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This paper investigates the relationship between supervisory enforcement actions and bank market power. Employing a unique dataset on enforcement actions in Italy from 2006 to 2018, we first document that banks with higher market power are more likely to escape public scrutiny. Further, this effect is more substantial for local banks than commercial ones, coherent with the view that national supervisors are softer when dealing with local banks. Second, when uncovering the main characteristics of the banks with higher market power, we find that banks with higher market power do not outperform other banks in profitability but show a worse loan quality, suggesting that banks with higher market power have riskier loan portfolios than other banks and attract fewer enforcement actions. Our results are robust across several econometric techniques and alternative specifications by contributing to the long-lasting debate on the implications of the bank market power on financial stability, considering the role of enforcement actions.

The chapter discusses enforcement aspects of the European Banking Union. The Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism are based on a far-reaching composite administration whereby the EU and national authorities and legal orders are in constant interaction. It is argued that the centralization of tasks and responsibilities at the EU level and the bringing together of national expertise, experience and knowledge generally succeeds in rebuilding public trust in the banking system. At the same time, it is posited that such extensive mixed administration results in many challenges for ensuring an effective enforcement of the relevant EU laws. The chapter then highlights a number of open questions that are worth being further researched.

This dissertation starts with an overview of the recent and ongoing efforts to achieve greater convergence in national banking supervision within the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). However, the persistence of distinct national preferences on banking supervision has resulted in ongoing differences in the practice of banking supervision at the national level. More specifically, the supervision of Less Significant Institutions (LSIs) has remained under the direct control of national supervisors and to, a certain extent, under national law, thus allowing significant ongoing margin of manoeuvre on supervision. This dissertation examines the consequences of this margin for manoeuvre left to national supervisors, despite strong convergence pressures through post-financial crisis EU institutional developments. The analysis focus upon the national supervision of LSIs. The main research question guiding this work is, therefore: under what conditions do pre-existing national institutional configurations continue to determine the trajectory of national supervisory practice in the context of European-level convergence pressures (through the European Banking Authority and the SSM)? To answer this question, I use a four-part analytical framework based on, first, Europeanisation which provides insight into top-down processes of integration, second, Historical Institutionalism which provides an understanding of path dependency from earlier policy decisions shaping national supervisory institutions and practice, third, the Epistemic Communities approach and fourth Transnational Policy Network framework. Based on this combined analytical framework, I formulate the following hypothesis: the more discretion exercised by the national supervisor in relation to its government, the more likely the adoption of policies and practices that result in greater convergence with the rules and practices developed at the EU / Banking Union level. To test this hypothesis, I start with a

This dissertation starts with an overview of the recent and ongoing efforts to achieve greater convergence in national banking supervision within the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). However, the persistence of distinct national preferences on banking supervision has resulted in ongoing differences in the practice of banking supervision at the national level. More specifically, the supervision of Less Significant Institutions (LSIs) has remained under the direct control of national supervisors and to, a certain extent, under national law, thus allowing significant ongoing margin of manoeuvre on supervision. This dissertation examines the consequences of this margin for manoeuvre left to national supervisors, despite strong convergence pressures through post-financial crisis EU institutional developments. The analysis focus upon the national supervision of LSIs. The main research question guiding this work is, therefore: under what conditions do pre-existing national institutional configurations continue to determine the trajectory of national supervisory practice in the context of European-level convergence pressures (through the European Banking Authority and the SSM)? To answer this question, I use a four-part analytical framework based on, first, Europeanisation which provides insight into top-down processes of integration, second, Historical Institutionalism which provides an understanding of path dependency from earlier policy decisions shaping national supervisory institutions and practice, third, the Epistemic Communities approach and fourth Transnational Policy Network framework. Based on this combined analytical framework, I formulate the following hypothesis: the more discretion exercised by the national supervisor in relation to its government, the more likely the adoption of policies and practices that result in greater convergence with the rules and practices developed at the EU / Banking Union level. To test this hypothesis, I start with a

Cette étude explique en quoi les établissements de crédit ne sont fondamentalement pas des entreprises comme les autres, de sorte que leur gouvernance devrait être spéciale. Pour que la prise de risque dans ces institutions ne soit pas excessive, cette étude propose au niveau de la supervision bancaire deux mesures qui s'attaquent à la racine du problème, autrement dit, qui traite directement la cause du problème, à savoir l'aléa moral des établissements de crédit associés aux filets de sécurité officiel, qu'il faut à tout prix réduire. En d’autres termes, d’une part, la Banque Centrale du Congo devra reconsidérer son rôle de prêteur en dernier ressort, de façon à inciter les déposants et surtout les plus grands d'entre eux à prendre en main, le contrôle et la discipline des établissements de crédit et, d’autre part, repenser le statut juridique conféré aux actionnaires dans ses institutions par le droit OHADA. Si la responsabilité des actionnaires vis-à-vis des déposants et autres créanciers reste illimitée, c'est-à-dire élargie sur leurs avoirs, ils seront plus prudents dans la gestion de l’établissement et se mettront à l’abri de toute incitation inverse en matière de politique d’octroi de crédit., This study explains how credit institutions are fundamentally not businesses like the others, so their governance should be special. In order for risk taking to these institutions is not excessive, this study proposes at the level of the banking supervision two measures which attach the root of the problem, in other words, which directly deals with the cause of the. In other words, on the one hand, the central bank of the Congo will have to reconsider its leader role as a last resort, so as to encourage depositors and especially the greatest of them to take in hand, the control and discipline.

Across Europe, banks remain, to this day, the main suppliers of finance to the European economy, but also a source of systemic risk. As such, regulating them requires that policymakers find an appropriate balance between restricting their risk-taking behaviour and increasing lending to support economic growth. However, the 'varieties of financial capitalism' that characterize national banking sectors in Europe mean that the adoption of harmonised capital requirements has different effects across countries, depending on the country-specific institutional setting through which banks provide lending to the national economy. This article conducts a new analysis of Member State governments' positions in the post-financial crisis reform of the EU capital requirements legislation, expanding the scope of previous studies on the topic. Here, I examine in detail the positions of Member States on a wider set of issues and for a broader set of countries than the existing literature. Building on the varieties of financial capitalism approach, I explain these positions with regard to structural features of national banking sectors. I find that Member State governments' positions reveal a general agreement with the proposed increase of bank capital requirements, while seeking targeted exemptions and preferential treatment that they deem necessary to preserve their domestic supply of retail credit.

