economic opportunity, and exclusion from participation in and lack of recognition by the state apparatus. Consequently, members within these minority groups often take up arms against the state. Understanding separatist movements in Southeast Asia is more than recognizing political and socio-economic grievances. US policymakers must take into account how and why a separate ethnoreligious identity is constructed and implemented to achieve a particular aim. The powerful notion of "other" mobilizes general support and gives legitimacy to goals and grievances in the pursuit of a specific political goal: a separate, Islamic state. Studying constructed and implemented identities will help policymakers contextualize regional instability, political violence, terrorism linkages, and at the same time, improve relations, bolster institutional capabilities, and promote human rights. However, the focus here will not be merely on the "who" and "why" questions. Exploring political and socio-economic grievances are indeed necessary and important in understanding political agendas and violent actions, as well as in the formulation of foreign policy. It is equally necessary and important, however, to explain how and why a separate ethno-religious identity is created and mobilized to reinforce political goals. The "whys" of separatist movements and violence-the historical, territorial, political, and socio-economic grievances-are not the focus of this paper. It will be assumed that these groups have such grievances against the state and that there are other ethnicities and religions that co-exist within the countries.

The Philippines is one of the foremost supporters of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), responding to the call for robust counter-terrorism (CT) measures through policy and legislation, intelligence-sharing, and military and law enforcement cooperation. As a strategic ally, the United States (US) has renewed political and security relations with Manila, strained since the base closures in 1991; Washington has given hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic aid since 9/11. However, instead of improving the country's CT capabilities to eradicate terrorism, the GWOT and related US policy have created a cyclical incentive structure: certain actors within the government, military, and insurgency groups in the Philippines profit politically and financially from US aid and the warlike conditions, and thus sustain, at a minimum, a presence of conflict and terrorism in order to continue drawing future benefits. This paper will investigate how such actors profit from the GWOT and perpetuate conflict, as well as examine the implications of these finding and recommendations on future US policy and Philippine counter-terrorism efforts., The original document contains color images.

The Philippines is one of the foremost supporters of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), responding to the call for robust counter-terrorism (CT) measures through policy and legislation, intelligence-sharing, and military and law enforcement cooperation. As a strategic ally, the United States (US) has renewed political and security relations with Manila, strained since the base closures in 1991; Washington has given hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic aid since 9/11. However, instead of improving the country's CT capabilities to eradicate terrorism, the GWOT and related US policy have created a cyclical incentive structure: certain actors within the government, military, and insurgency groups in the Philippines profit politically and financially from US aid and the warlike conditions, and thus sustain, at a minimum, a presence of conflict and terrorism in order to continue drawing future benefits. This paper will investigate how such actors profit from the GWOT and perpetuate conflict, as well as examine the implications of these finding and recommendations on future US policy and Philippine counter-terrorism efforts.