Banking operations are business activities, which are directly related to the achievement of macroeconomic objectives, including the objectives of ensuring the stability of the value of money, controlling inflation and ensuring the safety of banking operations and the system of credit institutions. For the safe and sustainable development of banking operations, risks that threaten the safety of banking operations need to be detected and prevented in a timely manner. Credit institutions in the concept of banking crime are both tools and targets of attacks by criminals, so they can be involved in many different crimes. Criminal acts arising in banking operations may be committed by people of a credit institution or may be outsiders, and it is also not uncommon for cases of collusion between bank employees and outside criminals. In order to effectively prevent crimes arising in banking activities, it is necessary to coordinate between the internal prevention institutions of the credit institutions and strong involvement from the investigating agencies as well as from the competent authority to supervise banking activities. Banking supervision plays an important role in detecting early signs of crime in order to give early warnings to credit institutions to take timely preventive and control measures.

Banking operations are business activities, which are directly related to the achievement of macroeconomic objectives, including the objectives of ensuring the stability of the value of money, controlling inflation and ensuring the safety of banking operations and the system of credit institutions. For the safe and sustainable development of banking operations, risks that threaten the safety of banking operations need to be detected and prevented in a timely manner. Credit institutions in the concept of banking crime are both tools and targets of attacks by criminals, so they can be involved in many different crimes. Criminal acts arising in banking operations may be committed by people of a credit institution or may be outsiders, and it is also not uncommon for cases of collusion between bank employees and outside criminals. In order to effectively prevent crimes arising in banking activities, it is necessary to coordinate between the internal prevention institutions of the credit institutions and strong involvement from the investigating agencies as well as from the competent authority to supervise banking activities. Banking supervision plays an important role in detecting early signs of crime in order to give early warnings to credit institutions to take timely preventive and control measures.

Banking operations are business activities, which are directly related to the achievement of macroeconomic objectives, including the objectives of ensuring the stability of the value of money, controlling inflation and ensuring the safety of banking operations and the system of credit institutions. For the safe and sustainable development of banking operations, risks that threaten the safety of banking operations need to be detected and prevented in a timely manner. Credit institutions in the concept of banking crime are both tools and targets of attacks by criminals, so they can be involved in many different crimes. Criminal acts arising in banking operations may be committed by people of a credit institution or may be outsiders, and it is also not uncommon for cases of collusion between bank employees and outside criminals. In order to effectively prevent crimes arising in banking activities, it is necessary to coordinate between the internal prevention institutions of the credit institutions and strong involvement from the investigating agencies as well as from the competent authority to supervise banking activities. Banking supervision plays an important role in detecting early signs of crime in order to give early warnings to credit institutions to take timely preventive and control measures.

Evento: High-level meeting on banking supervision; Organizado por: BIS, BCBS work programme and strategic priorities in 2023/24: risk assessment and horizon scanning, policy and supervisory responses to emerging risks, strengthening supervisory coordination and practices, Basel III implementation, and continued outreach with wide range of external stakeholders.

The central question of this research is the way in which effective legal protection can be ensured in case of composite administrative procedures within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM is a system for banking supervision that consists of both the European Central Bank (ECB) and National Competent Authorities (NCAs). The ECB and NCAs closely cooperate within this system to ensure an effective banking supervision. This interconnectedness must ensure that the ECB and NCAs can effectively carry out banking supervision, but it also results in complex administrative procedures in a mixed EU-national legal order. The current system of legal protection does not seem to be properly-equipped to face this complex new administrative reality. The tension between effective implementation of EU law (i.e. effective banking supervision) and effective legal protection is addressed in this research. The legal protection’s effectiveness is analysed in this research for the following groups of procedures: common procedures; procedures including preparatory measures that are carried out at the national level and that are followed by a final decision at the EU level (bottom-up procedures); procedures including preparatory measures that are carried out at the EU level and that are followed by a final decision at the national level (top-down procedures); and procedures that may end in a sanction of a criminal nature. These assessments are used as a basis for the discussion about the overall challenges and the recommendations that are made in order to improve the effectiveness of legal protection in case of composite administrative procedures.

In no other policy field has European integration advanced more rapidly over the past decade nor has the challenge of reconciling uniform rules with national diversity arisen more sharply than in financial regulation generally and banking supervision in particular. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for European Banking Union is widely recognized as one of the most significant integration steps since the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the euro. This paper begins by outlining two alternative approaches to integrating diversity within the EU: differentiated integration (DI), the adoption of policies and rules that apply only to some Member States, but not to others; and experimentalist governance (XG), a process of provisional goal setting and revision, based on recursive learning from comparative review of implementation in different local contexts. The paper then goes on to analyze the SSM from three distinct perspectives: first, as a centralized hierarchy, seeking to impose and enforce uniform rules, standards, and procedures across the Banking Union; second, as a polyarchic network, seeking to orchestrate intensive cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs; and finally, as an experimentalist organization, seeking to accommodate and learn from diversity by adapting common rules and procedures to the specificities of individual banks, and revising them regularly through peer review of implementation experience at multiple levels. Drawing on a wide range of documentation and in-depth interviews with EU and national officials, the paper reconstructs the evolution of the SSM’s organizational practices and decision-making processes, along with its institutional structures, from its inception in 2014 to the present. From this study of the SSM “in action”, the paper argues that while each of these three views highlights important characteristics which need to be incorporated into any comprehensive picture, the most encompassing perspective is

In no other policy field has European integration advanced more rapidly over the past decade nor has the challenge of reconciling uniform rules with national diversity arisen more sharply than in financial regulation generally and banking supervision in particular. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for European Banking Union is widely recognized as one of the most significant integration steps since the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the euro. This paper begins by outlining two alternative approaches to integrating diversity within the EU: differentiated integration (DI), the adoption of policies and rules that apply only to some Member States, but not to others; and experimentalist governance (XG), a process of provisional goal setting and revision, based on recursive learning from comparative review of implementation in different local contexts. The paper then goes on to analyze the SSM from three distinct perspectives: first, as a centralized hierarchy, seeking to impose and enforce uniform rules, standards, and procedures across the Banking Union; second, as a polyarchic network, seeking to orchestrate intensive cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs; and finally, as an experimentalist organization, seeking to accommodate and learn from diversity by adapting common rules and procedures to the specificities of individual banks, and revising them regularly through peer review of implementation experience at multiple levels. Drawing on a wide range of documentation and in-depth interviews with EU and national officials, the paper reconstructs the evolution of the SSM’s organizational practices and decision-making processes, along with its institutional structures, from its inception in 2014 to the present. From this study of the SSM “in action”, the paper argues that while each of these three views highlights important characteristics which need to be incorporated into any comprehensive picture, the most encompassing perspective is

In no other policy field has European integration advanced more rapidly over the past decade nor has the challenge of reconciling uniform rules with national diversity arisen more sharply than in financial regulation generally and banking supervision in particular. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for European Banking Union is widely recognized as one of the most significant integration steps since the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the euro. This paper begins by outlining two alternative approaches to integrating diversity within the EU: differentiated integration (DI), the adoption of policies and rules that apply only to some Member States, but not to others; and experimentalist governance (XG), a process of provisional goal setting and revision, based on recursive learning from comparative review of implementation in different local contexts. The paper then goes on to analyze the SSM from three distinct perspectives: first, as a centralized hierarchy, seeking to impose and enforce uniform rules, standards, and procedures across the Banking Union; second, as a polyarchic network, seeking to orchestrate intensive cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs; and finally, as an experimentalist organization, seeking to accommodate and learn from diversity by adapting common rules and procedures to the specificities of individual banks, and revising them regularly through peer review of implementation experience at multiple levels. Drawing on a wide range of documentation and in-depth interviews with EU and national officials, the paper reconstructs the evolution of the SSM’s organizational practices and decision-making processes, along with its institutional structures, from its inception in 2014 to the present. From this study of the SSM “in action”, the paper argues that while each of these three views highlights important characteristics which need to be incorporated into any comprehensive picture, the most encompassing perspective is

The aim of this paper is to determine the responses of the economic activity index of El Salvador to changes in the money supply, credit and the national interest rate, and the money supply and interest rate of the other Central American countries. The distinctive character of the work is that the Salvadoran economy was dollarized in 2001. The results indicate that no national variable elicits significant responses from the other national variables, but the Salvadoran economic activity index responds significantly to changes in the money supply and interest rates from other Central American countries., El objetivo de este artículo es determinar las respuestas del índice de actividad económica de El Salvador tanto ante cambios en la oferta monetaria, el crédito y la tasa de interés nacionales, como en cuanto a la oferta monetaria y tasa de interés de los restantes países centroamericanos. El carácter distintivo del trabajo es que la economía salvadoreña fue dolarizada en 2001. Los resultados indican que ninguna variable nacional provoca respuestas significativas en las otras variables nacionales, pero el índice de actividad económica salvadoreña responde significativamente a cambios de las ofertas monetarias y las tasas de interés de otros países centroamericanos., O objetivo deste artigo é determinar as respostas do índice de atividade econômica de El Salvador tanto a variações na oferta de moeda nacional, crédito e taxa de juros, quanto na oferta de moeda e taxa de juros dos demais países centro-americanos. O caráter distintivo do trabalho é que a economia salvadorenha foi dolarizada em 2001. Os resultados indicam que nenhuma variável nacional provoca respostas significativas nas demais variáveis nacionais, mas o índice de atividade econômica salvadorenha responde significativamente a mudanças nas ofertas de moeda e nas taxas de juros de outros países da América Central.

The aim of this paper is to determine the responses of the economic activity index of El Salvador to changes in the money supply, credit and the national interest rate, and the money supply and interest rate of the other Central American countries. The distinctive character of the work is that the Salvadoran economy was dollarized in 2001. The results indicate that no national variable elicits significant responses from the other national variables, but the Salvadoran economic activity index responds significantly to changes in the money supply and interest rates from other Central American countries., O objetivo deste artigo é determinar as respostas do índice de atividade econômica de El Salvador tanto a variações na oferta de moeda nacional, crédito e taxa de juros, quanto na oferta de moeda e taxa de juros dos demais países centro-americanos. O caráter distintivo do trabalho é que a economia salvadorenha foi dolarizada em 2001. Os resultados indicam que nenhuma variável nacional provoca respostas significativas nas demais variáveis nacionais, mas o índice de atividade econômica salvadorenha responde significativamente a mudanças nas ofertas de moeda e nas taxas de juros de outros países da América Central., El objetivo de este artículo es determinar las respuestas del índice de actividad económica de El Salvador tanto ante cambios en la oferta monetaria, el crédito y la tasa de interés nacionales, como en cuanto a la oferta monetaria y tasa de interés de los restantes países centroamericanos. El carácter distintivo del trabajo es que la economía salvadoreña fue dolarizada en 2001. Los resultados indican que ninguna variable nacional provoca respuestas significativas en las otras variables nacionales, pero el índice de actividad económica salvadoreña responde significativamente a cambios de las ofertas monetarias y las tasas de interés de otros países centroamericanos.

This paper bridges the gap between the study of European integration and financial regulation. This is of particular interest since one of the most recent and comprehensive steps in European integration was taken in the area of financial regulation, namely the integration of banking supervision under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Its impact on European integration has not been properly investigated yet, thus this paper analyzes whether it steers European integration towards positive or negative integration. The analysis is based on literature from economics, law and the legal basis of the SSM. Overall, positive integration could be detected which works mostly market-correcting, while also increasing competition. Thus, the SSM deviates from negative integration usually prominent in the EU., Dieser Artikel verknüpft die Forschung zu europäischer Integration und Finanzmarktregulierung. Dies ist von besonderem Interesse, da mit der Vereinheitlichung der Bankenaufsicht unter dem Einheitlichen Bankenaufsichtsmechanismus (SSM) ein umfassender Schritt der europäischen Integration in der Finanzmarktregulierung stattfand. Dessen Einfluss auf europäische Integration wurde bisher nicht untersucht, daher wird hier analysiert, ob der SSM zu positiver oder negativer Integration führt. Hierfür werden Artikel aus den Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften sowie die zugrundeliegenden Gesetze genutzt. Insgesamt wird vor allem markt-korrigierende positive Integration festgestellt, sowie eine Intensivierung des Wettbewerbs. Daher weicht der SSM von der vorherrschenden negativen Integration ab.

The financial crisis from 2008 and the following Eurozone crisis from 2012 created an incentive to establish a system of fi nancial supervision at the European Union ("EU") level, due to the fact that the policy tool commonly used turned out to be ineffective. With regards to banking supervision, the package of legislations: "CRR/CRD" and "BRRD" has been adopted as a response to financial system shortcomings, in order to make it more resilient and harmonised. One of the challenges was to take control of the so-called: "too big to fail" financial institutions, therefore next to macroprudential supervision, microprudential policy pools were introduced. This constituted the phenomena of the shift from regulationbased supervision to risk-based supervision with the aim of reducing the systemic risk in each and every EU Member State and, in turn, prevent possible future crises. In this paper, those methods will be gathered, presented, and discussed in the light of the current COVID-19 pandemic crisis.

The aim of this paper is to determine the responses of the economic activity index of El Salvador to changes in the money supply, credit and the national interest rate, and the money supply and interest rate of the other Central American countries. The distinctive character of the work is that the Salvadoran economy was dollarized in 2001. The results indicate that no national variable elicits significant responses from the other national variables, but the Salvadoran economic activity index responds significantly to changes in the money supply and interest rates from other Central American countries., O objetivo deste artigo é determinar as respostas do índice de atividade econômica de El Salvador tanto a variações na oferta de moeda nacional, crédito e taxa de juros, quanto na oferta de moeda e taxa de juros dos demais países centro-americanos. O caráter distintivo do trabalho é que a economia salvadorenha foi dolarizada em 2001. Os resultados indicam que nenhuma variável nacional provoca respostas significativas nas demais variáveis nacionais, mas o índice de atividade econômica salvadorenha responde significativamente a mudanças nas ofertas de moeda e nas taxas de juros de outros países da América Central., El objetivo de este artículo es determinar las respuestas del índice de actividad económica de El Salvador tanto ante cambios en la oferta monetaria, el crédito y la tasa de interés nacionales, como en cuanto a la oferta monetaria y tasa de interés de los restantes países centroamericanos. El carácter distintivo del trabajo es que la economía salvadoreña fue dolarizada en 2001. Los resultados indican que ninguna variable nacional provoca respuestas significativas en las otras variables nacionales, pero el índice de actividad económica salvadoreña responde significativamente a cambios de las ofertas monetarias y las tasas de interés de otros países centroamericanos.

An important policy discussion on joining the banking union is currently taking place in Denmark and Sweden. In this article we review the pros and cons of joining. The main rationale for joining the banking union is the importance of cross-border banking in the EU internal market. Reviewing the banking systems, we find that banks in Denmark and Sweden have the same cross-border characteristics as those in the euro area countries, suggesting a similar rationale for joining the banking union. Moreover, both countries have large banks which may be too big to save at country level, but not at the banking union level. Nevertheless, there are some governance concerns. While euro area countries have an automatic and full say in all banking union arrangements, the non-euro area countries (the ‘out’ countries) lack certain formal powers in ultimate decision-making; however, we find that this may be less of a problem in practice. If necessary, the ‘out’ countries would have the ‘nuclear option’ of leaving the banking union.

This contribution combines neo-functionalism and historical institutionalism to understand the implications of differentiated integration in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Banking Union (BU) for the single market in financial services in the European Union (EU). From the 1980s, the relaunch of the Single Market and monetary integration in the EU were presented by the supporters of EMU as mutually reinforcing, as in the logic of the Commission’s Report ‘One Market, One Money’. Initially, EMU appeared to reinforce financial integration, especially in the Euro Area banking sector, even though EMU was a case of differentiated integration in the EU. Subsequently, the incomplete EMU triggered the sovereign debt crisis, which undermined financial market integration and was addressed through the establishment of BU, which reinforced differentiated integration. Both EMU and BU have negative implications for the ‘singleness’ of the single market in financial services, potentially resulting in ‘One Money, Two Markets’.

This contribution combines neo-functionalism and historical institutionalism to understand the implications of differentiated integration in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Banking Union (BU) for the single market in financial services in the European Union (EU). From the 1980s, the relaunch of the Single Market and monetary integration in the EU were presented by the supporters of EMU as mutually reinforcing, as in the logic of the Commission’s Report ‘One Market, One Money’. Initially, EMU appeared to reinforce financial integration, especially in the Euro Area banking sector, even though EMU was a case of differentiated integration in the EU. Subsequently, the incomplete EMU triggered the sovereign debt crisis, which undermined financial market integration and was addressed through the establishment of BU, which reinforced differentiated integration. Both EMU and BU have negative implications for the ‘singleness’ of the single market in financial services, potentially resulting in ‘One Money, Two Markets’.

Between the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014, a radical reform of Banca d’Italia – the Italian central bank and banking supervisory authority – was enacted. It was the last chapter of an historical evolution, started in 1893 with its incorporation as a joint-stock-corporation under private law, whose result places the Italian system within the niche of countries that entail the participation of private investors to the ownership and governance of central banks. This article analyzes the relevant Italian regulation also by comparing it with other international experiences. While most of the debate on central banking independence focuses on in- dependence from politics, this article explores another side of the problem, namely the risk of capture by the banking sector and of subsequent conflicts of interests. Said risk significantly increases when the central bank’s shareholders are private investors which elect some of its governing bodies and receive dividends out of its earnings. Since a central bank carries out monetary operations that generate seigniorage, the distribution of profits out of these earnings is a transfer of public value to the private sector. Such circumstances can create incentives for the owners to influence the central bank’s decisions, also ac- cording to the magnitude of the values at stake.

We study the impact of ECB’s supervisory announcements on the Bank Stock index, from 2013 through 2017. Our evidence shows that the news, related to supervisory actions, do have highly significant effects on the market price of banks, contributing to the volatility of the Bank Stock Index for Europe and Italy. Most announcements signal the need to raise more regulatory capital and lead to negative returns in the stock market, thus increasing the cost of raising new capital. Our study is related to previous ones (by Bernanke and Kuttner) focusing on the impact of monetary policy announcements on the stock exchange.

This study examines the formalization of banking supervision in Japan and Sweden that occurred in the decades around 1900. Using an incremental change approach, we examine the respective cases along three dimensions: (a) the legal framework, (b) the banking supervisory agency, and (c) bank supervisory activities. Through this comparative analysis, we find several similarities and differences. The most important similarity we find is that financial crises-generally considered to be a primary driver of major regulatory and supervisory reforms-did not play a main role in the formalization of supervision in either Japan or Sweden. Rather, formalization was an incremental change process closely linked to the organic development of the banking sector, the general public's increasing exposure to the banks as deposit holders and borrowers, and the increased need for professionalization of the banking sector. This finding suggests that our approach is applicable to any country where the formalization of supervision took place without being prompted by a specific event such as a financial crisis.

We argue that the evolving preferences and power resources of large cross-border banks help explain the crucial political moves to European banking union. As they became larger and more European, the relative dependence of these banks on national regulators declined even as the dependence of states on these banks increased – resulting in a net rise in the structural power of large banks. These banks benefited from the supranationalization of supervision through reduced compliance costs and the effective opening of European markets. The political divergence in the interests of large international banks and small national ones eventually caused the German and the French governments’ change of position in intergovernmental bargaining. Once in place, banking union accelerated balance sheet consolidation to the benefit of large banks that took over their weaker competitors.

We argue that the evolving preferences and power resources of large cross-border banks help explain the crucial political moves to European banking union. As they became larger and more European, the relative dependence of these banks on national regulators declined even as the dependence of states on these banks increased – resulting in a net rise in the structural power of large banks. These banks benefited from the supranationalization of supervision through reduced compliance costs and the effective opening of European markets. The political divergence in the interests of large international banks and small national ones eventually caused the German and the French governments’ change of position in intergovernmental bargaining. Once in place, banking union accelerated balance sheet consolidation to the benefit of large banks that took over their weaker competitors.

Die Geldpolitik war eines der umstrittensten Gebiete der Wirtschaftspolitik während der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise von 1997/98 in Südkorea. Nach dem Absturz der Währungen der südostasiatischen Länder, beginnend mit Thailand im Juli 1997, kam ab Herbst 1997 auch die südkoreanische Währung Won unter Druck. Nach dem Absturz des Wechselkurses des südkoreanischen Won auf etwa die Hälfte stand die Geldpolitik vor einer schwierigen Aufgabe (vgl. Chopra et al. 2001: 20-26). Einerseits waren die hoch verschuldeten chaebôl und ihre mittelständischen Zulieferer an niedrigen Zinsen interessiert. Andererseits war ein Großteil der Verschuldung in Auslandswährung aufgenommen worden, sodass der Absturz des Wechselkurses ein großes Problem bei der Zinsbedienung und Tilgung darstellte. Die mit dem Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) abgestimmte Politik der hohen Zinsen wurde teilweise heftig kritisiert und als Auslöser der schweren Rezession von 1998 bezeichnet. Andererseits wurde das Ziel der Zinspolitik, nämlich die Wiederherstellung des Vertrauens in den Won, erreicht, und schon Mitte 1998 lagen die Zinsen unter dem Niveau vor Krisenbeginn.

The first judgement of the General Court (EU) pertaining to the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM) raised an issue concerning the source of the shared supervisory powers in the system of EU prudential supervision. In the General Court’s view, the SSM Regulation conferred on the European Central Bank (ECB) exclusive powers to carry out specific prudential supervisory tasks vis-à-vis all euro area credit institutions (significant and less significant). At the same time, the ECB’s national counterparts assist the former in implementing its supervisory tasks vis-à-vis less significant credit institutions. We argue that such a scheme requires a clear accountability relationship also between the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs), something that is not fully fledged in the current legal framework.

This study examines the formalization of banking supervision in Japan and Sweden that occurred in the decades around 1900. Using an incremental change approach, the respective cases are traced and examined from three dimensions:1) the legal framework, 2) the banking supervisory agency, and 3) bank supervisory activities. As a result of the comparative analysis, we find several similarities and differences. The most important finding is that the two cases are similar in that financial crises –generally considered to be a primary driver for major regulatory and supervisory reforms – did not play the main role in the formalization of supervision in either Japan or Sweden. Rather, the formalization was an incremental adjustment to the organic development of the banking sector, the general public’s increasing exposure to the banks as deposit holders and borrowers, and the increased need for professionalizationof the banking sector.

In this paper we seek to explain why bank performance has varied so dramatically during and after the financial crisis on Europe’s periphery, both across states and within them. Our dependent variable is bank performance defined in terms of credit provision and banks’ contribution to financial stability. Our independent variable is the particular mix at play between political/social purpose and what we call ‘market authority’ - the importance of market incentives, signals and pricing within a particular financial ‘ecosystem’. “Economic nationalism” or the politicization of local and regional banks has often imbued banks with social and political goals, serving the economy at different levels, and is one major source of political/social purpose. But the latter must be constrained by market authority. We argue that for optimal bank performance, economic nationalism or political/social purpose must be constrained by market authority, otherwise a political logic (e.g. cronyism, a lack of professionalism, and deficits in banking expertise) can easily subvert or distort credit provision and undermine financial stability.

Nowadays, there is an undeniable growing concern about the impact of human activities on the environment. In this sense, the financial system can play a crucial role as responsible for the channeling of resources towards sustainable investments. Within the financial sector, banking institutions have, in particular, a central role in the implementation of sustainable development, from both a quantitative and qualitative point of view. Nevertheless, in practice, it has been observed that credit institutions are not conducting generalized sustainable practices. In order to change this situation, achieving the introduction of environmental criteria in the financial decision-making processes, there are diverse policies that could be enforced and which would involve different degrees of public intervention in the freedom of credit institutions (build up an activity classification framework, impose reporting obligations, measure environmental risks, conduct stress test, set limits to large exposures in non-sustainable activities or specific prudential requirements). Whatever the regulatory option was, a careful weighing of public and private interests involved must be carried out. This judgment should respect the nature of the prudential model in force, which is risk-based, and should avoid impacts on the credibility of a trust-based system, which is, therefore, very sensitive to changes., El aumento de la preocupación por la incidencia del actuar humano en el medio ambiente es innegable. En este sentido, es determinante la importancia del papel que pueda desempeñar el sistema financiero, como encargado de la canalización de los recursos hacia las inversiones ambientalmente sostenibles. Dentro de este sector financiero la banca tendrá, en particular, un rol central en lo que a la implementación del desarrollo sostenible se refiere, tanto desde un punto de vista cuantitativo como cualitativo. En cualquier caso, en la práctica, se ha observado como las entidades de crédito no estarían llevando a cabo, de forma generalizada, prácticas financieras sostenibles. Para poner fin a esta situación, y lograr la introducción de criterios de sostenibilidad ambiental en los procesos de toma de decisiones de financiación, las políticas a implementar serían de lo más diverso, identificándose distintos grados de intensidad de la intervención pública sobre la libertad de las entidades de crédito (elaboración de un marco homogéneo de clasificación de actividades, obligaciones de remisión de información, medición de los riesgos, realización pruebas de resistencia, imposición de limitaciones a las exposiciones en actividades no sostenibles o requisitos prudenciales específicos). Sean cuales fueren las alternativas regulatorias escogidas, y para su elección, deberá llevarse a cabo una cuidadosa ponderación de los bienes en conflicto, respetando la naturaleza del modelo prudencial vigente, centrado en el riesgo, y evitando incidencias en la credibilidad de un sistema basado en la confianza y, por tanto, muy sensible al cambio.

The implementation of tighter regulation and more powerful supervision may impose large social costs due to the strong reliance on supervisory information that requires direct assessment by a supervisor (i.e. Mandatory Supervision). We show that by introducing a Flexible Supervision contract, which is designed to be chosen by those banks that have incentives to capture the supervisor and allows them to bypass Mandatory Supervision, the most efficient regulation under asymmetric information may be implemented. Benevolent regulators should introduce Flexible Supervision regimes for the less risky, more capitalized and transparent banks in addition to the traditional Mandatory Supervision regime., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Following the global financial crisis, in 2009 the world’s major economies (G20) quickly agreed on stricter rules for financial markets. Heads of government tasked the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) with developing a new framework for the capitalisation and liquidity of globally active financial institutions and the agreement (Basel III) was signed in December 2010. A crucial area that was left to be finalized later were final rules on the use of banks’ internal risk models. While it has been the US government’s intention to restrict risk models the EU made it clear that it would not agree to additional rules leading to increased regulatory capital requirements. After a long stalemate in the negotiations, chances now seem to increase for an agreement in fall 2017 between European and US representatives in the Basel Committee. The Trump administration might be willing to meet the EU halfway and grant Europe’s ailing banks greater freedom in calculating risk. But the price could be high: the US wants more leeway in national interpretations of the Basel framework. The European Commission, which will have to give its agreement in Basel, needs to be aware of the risks this poses to the stability of its own banking market. (author's abstract)

The collapse of the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers marked the escalation point of the financial crisis of 2008. Yet, while the consequences of the collapse are widely discussed, the developments that led to Lehman Brothers’ demise have yet to be dealt with from a sociological perspective. In this paper, we tackle this research gap by asking why Lehman Brothers – as opposed to other ailing banks – was not saved by the US regulators. We will show that mounting pressure from public opinion caused a shift in the risk perception on the side of the regulators. Initially oriented towards the economic risk associated with a potential failure of Lehman Brothers, the critique of the 2008 bailouts prompted regulators to weight the political risks of further bailouts over the economic risk of the bank’s collapse. Thus, we argue that the social change brought about by the collapse of Lehman Brothers was critique-induced.

Nach fast einem Jahrzehnt Finanzmarktstabilisierung droht eine Rückkehr zu Doppelstandards und falschen Anreizen für global aktive Banken. Noch unter dem Eindruck der schlimmsten Finanzkrise seit den 1920er Jahren waren sich die G20-Staaten bei ihrem Gipfeltreffen im September 2009 in Pittsburgh schnell einig geworden, dass eine umfassendere und einheitlichere Regulierung der Banken und anderer systemrelevanter Finanzmarktakteure notwendig ist. So wurde schon im Herbst 2010 ein neues Abkommen zur Regulierung der Banken (Basel III) vereinbart. Die USA und Großbritannien übertrugen die neuen internationalen Standards zügig in nationales Recht und gingen bei der Regulierung großer Institute und einzelner risikoreicher Geschäftsbereiche sehr weit. Die EU hingegen setzte die internationalen Vorgaben nur schleppend um. Zehn Jahre nach Ausbruch der globalen Finanzkrise steht die internationale Kooperation bei der Bankenregulierung nun erneut auf dem Spiel. Das liegt zum einen am Gebaren der US-Regierung unter Donald Trump, der mit einer Deregulierungsagenda angetreten ist. Zum anderen hat die EU über Jahre internationale Regeln blockiert, um die angeschlagenen Banken der Eurozone zu entlasten. Angesichts transatlantischer Spannungen zwischen den USA und der EU wäre ein Kompromiss bei den immer noch umstrittenen Eigenkapitalregeln für Banken ein positives Zeichen. Dennoch muss die EU darauf achten, dass ein Übereinkommen mit den USA keinen Rückschritt bei der Stabilisierung globaler Finanzmärkte bewirkt - dann nämlich, wenn den Großbanken wieder Anreize gesetzt werden, höhere Risiken einzugehen. (Autorenreferat)

In response to the recent financial crisis, European policymakers put banking regulation in the Eurozone on top of the agenda. In 2016, as part of the newly created European banking union, a mechanism for resolving troubled banks, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), became fully operational for the 19 member states of the euro area. The SRM was established to avoid future involvement of tax payers’ money in the resolution of banks. This paper focuses on the negotiations on one of its instruments, the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), a fund of ex-ante contributions of Eurozone banks set up to winding down unviable banks. The SRF proved to be a main conflict issue during the negotiations. Germany and France were pushing for diverging preferences although both countries’ banking sectors suffered from the crisis and both governments generally favored a regulatory approach on the European level. I provide an institutionalist explanation for these opposing positions of the two most important Eurozone countries. By drawing on the “Varieties of Capitalism” literature, I explain how the distinct features of these countries’ financial and banking systems accounted for their preferences. On the one side, German negotiators sought to preserve the dominant way of bank-based corporate finance by particularly protecting savings and cooperative banks. On the other, the French government was in favor of higher contributions by the banking sector because market-based corporate finance is more prevalent in France. Nevertheless, France aimed at keeping its ‘national champions’ out as far as possible. This paper has important implications for how to think about preference formation in European financial regulation.

Рассмотрены действующий контроль и его организация в банках, проблемы системы внутреннего контроля, рекомендации по совершенствованию системы внутреннего контроля в банках. Авторами определены проблемы внутрибанковского контроля в Республике Беларусь , игнорирование хотя бы одной из них значительно снижает эффективность функционирования всей системы в целом.

The move to European Banking Union involving the supervision and resolution of banks at euro-area level was stimulated by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in 2012. However, the long-term objective of Banking Union is dealing with intensified cross-border banking. The share of the assets of national banking systems that come from other EU countries was rising before the financial and economic crisis of 2007, but went into decline thereafter in the context of a general retrenchment of international banking. Most recent data, however, suggests the decline has been halted. While a crisis-prevention framework for the euro area has largely been completed, the crisis-management framework remains incomplete, potentially creating instability. Most importantly, risk-sharing mechanisms do not adequately address the sovereign-bank loop, with a lack of clarity about the divide between bail-in and bail-out. To complete Banking Union, the lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance functions should move to the euro-area level.

Den senaste finanskrisen har visat att det finns ett behov av ökad övervakning av aktörerna på den finansiella marknaden. Ett sätt att förbättra övervakningen är genom att öka förståelsen för företagens affärsmodeller. Syftet med detta examensarbete är att hitta likheter i affärsmodellerna hos svenska kreditinstitut och hos svenska filialer av utländska banker. Mer specifikt syftar denna studie till att hitta grupper av företag, i denna rapport kallat kluster, med liknande affärsmodell och till att identifiera existerande affärsmodeller på den svenska bankmarknaden. Informationen som användes i studien är från årsredovisningar som rapporterades till Finansinspektionen för åren 2000, 2005, 2010 och 2013. För att möjliggöra en jämförelse mellan olika aktörers data har kvoter skapats utifrån deras balans- och resultaträkningar. För att reducera mängden data och för att få ett fåtal okorrelerade variabler användes principalkomponentanalys. Metoden som användes för att hitta klustren är en hierarkisk agglomerativ metod kallad Wards metod. Antalet kluster bestämdes genom att använda Calinski- Harabasz-index. Bootstrapping användes för att testa stabiliteten hos de identifierade klustren. Denna studie visar att mönster existerar på den svenska bankmarknaden och att det är möjligt att hitta kluster av företag med liknande affärsmodell. Svenska filialer av utländska banker och svenska kreditinstitut har studerats separat. För svenska kreditinstitut hittades sex kluster och för att beskriva affärsmodellerna kallas de: Universalbanker, Sparbanker, Leasingföretag, Icke inlåningsfinansierade kreditinstitut, Servicefokuserade kreditinstitut och Övriga kreditinstitut. De mest stabila klustren, det vill säga de med högst likhet, är Sparbanker och Leasingföretag. Klustret med lägst likhet är Universalbanker och detta bör ses som ett mönster i använd data snarare än ett kluster. För de svenska filialerna av utländska banker hittades tre kluster och dessa kallas: Banker, Servicefoku, The recent financial crisis has emphasized the need for improved supervision of the actors on the financial market. One way to improve supervision is through better understanding of business models. The aim with this thesis is to find similarities in business models for Swedish credit institutions and for Swedish branches of foreign banks. More specific this study aims to find groups of companies, in this paper called clusters, with similar business models and identify existing business models in the banking market. The data used in this study are financial statements reported to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2013. In order to compare the companies’ data, ratios from the income statements and balance sheets have been created. To reduce the amount of data and arrive at a smaller set of uncorrelated variables, principal component analysis was used. The method used for finding the clusters was a hierarchical agglomerative clustering method called Ward’s method. The number of clusters was determined using Calinski-Harabasz index. Bootstrapping was used in order to test cluster stability. This study shows that patterns in the Swedish banking sector exist and that it is possible to find clusters of companies with similar business models. Swedish branches of foreign banks have been treated separately from Swedish credit institutions. For Swedish credit institutions a division into six clusters was found to be most suitable and in order to describe the business model the clusters are named: Universal banks, Savings banks, Leasing companies, Non-deposit funded credit institutions, Service-focused credit institutions and Other credit institutions. The most stable clusters, that are the clusters with highest similarity, are Savings banks and Leasing companies. The cluster with lowest stability is Universal banks and it could be considered as a pattern in the data rather than a cluster. For Swedish branches of foreign banks, thre

Überlegungen, wie Wirtschaftskrisen in der EU künftig wirksamer bekämpft und die wirtschaftspolitische Steuerung im Eurogebiet verbessert werden könnten, kreisen oft um die Idee einer Lastenteilung: Wenn die Ressourcen aller Mitgliedstaaten zusammengelegt würden, nähme die Belastung der krisengeschüttelten Mitglieder ab. Die Schaffung einer europäischen Bankenunion ist Ausdruck dieses Denkmusters. Die EU-Kommission argumentiert, dass damit der »Teufelskreis« der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit von Banken und Staaten durchbrochen werde. Eine einheitlich organisierte Bankenabwicklung, so ihr Versprechen, werde auch den EU-Steuerzahler nicht belasten. Bei näherem Hinsehen wird jedoch deutlich, dass die Bankenunion diese Erwartungen bestenfalls nur teilweise wird einlösen können. In ihrer jetzigen Ausgestaltung kann sie die wechselseitige Abhängigkeit von Staaten und Banken nicht wirksam verringern. Auch die Nichtbeteiligung des Steuerzahlers an den Kosten von Bankenrettungen ist nur bei Abwicklungen von kleinen Instituten realistisch. Zugleich ist es irreführend zu glauben, dass die Vergemeinschaftung von Abwicklungsausgaben und die Harmonisierung der Einlagensicherung den EU-Bankensektor stabiler machen. Die Kosten von Bankenrettungen dürfen nicht auf die gesunden Banken bzw. finanzstabilen Mitgliedstaaten verteilt werden. Der Ort, an dem es besonders darauf ankommt, dass die Bankenunion funktioniert, ist die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, wo die Rückkehr zum wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewicht Priorität genießen sollte. Nur wenn die Staaten im Eurogebiet dauerhaft ausgeglichene Leistungsbilanzsalden (und öffentliche Haushalte) vorlegen können, wird die Abhängigkeit zwischen Banken und ihren Schuldnern wirksam gebannt sein und werden kostspielige Bankenrettungen überflüssig werden. (Autorenreferat)

"The regulatory agency responsible for prudential supervision of the banks in China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), is not an independent authority. The agency's regulatory actions are constrained by the central government, which has to balance the prudential and non-prudential consequences of bank regulation for its political survival. The conditions and limits of the government's influence on the CBRC is analysed through an investigation of three regulatory cases. The conclusion is that the CBRC's regulatory actions are determined by the relative importance of prudential outcomes for the government's policy objectives." (author's abstract)

This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB) control over bank supervision. Building on the concept of the ‘financial trilemma’, it argues that different bank internationalisation patterns in the seven northern member states explain different preferences on the transfer of supervisory powers over less significant banks to the ECB. In particular, the reach of internationalisation into a national banking system – notably the extent to which even smaller banks were exposed to foreign banking operations – is shown to be the core factor explaining different national preferences on threshold. In the five countries with a large number of small and parochial alternative (cooperative and savings) banks, it is necessary to examine the system-specific structures of these banks to explain better the reach of internationalisation and national preferences on the threshold. Determined German opposition to ECB supervision of smaller alternative banks is juxtaposed with either less hostile or more positive support of at least four other countries despite the important presence of small alternative banks.

This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB) control over bank supervision. Building on the concept of the ‘financial trilemma’, it argues that different bank internationalisation patterns in the seven northern member states explain different preferences on the transfer of supervisory powers over less significant banks to the ECB. In particular, the reach of internationalisation into a national banking system – notably the extent to which even smaller banks were exposed to foreign banking operations – is shown to be the core factor explaining different national preferences on threshold. In the five countries with a large number of small and parochial alternative (cooperative and savings) banks, it is necessary to examine the system-specific structures of these banks to explain better the reach of internationalisation and national preferences on the threshold. Determined German opposition to ECB supervision of smaller alternative banks is juxtaposed with either less hostile or more positive support of at least four other countries despite the important presence of small alternative banks.

Den senaste finanskrisen har visat att det finns ett behov av ökad övervakning av aktörerna på den finansiella marknaden. Ett sätt att förbättra övervakningen är genom att öka förståelsen för företagens affärsmodeller. Syftet med detta examensarbete är att hitta likheter i affärsmodellerna hos svenska kreditinstitut och hos svenska filialer av utländska banker. Mer specifikt syftar denna studie till att hitta grupper av företag, i denna rapport kallat kluster, med liknande affärsmodell och till att identifiera existerande affärsmodeller på den svenska bankmarknaden. Informationen som användes i studien är från årsredovisningar som rapporterades till Finansinspektionen för åren 2000, 2005, 2010 och 2013. För att möjliggöra en jämförelse mellan olika aktörers data har kvoter skapats utifrån deras balans- och resultaträkningar. För att reducera mängden data och för att få ett fåtal okorrelerade variabler användes principalkomponentanalys. Metoden som användes för att hitta klustren är en hierarkisk agglomerativ metod kallad Wards metod. Antalet kluster bestämdes genom att använda Calinski- Harabasz-index. Bootstrapping användes för att testa stabiliteten hos de identifierade klustren. Denna studie visar att mönster existerar på den svenska bankmarknaden och att det är möjligt att hitta kluster av företag med liknande affärsmodell. Svenska filialer av utländska banker och svenska kreditinstitut har studerats separat. För svenska kreditinstitut hittades sex kluster och för att beskriva affärsmodellerna kallas de: Universalbanker, Sparbanker, Leasingföretag, Icke inlåningsfinansierade kreditinstitut, Servicefokuserade kreditinstitut och Övriga kreditinstitut. De mest stabila klustren, det vill säga de med högst likhet, är Sparbanker och Leasingföretag. Klustret med lägst likhet är Universalbanker och detta bör ses som ett mönster i använd data snarare än ett kluster. För de svenska filialerna av utländska banker hittades tre kluster och dessa kallas: Banker, Servicefoku, The recent financial crisis has emphasized the need for improved supervision of the actors on the financial market. One way to improve supervision is through better understanding of business models. The aim with this thesis is to find similarities in business models for Swedish credit institutions and for Swedish branches of foreign banks. More specific this study aims to find groups of companies, in this paper called clusters, with similar business models and identify existing business models in the banking market. The data used in this study are financial statements reported to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2013. In order to compare the companies’ data, ratios from the income statements and balance sheets have been created. To reduce the amount of data and arrive at a smaller set of uncorrelated variables, principal component analysis was used. The method used for finding the clusters was a hierarchical agglomerative clustering method called Ward’s method. The number of clusters was determined using Calinski-Harabasz index. Bootstrapping was used in order to test cluster stability. This study shows that patterns in the Swedish banking sector exist and that it is possible to find clusters of companies with similar business models. Swedish branches of foreign banks have been treated separately from Swedish credit institutions. For Swedish credit institutions a division into six clusters was found to be most suitable and in order to describe the business model the clusters are named: Universal banks, Savings banks, Leasing companies, Non-deposit funded credit institutions, Service-focused credit institutions and Other credit institutions. The most stable clusters, that are the clusters with highest similarity, are Savings banks and Leasing companies. The cluster with lowest stability is Universal banks and it could be considered as a pattern in the data rather than a cluster. For Swedish branches of foreign banks, thre